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Bill Paton

Labour Export Policy in the Development of Southern Africa

LABOUR EXPORT POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Bill Paton



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This book is for the two 'Kens' whom I came to know while I was writing it. Ken became my teacher and my friend, and Kan became my love, and my wife

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Abbreviations, Acronyms and Glossary

AHM	Arquivos Históricos de Moçambique
ALGOS	Agência do Colocação de Trabalhadores para Africa do Sul
Batswana	Historically, people of Tswana-speaking ethnic origin Modern usage means citizen of Botswana
Basotho	Historically, people of Sotho-speaking ethnic origin Modern usage means citizen of Lesotho
BNA	Botswana National Archives
BSA	British South Africa Company
CO	Colonial Office, Government of Britain
CS	Chief Secretary
CSK	Comité Special du Katanga
DPMO	Deputy Prime Minister's Office
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa, International Labour Organization
fi.	Archival file item number
fp.	Archival file page number
FRELIMO	Frente de Liberação de Moçambique
GDR	German Democratic Republic
LBSC	London and Blantyre Supply Company
LC	Labour Commissioner
LNA	Lesotho National Archives
MLO	Mine Labour Organization
MNA	Malawi's National Archives
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance, or 'RENAMO'
NRC	National Recruiting Corporation
PC	Provincial Commissioner
prazciro	'Senhor' or owner of a *prazo*
prazo	Large personal estates granted to Portuguese settlers by the Portuguese crown
RENAMO	Resistáncia Nacional de Moçambique
RNLB	Rhodesia(n) Native Labour Bureau
RNLSC	Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SALC	Southern African Labour Supply Commission

SNA	Swaziland National Archives
TEBA	The Employment Bureau of Africa
thangata	Forced labour in lieu of taxes and rent in colonial Malawi
TNA	Tanzania National Archives
ulere	Nyanja word for 'free' referring to free transport service provided by the Southern Rhodesian administration to encourage incoming migrants
UMHK	Union Minière du Haut Katanga
Wenela	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, the recruitment arm of the South African Chamber of Mines, originally the Transvaal Chamber of Mines Sometimes 'WNLA'
WNLA	See 'Wenela'
ZANA	Zambia National Archives
ZINA	Zimbabwe National Archives

1 Introduction: Labour Export in Theory and in Southern Africa

It is a peculiar thing that a person should be electrocuted for crossing a fence to go to work, yet that is exactly what has happened to many labour migrants in Southern Africa.[1] A century ago, today's states did not yet exist in the region, and most territories possessed only fledgling administrations. The European men in their small colonial buildings lacked much capacity to even control border-crossing migrants, let alone electrocute them. Today we see their descendants – a mutually exclusive system of formally self-determining states with their own armies and currencies, and with more and more rigid control over people's movements among them. Worldwide, the legal barriers to the passage of the majority of migrants and travellers continue to thicken, with industrialised states clutching at legal straws and quickening the pace in their game of human 'hot potato'.

It has become quite difficult, in fact, to imagine the functioning of our modern state system were people freed to move. If the burning of the myriad immigration and emigration posts was somehow miraculously decreed, how many millions with their suitcases would manage to leave their own state and arrive in another? What would be the probable influx into Canada, for instance, with only 0.5 per cent of the planet's population but with 8 per cent of its land? Many of the benefits that citizenship of richer countries confers are only valuable because they have elsewhere been withheld – because the fence held out the poor. Governments are bound, after all, to protect the interests of their citizens. How many of today's governments would survive if they were perched upon the aspirations of those – all those and only those – who freely chose their jurisdiction?

It was not so long ago that this pent-up propensity to migrate was contained within borders. Many a European peasant a century ago did not yet conceive of her- or himself as a citizen of a nation-state, despite living in the birthplace of that species. European migrations were then dominated by those moving to settle in the New World – often assisted with their passage and offered land and tools by the

state. Certainly, few Africans in 1890 understood the nascent system of colonial bureaucracies to which they were being assigned. Formerly migrating in complex precapitalist patterns, their norm for early migration to work was to be sailed away in chains.

In the space of a hundred years, then, a system of states has been replicated over the globe, with each of us possessing the right to live and work in only one or two. The allocation of where people may live and work appears fundamental to this state pattern. The transformation brought about by my imaginary edict that burns the immigration and emigration posts would hardly be so great were the customs posts or foreign-exchange-control offices of the world to be burned instead. The state pattern contains primarily *people* and has become the foremost grid of socioeconomic inequality on our planet.

In the chapters to follow the reader is asked to consider the historical relationship between the development of the world state system and the development of control over people's movements. In Southern Africa the century of state system formation has run concurrently with the rise and decline of intensive labour export. An enormous amount of energy was devoted by ever-expanding administrations to gaining control over their labourers. The region is also the oldest large-scale example of circular labour migration and its once-large flows of labourers are likely to be relatively small by the century's end. The development process in which crossborder labour migration was so fundamental has wrought a pattern of now formally independent states, with still-tightening border control.

What is the collective impact of governments in controlling their citizens' international movements, maintaining people's positions on the lattice where so much inequality has grown? While in the broadest sense it is structural economic changes that propel most migrants' movements, their actual movements are increasingly determined at borders, at immigration offices and – worse – at emigration offices. Governments have devoted tremendous attention to the tuning of these instruments, for they in fact prescribe the limits of their own authority.

The work presented here traces the evolving labour-export policy of eight emergent states. While they are different, they are complementary, for all are part of a single regional economy and state system. The evolution in the orientation of those governing the development of states is parallelled by a sequence of orientations regarding labour export – a progression from the promotion of the metropolitan interests that spawned the original units; to those of internal employers;

to an eventual preoccupation with the particular interests of the new governments themselves. Paradoxically this increasingly independent outlook on labour export tended to bring governments together again at the bargaining table, where they could mutually improve labour control.

Global labour migration theory does not yet provide an adequate basis for understanding states' roles in labour export. Early theorization of the migration of labourers developed an emphasis on the individual decision maker as the determinant and greater economic equilibrium as the result. This was a positive vision of migration as a voluntary movement towards greater socioeconomic equality. From the 1970s a newer, 'stuctural' school began to insist that migration must be examined in the context of the history of relations between sending and receiving areas – in many cases the history of expansion into precapitalist economies. The migration process can often be shown to benefit the destination area's economy more than that of the sending area, thereby *widening* disparities. Despite the debates, the labour-exporting state's role was never adequately explained by either school. A dynamic understanding of the growth in exporting states' roles has been particularly lacking.

Southern African analysts of labour migration have gone further than most. Fuelled by the quest to understand apartheid, there has been an energetic application of the historical/structural method. The interconnection between the development of labour-importing areas and the underdevelopment of labour-exporting areas has been especially well documented. So too has the concept that migrants are maintained somewhere between domestic and completely capitalist production modes in order to keep their wages down. However, the focus on apartheid has tended to downplay the role of labour-exporting governments. Interest in the labour-importing government of South Africa has been intense, but much of the migration literature on the region tends to treat the labour-exporting administrations as unimportant auxiliaries. While the migrant-sending administrations are often documented as pushing Africans off the land and out to work, the tale of their constant preoccupation with controlling the supply of their migrant labour abroad has not been fully spun.

The general proposition here is that the evolution of the power to control labour flows among the jurisdictions of different territorial administrations in Southern Africa was of major importance in the formation of a regional system of states. My purpose is to clarify the evolving roles of labour-sending governments in controlling

crossborder migration. My hope is that the elaboration of the process in which they engaged may be a small contribution to our understanding of the origins and functions of migrant labour, and of states.

INDIVIDUAL/EQUILIBRIUM APPROACHES TO MIGRATION THEORY

Ravenstein can be credited with the first microanalytic approach to migration, emphasizing the individual's will to move in what became a tenet of the individual/equilibrium approach.[2] Weber touched on the subject of labour migration in a discussion on the principal forms of 'unfree' labour, slavery and serfdom, mentioning the movement of estate labourers to workshops as long ago as Byzantium.[3] The subject of immigration policy came up regularly, as in the US debate on restricting immigration in the 1930s,[4] but it was not until the 1940s that sustained interest in both cultural and economic aspects of labour migration really began. Margaret Read attacked migrant labour as undermining 'traditional' village life in Nyasaland.[5] Schapera described the migration of Batswana to South Africa in considerable detail from a sociological viewpoint.[6] Isaac published a work based on equilibrium principles the same year, looking mainly at settler migrations, including a chapter entitled 'Migration as a means of adjusting a disharmonious distribution of population'.[7]

Lewis' seminal article on dual economy in 1954 – the transfer of labourers from one economy to the other at a constant real wage, and exceptions – might be taken as the first general model of migration's role in accumulation, though it was more based on spatial labour mobility than addressed to it. Its major flaw was a failure to recognize the role of capital and state in creating and maintaining the dualism.[8] Lewis' work engendered the ascendancy of economic explanations of migration and the decline of cultural explanations. A good example is Gulliver's criticism of the 'bright lights' theory in Tanganyika (Tanzania).[9]

Lee took up the migration question directly in 1966. As with Lewis, labourers move from the rural economy, where their productivity is low, into the industrializing cities, where their higher productivity fuels economic growth – particularly as wages are slow to rise during a period of 'unlimited' labour supply.[10] Todaro's work best typifies the neoclassical school of labour-migration theory, which subsequently

began to dominate the approach. Dual economy was anathema to neoclassicists but, other than the difference between the 'two economies' of dualists and the neoclassical single 'flat playing field', many of the concepts were the same. Based on implicit income expectations, individuals make rational decisions as to whether to move to where they can increase their earnings. They trade off unemployed 'queuing time' with the anticipated difference in wages, thereby maximizing their total earnings over time and equilibrating the distribution of labourers, capital and material resources in space.[11]

Of course the microanalytical approaches that emerged both before and after Todaro were hardly homogeneous or harmonious. There was refinement and adjustment of the understanding of complex individual responses to migration choices: spatial approaches including the gravity model;[12] economic models with econometric formulas, cost–benefit models, and push–pull frameworks;[13] probabilistic approaches such as longitudinal mover–stayer and subjective emphases such as the 'family decision'.[14] Shaw provides a near-exhaustive bibliography and review of mainly individual/equilibrium approaches up to the early 1970s.[15]

The entire school is defined by two axioms: individual decision maker as determinant, and greater economic equilibrium as result. While the precise findings are diverse, the paramount assertion is that migrants' decisions to migrate or not can be demonstrated to be based chiefly on economic criteria.

There are two main weaknesses in this approach. First is an overall failure to adequately consider the less-than-purely economic basis for individual decisions to move, or the degree of coercion versus choice.[16] Given the extent of global economic disparities, why are migrations not of billions of people?[17] On the one hand populations' subsistence production can be undermined so as to leave little alternative to migration. On the other their movement is constrained by a preponderance of barriers, especially at national boundaries, that restrain movements and set terms for those who pass in a manner that blocks equilibrating effects.[18] Indeed conditions beyond individuals' control seem much more explanatory than their preferences or decisions. As it is put in a recent text on the history of migrants:

> I am interested in structure rather than motivation in that individual preferences can explain only why some people choose to make themselves part of a general phenomenon: they cannot explain the phenomenon itself.[19]

The second major weakness of the individual/equilibrium approaches is their inability to predict the outcome of labour migration. The proposition that labour migration as it occurs contributes to reducing economic disparities is not supported by the evidence in general, though it is doubtless true in particular instances. Equilibration might very well occur in a stateless, borderless world where migrants enjoy equal rights wherever they go. However in the real world this has not generally been the case.

Labour migration in the Southern African region has impoverished migrant-sending areas and enriched receiving economies. Globally and historically, labour power has been transported and deployed in economic spheres that were key to the expansion of the most developed economies. This process of labour movement has been essential to the success of new nodes of accumulation on the one hand, and has withdrawn labour power from supplying areas and thus undermined their development on the other. Labour migration, at least as we have practised it thus far, may even be wasteful of labour power; Linda Potts' recent volume on the global record of labour movements concludes that the economic losses due to slavery, coolieism, colonial forced labour and the brain drain were many times greater than the profits the metropolis drew from them.[20]

We should not, however, dismiss the importance of the level of analysis or the entire approach. Even if we disregard the prediction that migration will generally 'equilibrate' income, we should maintain an interest in the motivations and preferences of migrants. Good mathematical prediction of migration volumes can be achieved by modelling the economic basis of migrants' decisions.

We should also maintain an awareness of the history of the theorization process itself, in order better to understand why emphasis has been placed where it has. Equilibriumists were more open to history and structure before the emergence of structural approaches.[21] When historical/structuralists sought to discredit earlier theory – in order to advance their own – equilibrium theorists retreated into the laager of individualism and there followed an excessive association between each of the schools and their chosen unit of analysis.

HISTORICAL/STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL MIGRATION THEORY

The second major conceptualization of migration developed in the early 1970s from criticism of the limits of the microeconomic approach.

Samir Amin, for instance, began by asking why capital does not go to labour to establish equilibrium, material inputs permitting, and why the factors of production are poorly distributed at the outset of neoclassical analysis.[22] His work explored the underdevelopment of the West African interior as a consequence of 'structural' economic orientation to metropolitan capital's requirements. In Amin's view the coastward migration of Africans to work was an upsetting, non-equilibrating imposition on the indigenous West African economy. The colonists had a vested interest in the inferior administrative and legal status of migrants in order to perpetuate their exploitation.[23]

Throughout the developing world, migrant-sending areas were at least relatively and often absolutely impoverished by contributing their labour power to production elsewhere. Women were left to struggle alone in the fields while the higher cash incomes the men brought home were not invested in local development the way their labour power might have been. Even under the best of circumstances, temporary labour migration did little to reduce disparities. For instance, Suzanne Paine's analysis of Turkish labour export to Europe found that the impact of migration was far less positive than that of 'equilibration'.[24]

The realization that labour migration was rather more complicated than the efficient self-relocation of a production factor was summed up in 1975 in Abu-Lughod's 'End of the Age of Innocence'. Migrants were no longer to be conceived of as 'iron filings' or 'atoms', 'stripped of their cultural and temporal identity . . .'[25]

The historical/structural school fitted migration to most major historical theorization of underdevelopment: unequal development, dependency theory, centre–periphery theory and world-systems.[26] Analysis focused on either the explanation and developmental impact of migration in specific instances, particularly home economies,[27] or on global theorization – the historical position of migrants in the international economy.[28] A brief summary of the findings is due.

Local studies find that migration entails: (1) fundamental benefits for individual migrants and exporting governments, especially in the form of remittances and unemployment reduction; (2) serious negative social impacts on rural households and culture, particularly on women; and (3), long-term negative impacts on the development of the source economy due to the frequent decline of agriculture and disproportionate accumulation of surplus in the host economy. Quite a number of national studies have found that home-country governments have a real opportunity to regulate aspects of migration such

as foreign-exchange remittances in order to maximize positive effects, although the opportunities are often squandered.[29] In the short run there are definite economic benefits for labour exporting countries, with ambiguous and situation-specific 'net' losses or gains.[30] However, in the longer term international migration develops the 'host' economy more than the home's, thereby widening international disparities.[31]

Local studies also reveal how the temporary admission of foreign labourers can be politically advantageous to both host and home governments. Migrants from other countries often perform less desirable jobs, supplying low-paid labour to influential employers but lacking political representation themselves. National workers are often satisfied with such a system as it puts an underclass of aliens in the most vulnerable positions, bearing the brunt of cyclical economic downturns. As for the sending government, migration abroad relieves the pressure for more employment creation at home – even removing numbers of potentially disgruntled underemployed from the country.

Global studies have traced the correspondence of migrants or other quasi-free labourers – 'the new helots' – with periods of particularly rapid capital accumulation: from serfs or slaves to coerced labourers during the spread of imperialism, to today's systematic use of foreign labourers in industrialized economies, where they have only inferior rights. The international division of labour wrought by capitalism has consistently combined free and 'unfree' labourers.[32] Today's migrants are drawn from a widening pool of peripheral labour-supplying countries to follow capital through any global restructuring of production and accumulation processes. A good example is the migrants who have accompanied the flow of capital to the major oil-producing states since their cartel action in 1973.[33]

Overall, then, historical/structural theory of labour migration is characterized by a great variety of specific descriptions but with two universal tenets: migration must be examined in the historical context of the development of relations between the source and destination areas; and the overall benefits of migration for the source economy are less than for the destination economy, facilitating unequal accumulation.

Since the progress made by historical/structural interpretations, global migration theory and its debates have been disappointing. The major contribution of the 1980s has been a mere consensus on the lack of consensus, with scholars of both ilks noting the 'impasse', the 'clash of paradigms', or even the 'dialogue of the deaf'.[34] The difficulty that proponents of individual/equilibrium and historical/

structural approaches have in 'hearing' each other seems due to the extraordinary gulf between their levels of analysis, specifically from the difficulty of theorizing the relationship between the two.[35]

This book is theoretically quite historical/structuralist, but the approach's limitations must still be admitted. Weaknesses arise from a tendency to look exclusively at the impact of structures on migrants and not of migrants' collective impact on the structural forces they encounter. Bach and Schraml have satirized this vision of migrants as 'empty grocery carts, wheeled back and forth between origin and destination under the hungry intentions of world capital'.[36] Another writer argues that,

> in some theoretical accounts structures take flight in a way that is totally improper. Although the structure of a society is never one man's creation, it does grow out of many people's collision, collaboration and collusion. Social structures are not agencies; humans are.[37]

We need to extract a confession from the structuralists that the choices of prospective migrants are also a powerful force in the forging of structure – that the shape of structure is not a 'given' but rather a result.

Despite this sometimes too-narrow or too-static conceptualization of 'structure', the basic tenets of the historical/structural approach to understanding labour migration have proven correct. Labour movements are best understood as part of a global capitalist dynamic mobilizing a series of types of 'unfree' or less-than-equal labourers over the last 500 years. Labour migration, from its most coercive to its most voluntary forms, represents a part of the historical spectrum of 'unfree' labour that became important in the nineteenth century and continues to be a vital ingredient in the recipe for nodal capital accumulation today.

LABOUR EXPORT POLICY IN THE STUDY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

While global development of migration theory does not yet provide very fertile ground for examining labour export policy and the importance of sending states in international labour migration, study on Southern Africa – perhaps more than on any other region – has

made progress. Early development of labour-migration theory in the region fit well in the global pattern but the special interest in the study of apartheid drove things along a little further.

Early Southern African studies of labour migration were sociological/anthropological. As early as 1933 Issac Schapera was pleading for attention to the social devastation caused by large-scale male labour migration from Bechuanaland (Botswana).[38] The approach became more popular in the 1940s and 1950s.[39] The individual was already the main unit of analysis in such studies, which sought to depict the impact on 'traditional' life of migration to new formal employment. There was a good deal of sympathy for the hardships that migrants and their communities endured.

In the 1960s more economic and mainly dualist approaches emerged in the study of Southern Africa, just as elsewhere.[40] The unit of study remained chiefly the migrants and their decisions to migrate in a 'transition' from the 'traditional' to the 'modern' economy. The general conclusion was that labour migration 'represents an optimum allocation of resources under existing conditions'.[41] A bizarre variant was the 'backward-sloping supply curve' hypothesis in which labour supply was predicted to *fall* with rising wages because workers had 'targeted' an exact amount of savings before returning home.[42]

The starting point for an improved critique of the Southern African contribution to migration theory should be Arrighi's observation that economic development in Southern Rhodesia did not absorb underemployed labourers as in classical dual development but rather *created* a surplus of willing wage labourers.[43] The historical/structuralist school of labour migration, which subsequently emerged in studies of the region, was a great success, linking the study of industrial development with that of underdevelopment in rural areas. Within a decade there were hundreds of sources documenting how labour migration in Southern Africa has caused or exacerbated the underdevelopment of migrants' domestic economies.[44] These writers also explored the ways in which Europeans and their governments deliberately sought to undermine African agriculture and otherwise push the African population to supply more waged labour.

An initial increase and subsequent decline of African peasant agriculture in the nineteenth century was documented.[45] A host of measures had been introduced to protect European farmers against African competition, led by the taking of African land. Deliberate measures, especially taxation, were specifically implemented to stimulate a supply of wage labourers. These were the 'causes' of

labour migration and debate ensued as to the particular way in which to integrate these causes with various theories of capitalist development.

Economically, when large numbers of men spend long periods away from home, rural agriculture suffers. While the absence of smaller numbers might still sometimes be argued *à la* Lewis to have no effect on agricultural production, or at least no more of a reduction in output than the consumption of the absent individuals, larger numbers clearly reduce rural productivity. In Botswana, for instance, women were forced to take up the plough in their husband's absence. As young women received no training with draught animals and were already burdened with the larger share of domestic work, dry-land farming was much less productive. Discriminatory colonial practices favouring white farmers also reduced the return that migrants might have made from investing any savings from their wages in agriculture, and demand for new consumer goods rose instead. For many, wages earned afar soon became necessary to buy food, sustaining a cycle of underdevelopment and circular migration.

Socially, the absences of large numbers of husbands, suitors and fathers caused alarming increases in marital problems and the shattering of cultural norms for fidelity, family and children. Women left alone invariably headed the poorest households, and were often reduced to selling beer and other marginal activities in order to survive. Men in all-male compounds on mines and farms also suffered enormously, leading debilitating lives of too-heavy labour mixed with alcohol, prostitution and disease. In Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa the three-generation household became more common, with the middle generation partly absent working and one unmarried daughter often present with her children.[46] Migration, then, was a powerful phenomenon of household transformation.

What had emerged was that labour migration was not a trip to work from a traditional society but rather a whole social voyage – a century-long process of social transformation that resulted from the penetration of capitalist relations of production and facilitated unequal development – a concentration of investment, profit and reinvestment in a labour importing area. What emerged, in fact, was a complete new historiography of Southern Africa that has become the most important theoretical base for understanding the region today.[47]

One of the most valuable of Southern Africa's debates has been its version of the 'articulation-of-modes-of-production' thesis. In this

view, the South African state aided employers by managing the 'articulation' of the peasant and capitalist modes, protecting capitalist social relations in both the economic and political spheres where it imposed control. Cheap(er) labour could be obtained by maintaining male workers alone at their industrial work site, where costs of living were higher, and only allowing them to stay while they were working. Migrants were thus circulated back and forth between compulsory African 'homelands' and centres of accumulation and employment in the industrial economy. There is plenty of evidence, including widespread admission by mine owners, state officials and practically everyone involved that wages were in this way lower than they otherwise would have been.[48]

This detailed exploration of the reasons for circular migration in Southern Africa was occasioned largely by the special attention the analysis of apartheid had attracted. This has been useful in explaining the importing state's role in particular. The South African state, allied with white employers, helped a great deal to 'circulate' workers systematically between the work site and rural homes. An example that is relevant here was the role of the state in assisting employers to establish a hiring monopsony in the key mining industry.[49] Indeed many of the state mechanisms of racist South Africa – pass laws, 'homelands' and forced relocations to them, colour bars to higher employment – were all essential to the creation and maintenance of a labour-circulation system.[50]

However one of the weaknesses of the work has been the development of what is sometimes a 'too South African', even a 'too South African mining-oriented' approach to regional phenomena. Labour migration in the region was very widespread. The majority of migrant labourers did not go to work in the South African mines where the bulk of scholarly attention has been riveted.[51] Neither was the majority of international migration in the region historically even to South Africa – Southern Rhodesia was the largest labour importer. It was not until about 1970 that South Africa's tenacious hold on alien workers left it with a majority in the region, already well into the decline of international labour migration in Southern Africa, especially the decline of migration as a proportion of labour force and of population.[52]

Of course Southern Rhodesia shared important characteristics with South Africa. Both had a large, virulently racist white population, which attracted major international investment. Both founded their economic and political systems on white privilege. However every

country in the region was sending or receiving migrant labour – usually both – thus the phenomenon called for a more regional view.

The approach to these complexities was mainly to integrate multiterritory and non-South-African extraterritorial labour migration into a primarily South-Africa-based analysis. Interterritorial labour migration in Southern Africa was theorised into the political economy of South Africa or Southern Rhodesia and racist capitalist development – rather than the reverse. Legassick and de Clerq, for instance, get through an otherwise quite good article entitled 'The Origins and Nature of the Migrant System in Southern Africa' (1985) with only the scantest reference to supplier-country policy, and no reference at all to supplier-countries' internal policies, nor to migration to any country but South Africa. This is quite typical.

The dominance of the apartheid phenomenon in capitalist development on the subcontinent was applied to explain almost the entire pattern of economic development in the region. Migrant labour from other territories or countries was widely thought to be analogous to labour migrating within South Africa, from its internal forced 'homelands'. The difficulty with this, of course, was that the administrations of other territories could not be assumed to be so automatically allied with South African – or extraterritorial – employers. The assumption therefore had to be made that neighbouring states were virtually powerless – especially with regard to the control of their labour.

This 'too-South-African' approach to regional migration is part of a general problem in the study of the region. As Ronald Libby puts it, the odious nature of apartheid has made it unfashionable to even qualify the economic 'dependency' view of international economic relations in the region:

> Most writing and commentaries on Southern Africa fail to make [the] important distinction [between state action and the regional economy]. It is assumed that regional economic ties constrain state action to the point where there is little, if any, room for political strategies in the manipulation of economic ties to serve domestic and foreign policy objectives. It is usually taken for granted, for example, that regional economic relationships tend to strengthen the South African state regardless of the policies and strategies followed by the regime.[53]

Libby's book makes the point that even in Southern Africa's economically dependent states, political leaders possess an important

degree of autonomy with which they can implement policy in response to their domestic political and economic concerns. In fact Libby frequently uses examples of labour-export policy to illustrate his point: national governments in Southern Africa *do* make decisions that affect the regional economy and the South African economy.[54]

There are generally two views of historical labour export policy in Southern Africa. Firstly, administrations are shown to have been overwhelmingly implicated in the plan to supply labour to neighbouring territories for British accumulation, serving the British state.[55] This is particularly the argument for colonial Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi, where a good deal of early complicity has been documented. The second view is that migrant-sending administrations or governments were virtually powerless to control outflows of African labourers.[56] Again there *are* plenty of examples of administrations unable to control the exit of 'clandestine' or 'illegal' migrants, especially in the earlier decades of labour export. Much of the work, however, has concentrated on the South African gold mines' labour supply, using South African primary material almost exclusively. Such work has therefore not been fully attentive to the importance of the sending country.[57]

A useful variant of the 'powerless' approach to labour export policy is the 'barter' view. Mozambique is the classic example of the success of a colonial administration, in this case part of the Portuguese state, in selling access to African labourers circulating from their colonial territory. This is interpreted as negotiation from a position of extreme weakness by a separate colonial power too poor to be able to fully exploit the Africans they ruled, but with a residue of negotiating power that could be bartered for revenue and other concessions from the British Empire. Ruth First came closest to the idea explored in the present work with her chapter 'A Two State System', which describes agreements between Portugal and South Africa over the supply of Mozambican labour.[58] Most labour exporting colonial administrations under the British also traded migrant labour for concessions of one type or another, and negotiated to maximize their revenue from it – even from other parts of the British colonial empire in the region. A recent book by Wilmott James on the African labour supply in South Africa's gold mining industry devotes a short chapter to interstate relations, 1970–90. James suggests that in linking labour and the state we must not confine our analysis of state power simply to the individual state – we must also consider interstate relations.[59]

Turning to contemporary labour migration in the region, the most common interpretation of labour export policy is that neighbouring countries were, by the time of their independence, just too dependent on South Africa and its jobs to cut off the supply of migrant labour against their elephantine's neighbour's wishes. Indeed differentiating state action and regional economy was decidedly unfashionable. In fact, however, a number of labour exporting countries' governments dramatically cut off the supply of their labour. Most others bargained hard for the further controls, revenue, concessions and conditions they felt they were due. Where had this bargaining power come from, and how does it fit into an overall view of the role of emerging states in a regional labour-circulation system?

Approaches to explaining Southern African policies on labour emigration, then, are in my view still a little too simple and incomplete. My second proposition here, therefore, is that the overall importance of the policies of labour-exporting administrations has been seriously downplayed.

The lines on Southern Africa that delineated early colonial administrative units cum states were drawn in the late nineteenth century, just at the time when capital's demand for labourers on the subcontinent began to intensify. There followed a process of inducing migrant wage labouring, and prolonged bargaining over its allocation among these territories. Taxes, particularly, land confiscation and various forms of discrimination undermined the ability of Africans to support themselves from subsistence production, or to meet their new cash needs from cropping. Forced to migrate to work, they frequently crossed the new borders, forcing the new territorial administrations to try harder to control them.

The capacity to direct migrants was increasingly improved through tax systems, pass systems, identity cards, chiefly authority, recruiting regulations, other labour law, transport regulations and border control. The growing necessity of coordinating systems of control among different territories to make them more effective led to extensive bilateral and multilateral arrangements. This marshalling of interterritorial labour flows was an important part of the process of strengthening the capacity of – and differentiating the interests among – the various territorial administrations.

In colonial Botswana it must have seemed to many Africans that the new *goromente* (Setswana for government), *was* labour export management. The administration of their protectorate, located outside the territory of South Africa, was doing little else but labour-supply

administration – especially taxing the African population so as to necessitate labour migration to South Africa, but also regulating migration down to the district level and collecting the fees and taxes upon which it depended. The *goromente* was by far the greatest mechanism integrating human desire with structural transformation, compelling labour migration abroad and at the same time struggling to control it.

STATES IN MIGRATION THEORY

Migration theorists have devoted remarkably little attention to the development of the international system of states. Among the few directly addressing the theory of state and international labour migration, Burawoy has compared the importance of the migrant-importing government in the circulation of labour in both the United States and South Africa. In both cases the government is charged with maintaining the separation of the sites of labour's maintenance and renewal.[60]

The overall economic and political benefits of admitting labour on only a temporary, circulating basis are now widely recognized. But what of the migrant-sending state, and more importantly, what of states together and in formation? How were their powers and policies regarding migrant labour developed? There is little *dynamic* global theorization of state and frontier crossing at all.

In Southern Africa, as we shall see, most administrations either intentionally or inadvertently provoked labour migration to other territories right from the start of their tenures, and then determinedly improved their capacity to control such movements. Indeed the socio-economic disparities that provoked and exacerbated migration among territories grew on the basis of the emerging state system, requiring political bureaucracies to propel and control migrants' movements among states. 'State intervention gradually became the most effective obstacle to the international mobility of [humankind].'[61]

Many global theorists assert that labour migration has become 'demand-determined' in the era of 'surplus' labourers.[62] Indeed mathematical models matching migration volume to characteristics of the importing economy can have considerable predictive capability.[63] However, too static a model tends to overemphasize the demand side. Supply determination is inherently overlooked when only migration flows are studied and not their absences. China's nineteenth century

rulers, for instance, began sending out labourers in lots of 1000, or even 10 000, until it was decided to stop the practice in the early 1900s. Then, during communist rule, the government refused to allow labour migration abroad, indeed even to allow most citizens to *travel* outside the country. Now, in the last few years of Chinese economic reform, this has begun to change again, and the government is once more pursuing labour export much as was done long ago.

The strong demand-side perspective on migration overall reflects the prevailing legal concept that the human right to freedom of movement in a global state system is the 'right to leave' but not 'the right to enter'. To return to the imagery that pervades migration theory, Lucas compares migration to 'a flow of water or electricity' but sees the flow adjustment as responding primarily to economic 'pressure differentials at opposite ends of a pipeline', according little space to the role of the state governments.[64] Böhning adds a 'faucet' to the pipe – the modern labour importing government controlling the inflow of migrants. This improves a crude metaphor, but typically overlooks the control that is also exercised by labour exporting states.[65] Their willingness to permit, promote or prohibit labour migration to another country has also become quite an important condition for it to take place.

What are state-government leaders' motives regarding interterritorial employment? Writing of the modern international labour market, Böhning asserts that 'a state opens its borders to economically active foreigners only ... to promote the welfare and satisfy the wants of citizens', or 'migration is determined by two factors: the state as the representative of a collective will and the individual mover'.[66] In contrast Petras asserts that modern international labour-migration policy is formulated by state leaders 'charged with the primary responsibility of defending the interests of the dominant classes: of managing the affairs, of mediating the needs, of capitalism and the capitalist class'.[67]

This, unfortunately, is about as far as the global-migration theorists have taken us on the state, yet there has been a worldwide increase in the state role in controlling international labour migration.[68] Only state apparatuses can physically control border crossing, refuse migrants' dependents exit or entry, set maximum terms of absence, impose compulsory pay deferral on those away working and arrange automatic repatriation at the end of contracts. These powers were not gratuitously bestowed on governments. They are the product of a sustained effort throughout the twentieth century to develop the

capacity to control international labour movements, with an increasing emphasis on negotiations with other governments to establish better systems of control.

Who have the leadership of states acted for in regulating labour export? How powerful and how independent have they been? How has the orientation of leaders in formulating labour-export policy changed in the transition from late-nineteenth-century colonial Africa to the late-twentieth-century's community of African states? How has the orientation – and change in orientation – varied among states?

If the chapters to follow have any relevance to discussions of the state, it is to debates on state formation and autonomy. The debate on the autonomy of the state is one of the most profound in political science.[69] Even in defining the state there is such a close proximity between the questions 'what is the state?' and 'how does it form and function?' that it can lend itself to rather tautological predefinition.[70] For my purposes the state is the ensemble of apparatuses and practices within which is found a politically supreme authority of a bounded area, claiming monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and creation of law within those borders, and over representation of the area to the international community.[71]

The state's 'autonomy' refers to the independence of its leaders from the class that owns the means of production. Political and economic instances of the social formation are not arranged in hierarchy. In contrast the 'state-derivation' approach sees the state as determined in form and result by economic processes. Poulantzas awards the state 'relative autonomy' – independent of economic determination in formation but hardly in the final analysis of the exercise of power. A relatively powerful state is charged with such tasks as 'organiz[ing] the labour process'.[72] Many place the postcolonial state in a position of relative autonomy as mediator between the interests of different propertied groups or classes.[73] Though I find a static view of limited value, those controlling the emerging state apparatuses examined here have all developed very distinct interest in labour export – distinct from those of various groups of employers and from the emerging governments of other states.

By 'state formation' I am not referring only to the creation of an internal administrative apparatus and dominant power block. I am more interested in the global process defining a grid of states through the establishment of political 'boundaries', in their wider sense. This involves three distinct processes:

- continuity of the political order must be established within the unit;
- discontinuity must be established with the environment in which the unit is found;
- and rules must be established for the control of boundary crossing.[74]

The larger part of the colonial era, from the late nineteenth century until the rising nationalism of the 1950s, was characterized by an important coincidence between these processes and the desire to control labour migration. Labour migration control stimulated a large share of the bureaucracy constructed by emergent states in migrant-sending and receiving territories alike, especially taxation systems, local government and mammoth 'native affairs' and labour departments. The borders were marked, patrolled and sometimes fenced in order to marshall African labour. The first treaties were virtually all concerned with labour, while the first diplomats were 'labour representatives'. Gradually the emergent states developed the capacity to influence regional economic development through the increasingly autonomous control of migrant African labourers. This process was a driving force in the development of a distinct set of interests by those controlling the emerging governments of individual new states.

The work presented here covers the policy of eight emerging states on sending labour to others over roughly a century, thus there is not so much detail presented on internal state dynamics. However the primary concerns of state leaders regarding labour outflows are for the most part easily deduced from the policy they pursue, and from their frequent conflicts with other governments and internal and external employers. At times we can see clearly the impact of domestic political decisions on the international economy. What is most interesting is the radical gain in state autonomy with regard to labour export, over time.

Looking at Southern Africa, we can observe a three-stage progression towards autonomy in labour export policy making. The first orientation of administrations was an allegiance to the labour needs of the metropolitan state, or in the cases of company rule, to the company. The original colonialists were there to further the interests of the colonial government and economy, supplying as much labour as needed to colonial investments and acting in the interests of a colonial treasury.

The second stage involved primary orientation of the administration to the interests of internal capital in the making of their policy

on labour export. The metropolitan outlook had been eclipsed by the development of internal demand for labourers, with home employers loudly opposing the level of labour export. The timing of this stage varied as much as the rate of development, thus in some territories there was so little internal employment that the administration remained primarily oriented to outside labour demand until after the coming of unemployment.

This brought governments to a third stage of labour export, resulting from a regionwide 'surplus' supply of labourers at given wages and conditions – the long-term result of stimulating a supply of wage labourers. This 'surplus' of willing wage labourers freed administrations from the responsibility of allocating labourers among competing employers and it became possible to formulate labour export policy mainly with a view to those interests particular to the government.

Wherever government revenues and foreign-exchange balances were not critically dependent on labour export, policy in this latter stage became determined by the government's perceived political interests. In some cases postindependence legitimacy required a strong ideological stance against dependence on foreign jobs, while in others the government was more concerned to delay the political transformation that is accelerated by ending circular migration.

The 'autonomy' of the leaders of the emerging states with respect to labour export therefore grew in two ways during the century under examination. Firstly, their relationship to employers' needs became increasingly more symmetrical. Rather than subordinating policy to a hugely powerful metropolitan power, as at the outset, they soon shifted their primary concern to the needs of internal employers, as well as their own. Secondly, with the coming of labour surplus the states' leaders found themselves relatively free of pressure for allocating labour to internal employers and could act more self-interestedly with regard to labour export.

While unemployment freed state leaders from having to allocate migrant labour, the coming of a regionwide surplus of willing labourers was an event that favoured importing administrations in the bargaining process. They became less dependent on supplies of foreign labourers, and were blessed with a number of governments all vying for a limited number of jobs for their nationals. The South African government, for instance, was freed to pursue geopolitical and foreign-relations goals through their policies on foreign migrant labour.

However the advantages of labour 'surplus' for foreign employers and their governments was more than offset by the continued

improvement of home governments' capacity for control and their autonomy for action. Supply may have exceeded demand, but it was more and more difficult to secure supply without negotiating with a supplying government. The combination of government control, freedom of action and shifting relative advantage made for a dramatic new era.

To recap, then, the primary orientation of the labour export policy of those controlling territorial cum state administrations in Southern Africa progressed through three stages: (1) a metropolitan orientation; (2) an internal capital orientation under labour 'scarcity'; and (3) a focus on the administrations' own particular interests under 'labour surplus'. During this process the administrations developed increasing control over labour outflows, contributing substantially towards their definition as the nascent governments of future independent states.

This book undertakes to give a full account of the labour export management process, country by country. More or less the entire experience of each emerging new state's labour export policy is presented. Both the similarities in the administrations' behaviour and the individual quirks are sought. Tanzania is included as it was at one point marginally part of the Southern African labour-exporting system, and because its successful labour-retention policies and low levels of labour migration to other countries provide a good illustration of successful labour-retention policy. While an attempt is made to give the reader as much general context as possible for each of the eight countries – over the near-century studied – the focus is fairly narrowly confined to labour export policy.

Additionally, as complete a statistical overview as possible of total absenteeism is provided in Appendix 2, with graphs in each chapter summarizing the estimated proportion of each country's population working abroad. The data estimate the average number of workers working in another country – not including permanent emigrants – for as many years as reliable data and indications can be obtained, compared with *de jure* population estimates. The graphs in Chapter 10 compare countries and present the overall trend line. This is an attempt to conquer a wash of often conflicting or incomplete statistics, which has proved a barrier to advancement. The data are sometimes only approximate but give quite an accurate picture overall.

Taken together, the chapters demonstrate the importance of political policy evolution in the social transformation of the region, in which labour migration was so key. This, then, is the broad thesis advanced here – that the effort expended by Southern African administrations

better to control the interterritorial movements of labourers was important in their development into a system of politically independent states. Emerging governments developed increasingly separate interests in labour flows – yet worked more and more together to maximize their mutual control over them on terms of compromise. In a few spots, a barbed – even an electrified – border fence appeared, with governments on either side bargaining over who could cross and on what terms, a rather graphic illustration of the interaction of structure, agency and individual.

Notes and References

1. The South African Defence force switched on a section of electrified fence between Mozambique and South Africa in 1986, electrocuting six would-be migrant workers in one incident alone (Interview with Fidor Nassone, Agência do Colocação de Trabalhadores para Africa do Sul, Maputo, 29 June 1989). Part of the purpose of erecting the fence was said by the South African government to have been to prevent attacks by the armed wing of the African National Congress, waging struggle against their white minority rule.
2. Ravenstein, 1885, 1889.
3. Weber, 1947 p. 235.
4. See Taft, 1936.
5. Read, 1942.
6. Schapera, 1947.
7. Isaac, 1947, p. 70.
8. Jones, 1977.
9. Gulliver, 1955a. Bright-lights theory maintains that the attraction of big city life is a major cause of rural–urban migration.
10. Lee, 1966.
11. Todaro, 1969, 1971; see also Reynolds, 1985, p. 399.
12. Zipf, 1946.
13. Schultz, 1962; Winkleman, 1966.
14. Mincer, 1978.
15. Shaw, 1975.
16. Isaac's work concluded that individuals' migration aspirations were severely constrained by states: 'National planning involves not merely the suspension of laissez-faire as regards movements of trade and investment. It involves also the suspension of laissez-passer as regards the movement of men' (1947, p. 52).
17. Böhning, 1981, p. 33.
18. Burawoy, 1976, p. 1051; Zolberg, 1981; p. 4; also Zolberg, 1978, pp. 1–9; Marks and Richardson, 1984.
19. Cohen, 1987, p. 40.
20. Potts, 1990, pp. 223–4.

21. Brinley Thomas' conference volume on proceedings held by the International Economic Association is almost entirely concerned with the macrostructural implications of the connection between capital formation and migration flows considered in a very critical, if still equilibriumist light (1958). Amos Hawley developed a mostly structure-level equilibrium theory of migration analysis (1950, cited in Bach and Schraml, 1982, p. 322).
22. Amin, 1974, p. 85.
23. Ibid., p. 103 et seq.
24. Paine, 1974. On the one hand agricultural output and incomes increased due to new techniques and savings brought home by migrants; aggregate demand and output increased; and the balance of payments improved. But on the other hand skilled labour supply and agricultural employment fell; there was no increase in capital formation despite a marked increase in the rate of profit; and income disparities may have increased.
25. Abu-Lughod, 1975, p. 201, cited in Bach and Schraml, 1982; Lycklama à Nijeholt, 1987.
26. For example Portes, 1978; Gregory and Piche, 1977; Piore, 1979; Wallerstein and Martin, 1979.
27. Swanson, 1979; Kirwan, 1981; Pennix and van Velzen, 1977; Kerven, 1977.
28. Sassen-Koob, 1978; Chaney, 1979; Petras, 1979; Standing, 1982; Stahl, 1982.
29. Hadley, 1977.
30. Stahl, 1982, p. 38.
31. See Swanson, 1979; Sassen-Koob, 1978, p. 540; Power, 1979; Stahl, 1982, p. 55.
32. Cohen, 1987, pp. 2, 251–2. For others putting forth a similar view see Petras, 1979; Miles, 1982, pp. 159–62; Carchedi, 1979; von Werlhof, 1984, p. 138; Friedman, 1984.
33. Sassen-Koob, 1987; Sassen, 1988.
34. Pastor, 1985; Zelinsky, 1983, p. 19; Fielding, 1985, pp. 174–5; Bach and Schraml, 1982, p. 321.
35. Mitchell, 1975, p. 94.
36. Bach and Schraml, 1982, p. 324.
37. Weiss-Altaner, 1981, p. 145.
38. Schapera, 1933–4. See also Schapera, 1943, and his 1947 classic *Migrant Labour and Tribal Life.*
39. Read, 1942; Scott, 1950, 1954; Watson, 1960.
40. Mitchell, 1954, 1959, 1961; Houghton, 1960; Baldwin, 1966. Nattrass, 1976, is a lingering example.
41. Berg, 1965, p. 176.
42. Berg, 1961. There was doubtless at one time a grain of truth to this. Africans were often forced to take to wage labour in order to pay taxes, and sometimes, therefore, worked only as long as necessary to save enough cash to pay their tax. However it was a fleeting moment in economic history, and was exaggerated in order to justify wages as low as possible.

43. Arrighi, 1970.
44. To cite relevant sources from my card file under 'W' alone: Webster, 1977; van der Wees, 1981; Westmore, 1979; Weyl, 1980; van der Wiel, 1977; Wilkinson, 1985; Wilmsen, 1982; Winter, 1977; Wykstra, 1978.
45. See, for instance, Bundy, 1972, 1979.
46. Murray, 1980, p. 146.
47. See Wilson's classic on South Africa (1972); Bundy on South Africa (1972, 1979); Magubane on South Africa (1975); Lacey on South Africa (1981); Palmer and Parsons' important volume on Southern Africa (1977); Clarke on Rhodesia (1974, 1975, 1976, 1978); van Onselen on Rhodesia (1980); First's work on Mozambique (1983); Murray on Lesotho (1980, 1981); Massey on Botswana (1980a, 1980b, 1981); Booth on Swaziland (1981, 1986).
48. Wolpe, 1980; First, 1983; Henderson, 1980; Lonsdale and Berman, 1979. Beyond Southern Africa, see also two French authors, Meillassoux (1975) and Rey (1976). The theory provoked a great deal of discussion as to the class status of migrants. Were they to be peasants moonlighting as workers; proletarians with ties to the land; or – as one author attempted – a 'peasantariat'? (Parson, 1984).
49. See Johnstone, 1976; Jeeves, 1983.
50. Important references include Greenberg, 1980; Yudelman, 1983; and Lipton, 1985.
51. Workers from other countries have contributed about 10 million 'man years' to the South African Chamber of Mines by 1990 (7.1m from 1945 to 1975 according to the World Bank 1978, p. 45). Based on Appendix 2, the figure for the region as a whole would be roughly 48 million.
52. Up until the 1960s Southern Rhodesia alone accounted for more alien labourers than South Africa. There were 209 000 registered working in Zimbabwe in 1966, compared with 175 000 in South Africa (AHM-DSNI Caixa 55, No Processo no., Official Tables for Migration to Rhodesia, July figure; Caixa 48, File marked A/23/1/2 1960 & 1961. Numbers registered with curator in July). As there was a much higher rate of official registration in South Africa due to the mine recruiting, the actual gap between the two countries is undoubtedly much larger. While this underestimated difference of 84 000 is countered by South Africa's 117 000 from Lesotho, 45 000 from Botswana, and 19 000 from Swaziland, in 1966, there were many more in Zimbabwe as well, from Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and so on (Basutoland, 1966; Botswana, 1968, p. 2; Swaziland, Central Statistics Office, 1966). This does not begin to take account of the numbers working in other countries at that time, making it clear that South Africa only began to employ the majority of the region's foreign migrant workers from about 1970.
53. Libby, 1987, p. 313.
54. Libby, 1987.
55. For example Kowet, 1978.
56. Wilson, for instance, stresses the dependency of sending countries in his near-classic on South African gold mine labour supply (1972).

57. Yudelman (1983) takes more or less the powerless position in his work on labour on South Africa's gold mines, 1902–39. Jeeves (1985) also did not see too much importance in sending-country policy in his work, also on the South African gold mines' labour supply, and also for an early period – 1890–1920.
58. First, 1983.
59. James, 1992, p. 13.
60. Burawoy, 1976, p. 1074.
61. Isaac, 1947, p. 52.
62. 'Surplus' is the availability of more willing labourers than jobs at the prevailing wages and conditions. Shortage is a shortfall of willing labourers at prevailing terms. Some degree of shortage and surplus almost always coexist, with the most desirable employment invariably taken up immediately, while the most appalling jobs are sometimes even avoided by the hungry – who know that such employment will not provide relief.
63. For example Straubhaar, 1986.
64. Lucas, 1981, p. 85.
65. Böhning, 1984, p. 35.
66. Böhning, 1984, pp. 33, 47.
67. Petras, 1980, p. 174.
68. Lycklama à Nijeholt, 1987, p. 11.
69. See Gouldner, 1987, pp. 301–4; Smart, 1983, pp. 35–52; Carnoy, 1984, pp. 45–6.
70. Marenin (1987, p. 62) makes this accusation. See Vincent (1987, p. 3) on the 'considerable conceptual puzzlement surrounding the idea of the state'.
71. Though there is much room for argument in such definitions, there is little left for originality.
72. Poulantzas, 1973, p. 53.
73. For example Alavi, 1972.
74. Foltz, 1973, pp. 360–1.

2 Malawi: The Power to Control Recruiting

Malawi has historically contributed as much wage labour to its neighbours' development as to its own. At times during its colonial history the majority of its wage-earners were employed outside the territory, as were hundreds of thousands following political independence. The struggle to control this labour export has been a major formative activity of Malawi as a state – an outstanding preoccupation of its administration when its interests diverged from those of its neighbours and it evolved from colonial outpost to independent government.

Many a colonial governor in Nyasaland was frustrated by British apathy towards economic development in the territory. European plantation development and the processing of tea and tobacco for export were about as far as things went before independence. Investment in peasant production, which would have been necessary to boost development in an agricultural country, was never made.

Throughout both colonial and postindependence history, successive administrations have had to choose between using labourers for internal development or exporting them, painstakingly creating the capacity to implement their decisions. Taxes and other pressures at home forced Africans to seek work and thus look to better-paying employment outside the territory. When different demands for Nyasaland's labourers began to clash, London delegated authority over recruiting to the territorial administration – which had developed its own interest in the discouragement of emigration and the control of those who persisted in leaving. Thereafter the administration's chief tactic to manage the outflows was the banning and unbanning of recruitment for employment abroad.

The representatives of the administrators of the future Malawi by this time were sitting opposite those of their neighbours, and of Britain, and were negotiating as if they were already governing an independent state. Bilateral and multilateral labour-supply agreements were signed with the administrations and recruiters of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Northern Rhodesia and others. This was *the* major subject of interterritorial cum international relations throughout Malawi's history.

The on again–off again pattern of foreign recruiting was to last for 90 years. South Africa and Northern Rhodesia were both refused recruiting rights in 1898, and then granted them in 1903. Recruiting was banned in 1909, permitted again from 1935, suspended repeatedly during the Second World War, and then entrenched in new agreements in its aftermath. Following independence the government pursued a rapid expansion of labour export, along with trade, investment and diplomatic ties to white regimes. However in 1974 the government staged a massive boycott of foreign employment, the largest supply-side action in the history of Southern African labour export. The boycott was lifted in 1976, and recruiting continued on a smaller scale until it was stopped again in 1988.

SOME EARLY ACTS OF GOVERNMENTS

The arrival of the whites was watched by Africans in a land that was already in chaos. The people were suffering the effects of prolonged slave trading, invasion and raiding. The Yao had monopolized guns and depended almost completely on the slave trade to make their living.[1]

A British administration was set up in Zomba in 1891. The first proconsul was Harry Johnston, an energetic and pompous man determined to turn the 'paper protectorate' into a governed territory.[2] Almost immediately upon arrival Johnston applied a tax of six shillings per African man per year in order to alleviate 'labour shortage'.[3] Despite the tax, however, the local African population remained quite independent, growing vegetables or selling beer to incoming migrant workers in the major plantation areas rather than labouring for wages themselves. At one point the transport companies were stuck with 100 000 head-loads backed up at depots for lack of porters.[4]

At this early stage only a few had begun to go off through Western Mozambique to work in Southern Rhodesia. They had a difficult journey, being frequently attacked by locals or coerced into labour by the Portuguese, and for security they took to travelling in parties, called *ulendos*.[5]

The new administration swiftly applied itself to the management of labour. Labour regulations introduced in 1894 included clauses providing for the engagement of foreign labourers within the territory but no mention was made of labour emigration, which was still relatively low.[6] The outflow swelled over the following two decades,

migrants winding their way to Beira, the Rhodesian Railway, the Belgian copper mines, the Rand gold mines, and farms and plantations from Tanganyika (the future Tanzania) to the Cape.[7] The Germans were asked to stop recruiting across Lake Nyasa, to which they agreed.[8]

There was a great deal of white opposition to these new outflows. The *British Central Africa Gazette* began reporting trickery by recruiters for the Beira–Salisbury railroad and Natal sugar estates. Foreign employers were required to obtain permission to hire labourers and to cooperate with tax collectors.[9] British South Africa Company (BSA) officials struggled to control the situation, fining and imprisoning 'illegal' migrants, if they could catch them, upon their return.[10]

Planters inside the territory were soon unable to attract all the labourers they required as they were paying less than employers in neighbouring territories. They petitioned for a ban on labour emigration, a strict pass system and redoubled taxes.[11] The Native Hut Tax ordinance of 1901 contained most of what the planters had asked for, including the stipulation of one month of employment for a European if an African's tax was not to be doubled. As a result of the ordinance the south was inundated with job seekers the following wet season.[12] Only the pass system was vetoed by the Colonial Office.

Some of the main themes for a century of history in Malawi were introduced in the opening scenes of British colonialism. The new officers demonstrated the central importance of managing the African labour supply, while the British government started off by taking direct responsibility for the matter. White planters quickly discerned the difference between their interests and those of the British government. For them it would be a question of internal development versus regional development. Africans, too, quickly established their role for decades to come – resisting easy manipulation.

EARLY REGULATION

The first decade of the twentieth century found the Nyasaland administration caught between the conflicting labour demands of its own European settlers and those in neighbouring territories, and between the requirements of African production and the supply of wage labourers. At first the supply of labour to other territories was favoured by Britain, with the local administration's position wavering

among the various interest groups. But the conflict intensified and the high death rate among those recruited to work abroad prompted Britain to empower the Zomba administrator to ban recruiting, effectively prohibiting it from 1909 to 1934. London had found it necessary to resolve competing claims for labour by delegating responsibility for labour-export policy to the local administration, which then almost immediately exercised its new power to restrict the outflow as much as it could. The delegation of this power, subject as it was to continuing British authority, proved a fundamental step in the creation of an administration whose interests differed from those of the British government and other British administrations.

Once the South African War had ended in 1902 there was greater demand for Nyasalanders on the Transvaal mines, where supply from Mozambique and Rhodesia had declined with wages and conditions. With the support of the Colonial Office, the Rand Native Labour Association (RNLA) – in what would soon be South Africa – asked the Foreign Office for permission to recruit from various parts of Africa, including British Central Africa (the future Malawi).[13] When famine struck, the commissioner in Zomba recommended that the Foreign Office either immediately authorize railroad construction to provide jobs, or sign a deal with the RNLA.[14] The deal that resulted authorized up to a thousand one-year contracts from the famine areas and from West Nyasa districts, where labourers were most available.[15] A storm of protest from white planters followed negotiation of the first 1000 RNLA recruits. The wealthy plantation owners saw no need to openly encourage competition for their labour supply. At the same time the alternative view – that labour emigration could be a useful money earner – was gaining popularity among some whites in the administration.[16]

Rhodesian jobs were hardly the salvation they were made out to be. Of the 925 men officially recruited the first year, 124, or 13.4 per cent, died.[17] Before ceding jurisdiction over British Central Africa to the Colonial Office in 1904, the Foreign Office agreed that a further 5000 labourers from British Central Africa would be delivered to the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, but workers were increasingly reluctant to die for wages and the quota went unfilled.[18] Overall labour emigration continued to be much higher than mine recruiting.

The pressure on London to intervene more decisively was still


increasing. Bickering over access to British Central Africa labour was intensifying among those administering Britain's possessions, with the leaders of the administration inclined to try and keep workers home. By 1903 the administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia complained that British Central Africa's managers were forbidding its labourers to work in North-Eastern Rhodesia or Southern Rhodesia.[19] A High Court judge there asserted that '... a highly improper pressure is exercised by the Administration of British Central Africa to prevent the natives coming to NER'.[20] This was not yet conceded to be a territorial administration's right, for the various possessions were still thought to be administered for the good of Britain.[21]

Because of mounting British concern, the Foreign Office began to publish, for parliament, correspondence on the protectorate's labour emigration.[22] Seeing the enormous potential for African commercial crop production, particularly of cotton, the British resident representative in British Central Africa was quite frustrated with the Foreign Office's defence of labour export.[23] He flatly denied that migration was being suppressed, and then issued instructions to suppress it more quietly,[24] saying 'There are only two ways in which to deal with this established stream of labour emigration, the first is to recognize and control it, the second to ignore it'.[25]

In the midst of the squabbling a *modus vivendi* was signed with the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela), the Transvaal Chamber of Mines' recruiting arm, agreeing to provide men from the highlands during the South African warm season. Wenela achieved this coup by agreeing to ensure good working conditions, to defer payment of two thirds of workers' pay until their return home, and to otherwise ensure that the workers did indeed return home.[26]

By 1904 there were about 24 000 labourers working outside British Central Africa, amounting to 2.5 per cent of the population (see Figure 1). About half were in South Africa and most of the rest in Zimbabwe. Still seeking to discourage the 'illegal' outflow, British Central Africa's Native Labour Ordinance of 1904 imposed licensing and bonding on all recruiters and obliged migrants leaving the protectorate to buy passes.[27] In a now heated dispute with the administrator of the Rhodesias, Zomba's new commissioner, Sharpe, instructed his officials to demand that only pass carriers be employed.[28]

Migrants suffered quite bad treatment. During their trip across Portuguese Zambézia they ran a gauntlet of xenophobic attacks by Africans and were subjected to systematic extortion by the Portuguese. There were less than a hundred members of the British Central Africa



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 1 Malawi: estimated population working abroad

administration by this time. Africans must have had an increasingly negative attitude to these officers' attempts to prevent them from migrating, not to mention their frequent acts of extortion. The settlers, it seems, were worse. Africans working on estates were not permitted to grow crops, not even in their own time and on unused land. African women were frequently raped and the men were sometimes beaten and whipped.

The most infamous instrument of African oppression in Nyasaland was forced labour for rent, or *thangata*, introduced in 1904. Until 1952 many of the Africans forced to live on estates would be allotted eight acres by the white landowner. In exchange they were obliged to perform one month's labour in lieu of hut tax, plus another month's labour as rent. Planters were able to greatly stretch the two months by withholding their signature from tax certificates.[29]

The death rate of men abroad remained an appalling 16.6 per cent from 1905–6, and only half of Wenela's 1906 quota of 1000 recruits could be found.[30] Later that year a new Liberal government in Britain imposed a prohibition on recruiting north of 22° latitude.[31] Various ploys were concocted to get around the ban. The governor of the Transvaal 'recommended' that recruiting be permitted only until October so that recruits would arrive for the warm season.[32] The Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau set up a post at Fort Jameson to entice Nyasalanders across the border, and Wenela threatened to do the same.[33]

When the commissioner of British Central Africa came under heavy

pressure from neighbouring administrations to supply more labour, he yielded.[34] The diamond mines were abruptly offered more 'test batches' of workers than they wanted.[35] It was clear that the administration was not fully in charge of its labour policy.

By 1908 a new 'experimental' group of 1000 was approved for the Rand and a supply of 5000 arranged for Southern Rhodesia's new recruitment board. When 113 out of 774 died within seven months it was argued to the British secretary of state that this was an improvement. Another 4000 were approved.[36] This amounted to official approval of an annual death rate of 25 per cent and local planters seized on the issue to defend their labour supply from competing employers. When they organized the largest public meeting ever held in British Central Africa (by then the 'Nyasaland Protectorate'), it was the turn of an awed British government to yield.[37]

This was an important turning point. After such an intense struggle between local whites and British interests, the British government decided to cede control over foreign recruitment to the Nyasaland administration. Once he was no longer obliged to bow to British policy on the matter, the governor made his position against emigration clear:

> The principle governing the question of natives proceeding outside the Protectorate in search of work is that emigration is to be discouraged so far as possible, but that natives who have made up their minds to leave the Protectorate shall do so under Government control.[38]

Foreign recruiting was immediately prohibited in a ban lasting from 1909 until 1934. Nearly 1400 returning workers were fined in one year; a further 167 were imprisoned for leaving without passes.[39] This was thought to be causing labour shortfalls in Southern Rhodesia, and so a senior Rhodesian delegation visited Nyasaland to request 6000 labourers, but were refused.[40] Of course the Nyasaland administration was unable to control clandestine labour emigration at this point, and the proportion of the population working in Southern Rhodesia, and abroad in general, continued to increase (see Figure 1). The levels, however, were lower than they would have been had recruiting been allowed.

Nyasaland's Governor Manning asked the Colonial Office for permission to stop labour emigration altogether from 1912. He argued that Nyasaland would have a shortage of labourers even without

emigration, suggesting that recruitment be restricted to south of 22° latitude, a line which Nyasaland lay entirely to the north of.[41] A 22° latitude ban was introduced in Mozambique as well, and the following year the South Africa government took preemptive action on a regional scale and imposed such a ban themselves.

The most important moment in the labour export policy of these early decades, then, was 1909. That was the year that the local administration effectively wrested control over such policy out of London's hands.

FORMALIZATION

The Nyasaland administration lacked the resources to develop domestic alternatives to migration abroad. Both senior administrators and white planters realized that local development would make them richer than would sending Africans outside to work, but the small plantation economy could not compete for investment. Neither were the resources needed for greater internal economic development forthcoming from the British government, and so the small administration in Zomba was forced to capitulate. Making it clear that he would still prefer increased domestic development, in the 1930s the administrator of Zomba lifted the prohibition on foreign recruiting – after 20 years – and began to strive for a degree of compromise on labour supply to neighbouring administrations.

Migration grew steadily during the years in which recruiting was prohibited. To add to their burdens, by the beginning of the First World War Africans in the more southern parts of Nyasaland had also suffered a severe loss of land. Governors Manning and Sharpe were both 'pro-African development', at least compared with the British Colonial Office, and had made at least some attempt to reserve sufficient land for future African use. However nearly a million acres were lost to whites in the Shire Highlands alone, of which only about 50 000 acres were promptly developed. Many Africans in more populated areas were already forced to live on estates, and when Governor Smith took over in 1913 he showed himself even less concerned with African development than his predecessors.[42]

With the start of the First World War the question of African

development was put aside. Though independent emigration was temporarily suspended, the demand for army porters increased the overall labour-migration tendency. Because of prolonged fighting, Nyasaland was especially involved in the war compared with West or South-West Africa.

Satisfying the labour requirements of the Nyasa Field Force became the main wartime task of the Nyasaland administration.[43] District residents recruited thousands to carry food overland to Lake Nyasa – 169 000 carriers were added to the 22 000 other non-combatants and 19 000 soldiers. Taxes were raised in order to improve labour supply, and independent labour emigration was suspended. These measures were quite successful, an early indication of the administration's long-term potential for control.[44] During the war Africans suffered a great deal from famine, exacerbated by the absence of so many men as porters and by the high wartime prices for grain as the army bought up reserves. When the war ended the military released much of its maize reserves to feed the starving.[45]

Almost as soon as peace came, there were signs everywhere that ordinary labour migration abroad was on the return, especially 'independent' migration.[46] As of 1913 there were about 40 000 Nyasalanders working abroad – 20 000 in Southern Rhodesia and 18 000 in South Africa. This amounted to 3.9 per cent of the population. By 1921 this had risen, with an estimated 5.4 per cent of the population working away, mainly due to a large increase in migration to Southern Rhodesia (see Figure 1).

Various 'foreign' chambers of commerce and employer's federations, supported by their respective administrations, asked that Nyasaland's prohibition on recruiting be lifted. However only a single recruiting pass was issued from Zomba in the period 1909–31, for 5000 labourers for the Trans-Zambezia Railway to which the protectorate's administration was financially committed.[47] Sena Sugar Estates in Mozambique asked to recruit inside Nyasaland in 1924, adroitly arguing that increased sugar production would increase traffic on the railroad and alleviate Nyasaland's financial burden of subsidizing it. The governor checked first with the secretary of state for the colonies in London, and then refused.[48]

Independent migration was still 'discouraged but permitted'. A Protectorate Standing Order required those artless enough to confess their intention to stay away for two years or more to pay tax in advance. Anyone confessing they were Transvaal-bound was refused a pass and threatened with punishment.[49] Those heading for the Congo

Free State and Katanga were to be discouraged as well, while anyone off to Sena Sugar Estates in Mozambique was told that the Nyasaland/Zambézia agreement had ended and was sternly warned of the dangers.[50] Only independents passing through Western Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia received any assistance. Following trilateral negotiations, a supervisor was appointed to run ferries across the Zambesi and to protect them against attack.[51]

By this time there was a growing call from several British protectorates for Nyasaland to redefine its labour policy. In response, after studying the Kenyan example of inducing Africans to work at either export crops or jobs, the governor of Nyasaland commented:

> Conditions in this Protectorate obviously differ greatly from those in Tanganyika and Kenya, and our problems and policy differ accordingly. For many years the problem in this Protectorate has been not so much to induce the native to work as to induce him to work in the Protectorate.[52]

'Containment', then, was still the main issue. Of course the most constructive way to retain labourers was to preserve African land tenure. By the early 1920s measures were being taken to restore land to Africans, to the extent of freehold land in non-African hands falling from a high of 15 per cent by the end of the giveaway in the 1890s to less than 4 per cent by the 1950s.[53] This alone, however, was far from enough to stop labour outflows, and was more than a little contradictory given the heavy taxes being imposed in a territory with so little employment.

Recruiting Resumes

It had become steadily more apparent that limited European plantation development was the extent of the protectorate's economic future. Without investment in peasant agriculture – feeder roads, agricultural extension and services – there was little hope of boosting exports and internal development.

By December 1929 the governor of Northern Rhodesia was worried that South African recruiters might be allowed into Nyasaland, cutting into the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt's supply of labourers.[54] As the copper mines' labour needs grew increasingly urgent, even white opinion in Nyasaland shifted in favour of allowing the Northern Rhodesians to recruit. Following the regional trend, labour emigration

had been growing more slowly during the 1920s. Planters were feeling so secure, with their huge supply of labourers, that they were not too concerned if some went to Northern Rhodesia. However most senior policy makers and persons of influence continued to defend internal development prospects from any new labour drain, confident that more labour would be needed in the future.[55]

This conflict between Britain and Nyasaland's development priorities might have escalated to more open confrontation had the Depression not turned the tables. By late 1931 the supply of labourers in the copperbelt greatly exceeded demand and recruiting had been suspended as superfluous. The chief secretary and others in the Nyasaland administration were beginning to realize that they might never be given the resources needed to develop Nyasaland as they would like. The secretary juxtaposed two alternatives for Nyasaland development: either they would have the resources to foster African agriculture, not currently forthcoming from London, or Africans would have to be sent away to work.[56]

African desperation to find jobs mounted further, until the governor of Nyasaland finally reversed his stance and informed the British colonial secretary that he was '[no longer] in favour of irksome restrictions on the movements of natives'. New tax and pass arrangements were implemented, which the Northern Rhodesians believed would make matters easier for emigrants.[57] Taking obvious pleasure in this role reversal, the director of the Northern Rhodesian Labour Association assured Nyasaland's chief secretary that they would continue to accept Nyasaland workers once the Depression was over.[58]

It was now only a matter of time before a crack appeared in the recruiting ban itself. A Rhodesian firm was finally permitted to recruit 100 men in 1934, and foreign recruiting was rapidly reestablished.[59] The government of Southern Rhodesia agreed to create a department to supervise the placement and repatriation of Nyasaland workers, as well as the collection of Nyasaland taxes and voluntary deferred pay. They would receive labourers delivered by the London and Blantyre Supply Company (LBSC), which would recruit men in Nyasaland's northern province for Rhodesia and South Africa.[60]

These decisions must have been taken with great trepidation. The governor was all too aware of the validity of the antimigration arguments that would be raised. He himself had recently described the protectorate as a 'dead ground' due to excessive labour migration.[61] Growing labour migration, both inside and out, was having dramatic

social effects. From 1925, women who lived on European estates were forbidden to marry men who lived off the estate, causing a severe separation of the sexes. Men and unmarried adult women were still obliged to perform *thangata*, which could sometimes still be stretched by exploitive landlords to last five or even eight months a year. At the same time women's ability to earn cash was slipping and the administration would soon exempt all women from taxes, fitting in well with the plan to have men do the migrating.[62]

The Depression spurred emigration to one of its two historic peaks. From 1921 to 1931 there had been a slow rate of increase, reaching 75 000 migrants or an estimated 4.7 per cent of the population working outside the protectorate. However, by 1935 Nyasaland migrants in Southern Rhodesia alone numbered 75 000, and the estimated emigrant total of 120 000 amounted to 7.5 per cent of the population (see Figure 1).

Forced into the role of a mere labour-camp manager, the governor could at least exploit competition for Nyasaland labourers among his peers. The Rhodesians had become nervous about the LBSC's supply to the Rand, suggesting that if Wenela would agree 'not to pursue any active measures to obtain labour from Northern Rhodesia of Nyasaland', they would offer South Africa 20 000 recruits per year from Barotseland in their own territory.[63] The governor played his cards well, writing to the Colonial Office:

> Now as regards natives going to the Rand – Southern Rhodesia hate the idea of any regulation of the labour from here because it means that it will cost them more and that they will no longer be able to grow rich at our expense. . . . I would much rather see our natives working in Southern Rhodesia than in the Union (though the conditions in the Union are probably far better) but I am definitely glad to see the Rand making a bid for our labour because it is the one weapon that I have with which to threaten Southern Rhodesia if the people there will not play the game.[64]

The LBSC was granted an experimental three-year monopoly on recruiting and permission was given for 2000 test recruits to be supplied to Southern Rhodesia and the Rand.[65] This time the British Colonial Office was not fully consulted, but it urged from afar that the Rand supply be treated with care and that 'active' recruiting or 'offering inducements' should not be permitted.[66]

THE LACEY REPORT

As the administration's scope for resistance to labour export narrowed, the evils of extended labour migration were spotlighted by an official report. The prohibition of labour migration to other territories was considered impossible, and so it was recommended that the *control* of such migrants be made the focus, especially through multilateral negotiations on interterritorial systems.

A Nyasaland-commissioned enquiry into migrant labour in 1936 published a report that was highly critical of the evils of foreign employment, even condemning Nyasaland's pass system as a 'complete failure'.[67] A host of abuses were catalogued, mainly relating to corrupt recruiters, transporters and employers – and officials who exploited the migrants in a myriad of ways. *Machona*, those who never returned, were thought to represent 20–30 per cent of all those going abroad.

The committee responsible for the report called their work an emergency measure to reveal how:

> this uncontrolled and growing emigration [brings] misery and poverty to hundreds and thousands of families and that the waste of life, happiness, health and wealth [is] colossal.[68]

The report suggested that the Nyasaland government obtain financial compensation for its labour export, which could be placed in a native trust fund to promote economic alternatives within the protectorate.

The fact was that the standard of living for Africans had fallen abysmally low. In some districts the infant mortality rate was 60 per cent. Taxes were high, the local alternatives to labour migration were unattractive, and many members of the European 'civil service' were apparently demoralized by what they knew they were doing to the population.[69]

Since the complete prohibition of labour emigration was considered impossible, the preferred option was to sharply increase control in order to obtain more financial compensation for labour export. The establishment of a labour department was recommended, which could then negotiate commitments by neighbouring territories to administer pay deferral, collect taxes and ensure that migrants carried passes.[70]

Southern Rhodesia was to be asked to form a recruiting agency like Wenela, 'so that the interests of Nyasaland natives may be adequately protected'.[71]

On the question of African rights, the Colonial Office claimed to favour freedom of choice.[72] The Foreign Office agreed and suggested Tanganyika-style voluntary identification certificates, unlinked to taxes so that Africans would have no reason to avoid them.[73] The governor, however, asserted some independence and responded that 'protection of the community was of primary importance rather than the interests of the individual', forsaking Africans' 'right to work abroad'.[74] Thereafter the right to work abroad – at least legally – would be more clearly a privilege extended at the administration's discretion.

MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Having lifted the prohibition on recruiting at a time of heavy concern about the effects of emigration, the administration followed the advice of the Lacey Report and took to the bargaining table. The objective was to create multilateral systems of documentation and general migrant control that would be more effective than unilateral measures. The basic principles were that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would allow recruiting in exchange for revenue and cooperation on controlling migrants' movements, and that Southern Rhodesia would have first call on Nyasaland labourers. These multilateral control systems are one of the best examples of how territories functioned together to control labour.

Migrants working abroad numbered an estimated 7.5 per cent of the population by the mid-1930s and there was tremendous lobbying for interterritorial labour control.[75] Planters, in particular, were continually clamouring for labourers to be retained within the protectorate. However the British government still stressed metropolitan capital's requirements in neighbouring territories, cynically arguing that the outflow was uncontrollable and that recruits had a right to go away to work. The governor of Southern Rhodesia was particularly anxious that Nyasaland should not prohibit migration.[76] Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia began talks immediately, and signed a 'provisional agreement' in August 1936.[77] The agreement, however, was

discovered to be unenforceable because by the time most illegal migrants returned home they were no longer liable to prosecution.[78]

Next, in September 1936, the governments of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias signed the Transvaal Agreement with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. Subject to the approval of the secretary of state and the completion of a successful Rand experiment with 1000 Barotse workers, the Chamber's gold mines were to be permitted 10 000 recruits per year from Southern Rhodesia's Barotseland and 2000 more from Nyasaland. Estimates were to be made of the labourers available in the three territories once Southern Rhodesia's demand for foreign migrants had been satisfied. In return the Chamber of Mines agreed to take no steps to encourage independent migration from the three territories until at least 1938.[79]

Nyasaland and the Rhodesias then signed a firmer Salisbury Agreement, or Tripartite Agreement, guaranteeing each other first access to each other's surplus labourers and making passes mandatory for entry into all three countries in order to further mutual control.[80] Things were more settled thereafter but a good deal of bickering continued among the respective labour officials.

Wenela eventually won the right to set up recruiting facilities inside all three territories in 1938, and its Nyasaland quota was raised from 2000 to 8500.[81] It consented to remit deferred pay to the Nyasaland Treasury, which held and then returned the funds to Wenela for payment to workers, without interest.[82] Southern Province employers in Nyasaland caused an enormous ruckus over the higher quota, forcing the governor to promise to set up a Nyasaland *ulere* – or free lorry transport – for incoming migrants if it became necessary, but nothing was ever done.[83]

The third combination to begin negotiating over multilateral control of labourers was the administrations of Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian officials approached their counterparts in Tanganyika, who, as they represented a labour importing territory, stated firmly at the outset that they would 'look with considerable suspicion' on any curtailment of workers' movements.[84] Back in 1936 the Tanganyikan administration had agreed to join in the spirit of the Tripartite Agreement and require passes from Nyasalanders entering their territory.[85] Nyasaland, however, continued to stall a recruiting permit for Tanganyika's Lupa goldfields until negotiations eventually collapsed.[86]

By this time *inflows* into Nyasaland had also become huge. The Lomwe from northern Mozambique had been entering as refugees,

settlers and labour migrants since the turn of the century. Numbering 235 000 by 1931 and swelling to 580 000 by 1945, they were becoming the southern region's largest ethnic group, supplying southern planters with labourers more cheaply than would otherwise have been possible.[87]

The Second World War and its Aftermath

The outbreak of the Second World War provoked furious new rounds of negotiations on labour supplies. Recruitment and the issuing of identification certificates to independent migrants were impulsively suspended by Nyasaland in September 1939, and then reinstated five weeks later.[88] Wenela approached the secretary of state for the colonies to speed approval of its request to recruit 15 000 in Nyasaland, but the Colonial Office decided to preserve some labour in Nyasaland in order to encourage food production for the war effort.[89] Wenela's response was to begin recruiting Nyasalanders in Johannesburg, refusing to pay fees for these since they had found their own way to the 'Golden City'. In response, Nyasaland's labour commissioner threatened that this would affect the renewal of Wenela's recruiting permit within Nyasaland.[90]

By mid-1942 9000 Nyasaland men figured in a total of 91 500 African troops.[91] Exasperated with its small quota Wenela threatened to close its recruiting facilities in the Nyasaland protectorate, which were used by the army there, if it was not at least allowed to use the stations to channel Portuguese recruits. Nyasaland agreed, without bothering to consult the Portuguese, stipulating only that Wenela could not entice Africans from Mozambique to cross the border.[92] With fluctuating army labour demands, Wenela's access to Nyasaland labourers was reinstated, suspended again, and then renewed once more in 1943 when military recruiting ended.[93]

The estimated number of labour migrants working abroad surged a little during the war to about 130 000, of whom 88 000 were in Southern Rhodesia and 31 000 in South Africa. This amounted to about 6 per cent of the population. There was a small dip after the war, to about 120 000 in 1946, or 5.2 per cent of the fast-growing population, and then down to 4.8 per cent by 1950 (see Figure 1).

After the war ended the governor of Nyasaland sought to renegotiate both the Tripartite Agreement with Southern Rhodesia, which had been informally extended during the war, and the Transvaal Agreement.[94] Recruitment of 5000 men for South Africa was reauthorized

in September 1945, and the full quota was hired within three months. Another permit was signed, raising the total number of men who could work in South Africa at any one time to 8500.[95] The governor did not have much support for this, his own chief secretary being among those opposed:

> Mr Gemmill [the Wenela manager] makes much play of the amount of money remitted to Nyasaland, more must be spent by the labourers on 'truck' in South Africa and the argument 'leaves me cold'. It is bad money, spent on rubbish by silly native women. And he tells us that we could not stop clandestine immigration, that I do not believe. A little 'live' police work and strictness by magistrates on returning natives who have broken the law would soon have an effect.[96]

The earning of wages and the cash purchase of goods had become a dominant activity in most of the villages touched by labour migration. Though there were many more consumer goods in such places, it was by no means obvious that villages earning cash wages were better off than those without. Diet was not improving, women and older people were being left to do more of the hard physical labour, and farming was declining in popularity. Villagers in many less-developed areas were thought to be losing morale, with returned migrants pessimistic – even despondent – about their economic future.[97]

The governor appeared to be not so much regulating 'inevitable' labour migration as actively promoting it, especially considering that more control was widely thought to be possible. The governor's internal popularity was suffering as a result. Planters still wanted wages to be kept as low as possible by discouraging emigration, and the white population in general was disappointed with the low levels of internal economic development.

In 1947 Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland signed a major new Tripartite Agreement providing for organized recruitment of Nyasaland workers for the Rhodesias, and uniform, reciprocal labour migration arrangements overall. Contracts were for two years and included free transport, medical examinations and arrangements for regular remittances to families. The two Rhodesias agreed that no Nyasaland African would be employed in the Rhodesias without an identity certificate, and a network of labour offices was formed in the three territories for the handling of remittances and deferred pay.[98] The Rhodesian Native Labour Supply

Commission (RNLSC) was given a permit in 1948 to recruit 10 000 labourers in Nyasaland's Northern and Central Provinces, ignoring the RNLSC's preference for nearby Southern Province. Upon appeal the RNLSC was allowed at least passive operations in a part of Southern Province, hiring only those who presented themselves to their offices, with advertisements or 'runners' (recruiter's helpers) not allowed.[99]

The multilateral era, which had begun in 1937, did appear to be working however. The number of migrants working outside both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia had been falling since the first Tripartite Agreement had been signed (see Figures 1 and 2) due to a significant increase in administrative control. For instance, when famine first broke out in populous Blantyre district in 1949, the government decided to extend the closed season for Wenela recruitment in order to keep men home for planting. Identity certificates to leave the protectorate independently were also withheld, something that would have had little effect before multilateral controls were introduced.[100]

The administration was now growing concerned for its political image among migrants abroad, fearful of a nationalist uprising over its famine policy. Nyasaland was described as the 'slum' of the empire, with its minimal social expenditure and underdeveloped infrastructure.[101] News reports were severely censored in order to prevent absent Nyasalanders from learning too much about the famine, and the governor of Southern Rhodesia soon suggested that the starving *needed* Rhodesian jobs to earn money for food. If Nyasaland would allow the RNLSC to recruit in Southern Province, Southern Rhodesia would accept some dependents and pay Nyasaland a commission. It was a deal, beginning with a thousand men and their families.[102] Nyasaland then granted the RNLSC a permit for 8000 two-year contracts in 1950. This was similar to Wenela's 10 000 contracts for 12–18 months.[103]

Although the Nyasaland administration had given in to the RNLSC during the famine, most leading figures were appalled at the underdevelopment of Nyasaland under labour export and still wished to discourage it. A confidential survey of 'African policy in Nyasaland' in 1950 concluded that 'Economic development will be prejudiced unless a greater proportion of its man-power is retained'.[104]

At the same time things were settling down amongst the four administrations. All Northern Rhodesian labour officers were granted the power to extend the validity of Nyasaland identity certificates, a power that would soon also be granted to Southern Rhodesian

native commissioners.[105] Cooperation on control could hardly have extended further than this – having another administration apply Nyasaland law.

Nyasaland labour representatives were now posted in both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa – Malawi's first diplomatic representatives abroad. Their work regarding permits, passes and remittances was the forerunner of modern diplomatic missions. The three emerging governments were together administering one labour-control system.

FEDERATION

Federation of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias further entrenched a multilateral system of migrant control, integrating Nyasaland into the federal economy as primarily a labour reserve. Indeed the installation of tripartite labour control had been a crucial step towards the federation process. No sooner had federation been established, however, than surpluses of labour for hire became increasingly common and labour emigration from Southern Province began to boom. With internal pressure on wage-labour supply lifting, the Nyasaland government's posture shifted rapidly from a reluctant supplier of labour to an aggressive labour exporter.

Despite widespread African opposition, federation with the Rhodesias was imposed in 1953 and was destined to last a decade. African Nyasalanders quite correctly saw the large white population in the Rhodesias as a threat to their eventual independence, and felt that their small protectorate – accounting for only 5 per cent of federation domestic product – would be in a weak position.[106] Northern Rhodesia's subsequent request for permission to recruit in Nyasaland was a delicate matter:

> The request puts us in some difficulty since one of the major objections voiced by Nyasaland Africans against Federation, and one which we did our best to refute, was that, if Federation came about, the Protectorate would come to be regarded as little more than a labour reserve for the other two members of the Federation. If, at this early stage, we now proceed to provide facilities for the establishment of further recruiting organizations, they may well claim

> that their fears are already being realized. For this reason we feel that it might be politically embarrassing to make any move, at any rate for the present.[107]

Nyasaland's labour-policy makers were beginning to consider Africans as a political force. The *thangata* system was finally modified in 1952 to give most tenants the right to pay their rent in cash instead of labour. This was a relief to some, but many peasants were still farming under much the same conditions as they had in 1904 when *thangata* was first introduced. A typical village used several kinds of soil to plant tobacco and maize, as well as sorghum, beans, pigeon peas and cassava. When the rains failed – which they frequently did – only the sorghum and cassava ensured survival.

The first serious attempts to assist African agriculture were made at the beginning of federation. European agricultural specialists designed plans for African resettlement, hut concentration and land consolidation, which were implemented on a modest scale with varying success. New crops, and techniques such as contour ridging, were successfully introduced. The effort, however, was grotesquely disproportionate to the enormous damage that had been done over three to four generations.

Nyasaland's economic situation was still quite bad. The economy had a large subsistence sector with persistent weather and pricing problems in producing exports for Britain. There was little manufacturing, a small internal market, a large annual administrative deficit, inadequate internal transportation, and of course the constant absence of a large proportion of the territory's able-bodied men.[108] The Nyasaland African Congress's fears that federation would underdevelop Nyasaland soon appeared to be confirmed by the federal choice of a new dam site at Kariba in Southern Rhodesia instead of the Shire River site in Nyasaland.[109] Over 10 000 Nyasaland workers migrated west to work on Southern Rhodesia's new dam.[110]

The Nyasaland government was still far from satisfied with the effectiveness of its control mechanisms and passed the African Emigration and Immigrant Workers Act of 1954, requiring Africans to obtain identity certificates or travelling permits in order to leave Nyasaland, or for Rhodesian Africans to enter, and for workbooks to be presented on demand.[111] Provisions were made for the encashment of remittance stamps and deferred pay for migrants in the Rhodesias.

Labour emigration was again increasing faster than population. After a steady fall under the Tripartite Agreement, it began to rise

in about 1950 and continued to increase for more than two decades. Whereas 143 000, or 4.8 per cent of the population, were working abroad in 1950, this had increased to 240 000, or 6.3 per cent by 1963. The majority were still heading for Southern Rhodesia as federation began, but the fastest growth in emigration was to South Africa.[112] Overall this was part of a steady climb in Malawians working abroad, from about 4.8 per cent in 1950 to 8.3 per cent by 1972 (see Figure 1).

As for foreign labourers working in Nyasaland, there were Portuguese subjects in the rural areas, especially in the south; Tanganyikan labourers in the rural north; and a small number of Rhodesian labourers in construction and domestic service.[113] Even with a boom in emigration the RNLSC continued to have trouble finding men to work for its low wages, attracting only 7000 of its 8000 quota in 1954.[114] Wenela's quota was increased from 7000 to 12 600 in the period 1953–55. Ten thousand were recruited in Northern Province and another 2600 hired from Wenela's offices in Southern Province.[115] The RNLSC's quota was also increased, despite its inability to fill the quota it already had. Its allotment went up from 8000 to 10 000, including 2000 from Southern Province, where the pressures on land were forcing more Africans to migrate.[116] Of course far greater numbers were migrating abroad to work independently.

In 1957 the RNLSC found its quota graciously raised again – this time to 14 000, with 3500 from the coveted Southern Province. However it was still experiencing difficulty in recruiting in the face of higher South African wages. When it finally raised wages the situation improved dramatically. An extended permit allowed a total of 5000 from Southern Province in 1958, and it was able to stop recruiting Tanganyikans in north Nyasaland.[117] All told the Southern Rhodesian government transported 39 000 Nyasaland workers into its territory during 1959.[118]

The outflows again became a fiery issue among whites, who blamed emigration for spiralling wages. The governor defended Wenela's excellent conditions and benefits, pointing out the half-million pounds a year brought into the protectorate by remittances and deferred pay and the quarter-million Wenela spent in the protectorate itself.[119] Total remittances reached £1 750 000 by 1959, not including cash brought home personally by workers, an important amount considering that Africans sold only £3m worth of agricultural produce for export that year.[120] The governor wrote:

> My conclusion therefore is that the activities of WNLA in Nyasaland should be encouraged and that in a rapidly growing population the quota should be steadily increased: indeed I feel bound to express a doubt as to whether any African who wishes to join WNLA should be prevented from doing so: only by outside competition will Nyasaland employers be forced to raise wages and improve labour conditions.[121]

The governor, however, was out of tune with the times. Growing African nationalism had singled out migration as a unifying chord of complaint about Nyasaland's membership in the federation. African members of the legislative council introduced a motion to abolish labour recruitment in Nyasaland in 1956, passed with a majority but of course rejected by the government.[122] African activism seriously damaged the RNLSC's reputation by publicizing poor conditions at Kariba.[123] Nyasalanders were reported to be the organizers of the strike there, which led to mass quittings, the banning of the Nyasaland African Congress in Southern Rhodesia and declarations of a state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.[124]

The Nyasaland administration refused to respond to African cries, giving Wenela bigger and bigger quotas in 1960 and 1961, culminating in a permit for an unrestricted number from anywhere in the territory.[125] The RNLSC was permitted to recruit its entire quota of 14 000 in Southern Province in 1960, and the Nyasaland Labour Department even decreased the attestation fee from 40s to 24s.[126] With the dawning of an era of permanent surpluses of labourers for hire, the Nyasaland government had become an unabashed labour exporter.

The federation government continued to insist that Nyasaland was benefiting economically from federation, applauding the advantages of labour emigration from the protectorate and asserting that the decline of local production where labour emigration was high 'may easily be overstated'.[127] However this was a back-handed admission that African agriculture in Nyasaland *was* declining due to migration.

Opposition to labour migration at a time of growing surplus labour supply contributed to Malawi's birth as a politically independent state. The Southern Rhodesian economy had grown dependent on £6m of exports to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland per year, on the transport traffic provided by Northern Rhodesia's copper exports, and on the concentration of federal expenditure in Southern Rhodesia.[128]

But it no longer required more than a shrinking number of labourers from its two confederates. With much of the reason for federation dissolved, the arrangement fell easy prey to the nationalists of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Britain's commission recommended in 1960 that the two be allowed to secede from the federation with Southern Rhodesia's racist regime, which was so abhorrent to ascendant black leaders.[129]

Just as many had feared, there had been little economic progress during the federation decade, but it was not entirely clear that federation had damaged the economy in European terms. On the one hand the largest manufacturing activities were still the processing of tea and tobacco for export. Other possible industrial development had been hindered by inclusion in the federal free-trade area. On the other hand an extra £4m a year had gone to the Nyasaland treasury under federal income redistribution – equal to about 15 per cent of GDP. The country remained dependent on a few key exports shipped out to Britain on a rail link through Mozambique, and on remittances and savings from emigrant labour. However, damage to the African economy had continued to worsen during federation, with labour emigration further undermining smallholder agriculture.

INDEPENDENT LABOUR EXPORT

Although opposition to labour emigration had been a major rallying cry among African nationalists before independence, that cry was quickly dropped once political independence had been gained from both the federation and Britain. The new African government continued aggressively to pursue labour export, allying with the white-ruled pariahs of Africa in exchange for jobs. For a decade there seemed to be little conflict between labour export and internal wage-labour supply, and the government concentrated on maximizing its own returns from the supply of workers abroad.

Nyasaland was led through the transition to independence in 1964 by Prime Minister Banda. Two years later it became the Republic of Malawi, with Banda, leader of the single party, as president. Malawi found itself in the grip of a strong promoter of an entrepreneurial

class. In his many years abroad Banda had been a staunch opponent of Malawian labour emigration. He had spoken out against it upon his return to Malawi in 1958, and again in 1960, declaring that he intended to bring the migrants home. If Malawians could earn money for South Africa, he had reasoned aloud, they could earn it for their own country.[130]

Malawi had emerged among the poorest countries of the world, with a high population density, no exploitable mineral deposits and a small domestic market.[131] There was some good arable land concentrated in the south, but much of the country was hillside, swamp, woodlands or grasslands. The country's main assets were the more fertile of its lands and a mass of unskilled labourers, and so postindependence development concentrated on agriculture, encouraging both smallholding and estate production, especially of tobacco, tea, groundnuts and cotton. Both sectors grew but estates' share of exports increased at smallholders' expense.[132] Wages for unskilled labourers were kept down overall, stimulating migration abroad. Despite quite considerable growth in the early postindependence years – an average 7.2 per cent real increase in GDP from 1964–72 and as high as 9.9 per cent in 1972 – labour out-migration still grew dramatically, in contradiction to Banda's declared goal.[133]

Rhodesia had already renounced the Tripartite Agreement in 1961 and introduced the Closed Labour Areas Order in 1964, defining areas where foreign labourers – originally just Mozambicans – could no longer enter. Malawian migrants in Southern Rhodesia were estimated at 186 000 in the Southern Rhodesian census of 1962.[134] When the exclusion zones were extended to Malawian and Northern Rhodesian Africans, over half of these suddenly found themselves in closed areas.[135]

Resentment towards Malawian workers was also festering in newly independent Zambia, where unemployment was growing fast. Banda was not on good terms with Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda. Malawians in Zambia were estimated to number 45 000, nearly half of them women, and all were less and less welcome.[136]

Relations with Tanzania became even worse than with Zambia, migration declining along with bilateral relations after Tanzania's socialist declaration in 1967.[137] The Malawian Brotherhood Society, an organization for Malawians working in Tanzania, was alone thought to have over 10 000 members, and the future of these workers was increasingly insecure.[138] South Africa, then, was the only country to which labour migration showed much promise.

Dealing with the Devil

In contrast with rocky relations with its fellow black-ruled states, Banda's government pursued cooperation and 'neighbourliness' with South Africa's white-minority regime, as well as the white regimes still in power in Rhodesia and Mozambique.[139] Banda was intent on building up South African trade and investment. He began to foster the development of a new plantation-owning class that would provide him with support based on ties to the poles of white-controlled capital. South Africa was encouraged to commit further aid, though it was already Malawi's third most important donor by 1964 – after the UK and the World Bank.[140]

The emotion of Banda's drive to power gave way quickly to the practicalities of governing and the need for foreign exchange. In a complete reversal of his opposition to labour export up until independence, Banda decided to allow Wenela to expand recruiting in Malawi to 30 000 per year. Migrants' remittances from South Africa were fully institutionalized in return, reversing Malawi's negative balance of payments.[141] By 1965–67 the combined inflow from all migrant sources averaged £2.4m per year, the third largest export in foreign-exchange terms after tobacco and tea.[142]

Banda, in fact, governed the most rapid expansion in labour emigration in Malawi's history, a direct result of his labour salesmanship. Already an estimated 260 000 or 6.7 per cent of the 1964 population, Malawians working abroad reached an historic peak of some 8.3 per cent of the *de jure* population by 1972 – some 400 000 absent workers (see Figures 1, 2, and 10–12).

All sorts of measures were taken to make Nyasaland a 'good labour supplier'. The Employment Act of 1964 relaid the basis for recruiter permits and deposits on an annual basis, just as in colonial times. 'Neighbourliness' also included the pacification of supplied employees. For instance Banda warned Malawians working in South Africa that they would get no help if they broke South African laws.

At a time when other majority-ruled states were stridently anti-apartheid, encouraging black South Africans to defy the apartheid regime, such collusion by the Banda government further isolated it from the new community of African states.[143] By 1965 Banda was making it clear that he was willing to 'deal with the devil', receiving free equipment from South Africa to improve airport facilities and stating that 'apartheid is not all bad'.[144]

A new agreement was signed with Wenela in 1965. Dramatic

increases in the total number of recruits were envisioned but Wenela would no longer be allowed to recruit or advertise in Malawi. Malawi's Ministry of Labour would itself recruit workers and transport them to Wenela's depots throughout Malawi, and Air Malawi would then fly the workers to Botswana, the first leg en route to Johannesburg. The Nyasaland Treasury would be paid R240 000 for the first 20 000 workers a year, and R6 per recruit thereafter.[145]

The only real hitch in the 1965 agreement with Wenela was that the negotiations had excluded the South African government.[146] Pretoria was therefore pleased when a Malawian government representative suggested a bilateral deal in 1967, seeking more jobs and better documentation of Malawians in South Africa.[147] While mine contracts had been falling in recent years, Malawi wished to increase the minimum of 20 000 recruits to 30 000, presumably for R360 000 or more in payments.[148] Malawi was also seeking business for an independent Air Malawi, a personal interest of Banda.[149] Negotiations were long and thorny but ended in the concession to Air Malawi of exclusive rights to fly workers all the way to Johannesburg.[150]

On documentation issues, however, Pretoria was all smiles. The new five-year labour treaty bound Pretoria to verify that Malawians had passports, and that contractees had employment record books, facilitating both Pretoria's and Zomba's control. Malawi would place staff in Johannesburg to formalize the status of the estimated 30–40 000 clandestine Malawians in South Africa.[151]

Malawi also agreed to establish a Malawian trade mission in South Africa in 1967. Pretoria had almost certainly asked for the missions during negotiations on the new migrant-labour agreement, and perhaps also during talks on a new trade agreement and a loan to move the capital city.[152] These missions were a major concession to Africa's pariah government. Banda even agreed that the first 'representative' would be a white man of British citizenship.[153] Such missions would become a standard South African request in labour-export negotiations with other countries.

The Malawi–South Africa agreement of 1967 considerably increased trade, investment and aid. Malawi was granted duty-free importation of its first 250 tons of exports to South Africa, and 'most-favoured nation' status thereafter. This included its main exports of tea and tobacco. South Africa also loaned Malawi $33m to construct the new capital in Lilongwe, while a South African consortium financed $20m worth of work on the Malawi–Mozambique railway.[154]

The effects of the labour treaty on migration flows were also

considerable. Legal Malawian migrants to South Africa increased their remittances, rising from 2.80 million Malawian Kwacha to K4.8m ($5.7m) out of a total of K6.8m ($8.2m) from all countries.[155] The Malawian government clearly wanted as many people working in South Africa as possible, and labour supply was only blocked for private South African farms – where conditions were the most appalling and drew the most criticism.[156]

Labour Export to Rhodesia

Relations with Rhodesia, also still ruled by a white minority, had been maintained as well as those with South Africa, though the prospects for continued employment there were less rosy. Member-states of the Organization of African Unity voted to break diplomatic relations with Britain if it did not put down Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1966, but Malawi's ruler recognized the post-UDI government – not least to ensure that Malawians would enjoy preferential access to the remaining jobs available there. When Britain declared that it would impose economic sanctions, Prime Minister Ian Smith replied that foreign migrant workers might be sent home if Rhodesians lost jobs under sanctions.[157] Banda was alarmed at the threat, considering a flood of repatriated workers a potential 'security problem' – meaning a 'political problem'.[158] A resettlement committee with district subcommittees was quickly formed and contingency plans drawn up for massive resettlement in the north, though they were never called for.[159]

By this time there were some signs that Banda's government wished to contain some of the lowest-paid workers. The Zambian government was on poor terms with the Banda regime for declining to curtail the employment of non-essential Malawians and then for having ceased to recognize Malawian identity certificates.[160] In reply the flow to Zambia of essential skilled Malawians such as carpenters and bricklayers was restricted.[161] By mid-1966 it was apparent that the demand for Malawian low-skilled labourers in Rhodesia was also temporarily increasing, particularly in agriculture and mining. On the one hand Malawi's Department of Labour actively promoted job opportunities in Rhodesia. But on the other it became a little choosier, refusing a group of white Rhodesian farmers permission to recruit 1000 cotton pickers and stating that it no longer wished to send labourers for less than 12 months.[162]

Overall, Banda's government was still maximizing labour export to both South Africa and Rhodesia. However in both cases a few steps had been taken to discourage emigration of the lowest paid. These migrants were worth very little revenue to the Malawian economy and treasury, and very-low-paid workers were precisely those who were needed at home to work on new plantations.

THE BOYCOTT AND POST-BOYCOTT ERA

The Malawian government's unexpected boycott of South African employment in 1974 was the greatest supply-side action in the history of Southern African labour export, the culmination of a long history of on again–off again foreign recruiting. The boycott represented a deliberate, general policy reversal in Malawi. The government had ended recruiting for Rhodesia a few months earlier, and the new boycott was also applied to Zambia. Employment was growing rapidly at the time, and peak-season labour shortfalls were occurring on private estates – a sector particularly favoured by Banda.

At the start of 1973, 129 207 men, or 31.2 per cent of the 414 333 African employees on Wenela-affiliated mines, were Malawian.[163] The Malawian government received K1.2m in taxes and fees; another K12m in foreign exchange was deferred or remitted into the country; and several million more was imported in cash. Air Malawi earned another K1.5m in charter fees for transporting roughly 30 000 recruits, with Wenela air service still carrying the larger share and spending another K1.1m in Malawi.[164] All told, formal Wenela-derived foreign exchange brought into Malawi in 1973 came to K15.7m, and with postal orders, casual remittances and pocket cash it reached about K20m.[165]

Malawi's population was still largely dependent on small-scale agriculture, with the majority spread out on smallholder farms. Laws and regulations specified that only estates could grow flue-cured and burley tobacco, while other government policies also effectively restricted tea and sugar production almost exclusively to larger landowners. The ordinary small farmer was left growing mainly cheaper tobacco and cotton, along with rice, groundnuts and maize. Living standards for the great majority were therefore increasing only slowly,

most work being very poorly paid, especially that growing export crops on large new estates.

Malawi's economy was increasingly buoyant at this time and foreign reserves stood at K22.8m, about the same as at independence.[166] Resident wage-earners still accounted for less than 10 per cent of the economically active population.[167] The fact that over 400 000 labourers were working abroad was an embarrassment beside an internal wage-labour force of only 200 000, and discussion of the issue – indeed all mention of the issue – was officially discouraged by the strong-arm government. The official statement on development at the time made no mention of labour emigration, even omitting the topic from its 'manpower' section.[168]

Although the 1974 boycott appeared to be sudden, Banda had begun reversing his position on emigration in 1973. He had called on workers to stop going to South Africa, Rhodesia and Tanzania, where he claimed they received low wages compared with new opportunities for cash-crop profits at home.[169] In March 1974 the government stopped the emigration of contractees to Rhodesia. Reduced to Malawi alone as a source of supply, the RNLSC remained in a 'holding position' in the vain hope that the new policy would be rescinded.[170]

The mood had certainly changed. It seemed that Banda and those who had supported labour export now feared they were going too far. A reasonable rate of internal economic development held out a promise of Malawians returning to work at home. The chairperson of the Malawi Tea Growers' Association, a group favoured by Banda, grew quite excited at the prospect of a solution to growing labour shortages because of their very low wages and exclaimed that Malawi needed its migrants to come back. Alarmed, the South African Chamber of Mines hastily completed a socioeconomic survey of Malawi, which reassured them that dependence on their jobs would continue for the foreseeable future.[171]

The Chamber of Mines had it wrong. They had underestimated the impact of rapidly growing internal employment on the Banda government's mood. Employment had been in striking decline before independence, falling from 152 000 in 1961 to 128 000 in 1964.[172] After independence the economy grew steadily, led by labour-intensive estates producing tobacco, sugar and tea for export. The transformation of peasant agriculture into large-scale agriculture was financed by ploughing the profits from marketing peasant crops into the estate sector. Uncultivated land was allocated to the estates as well, and banks were encouraged to give them easier loans.[173] Participation in

peasant production declined between 1966 and 1977, becoming more female and part time, while waged employment increased 10 per cent per year, including a 22.5 per cent annual increase in female part-time waged employment. By 1971–72 there was growing evidence of peak-season labour shortages in both the family-labour and wage-labour sectors, and shortages in two high-profile settlement schemes.[174] Unemployment in Blantyre, the largest city, had fallen to 4 per cent, which was unusually low for an African capital in the 1970s.[175]

Some migrants began to return home to the new jobs in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many of the returnees were young, not just migrants coming home at the end of their careers.[176] Encouragingly, job creation peaked at an exceptionally high 14 per cent in 1973.[177]

It was in this mood that Malawi's famous boycott began. In mid-1974, upon the crash of a Wenela-owned aircraft, killing 75 Malawian recruits bound for South Africa, Banda telexed Wenela in Johannesburg and temporarily suspended recruiting. Ten days later he decided to withdraw Malawians from the mines for an indefinite period.[178]

The Wenela manager hurriedly flew to Malawi to meet with Banda. The Malawian government registered a litany of complaints about workers' conditions, but then went on to propose new terms that were concerned with government revenue – and not at all with working conditions. Banda demanded that Air Malawi operate direct flights for miners from Malawi to South Africa and that deferred wages be paid to Malawi's Reserve Bank government account, rather than directly to miners' personal bank accounts as before. Talks collapsed and the new Malawian ambassador to Pretoria was recalled.[179]

The lack of Malawian labourers was soon seriously reducing gold production. Fearing that Banda might not be bluffing after all – or any more – the Chamber of Mines announced a new recruiting drive in South Africa, while still hoping this would help to foster reconciliation.[180] At the mines Malawians were panicking at reports that those not returning home would soon become stateless, and tension and conflict rose.[181] When the workers were freed to end their contracts on only 30 days notice, Air Malawi was unable to keep up with the traffic, backing up 5000 returnees by April 1975 in an even more explosive situation.[182]

The boycott was widely perceived within the Malawian civil service to be a response to labour shortages on estates.[183] During the 1970s international sanctions imposed on Rhodesia had stimulated an average 16 per cent per year expansion in Malawian estate tobacco volume.

While most old plantations were held by whites, new estates were leased on quite easy terms to black Malawians, especially government officials.[184]

Back in 1965 Banda had gained absolute power over the use and ownership of all land. The focus of his interest became the leasing of private land to members of the emerging state elite. Private estate ownership in Malawi, down to 2 per cent of land by Malawi's independence, was rising sharply again.[185] Banda openly encouraged senior party members, civil servants and soldiers to get in on the boom and imitate his own success as an estate owner.

Although they grew only one eighth of agricultural exports, estates were the most dynamic sector in 1973, largely accounting for a 37 per cent fall in the trade deficit from the year before and for growth of K30m in reserves.[186] Banda must have believed that increased foreign-exchange earnings from fuelling this sector with a labour influx would offset the foreign exchange forsaken with South African jobs.

The new estates, however, quickly ran into difficulties – even with free land and easy loans – and suffered hiring shortfalls at the low wages offered.[187] They also proved to be capital-intensive importers with lower net foreign-exchange earnings than expected.[188] Serious foreign-exchange shortfalls set in, while many of the poorest-managed operations began to flounder. In fact, at the time the boycott was announced Banda was in quite an awkward position. He appeared to be leading his elite to ruin rather than riches, thus the idea of solving their labour shortages must have been very attractive.

The boycott did in fact direct more labour to estates. Although returning migrants were generally too well off to proceed directly to estate jobs, the decrease in international migration was followed by a surge in internal migration, particularly to estates and to the new capital city of Lilongwe.[189]

An additional aspect of boycott logic had been a political toning down of the Banda government's collaboration with white regimes. No sooner had the temporary suspension of recruiting for South Africa been declared than President Kaunda of Zambia made an ice-breaking visit. Another thaw was overdue with FRELIMO, the party heading the Mozambican independence struggle and due to take power. Malawi had become heavily dependent on Mozambique's Nacala Railway since the Zambia/Rhodesia border closure. Diplomatic missions were also exchanged with the government of Tanzania that year. Banda must have found that the recruiting suspension looked better and better as the months went by.[190]

As it turned out, the South African Chamber of Mines was not the only party that had miscalculated. A few months after the boycott was declared, it became apparent that job growth had dipped sharply due to economic slowdown and recent government wage increases. Growth in employment for the year plunged from the previous 14 per cent to below 4 per cent – an ugly surprise for a president who had just forsaken 130 000 higher-paying jobs.

In the end, despite the unexpected initial drop in employment creation in the first year of the migrants' return, Malawi did successfully reabsorb over 250 000 Malawian returnees in the six years after the boycott began.[191] Fifteen per cent of the economically active in 1977 were people who had returned to Malawi since 1966. Liberation wars in Zimbabwe and Mozambique encouraged even more Malawians to return home, as did anti-Malawian feeling in Zambia. Six per cent of Malawi's *de facto* population is estimated to have returned, re-entering the wage, subsistence and cash-crop economies.[192] Of course there were still some continuing and new emigrants, but overall the estimated numbers of Malawians working abroad fell from 400 000, or 8.1 per cent of the population, in 1973 to 150 000, or 3.6 per cent, by 1977.

The 1977 Agreement

The boycott was ended in late 1976 following the realization that Malawi's economy needed the foreign exchange from jobs abroad. Financial benefits for the Malawian government was the issue that dominated the renewed negotiations. A new deal was followed by a decade of renewed labour export to South Africa, though Pretoria and the Chamber of Mines would never again risk the same dependency on Malawi's recruits as before.

Though Banda ended the boycott there is little evidence of a concern for the plight of Malawi's poor. There was still great poverty despite the postindependence growth, with education, health, nutrition – indeed most indicators of living standards – at lower levels than for most of Malawi's neighbours. However it was not so much the rural unemployed that caused the government to end the boycott. That invited a thorny debate on the trade-off between migration and

successful peasant agriculture. The boycott was lifted primarily for the foreign exchange that migration could bring in.

By 1976 it was realized that the importance of migrants' remittances had been grossly underestimated.[193] Growth in GDP was still over 6 per cent, but the current-account deficit had grown to K75m under deteriorating terms of trade. Malawi had become more dependent on the South African economy, obtaining 26 per cent of its imports from South Africa in 1976 compared with 6 per cent at independence, and heavily using South Africa's railways since lines through Mozambique had been closed by Pretoria-backed insurgency.[194] Talks between Malawian representatives and those of the South African Chamber of Mines' revised recruiting arm, The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), began in 1976 and recruiting soon resumed.[195] On 1 March 1977 the final version of a new agreement was signed. Recruits averaged about 1500 per month throughout 1977, all flown to Johannesburg by Air Malawi.[196]

The new agreement set fees for a minimum of 20 000 recruits as before, but compared with the 130 000 at the time the boycott commenced, Malawians with the Chamber of Mines averaged just over 19 000 over the next decade.[197] As Malawi had wanted, 60 per cent of the basic wage from the fourteenth week of employment would be deposited with the Malawian Reserve Bank, which would pay miners in Malawian kwacha upon their return. Payments amounted to R14m in 1980.[198] Recruits still required a letter from their district labour officer, preserving Malawian control over recruitment areas and individuals.[199] Intriguingly the Malawian government chose to keep the terms of this new agreement a secret, and some clauses remained a mystery even in 1990.[200]

Reminiscent of colonial times, a German study conducted surveys in 1980 and found a strong correlation between below-average household agricultural production and labour migration.[201] The issue of migration and development just would not go away. While government ministers continued to claim that 'Wenela is dead', due to the political sensitivity of the domestic development issue, the governor of the Malawi Reserve Bank quietly requested an increase in mine jobs of 5000 in 1982. The request was turned down.[202]

Unlike colonial times, however, migration was declining rapidly. From the 150 000, or 2.6 per cent, of the population working abroad in 1978 – at the boycott's end – the numbers had dropped to 100 000 in 1980. The number continued to fall, down to 30 000 by 1987, or only 0.4 per cent of the population. This was a country where 8.3 per

cent of the population had been working abroad only 15 years before (see Figure 1).

The 1987 Breakdown

By the mid-1980s the Malawian economy was in some difficulty, as was the government's budget. Many poorer households must have suffered a considerable drop in income from the loss of miners' remittances.

Annual negotiations with TEBA had become rocky again by January 1987. TEBA began the meetings by hinting that Malawian labour was too expensive, thus it is probable that the underlying issue was concessions on costs requested from the Malawian government. With a large South African regional labour surplus, Malawi's expensive fly-in recruits must have seemed expendable to TEBA, especially when it was under pressure from Pretoria to reduce labour dependency on countries other than Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.[203]

TEBA was also tired of the Malawian Reserve Bank's intransigence regarding ridiculous delays before returnees received their deferred pay. Negotiations were broken off in December 1987, and recruiting stopped in February 1988.[204] The Malawian civil service was split on the issue. One side favoured a total ban on labour export once and for all, while the other argued that Malawi could not afford to lose the foreign exchange – estimated by TEBA at K65m (US$25m).[205] The official issue became Pretoria's insistence that Malawian recruits be compulsorily tested for the HIV virus, believed to cause AIDS.[206] There is reason to suspect, however, that there was more being talked about than AIDS. Indeed South Africa reduced its demand to the testing of new recruits only, normally just 6 per cent of those signing on. Malawi reportedly insisted on the World Health Organization's principle that all AIDS testing should be voluntary, but to this author the Malawian government's credibility as the defender of migrants' rights is doubtful. Additionally, when the incidence of the HIV virus among Botswana's migrant miners rose above that of Malawi's, nothing similar was done.[207] It is likely therefore that there were other substantial issues, almost certainly the reduction of TEBA's costs and most likely with some relation to the undisclosed terms of the 1977 agreement. In any case the deadlock was never broken. The 20 000 Malawian mineworkers dwindled to only 7000 by the end of 1988, 6000 by May 1989 and none by the end of 1989.[208]

It seems, then, that this final recruiting stoppage was attributable to mutual apathy. Banda's advisors must have again estimated that the Malawian Treasury *could* afford to forgo the foreign exchange, while TEBA was minimizing recruitment costs in the surplus conditions that had developed since the 1977 agreement, and was internalizing labour supply within South Africa and its most dependent neighbours. With both sides of the bargaining table little motivated to resolve the conflict, 85 years of intermittent labour export to South Africa succumbed to negotiator fatigue. The boycott of 1974 had been the turning point – substantially reducing Malawi and TEBA's mutual dependence. Though the Malawian government had again sought to increase numbers in the early 1980s, the overall effect of policy from 1974–89 was a two-stage withdrawal of Malawian labourers from the South African economy.

CONCLUSION

The beginnings of labour export from Malawi, from the 1890s until 1902, were years of free movement despite some early intervention by the administration. Labour-export policy was confined to 'tinkering' as the Colonial Office preferred to supply labour to British investments in neighbouring territories.

From 1903 until 1912 interventions by the British government and the protectorate administration became more effective, and the competition for labour more heated. London resolved matters in 1909 by delegating responsibility for labour export to the territorial administration, which immediately began a 22-year prohibition of recruiting for foreign employers and took various other measures to control emigrants. The differing interests in labour export between the protectorate's administration and the labour-receiving territories was firmly on the table and would dominate the country's interterritorial – later its international – relations throughout most of its future.

The administration's capacity to limit labour outflows may have been incomplete but it was still substantial, and more importantly it was still growing. Attempts to control independent migrants during the two world wars were only moderately successful, but slow progress was made. An enormous amount of energy was expended by the protectorate's administration on negotiating labour-supply treaties with neighbouring administrations in the 1930s and 1940s, and these deals were among the most significant improvements in control.

Upon independence Banda led Malawi into an extraordinary phase of expanding, well-administered labour export to South Africa, thereby compensating for reductions in the number of Malawians working in Zambia and Southern Rhodesia and reaping considerable benefits in revenues and foreign exchange.

The period of heavy South African recruiting culminated in a sudden policy reversal and boycott of South African jobs in 1974. Recruiting was again suspended in 1988 after negotiations in which both Malawi and TEBA seemed unwilling to compromise.

The withdrawal from dependence on the South African economy, in 1974 and again in 1988, constituted the region's most decisive move by a country dependent on large-scale labour supply and has done much to dispel the myth of the powerless labour-supplying government. The long rise to power over its foreign-employed population began with the concession to the territorial administration in 1909 of authority over recruiting. The first prohibition was largely ineffective, but the power to control recruiting and emigration in general was steadily improved for 75 years, eventually making the 1974 boycott possible. Access to recruits was consistently traded for concessions in furthering administrative control and revenue. This was the primary objective of interterritorial cum international relations throughout Malawi's history.

Notes and References

1. Palmer, 1977b.
2. Palmer, 1977b, pp. 299–300.
3. Coleman, 1972, p. 36; Krishnamurty, 1972, pp. 384, 392.
4. Vail, 1977, p. 366.
5. The Zomba administration negotiated an Anglo–Portuguese Treaty on behalf of London (signed 11 June 1891, Clause XI, see Makambe 1980, pp. 549–50), guaranteeing freedom of passage for those travelling through Tête in western Mozambique, heading for work in Southern Rhodesia, but the Portuguese lacked sufficient control to enforce the deal.
6. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1903, p. 4.
7. Read, 1942, p. 606.
8. Boeder, 1974, p. 12.
9. See Boeder, 1974, pp. 32–3.
10. Tapela, 1979, p. 73.
11. Sanderson, 1961, p. 261.
12. Krishnamurty, 1972, p. 396; Boeder, 1974, p. 31; Pollock, 1971, p. 412.

13. See Great Britain, 1903, various correspondence. The request included British East Africa, British Central Africa, Portuguese West Africa, the Congo and Uganda.
14. Great Britain, 1903, p. 1, Sharpe to Marques at Landsdowne, 11 March 1903.
15. Great Britain, 1903, pp. 7–13.
16. Pollock, 1971, pp. 414–15.
17. Tapela, 1979, p. 75.
18. Jeeves, 1983, p. 397.
19. ZANA BS1/98, Administrator, Fort Jameson, to Commissioner, BCA.
20. ZANA BS1/98, Judge Beaufort to the Administrator, NER, 22 Apr. 1903, fp. 8, and subsequent correspondence.
21. ZANA BS1/98, Administrator, BSA Co., to Chief Representative, BSA Co., Fort Jameson, 6 Sept. 1901; and Judge Beaufort, NER, to Administrator, NER, 4 Aug. 1903, fp. 47–52.
22. See Great Britain, 1903, 1908.
23. Krishnamurty, 1972, pp. 385, 396.
24. ZANA BS1/98, Judge Beaufort to the Administrator, NER, 22 Apr. 1903, fp. 8, and subsequent correspondence.
25. MNA-PA, COM 8/1, *The Lacey Report*, 1935: 16.
26. Tapela, 1979, p. 74.
27. MNA-PA, COM 8/1, Native Labour Ordinance of 1904, pp. 8–9.
28. ZINA A11/2/8/13, Zomba Administration to CS Administrator, SR, 12 Oct. 1905, fp. 27. When recruiters continued to woo labourers from just across the Rhodesian border, Zomba bargained for entry into a customs union with its larger neighbour as compensation.
29. White, 1987, p. 89.
30. Boeder, 1974, p. 54.
31. Great Britain, 1908, p. 1.
32. Great Britain, 1908, pp. 1–2, telegram, Transvaal Governor to Sec. of State. 7 Aug. 1906.
33. Krishnamurty, 1972, p. 397.
34. Great Britain, 1908, p. 12, letter of 14 July 1906. He 'recommended' that recruiting only be banned in the northern half of Central Angoniland, claiming this particular group's weak physique accounted for most deaths, a mathematical unlikelihood.
35. Great Britain, 1908, telegrams, Governor of the Transvaal to Sec. of State, 2 Nov. 1906; Sec. of State to Acting Commissioner BCA, 24 July 1907; Sec., Premier Diamond Mines, to Sec., WNLA, 9 Aug. 1907.
36. Great Britain, 1908, telegram, Sec. of State to Governor of the Transvaal, 8 Nov. 1906; Gelfand 1961: 298.
37. MNA-PA, COM 8/1, *The Lacey Report*, 1935, p. 10; Gelfand, 1961, p. 298.
38. MNA-PA, S1/1286/24.
39. Krishnamurty, 1972, p. 398.
40. Including a Sec. to the Administrator in Rhodesia, a former member of the Legislative Council, and a representative of two farmer's associations (BSA Co. 1911–12, *Report of the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia*, p. 76).

41. Tapela, 1979, p. 77.
42. Krishnamurty, 1972.
43. Baker, 1984, p. 26.
44. Tongas, in particular, served not only in the British and South African armies but were recruited by the German forces across Lake Nyasa as well (Murray, 1926, p. 272, cited in Baker, 1984, p. 26). Another estimate (Malawi, n.d., p. 3) puts the number at 0.25 million porters and soldiers. More than one must have found himself shooting at fellow villagers, or even fighting for both sides at different points during the war.
45. Krishnamurty, 1972.
46. Southern Rhodesia introduced a central registry for alien Africans' tax data, and the Nyasaland Native National Association was formed in Johannesburg (ZINA N3/22/3, entire file; Caputo, 1971, p. 28).
47. MNA-PA, S1/1286/24, Sena Sugar Estates to Governor, Nyasaland, 12 Feb., fi. 8.
48. MNA-PA, S1/1113/20, letters from Nyasaland Chamber of Agr. and Commerce to Acting CS, 10 Jun, 1 July 1920; and from Mlange Planters Association, 10 July 1920. MNA-PA, S1/104/21, letter of 7 Feb. 1921.
49. Nyasaland, 1921, p. 2.
50. Nyasaland 1921, p. 2. Exceptionally, Tanganyika's administration in Dar es Salaam, with a glut of willing labourers, itself asked Nyasaland to restrict passes to those with definite work. Nyasaland agreed (MNA-PA, S1/1383/21, District Political Officer, Songea, Tanganyika, to CS, Nyasaland, 5 Aug. 1921, reply and further correspondence).
51. Makambe, 1980, p. 565.
52. MNA-PA, S2/23/25, memo from Governor to Sec. of State, 31 Mar. 1927, fi. 23A.
53. Pachai, 1973, pp. 684–92.
54. MNA-PA, S2/4[1]/31, Maxwell to Thomas 17 Dec. 1929; Thomas to Maxwell 3 Jan. 1930.
55. But the Northern Rhodesian Native Labour Association (NLA), asked for *permanent* emigration of thousands of Nyasaland families to the Copperbelt there, earning the support of the secretary of state for the colonies: '[T]he Mining Companies could no doubt make arrangements to recruit in Portuguese Africa, but it is preferable that they should obtain their labour in an area where complete control is possible'. (MNA-PA, S2/4[1]/31, Passfield to Thomas 9 Mar. 1931, fi. 41.) The Portuguese government had in fact refused. The government of Nyasaland organized a meeting with the NLA and a Southern Rhodesian official, discussing the death rate, numbers, housing, dependents, food, and alternative supply (Notes of the meeting, 4 May 1931, fi. 50). Zomba finally decided to resist, arguing that Nyasaland's planters, railway builders, and others simply could not spare the labourers, especially as permanent emigrants (MNA-PA, S2/4[1]/31, Thomas to Passfield, 7 May 1931, fi. 49).
56. *East Africa*, 25 January 1934, reporting a speech by Hall; cited in Vail, 1977, p. 389.

57. MNA-PA, S2/4[I]/31, NLA to Maxwell, 8 May 1931, fi. 52; Boeder, 1974, p. 130; citing Colonial Office 525/14, Despatch 538.
58. MNA-PA, S2/4[I]/31, NLA to CS, Nyasaland, 10 Oct. 1931, fi. 72.
59. Vail, 1977, p. 389.
60. MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, letter, CNC to CS, Nyld., 6 Mar. 1935, fp. 22–3. Zomba asked Southern Rhodesia for pay deferral, blankets, medical examinations, collection of Nyasaland hut-taxes upon contract renewal in Southern Rhodesia, full transport to the job, and at least rail fare home (MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, letter, CS to editor *East Africa*, 7 May 1935). The LBSC asked that the 2/6d recruitment tax be waived, an awkward request as it was politically unwise to amend labour legislation at the time (MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, File Note of the Governor, 24 Mar. 1935, fp. 40).
61. Nyasaland, 1936, p. 19.
62. Vaughan, 1986.
63. MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, Bottomley to Kittermaster, 10 Aug. 1935, fp. 163–70.
64. MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, Aug. 1935.
65. MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, Record of an Interview between Acting Governor and Downs of LBSC, 10 June 1936, fp. 333–4.
66. MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, Bottomley to Kittermaster, 10 Aug. 1935, fp. 163–70. A new International Labour Office (ILO) Article required all transport costs to be free for migrants but when South Africa's government objected, the ILO allowed the article to be waived where wages were adequate (MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, Lacey to Gemmill, 4 July 1936, fp. 344, Regulations for Recruiting Workers). LBSC was now contracted to recruit on WNLA's behalf until WNLA took over directly in 1938 (MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, Gemmill to Kittermaster 14 Sept. 1936, fp. 343; Gemmill to CS, Nyld, 23 Feb. 1938, fp. 443). For supplying Southern Rhodesia the LBSC agreed to pay a recruitment fee of £1 per contract (MNA-PA, S1/69[I]/35, Governor's minute, fp. 445).
67. Copy in MNA-PA, COM 8/1. The problem was that the £1 fine for evading the pass system was not enough to make it worthwhile to pay taxes and provide for dependents, in order to go legally. Those who needed to emigrate to work most, the poorest, needed to earn cash for just such things as supporting their families and paying taxes.
68. MNA-PA, COM 8/1, the Lacey Report, p. 8.
69. Vail, 1977.
70. MNA-PA, COM 8/1, the Lacey Report, pp. 51–92.
71. MNA-PA, S1/174/35, Precis of meeting between Lacey and Governor Kittermaster, 14 Aug. 1936, fp. 111–32.
72. This meant that taxes had to be lowered in areas such as the north. Opposed to a generalized system of recruiting, the Secretary of State was prepared to consider trial recruiting on a small scale, under interterritorial agreements (*Government Gazette*, Nyasaland, 15 Oct. 1936, vol. XLVII, no. 32, pp. 219–26).
73. Overly confident that their view would prevail, the Foreign Office then prematurely requested tenders for 200 000 metal cases in which to suspend identification certificates around African workers' necks

(MNA-PA, S1/943[II]/29, Ormsby-Gore to Kittermaster, 3 Dec. 1936, fi. 6B; FO to Govt., Nyld., 20 July 1937, fp. 166–7; letter, Calder to the Crown Agents for the Colonies, 23 June 1937, fp. 162–3).

74. He committed Zomba to tax reform, labourer registration and the promotion of development in Northern Province (MNA-PA, S1/174A/35, Precis of Informal Discussion on Report, p. 21; and 'Minute from the Governor to the Hon. the Chief Sec.', fp. 29–30).
75. See Figure 1 and Appendix 2.
76. MNA-PA, S1/174A[I]/35, coded telex from Colonial Office to Kittermaster, 3 Apr. 1936, fp. 36b.
77. Salisbury Agreement (Provisional) (Tripartite Agreement) 1936.
78. Nyasaland's six-month statute of limitations on pass offences prevented prosecution as the great majority returned to the protectorate only after longer absences.
79. MNA-PA, S1/174A[I]/35, Copy of the Note of Agreement, fp. 235.
80. Copy in MNA-PA, LB 1/4/1.
81. MNA-PA, S1/49/38, Governor's minute, 19 Sept. 1938, fp. 119.
82. MNA-PA, S1/49/38, Smith to CS, 30 Aug. 1938, fp. 115–17.
83. *Nyasaland Times*, 15 Dec. 1938, p. 5.
84. MNA-PA, LB 1/1/1, p. 2.
85. MNA-PA, S1/943[II]/29, Acting Gov't. Tang., to Gov't. Nyld., 17 July 1937, fp. 159.
86. MNA-PA, S1/204/37, fp. 17–26.
87. Chilivumbo, 1974, p. 50.
88. Boeder, 1974, p. 181.
89. TNA SEC 10218/II, letter from Martin to SSC, 11 Dec. 1939, fp. 132b & response; CO to Hall, Nyasaland, 29 Jan. 1940.
90. MNA-PA, LB 1/5/1, Acting Labour Commissioner to WNLA, 17 Jan. 1940; extract of minute on LAB 5, vol. IV, fp. 247.
91. Read, 1942, p. 630.
92. Boeder, 1974, p. 186, citing CO to Nyasaland Government, 28 December 1942, CO 525/189.
93. MNA-PA, LB 1/5/1, Secret Precis of Executive Council, Nov. 1943, fp. 177. They were allowed only 5000 that year, and only from Northern Province.
94. Boeder, 1974, p. 190.
95. Boeder, 1974, p. 190.
96. MNA-PA, LB 1/5/1, minute 339 on LAB. 5[I]/II, to the Govt, 17 Aug. 1944.
97. Read, 1942.
98. *Bulletin of the Inter-African Labour Institute*, 1955, p. 26; Milazi, 1975, p. 32.
99. Clarke, 1974, pp. 33–7.
100. ZINA F137/186C(3), fi. 59, *Rhodesia Herald*, 3 Feb. 1949; 21 Sept. 1949.
101. Milazi, 1975, p. 35.
102. Vaughan, 1984, pp. 39–40.
103. Great Britain, 1951, p. 59.
104. Nyasaland, 1950, pp. 190–1.

105. ZANA NR11/195, circular Minute No. 13 or 1954, fi. 63.
106. Milazi, 1975, pp. 47–8.
107. ZANA NR3/155, CS, Nyasaland to Secretariat NR, 10 May 1954, fi. 254.
108. McMaster, 1974, pp. 38–9.
109. McMaster, 1974, p. 38.
110. Clarke, 1974, pp. 39–48.
111. Cap. 56, p. 2.
112. *Bulletin of the Inter-African Labour Institute*, 1955, p. 28.
113. Mitchell, 1961, p. 216.
114. Clarke, 1974, p. 48.
115. MNA-RC, (DOL) SEC 2/1/II, Migrant Labour in South Africa, confidential memo from the Govt., fi. 7.
116. Clarke, 1974, p. 50.
117. Clarke, 1974, p. 50.
118. Inter-African Labour Institute, 1955, p. 28.
119. Colby, 1956, p. 9.
120. MNA-RC, (DOL) ESD 18/5/8/V, Acting Dir. of Agr. to Acting LC, 17 Dec. 1959, fi. 39.
121. Colby, 1956, p. 10.
122. Boeder, 1977, pp. 310–13.
123. Boeder, 1977, pp. 313–14.
124. Boeder, 1977, pp. 314–15.
125. MNA-RC, (DOL) 1X/10, Provincial Commissioner Southern Province to Labour Office, Southern Province, 1960 Dec. 29.
126. Clarke, 1974, pp. 5, 59, 92. A fall-off in demand for foreign labourers soon led to staff reductions inside Nyasaland and the restriction of recruitment to the level of demand. Overwhelmed with its new surplus, Southern Rhodesia gave notice of its intention to terminate its obligation under the tripartite agreement to allow free entry of labour.
127. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, CSO, 1959, p. 3.
128. Bull, 1969, p. 313.
129. Zacklin, 1969, p. 30. Dissolution was also underlaid by the British government's desire to allow the separate granting of independence, satisfying black nationalism in NR and Nyasaland but avoiding the embarrassment of granting independence to SR's white minority government (Lemkin, 1969, pp. 265–71).
130. *African Digest*, vol. VIII, 3, Dec. 1960, p. 84; cited in Caputo, 1971, p. 38.
131. Sixty-four persons per square kilometre compared with 20 in Tanzania, 18 in Zimbabwe, 13 in Mozambique, 8 in Zambia or 6 in Angola (*Africa Insight*, 1983, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 56).
132. Humphrey, 1974, pp. 2–3.
133. Humphrey, 1974, pp. 6, 21–7.
134. Figures for major concentrations fell considerably below those given by religious dioceses the same year, indicating that the total number of Malawians in the country was more like 360 000 (Haan and Houlihan, 1971; cited in Milazi, 1975, p. 52).

135. Milazi, 1975, pp. 51–2, 55. Fortunately, there was still demand for foreign labourers in Rhodesia. Several huge new plantations placed large orders, which the renamed RNLSC – the Rhodesian *African* Labour Supply Commission (RALSC) – was still unable to fill from within Rhodesia. After this reprieve however, jobs for Malawians there went into steady decline.
136. McMaster, 1974, p. 135.
137. Che-Mponda, 1972, p. 187.
138. McMaster, 1974, p. 135.
139. McMaster, 1974, p. 88.
140. Libby, 1987, p. 189.
141. Humphrey, 1974, p. 21.
142. Malawi, Ministry of Labour, 1961–2, p. 18.
143. *Africa Confidential*, vol. 18, p. 1, 'Banda Goes it Alone', 18 Sept. 1964.
144. *African Digest*, Dec. 1966, vol. XIV, no. 3, p. 46.
145. Copy of the agreement in MNA-RC, (DOL) SEC 2/1, fi. 3.
146. MNA-RC, (DOL) SEC 2/1, fi. 43. Article 7 of the agreement did require Pretoria's consent for future amendments but Pretoria had not been consulted on the agreement itself.
147. MNA-RC, (DOL) SEC 2.2, Malawian Govt Rep., Zambia, to Malawian MOL, 15 Oct. 1966, fi. 1; MNA-RC, (DOL) SEC 2/1, Pretoria Dept. of Bantu Admin. & Dev. to Malawian Govt Rep., Johannesburg, 3 Jan. 1967; MOL Memo to the President 12 Jan. 1967.
148. MNA-RC, (DOL) S.2/1, memo to President Banda 1 May 1967, fi. 38. Pretoria only agreed to look for 'additional avenues of employment' for Malawians but the Johannesburg *Star* ran the encouraging headline: 'More Malawians to work in S. Africa' (09 May 1967).
149. MNA-RC, (DOL) S.2/1, minutes of the Third Meeting of the Repatriation Cttee, 12 May 1967, fi. 136; MNA-RC (DOL), S. $2/1^{II}$, minutes of discussions held at Pretoria between representatives of Governments of Malawi and South Africa, 4–5 Oct. 1967.
150. MNA-RC, (DOL) S.2/1, Memo to President Banda, 1 May 1967, fi. 38.
151. MNA-RC, (DOL), S.2/1, Sec. for Labour to the Establishments Sec., Copies of Memoranda 23 Jan. 1968, fo. 61.
152. *Africa Confidential*, 14 Apr. 1967, p. 3.
153. Brown, 1979, p. 233.
154. Libby, 1987, p. 189.
155. One Malawian Kwacha (K1.00) equalled US$1.20; McMaster, 1974, pp. 100–1.
156. MNA-RC (DOL), SEC 2/1/II, memo to the President, Publicity: Migrant Labour Scheme, 21 Jan. 1969, fi. 64; Malawi, Office of the President and Cabinet 1971b. When English television applied to make a documentary film on Malawian migrant labourers, the request was referred to Banda and went no further (MNA-RC (DOL), ESD/6/1/II, Migrant Labour Representative, Johannesburg, to Sec. for Labour, 17 Dec. 1970, fi. 9).

157. McMaster, 1974, p. 239.
158. MNA-RC (DOL), S.28/14/1, Sec. to the Treasurer, Malawi, to Sec. to the PM, Malawi, 21 Apr. 1965.
159. MNA-RC (DOL), S.28/14/2D, Report of meeting of Repatriation Cttee., Blantyre, 15 Mar. 1966, fi. 1.
160. MNA-RC (DOL), S.28/14/1, Sec. for Labour to Acting Sec. for External Affairs, 12 May 1966.
161. MNA-RC (DOL), (no number), Sec. of Labour to Minister of Labour, 28 Feb. 1968.
162. MNA-RC, (DOL) S.28/14/1, minutes following a meeting with President Banda, 22 July 1966, front of file; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malawi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 1966.
163. MLO, 1972, p. 11.
164. MNA-RC, (DOL) SEC 2/1/II, minutes of discussion held at Pretoria between representatives of governments of Malawi and South Africa, 5, 09 Oct. 1967.
165. MNA-RC, (DOL) 1/3/73, Contract Labour Fees, file 11–12–8f, Box 39602.
166. In 1971. Malawi, 1972, pp. 22–3; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
167. As of 1970 (Malawi, Office of the President & Cabinet 1971a, p. 2; *Developing Malawi*).
168. Malawi, 1971b; Malawi, 1972; Boeder, 1974.
169. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1973–4, p. B217. In June Malawian settlers of the less-populated north who had been urged not to go to South Africa or Rhodesia, replied by rote 'that they would never think of going to South Africa where people work the whole day, month and year for little money while in this country they earned three to four times as much as a boss in that country' (*Malawi News*, 15 June 1973). Banda's message had been received loud and clear.
170. Clarke, 1976, p. 69.
171. McNamara, 1985, p. 93.
172. Malawi, Department of Labour, 1977, p. 151.
173. Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, pp. 311–19.
174. Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, pp. 316–17; Farrington, 1973.
175. Malawi, Ministry of Labour, 1972, p. 54.
176. Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, pp. 316–20.
177. Gupta, 1976, p. 2.
178. MNA-RC, (DOL) ESD/2/8, Malawian Minister of Justice to Attorneys, South Africa, 27 June 1974, fi. 94. The safety of the WNLA's transport was already an issue at the time. Just three weeks earlier one of the WNLA's DC4s crash-landed but no one was injured (*Daily Times*, 29 Mar. 1974, 'Seventy-three escaped unhurt'). The issue of emigrant labour to South Africa's mines had come up in parliament on 14 March 1974, three weeks before the crash. Numbers were asked for and the figure 130 000 was provided (*Hansard*: Tenth Session, Second Meeting, Third Day, 14 Mar. 1974, p. 307).
179. *Africa Research Bulletin*, 'Malawi–South Africa: Labour Recruitment Problem', Sep./Oct. 1974.

180. McNamara, 1985, p. 95.
181. McNamara, 1985, pp. 95–9.
182. Malawi's railway refused to carry more than 50 such returnees per train, to preserve normal service (MNA-RC, (DOL) ESD/A/10/IV, monthly report to Minister of Labour from Johannesburg Migrant Labour Secretariat, for April 1975, fi. 32).
183. Government official, May 1989.
184. Lienau, 1980, p. 25.
185. Pachai, 1973, pp. 691–2.
186. Malawi: Office of the President and Cabinet, 1974.
187. Kydd and Hewitt, 1986, p. 536.
188. Kydd and Hewitt, 1986, p. 539.
189. Lienau, 1980, p. 5.
190. To maintain perspective on policy making during the boycott, we can benefit from a smaller example of labour-export policy formulation under Banda's awkwardly centralized administration. A request for a few hundred Malawians to work at a Canary Islands fish factory was routinely referred to Banda in 1970. The president received a standard memo on green card, 3.5 pages in length. The memo outlined how the company had been refused labourers by all of West Africa and the OAU states due to the Canary Islands' anachronistic colonial status and the firm's appalling working conditions. This information elicited the following decision from Banda, scrawled on the margin of page 1: 'Too far. Let the Company recruit men in West Africa'. The memo appeared to have gone virtually unread and the matter ended there. Although the 1974 boycott decision was a much more important one, it was undoubtedly also taken by Banda alone (MNA-RC, (DOL) ESD/6/1/II, memo to the President, 10 Dec. 1970, fi. 5, annotated by Banda 12 Dec. 1970).
191. *Africa Insight*, 1981, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 103, 'Towards balanced development in Southern Africa'. The number moving to seek work in the wage sector grew more rapidly than job creation, McMaster, 1974, p. 76.
192. Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, pp. 316–20.
193. Interview with labour official, May 1989.
194. Malawi: Office of the President and Cabinet, 1976.
195. Banda gave no sign beforehand of relenting on the boycott, even abruptly cancelling a World Bank study of labour migration that he had originally approved as of 'historical interest', stating: 'The subject is not relevant, because our economy is no longer based on migrant labour. We have so developed our agriculture now, that we need people at home and the people themselves do not want to go outside the country now' (MNA-RC, (DOL) 2/4/1, Sec. for Labour to Sec. to the Treasury, 13 July 1976, fi. 291; Ministry of Labour to Banda, 16 Aug. 1976, fi. 295; Sec. For Labour to Banda, 16 Aug. 1976, fi. 295.) Even as the note was made recruitment was already about to resume.
196. MNA-RC, (DOL) STAT D/4/4/25, Memo, Sec. of Labour to Minister of Labour, 12 Apr. 1978, fi. 14.

197. MNA-RC, (DOL) STAT/D/4/4/25, Sec. for Labour, 'Progress of Attestations . . .', 9 May 1980, fi. 42; Memos to the Minister for Sec. for Labour, 12 Apr. 1978, fi. 14; 3 Oct. 1978, fi. 24; & No. C/7/16 for month of Aug. 1979, fi. 33.
198. MNA-RC, (DOL) 1/3/73, reports of payments from TEBA to the Reserve Bank of Malawi in 1980, 'TEBA (WENELA Div.) Expenditure in Malawi 1980', fi. 22.
199. Interview with Mr Ridpath, TEBA representative in Malawi, Lilongwe, 5 June 1989.
200. The agreement was unavailable to a researcher for the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa, in 1984–5 (Whiteside, 1985a (I), p. 36), and has since been refused the ILO and this author. Archives reveal payments of R240 000 from TEBA to the Malawian government in both 1977 and 1980, unchanged from the 1967 agreement, although it is unclear whether further payment is somehow made (MNA-RC, (DOL) 1/3/73, WENELA to the Reserve Bank of Malawi, 7 June 1977, fi. 21; TEBA (WENELA Division), 'Expenditure in Malawi, 1980', fi. 22).
201. Lienau, 1980, pp. 13, 35. Households with labour migrants away were less innovative, less likely to use improved seed varieties, and cultivated less of their land. In one district 55 per cent of migrants were working outside the country, mainly in South Africa.
202. Fleischer, 1982; cited in James, 1992, p. 13.
203. James, 1987, p. 14.
204. Interview with Ridpath, 5 June 1989; labour official, May 1989.
205. Interview with Ridpath; labour official May 1989.
206. TEBA, 1988, p. 4. The Chamber of Mines' attitude to AIDS among Botswana recruits demonstrates that the disease was not the real issue. At a semi-secret meeting in mid-1988 between South African Chamber of Mines representatives and the permanent secretaries of labour of the Southern African Labour Conference countries, the president of the Chamber of Mines informed Botswana's permanent secretary that Botswana's HIV incidence among Chamber of Mines recruits had overtaken Malawi's, but no action was taken against the Botswana workers (interview with B.C. Gondwe, economic affairs officer, UN-ECA, Lusaka, 17 Oct. 1989). TEBA maintained that 4 per cent of 1000 Malawian goldminers were carriers of the disease, but Malawi announced that it had found those repatriated as HIV carriers to be uninfected (*Race Relations Survey*, 1987–8, pp. 316–17).
207. At a meeting in London in mid-1988 between the permanent secretaries of labour of the SALC countries and Chamber of Mines representatives, the president of the Chamber privately informed the Botswanan permanent secretary that the incidence of HIV among Botswana's Chamber of Mines recruits had overtaken Malawi's (interview with B.C. Gondwe, economic affairs officer, UN-ECA, Lusaka, 17 Oct. 1989).
208. SALC/X/6/Rev.1, para. 59, p. 12; labour official, May 1989.

3 Zambia: Labour Export and the Creation of a State

Zambia has a record of policy on labour outflows that illustrates especially well the divergence of interests among different British administrations and the British government over the supply of labour among them.

Zambia was originally a province chartered to the British South Africa Company (BSA) along with the modern Zimbabwe, then Northern and Southern Rhodesia respectively. As in other territories, BSA's northern officers energetically set about establishing a wage-labour supply, taxing and torturing the population and gradually undermining African agriculture.

The administrations of the north quickly became less cooperative about supplying labour to the greater British investments in the south – pursuing their own interests rather than BSA's. At first they wished to send more labour to the Belgians rather than preserve it for the British. The northern administrations then amalgamated and continued to develop distinctive interests – especially the maximization of their own taxes and other revenues derived from labour migrants working in Southern Rhodesia. Their separate interests were reinforced by separate rule after 1924.

In the next stage the administration of Northern Rhodesia gradually became convinced of the value of their developing copper deposits, and thus grew interested in retaining more labour to work at home. Trilateral deals in the 1930s on labour migrants moving among Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland paved the way for a federation of the three in 1953. Labour exchange between the two Rhodesias became particularly important in maximizing capitalist economic development. However surplus labour became the trend soon after federation was achieved, contributing to an erosion of its foundations. African opposition to labour export to Southern Rhodesia, and to underdevelopment, became a major issue of Northern Rhodesian nationalism, leading to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's secessions in 1962 and 1963, respectively.

The year following the political independence of Northern Rhodesia – renamed Zambia – the new African government promptly cut off labour recruiting for abroad and began to discourage all labour export. In addition to ideological reasons for reducing the migration, copper mining and the economy were again booming. There was reason again to believe that labour would be needed at home, and migration to Zambia's neighbours soon dwindled to low levels. This constituted not the first, but rather the third coincidence between the Zambian government's labour-export policy and its increasing independence in the evolving system of states.

THE CHARTER PERIOD, 1899–1924

Tonga and Lozi people seem to have been migrating from as early as the beginning of operations at Kimberly in the 1860s, long before Europeans occupied the Rhodesias.[1] However they were by no means migrating out of desperation. Livingstone had described Barotseland in the west of today's Zambia as a fertile valley, where 'the people never lack abundance of food'.[2]

Africans were leaving the area that is now Zambia to work in the Cape Colony, Transvaal or on the coasts long before Europeans even occupied the Rhodesias.[3] The British South Africa Company (BSA) began to administer the ten northern territories from 1891, running the north-eastern and north-western parts as separate possessions until they became Northern Rhodesia in 1911.[4]

The BSA board was mainly interested in its mineral investments, treating agriculture as secondary despite a rise in the number of white settlers.[5] Industry, however, performed very poorly during BSA rule from 1899 until 1924. Some labour was drawn away to the north to work in lead and zinc mines at Kabwe from 1902; on the construction of the Livingstone–Katanga railway from 1904 to 1909; and in copper mines at Kansanshi from 1908. However large-scale internal labour migration would only begin later – with the discovery of exploitable copper in the late 1920s.[6]

Tax collection and labour coercion conducted by BSA officials was extreme. When people failed to pay, their huts and granaries were burned, people were flogged and women raped. Village amalgamation was undertaken to consolidate control through willing chiefs,


and village headmen who did not cooperate in recruitment were publicly flogged.[7] Very few Africans were capable of paying their taxes in cash, and so they were forced to seek work.[8]

While this encouraged emigration to waged employment as intended, workers did not all go to work *where* they had been intended. Instead four main streams of labour migration to neighbouring territories developed: to Katanga in the Congo, to Southern Rhodesia, to South Africa and, later, to Tanganyika.[9]

While the Southern Rhodesian administration pursued labour import and retention for BSA's investments there, the Northern Rhodesian administrations sought to maximize labour export for the tax revenues they earned. They were alone in pursuing this, opposing not only Southern Rhodesia and BSA, but also their own territories' settlers, who wished to retain more labour for their own accumulation. BSA's board of directors in London and the British Colonial Office urged the northern administrators to work for the good of the company as a whole, but as the dynamic intensified the London officials were increasingly forced to pull back, simply approving or vetoing the initiatives of the administrations.

Outflows to Katanga

The Northern Rhodesian administrations had an early, major conflict of interest with BSA, whose interests it was supposed to represent, over the export of labourers to the Belgian-administered Congo to the north. Following the First World War, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), developed the largest mineral deposit in tropical Africa in a finger of Belgian territory – part of the Congo – that extended southward into Northern Rhodesia. The Congo's mines were the first to begin drawing labour away from Northern Rhodesia on a large scale, and the Northern Rhodesian administrations were happy to have the tax revenue that Africans yielded from their Congo wages. BSA, however, resisted the draining of labour power from its empire and sought instead to direct it into Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia was then unified under a single administration and became an even more stubborn defender of its own interests, maximizing its revenue through the widespread provision of labourers. Northern Rhodesia would go on to become a separate possession in 1924, upon the end of BSA rule.



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 2 Zambia: estimated population working abroad

The earliest formal labour export from Northern Rhodesia was northward. Labour was supplied to Tanganyika Concessions Ltd under an arrangement dating back to the supply of porters to the Africa Lakes Company in 1894. The porters carried goods from Karonga and Blantyre in today's Malawi to the Luapula River and on to Belgian territory in today's Zaire.

After their arrival the BSA administrator allowed recruiting to continue for work outside the country, as long as recruits were returned home after completion of their contracts. The UMHK, a growing copper-mining company, engaged Robert Williams and Co. to supply most of its labour from Northern Rhodesia, beginning in 1906.[10] North-Eastern Rhodesia was to be the primary source of UMHK labour, a factor that determined the location of the UMHK's Lubumbashi smelter.[11] At this point the UMHK had closer links with BSA than with its own Belgian Comité Special du Katanga.

BSA was quite successful at first at retaining labourers within its territory. Intent on keeping migrants from heading north, it directed the majority to Southern Rhodesia. The estimated number grew from 6000 in Southern Rhodesia and 1000 in the Congo in 1906, to 17 000 in Southern Rhodesia but only 2000 in the Congo by 1911. The proportion of the population working outside North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia rose from less than 1 per cent to over 2 per cent over the same five years (see Figure 2).

The unification of mining capital and the state greatly facilitated

the coercion of Africans into waged labour. Taxation and recruitment were virtually one system. In North-Western Rhodesia there were hut burnings and floggings, and even the shooting of tax defaulters attempting to escape a sentence of forced labour.[12] However, 'pressure' on Northern Rhodesian Africans to perform waged labour was of limited use without 'containment' to direct the labourers southward.

From 1906 until 1911 BSA attempted to embargo labour migration to Katanga, and soon to all non-British possessions, using an outbreak of sleeping sickness as its excuse. By 1907 the borders of North-Western Rhodesia were closed to labour export to Katanga and Angola, while the borders of North-Eastern Rhodesia were closed to Katanga and German East Africa.[13] At one point in 1908 BSA destroyed all canoes to prevent migrants from crossing the Luapula River.[14]

UMHK's reaction to this obstruction of its North-Eastern Rhodesian labour supply was to intensify pressure on Katanga households to supply men for wage labour. The Comité Special du Katanga agreed to the request of the UMHK for a money tax to increase their local labour supply, although declining to appoint government officials to 'encourage' waged labour at the district level.[15] Waged employment in the Congo had been expanding at an incredible rate, rising from 46 000 in 1916 to 278 000 by 1924.[16] Monopsony was not achieved by the UMHK's new Bourse du Travail, however, and Robert Williams and Company's recruiting operations continued to thrive.[17]

Despite hiring shortfalls, even at BSA's expanding Kansanshi mine, the Northern Rhodesian secretary chose to ignore the company's southern interests and requested permission to allow Robert Williams and Co. to begin recruiting again so that his administration could earn more taxes. The BSA board in London agreed at first, but when the Southern Rhodesian provincial administration in Salisbury cabled London to complain that this would reduce its labour supply, the board members changed their minds.[18] The company secretary for Northern Rhodesia then argued back that controlled recruiting was better than a free-for-all and the board again reversed its decision.[19] Under the resulting agreement, Williams and Co. were permitted to recruit 1000 men per year for the Union Minière, providing that they refrained from any other hiring of Northern Rhodesians.[20]

The northern and southern administrations of BSA were by 1911 seriously at odds over recruitment for Katanga, foreshadowing their

eventual divorce. Labour migrant policy had become the major point of disagreement between north and south.

It is important to keep in mind the horror behind this haggling. Thousands of people were being literally worked to death. By 1913 shortages of labourers at the UMHK mines, where the death rate was 12 per cent per year, had brought prospecting and development to a halt.[21] The mortality rate of Rhodesian labour at the mines was only a third of that of Congo labourers, perhaps because Rhodesians were voluntary workers while the Congolese were still often forced to work.[22] The Northern Rhodesian secretary finally threatened particularly bad mines with the '60 rule', meaning that if their death rate exceeded 60 per thousand per year they could not recruit from Northern Rhodesia.[23]

Demand for copper stimulated production in Northern Rhodesia during the First World War, and mine employment rose from under 4000 in 1914 to 7500 by 1918. The BSA administrator then closed certain areas of supply to Robert Williams and Co., restricting recruitment to a mere 250 per month. In compensation Barotseland and Kasempa district in North-Western Rhodesia were opened up to the Congo.[24] But after a costly invasion into German territory, which soaked up troops and porters, BSA temporarily extended the ban on movements to the Congo to cover all of Northern Rhodesia, punishing those caught abetting border crossing.[25] This was followed by a Colonial Office ban the next year in response to the high Congo death rate.[26] When the Belgian military also stopped recruiting – north of 9° south – the UMHK was briefly left surrounded with inaccessible labour, until the Belgian government relented and allowed it to recruit elsewhere in the Belgian territory.[27]

When the Northern Rhodesian copper mines were forced to shut down, the UMHK again became the sole copper producer in the region. Williams and Co. were once more allowed to recruit in Northern Rhodesia, this time in the whole of North-Eastern Rhodesia and in seven districts of the North-West. The UMHK's labour force more than doubled between 1918 and 1920, while the Northern Rhodesian mines remained inactive.[28]

In one odd twist, the UMHK's costs for Northern Rhodesians compared with the Congolese suddenly rose to 150 per cent due to a fall in the relative value of the Belgian franc. Northern Rhodesians began leaving and Katangan employers withheld their pay in an effort to detain them.[29] Once the initial shock wore off, it became evident that the Rhodesian presence in UMHK mines was declining

only slowly, retaining over half of its labour force. But the UMHK had already begun to 'Congolize' its supply, stating that it preferred its better-controlled local workers.[30] The change in exchange rates had greatly improved the value of employment in British territory for Congolese workers, causing a reversal in the net labour flow between the two possessions.[31]

The coming and going of migrants northward was still partly unaffected by the company's restrictions. There was a small drop in the First World War, but by 1920 growing labour demand in Katanga was bringing in 14 000 Northern Rhodesians.[32] This was only a minority of Northern Rhodesian emigrants however, who totalled an estimated 40 000, or 4 per cent of the population, by 1921 (see Figure 2).

By 1920, then, it was clear that interterritorial relations both within and between the BSA charter area and the Congo were to be completely dominated by labour-supply issues. The interests of the colonial powers in interempire labour-supply were being subordinated by the struggles of individual administrations' officers to control the tides of migrants. The British government and the BSA board of directors in London increasingly leaned back and watched the unfolding dynamic among their subalterns, intervening more and more selectively.

'Internal Labour Export': Outflows to Southern Rhodesia

The movement of labourers within the BSA charter area, from Northern to Southern Rhodesia, was also the cause of much friction within the company. The two original northern administrations were more committed to maximizing their province's local tax revenues than to maximizing the company's accumulation in the south. They were faced with a growing lobby from European settlers in Northern Rhodesia to have the flow to Southern Rhodesia reduced. Bound by the BSA board not to do so, they increased pressure on the African population to perform more waged labour in an attempt to satisfy all demand.

Despite the European onslaught of taxes and the bureaucratization of labour, many Africans were still maintaining considerable economic independence. In Barotseland, for instance, there was a growing

market for African grain. Labour migration mainly affected subject peoples there until the First World War. However rising European tax demands in Barotseland, as elsewhere, forced more farmers to go off to work for Europeans and African agricultural surpluses fell.[33]

The Southern Rhodesian Chamber of Mines made the first arrangements with a labour agent in Barotseland in 1895, but the plan was delayed due to an African rebellion and a lack of infrastructure. When it returned again in 1899 it was dismayed to find direct competition from the newly installed Transvaal Chamber of Mines' recruiting agency, and was only able to engage small numbers. The Southern Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) began recruiting in North-Eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1906, and had established operations in North-Western Rhodesia by 1912.[34] It was a wild time, with many recruiters operating quite lawlessly.

Negotiations between Southern Rhodesia and the two Northern Rhodesian administrations were hectic. The administrator of North-Western Rhodesia 'asked' the RNLB to stop recruiting in 1904, in order to retain labourers for its railroad construction. But labour supply from North-Eastern Rhodesia to the south ceased the following year, and the Transvaal's 'Rand Agency' was given permission to recruit 1000 per year.[35] Desperate for tax revenue, the North-West's administrator reversed his position and allowed the RNLB back in: 'We want our taxes and that is the only real reason we continue to allow our labour to be recruited'.[36]

Negotiations between Southern and North-Eastern Rhodesia were equally volatile. By 1905 the BSA had successfully enforced a money poll tax in North-Eastern Rhodesia to press more Africans into the wage economy. However this was done at a time when labour demand was expanding considerably in the Congo, thus far more migrants headed north than to BSA mines in the south. The Northern Rhodesian administrations did not seem to care, as in this way they collected even more taxes – an understandably unpopular attitude in Southern Rhodesia, where the company was argued to come first.[37] When the North-Eastern administrator then pushed the issue even further and asked the Southern Rhodesian administration to provide for a resident North-Eastern labour inspector, the company's assistant secretary in Salisbury was quite taken aback:

> It must be remembered that SR is not a foreign state, but is under the Administration of the BSA Co. and it is the earnest desire of the Board that in this, as in all other cases, the three Provinces

> of Rhodesia should be regarded as one territory with which the officials of the Company should loyally cooperate for the general good of the Company.[38]

The two provinces of Northern Rhodesia were not yet a 'foreign state', but labour-supply issues would go on pushing their officers to behave as if they were. The surprised BSA had discovered an embryonic state-system growing inside its charter area.

The North-Eastern administrator soon compromised a little, opting for better-controlled flows and signing labour-supply deals with the RNLB in mid-1906. The North-Eastern negotiators bargained hard, however, winning a deal that included specified contracts of 6–12 months, medical examinations, RNLB transport, 50 per cent compulsory deferred pay, compulsory repatriation and compensation for death or injury.[39] These contracts were taken over by the combined Northern Rhodesian administration in 1911, preserving the RNLB's monopsony in Northern Rhodesia until 1913.[40]

By 1912–13 the white settler population of Northern Rhodesia was again lobbying the administrator to stop labour emigration to the south.[41] The African aristocracy in Barotseland might also have complained about the labour drain as they were no longer obtaining tribute labour from outlying areas.[42] The administration responded by becoming a little more grudging in its cooperation, and only 6000 were recruited by the RNLB in all of Northern Rhodesia in 1912 compared with 7000 recruited in the North-West alone the previous year. As a result there was a general increase in labour-supply to mines and white farms within Northern Rhodesia.[43]

The coming of the First World War interrupted the Northern Rhodesian administration's still shaky claim to its own labour. BSA quickly drafted some 273 797 people from the North-East alone to serve in the East African Carrier Corps, or *tenga-tenga*, including 11 000 women.[44] As soon as the war ended planters in the North-East again took up the cry against RNLB recruiting. This time the resident commissioner openly defended the recruiting, pointing out that there were always surplus recruits waiting to sign on and that the problem was simply that plantation wages were too low to attract them.[45]

Almost all Africans found themselves increasingly ruled by a bureaucracy with the mentality of ruthless camp commandants. In an effort to supply all the quarrelling parties as well as balance the budget, the administration's officers were obsessed with efficient tax

collection, counting huts, registering males, and either drafting defaulters for stints of compensatory labour or burning their homes.

The contradictions of the administration's position as allocator of scarce labourers remained unresolved during the BSA period. The company's board and its Southern Rhodesian administration both conspired to restrict Northern Rhodesia to the role of supplier of workers for company accumulation in the south, but while there were clear limits to the capacity and authority of a subordinate administration to resist, the Northern Rhodesian administration had stubbornly taken on a life of its own, with increasingly autonomous interests regarding labour supply.

The Northern Rhodesian administration had not, however, taken an antimigration stance. It was primarily interested in maximizing its tax revenues by having *more* people working abroad. In 1921 workers abroad had reached an estimated 4 per cent of the population. There then appears to have been a fall in labour migration to only 32 000, or 2.8 per cent, in 1925. By 1927 it was back up to an estimated 43 000, or about 3.5 per cent of the population (see Figure 2). This was part of an overall regional trend as the proportion of populations working in another country held roughly steady in the region during the 1920s (see Figure 9 in Chapter 10).

Other Outflows

Not only was the company facing competition from the Congo and disagreement between its provincial governments over the supply of labourers, it also found itself facing competition from other British possessions, including South Africa, South-West Africa and Bechuanaland, if not yet from Tanganyika. Unconcerned for Southern Rhodesia's labour needs and possessed of an unquenchable thirst for taxes, the Northern Rhodesian administration proved willing to allow workers to go off anywhere as long as bad conditions did not provoke British censure.

South African employers were also after Northern Rhodesian labour. The Transvaal Chamber of Mines' Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela) was well established in Northern Rhodesia's Barotseland by 1906, making it difficult for Rhodesian recruiters to penetrate.[46] When Wenela applied to the Transvaal government to

recruit in Northern Rhodesia, the Southern Rhodesian RNLB was still only poorly established, without even a resident agent. The RNLB thought it best to cooperate with Wenela for fear of losing any outright recruiting war, and it agreed to allow labour to be recruited from British Central Africa (Malawi) and North-Eastern Rhodesia, where it was less active.[47]

In 1907 the Transvaal government requested permission for Transvaal recruiters to operate throughout the North-East and North-West, but the company administrator in Salisbury refused. In response Wenela positioned itself just inside the Portuguese East African border with North-Eastern Rhodesia, channelling recruits through Fort Jameson and Salisbury in the south. This provoked the RNLB to complain that its own territory was being used to favour the competition. When a conference was held in Salisbury to discuss the matter, it was suggested that the real problem was that Wenela's through-traffic was influencing Southern Rhodesians to emigrate to South Africa – a deliberate Wenela tactic.[48] South Africa's tentacles were subsequently withdrawn with the prohibition of recruiting north of 22° latitude.

A further stream of migration from Northern Rhodesia was opening up to South-West Africa, where Barotse migrants could earn pay four times higher than at home.[49] The South West African Co. Ltd requested permission to recruit miners from Barotseland in 1924.[50] The request was favourably received in Northern Rhodesia, which was struggling to keep up tax revenues:

> I do not see any objection to natives from the Barotse District proceeding to SWA to suitable employment, and in fact it would be to their advantage, and the Government's, if a new labour market could be found in that territory for them.[51]

But while the Northern Rhodesian subalterns were willing, the 'large and increasing number' migrating to South-West Africa were too often being murdered or were dying of thirst en route. Men's willingness to undertake such desperate journeys reflected the disappearance of any real alternative at home. The human carnage was unacceptable vis-à-vis Britain, where labour policies were increasingly in the public eye, and so recruiting was never permitted.[52]

Workers from Northern Rhodesia had also begun working in the protectorate of Bechuanaland, finding work in the Tuli Block of Afrikaner farms while en route to South Africa. While Bechuanaland

had a proclamation requiring all foreign Africans from south of the equator to have a pass from their home administration, it was decided to exempt those from Northern Rhodesia.[53]

The Northern Rhodesian administration was apparently willing to send labourers anywhere where conditions were not so appalling that they might embarrass the British government. The BSA's board and administrator in Salisbury, for their part, were increasingly unable to control the labour-export promotion of their northern officers.

A PROTECTORATE AND A COLONY

Having taken direct control of what had become the two Rhodesias by 1924, the British government provided no less harsh a labour policy than had its BSA proxy. So many were pushed into the wage economy in Northern Rhodesia that wages lagged well below those of its neighbours. More and more migrants went abroad, with the administration collecting far more taxes than would have been possible had the population remained at home. Even when the huge new copperbelt development promised enormous internal economic development and needed more labour, the administration still hesitated before restricting migration abroad.

When the BSA's charter was ended in 1924 the north was made a protectorate and a colony was set up in the more settled south. This provided for more complex administration and greater sensitivity to European settlers, especially regarding their African labour requirements, and more definitely divided the former BSA territory into labour-importing and labour-exporting areas.

Northern Rhodesia's 4200 white settlers were a modest group compared with Southern Rhodesia's 34 000, but they still weighed heavily on the viability of agriculture for 1 100 000 Africans. Only 19 000 square miles of land, out of a total of 291 000, was taken by whites and the overall population density remained a low 3.5 per square mile. However a web of discriminatory policies undermined African production all the same.[54] In particular, a deliberate lack of railways and feeder roads outside white-settler areas made it very difficult to transport harvests from African reserves.[55]

The Northern Rhodesian population was forced to work for wages

in far greater numbers than in Katanga for instance, where Africans retained more options.[56] Wages in Northern Rhodesia were thus the lowest in British Africa – only 4d per day on farms. Africans' taxes, however, remained a stiff 7s 6d or 10s per year, in compliance with the Colonial Office's demand that the books be balanced as much as possible.[57] Average mine wages of 15s per month were better than in the Congo but considerably short of the 22/6 being paid on Tanganyikan sisal estates or the 32/6 offered at Wankie colliery in Southern Rhodesia. Conditions in the copperbelt were also the worst.[58]

By 1929 there were at least 42 000 Northern Rhodesians, almost all men, working outside the country. About 30 000 were in Southern Rhodesia and over 10 000 were working at the UMHK. The numbers would rise to an estimated 60 000 by 1933 and 75 000 by 1937 – equal to some 5.3 per cent of the population (see Figure 2).

The discovery of Northern Rhodesia's massive copperbelt increased mine jobs from 8500 in 1927 to 32 000 by 1930.[59] White farmers were especially upset as mining was drawing away some of their labour. The Northern Rhodesian administrator was sceptical of white farmers' claims of shortage but wanted to quieten them for fear that they would scare away mining investment.[60] When white farmers attempted to press their advantage by repeating their perennial request that labour export be stopped completely, they were pointedly refused.[61]

At this point the administrator was reluctant to abandon labour-export revenues in favour of the risky new mining venture. The Northern Rhodesian copperbelt mines were still forced to secure some of their labour force by recruiting from distant regions of the north. Ironically the Congo's recruiting areas in Northern Rhodesia were actually nearer to the copperbelt than were the copperbelt's own recruiting areas, and the copper mines were also bringing in Nyasaland labourers through the RNLB in Southern Rhodesia.[62] Employers argued that if outflows were sufficiently restricted they would be able to obtain all their labour on the open market inside Northern Rhodesia. The administration finally gave in and informed the Katanga mines that recruiting for Katanga would be stopped.[63]

As elsewhere the Great Depression changed everything. Demand for workers dropped dramatically in Northern Rhodesia and hiring shortfalls shifted almost instantly to worrisome unemployment.[64] Labour consultants recommended employment creation schemes to see Africans through, but conservatives dismissed this as expensive pandering and recommended increased labour export instead.[65] The

UMHK was in the same circumstances, with employers there firing workers in order to hire less expensive rookies.[66] Just when sufficient labourers were the least of an employer's problems, in mid-1931 formal recruiting in Northern Rhodesia for Katanga was officially stopped. The flow of voluntary labour to Northern Rhodesian mines had become so dependable that internal recruiting was stopped as well and labour policy was briefly a non-issue.[67]

The prospects for copper development, however, looked dim again. All but two mines were closed when prices collapsed. The Milligan Report on Northern Rhodesia's economic prospects recommended that European settlement should not be increased as agricultural exports did not show sufficient promise. Although Europeans were concerned at the growth of African maize marketing, a marketing board was nevertheless set up. In fact some of the first steps were made towards developing African agriculture – perhaps because it had been made abundantly clear to the administration that the development of the territory would not be based on a further large influx of Europeans.[68]

The administration, however, was far from completely accepting British thinking on African development. As soon as the depression was over Northern Rhodesian native-affairs officials became adamant that employers should resume recruiting, fearing the creation of a landless labouring class. Copperbelt riots in 1935 had been aggravated by unemployment there, and the administration wished to ensure that the unemployed were recruited from the reserves rather than encouraged to strike off on their own. Official reports, especially the Lacey Report, were critical of the effects of net emigration on district economies and recommended increased control to retain the reserve population.[69] The scheme was then lost in the outbreak of war and the issue was dropped.[70]

Fine-tuning its labour-control mechanisms continued to be a major preoccupation of the administration, even with a temporary labour surplus. A new ordinance created 'labour districts' where recruiting could be prohibited.[71] The prosecution of those who returned after deserting an employer abroad was streamlined, while recruiting and runners were licensed and bonded and recruiting in urban areas was made subject to special permission.[72]

By the end of the 1930s, with the huge copper reserves proving their long-term worth after all, the Northern Rhodesian administrators again became interested in retaining labour supplies – and more than they had ever been. But their previous zealous pursuit of worker

export had left them too little means to stem the flow and they were forced to return to the interterritorial bargaining table in order to win back more control.

BARGAINING AND BUREAUCRACY

The increasing need for governments to control labour movements and conditions spawned a new era of bureaucratic bargaining. Copperbelt employers and white farmers wanted to retain first access to Northern Rhodesian labour supplies. This conflicted with Westminster's enduring view that labour should be free to migrate to British investments in the subcontinent, especially to Southern Rhodesian mines, agriculture and industry. This conflict was the root of white-settler nationalism in Northern Rhodesia, leading mine owners to demand a ban on labour emigration in 1935, and nudging their administration belatedly to support them. There followed a prolonged period of bargaining between the Northern Rhodesian administration in Livingstone and a number of parties, under the watchful eye of the British government. A trilateral labour-supply agreement resulted – the Tripartite Agreement – as well as a quadripartite agreement with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines.

In essence, the Northern Rhodesian government offered easy access to its surplus labourers in exchange for cooperation from other governments in reducing clandestine migration. Southward flows were restricted under the Tripartite Agreement's new controls and a renewed South African bid for access to recruiting was effectively rebuffed.

The Tripartite Agreement

By 1937 the number of labour migrants working outside Northern Rhodesia was an estimated 5.4 per cent of the population, or about 85 000 (see Figure 2). For more and more Africans it had become quite impossible to earn enough cash locally to pay their taxes and emigration grew out of control. In Barotseland the early agricultural prosperity witnessed by Livingstone had now given way to migration dependency, with many people suffering great hardships whenever hiring was reduced.[73] Africans were managing to market more grain but this was largely the result of socioeconomic stratification. Production per capita was still low – often below subsistence level.

Above African heads burgeoned the ever-larger bureaucracy of labour control. The Rhodesias and Nyasaland sat down to hammer out the Tripartite Agreement, a grand scheme to eliminate clandestine migration.[74] The essence was that Southern Rhodesia would get first call on the labour available from its two northern neighbours in exchange for facilitating the control of labourers' movements through a better documentation system. Organized recruiting in Northern Rhodesia at the time was limited to a licence for 4000, mainly from Barotseland and Livingstone for Southern Rhodesia, and 2500 for the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association.[75]

The Tripartite Agreement dominated relations between the two Rhodesias. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia gained the exclusive right to issue travel documents, and all parties undertook to turn back undocumented would-be workers at their borders. All migrants were to be repatriated after two years.[76]

Southern Rhodesia hoped that regularization would help to give it greater control of through-traffic, a sort of 'labour strainer' that would hold back more of the workers attempting to percolate through to South Africa.[77] A more subtle Southern Rhodesian objective was the creation of a bridgehead for those moving towards federation of the three possessions. The Standing Committee on Migrant Labour, created by the agreement, was the first piece of machinery set up amongst the three as a possible federation, paving the way for Southern Rhodesia's far-sighted plan to create a Central African Federation, from which it could exclude South African recruiters entirely.[78]

While the agreement had been intended to give the Northern Rhodesian administration more control, it was expected to exercise it more judiciously than it did. By 1938 Southern Rhodesia had experienced a sharp fall in migrants from the north – by over a half. Clause 2 of the agreement required that sufficient warning be given so that workers would not find their traditional routes unexpectedly blocked, but Northern Rhodesian officers in Lusaka had purposely introduced the new system too abruptly in order to redirect labour to their copperbelt.[79]

At this point the administration gave in to the Colonial Office's insistence that it form a Labour Department. The new department took a more active interest in external relations of labour migration than had the Native Affairs Department. Northern Rhodesia's new labour commissioner complained in 1940 that Southern Rhodesian officials were admitting labour without endorsed identification as required, and in a compromise a Northern Rhodesian policeman was

stationed at the border to endorse certificates on the spot.[80] There was a sufficient increase in migrants heading south to please Salisbury officials, and Lusaka's new labour commissioner became more flexible, allowing Southern Rhodesian officials to endorse retroactively the passports of those who had entered illegally.[81]

Like so many governments, Northern Rhodesia's had suspended the exercise of control in order to install the apparatus needed to wield it more strongly in the long term. The pattern was to match legal structures with independent migrants' present movements so that these mechanisms could be used to marshal their movements better in the future.

Agreement with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines

Once the three parties had agreed on the terms of their labour system they were able to bargain as a bloc with a fourth party – South Africa – and in 1937 signed the only four-country labour-control agreement in the region's history. Since the South African government had lifted its ban on hiring those from north of 22°, Wenela's demand for labour had rapidly widened clandestine labour flows to the Rand – just when both Rhodesias and the Congo were expanding their own labour forces. By 1937 the mining companies of Northern Rhodesia were talking of a general shortage due – they felt – to 'labour leakage' to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The Northern Rhodesian secretary for native affairs reportedly believed that they were approaching 'a labour war'.[82]

During the month following the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, the three signatories concluded a four-party agreement with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, culminating years of negotiations. The principle was the same. The Chamber of Mines would be allowed to recruit in Barotseland, within a limited quota, in exchange for cooperation in eliminating uncontrolled migrants. Trial Wenela recruitment of 1000 was arranged to see how many would die and the resulting rate of almost 1 per cent per year was considered excellent.[83] Wenela made it clear that it expected to recruit as many as 20 000 in Barotseland alone, where there were thought to be some 73 000 'able-bodied' men.[84]

Of course copperbelt employers disagreed that such large numbers could be spared.[85] The issue was pressure on wages – always the real meaning of 'shortage' and 'surplus'. Concern about Barotseland recruiting was not so great as copperbelt employers considered the

Barotse poor workers, but copperbelt mine managers *were* concerned not to provoke Wenela into looking at North-East Rhodesia.[86] The Salisbury administration, for its part, would have been happier to allow Wenela to recruit 20 000 labourers per year in Southern Rhodesia if Wenela agreed to stay out of Northern Rhodesia.[87]

In the end Wenela did not obtain so many recruits from the north. Its quota of 10 000 was reduced to only 3500 per year and remained there. Access to other labour pools within Northern Rhodesia was denied in what was altogether a clear victory for Northern Rhodesian employers. Recruitment for Rand mines would be suspended by the administration in Lusaka during the Second World War, reinstated afterwards – again at 3500 – and only raised to 5000 in 1959.[88] The Tripartite Agreement's trio therefore functioned fairly successfully to limit Wenela access.

Negotiations with Tanganyika

The Northern Rhodesian Labour Department was determined to regulate movements in every direction. While the Tripartite and quadripartite agreements were on the anvil, an investigation into labour in Tanganyika's Lupa goldfields led to negotiations with that administration as well. Thirty-four thousand Northern Rhodesian labourers a year were travelling to Tanganyika, living in utter squalor and often suffering from scurvy.[89] The report recommended the establishment of transit camps along the route and suggested that negotiations be held with the Tanganyikan administration in Dar es Salaam to obtain the migrants' taxes.[90]

Neither administration wanted the migrants to become emigrants and it was agreed that identity documents, deferred pay and home-country tax collection were all desirable to keep migrants circulating.[91] But Dar es Salaam officials were sceptical of the costs and efficiency of border control and passports, and called the return of taxes 'an expensive clause for us'.[92] At a conference in Dar es Salaam a Northern Rhodesian official asked:

> [Was] labour was to be allowed to wander in every direction over the face of Africa following every inducement that was offered, or was it to be controlled in its movements?[93]

Lusaka's negotiators then subtly threatened to ban recruitment in Northern Rhodesia by the Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association. Squabbling dragged on for years afterwards, until Dar es Salaam officials decided that the Northern Rhodesian government was bluffing.

> Are we prepared to allow the Territory's administrative and police machinery to be used to enforce the provisions in a contract drawn up by the Government of another Territory, which may thus be entirely in the interests of that Territory and detrimental to us?[94]

The Northern Rhodesian negotiators were in a weak position for there was little administrative capacity to control those particular migrants.[95]

Despite the failure with Tanganyika, overall the burst of multilateral negotiations and agreements was a huge control success and had irrevocably changed the labour migrant's environment. Before, a worker had needed only to cross a border to be welcomed with open arms by the officers of a neighbouring administration. Now most workers faced the more treacherous terrain of governments in open collusion.

CONTROL, SHORTAGE AND INTERDEPENDENCE

The Northern Rhodesian administration was to stick to its obligations under the Tripartite Agreement, despite heavy lobbying by white employers to end migration to outside jobs. The implementation of more and more migrant controls, however, continued. The Tripartite Agreement was revised twice in the 1940s, and a new Labour Department was created. Internal opposition to labour export spread – even within the Labour Department – but the administration's leaders stalwartly defended a controlled migration system. Indeed the Northern Rhodesian government found its economy more and more interdependent with that of Southern Rhodesia, giving them a greater interest in a mutually secure labour supply. Bargaining on labour export served as an important forerunner to the federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Differences on the issue, however, also underlay much of the strife and opposition that characterized the federation period.

By the late 1930s copper exports had grown sufficiently to make it clear that copper would dominate the Zambian economy for a long time to come. With wartime demand there was a further spurt of growth in exported copper, which accounted for 87 per cent of total exports, on average, from 1945–53.[96] Such mining development created enormous internal demand for African labour and there was more and more reason for whites in Northern Rhodesia to think that they would grow richer if the labour force was employed in home territory.

The Second World War, like the First, brought swift measures to direct labour where it was needed, including the conscription of Africans to work on private farms.[97] The flows to Southern Rhodesia, and even to Tanganyika, were sharply curbed and the government again proved itself capable of marching labourers to exactly where it wanted them.[98]

After the war the accelerated economic development of the region exacerbated the contrast between Northern Rhodesia's poor African agriculture, resulting in persistent emigration, and that in territories such as Tanganyika and Uganda, where peasant agriculture had been given greater encouragement and migration was low. Growing urban poverty, unrest and crime spawned debate in Northern Rhodesia on the allocation of resources between urban and rural areas, known as the 'stabilization problem'. The government and its migration system was now pitted against even mining capital's preference for a permanent wage-labour force. Labour camps in the copperbelt began to give way to 'towns for Africans', but stabilization was a slow process.

The Labour Department was revised in 1948 and began providing facilities and information in order to guide the movements of independent migrants – creating a middle ground between casual and recruited labour.[99] In their effort to get migrants under the auspices of the legal apparatus, the department even began legalizing contravention of its ordinances. For instance, when the Kariba Dam in Southern Rhodesia proved to be illegally employing many Northern Rhodesian workers, they were all immediately issued the proper documents.[100]

By the mid-1940s the state's role was expanding more and more. A postwar copper boom increased demand for food, and so the Department of Agriculture began to encourage peasant food production through agricultural extension. The countryside began to develop and some peasants – particularly in the southern province – became better off. The African National Congress was formed, becoming

an outspoken critic of labour emigration, and the government became more sensitive to emerging African politics. A development plan was drawn up, which eventually spent a surprising £47.5 million from 1947–56.[101]

Migration patterns were fairly stable. Northern Province residents went to the Congo, the copperbelt and Tanganyikan sisal estates. Eastern Province workers went mostly to Southern Rhodesia, and most Central and Kaonde–Lunda Province residents stayed somewhere within the territory to work.[102] Only from Barotseland did any real number make their way to South Africa. Wenela's permit for 3500 was reinstated in 1946 since it was known to be recruiting across the border anyway.

The Tripartite Agreement was updated in 1942 and 1949 to adjust the details to changing conditions. The Lusaka and Pretoria Labour Departments also began to cooperate more seriously in eliminating clandestine immigration.[103] Labour officers were posted to Elizabethville in the Congo, and to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa to supervise migrants in those countries.[104]

Inflows were still important. Tanganyikan inflows into Northern Rhodesia were now picking up, much as the flow had once reversed between Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. While most copperbelt labour was local, with Angola and Malawi supplying most of the rest, Tanganyikans would represent nearly half its foreign labour force by 1950.[105]

District commissioners were increasingly interested in retaining the labour force to the limit of their control and bargaining position, but the central administration in Lusaka would give only limited support. With still-growing hiring shortfalls, senior commissioners struggled with internal rebelliousness over their labour export policy, receiving many complaints from district-level officers, such as this one:

> I think it is ridiculous to allow men to go to Southern Rhodesia when all able-bodied males are needed urgently in this Territory. May I have your authority to refuse endorsement of passports for Southern Rhodesia and Territories outside Northern Rhodesia?[106]

The provincial commissioner replied, and there were many such replies:

> You should not decline to issue passes to natives who wish to proceed to Southern Rhodesia as this would be a breach of the

> Tripartite Agreement. . . . If this issue interferes with the supply of farm labourers it is to be regretted but it cannot be helped.[107]

Africans were also increasingly vociferous in their opposition to labour migration. Their growing awareness of its exploitative nature was strongly linked to budding political nationalism. A letter sent to the secretary of the legislature appealed for the creation of more industries at home, which would 'Free the Africans', meaning free them from working abroad.[108]

At the same time the two Rhodesias were growing more economically interdependent in the industrial sector, creating a reciprocal interest in a mutually secure labour supply. This was illustrated by the plight of Southern Rhodesia's Wankie Colliery in the early 1950s. Wankie was suffering drastic hiring shortfalls, hit by the Migrant Worker's Act of 1948, which required the repatriation of workers to Northern Rhodesia after two years. Salisbury's economic secretary asked the Labour Department in Lusaka to allow Wankie Colliery to recruit in Tanganyika but was refused on the grounds that it would reduce Northern Rhodesia's Tanganyikan supply.[109] The Wankie labour force stood at nearly 5000 from Northern Rhodesia, about a thousand each from Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and only a few hundred from Mozambique.

The situation was complicated by the copperbelt's dependence on Wankie coal. Copper production fell as Wankie coal deliveries fell, and the copperbelt mines began to send Wankie some of their own labourers in order to keep up their coal supply. Still suffering a shortfall, Wankie asked permission to recruit in Nyasaland, which was then out of bounds, or in Northern Rhodesia, but labourers were scarce everywhere.[110] Bechuanaland was tried and even South Africa – where Wankie ironically found the Natal Coal Owners Association lobbying for permission to recruit in Northern Rhodesia![111]

Copper production looked as if it would go down another 10 per cent for lack of coal but Britain was pushing for an *increase* in copper production.[112] The secretary of state telexed the governor of Northern Rhodesia to ask for the lifting of prohibition on RNLSC recruiting so that Wankie could mine more coal.[113]

The governor faced a dilemma. The copperbelt was falling short of labourers itself but Wankie had still been sent another 1000 men. In addition, copperbelt production had fallen by 20 per cent by 1951 due to coal shortages.[114] The governor eventually gave permission for Wankie to at least send an 'African boss-boy' to recruit Angolans

across the Northern Rhodesian border, but underproduction of coal continued until 1953.[115]

These, then, were among the preconditions of federation: mutual dependence on a secure labour supply and the necessity of mutual cooperation to retain labour within British Central Africa. The Wankie labour shortage brought home the necessity of coordinating labour supplies to maximize mutual accumulation. Labour exchange, the very policy area that had contributed to administrative fission in 1924, was now contributing to administrative fusion.

FEDERATION AND SURPLUS

Three possessions were combined in the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the ten years 1953–63. Labour supply was one of the objectives of federation, and a leading motive of Southern Rhodesia in seeking to bring the two northern territories under what was essentially its administration. But continuing migration was also one of the major reasons for widespread protest against federation among Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans.[116] The protection of domestic labour supplies afforded by the Tripartite Agreement was replaced by the protection of supply within the federation. A new Inter-Territorial Agreement on Migrant Labour between the three territories lasted for the decade of federation, allowing virtually uncontrolled labour migration within the confederacy but under as much administrative control as could be achieved.[117]

The coming of labour surplus, however, changed everything. Salisbury suddenly became interested in *reducing* influxes while Lusaka's officers were faced with such growing unemployment that they began to consider allowing Wenela to recruit, even in the copperbelt. Labour shortfalls, one of the binding agents of federation, had disappeared almost as soon as federation was accomplished, and rising nationalism soon freed the emerging Zambia from its unwanted union.

By 1952 about half of Northern Rhodesia's adult male population was in waged employment. Of these over 30 per cent were estimated to be working elsewhere – at least 48 500 in Southern Rhodesia, 11 000 in South Africa including 7000 in the Rand, another 7000 in the Belgian Congo and 3500 in Tanganyika. Inflows were smaller but

still substantial. Of an African labour force of 202 600 in 1951, aliens were thought to number about 30 000, or 15 per cent, of whom 10 500 were from Nyasaland, 8500 from Portuguese territories – mainly Angola – and 6300 from Tanganyika.

The proportion of the growing population that was working outside Northern Rhodesia was falling, down from about 4 per cent in 1942 to an estimated 2.9 per cent by 1953 (see Figure 2). With the overall labour force growing, labour emigration was becoming less important.

A series of conferences and white papers culminated in the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. While the three separate governments were preserved, the federal government was to control economic and financial affairs, transport and communication, immigration, foreign affairs, education and defence.[118]

Southern Rhodesian whites dreamed of an even more European-dominated Northern Rhodesia, similar to Southern Rhodesia. South Africa looked set finally to inherit its labour supplies – the High Commission Territories – so it seemed wise to form a similar bloc to the north. It was hoped that the primary labour-linkage between the two Rhodesias could be expanded to trade and investment linkages as well. It was also expected that federation would result in Northern Rhodesia's labour export increasing, but two factors mitigated against this. Firstly, Northern Rhodesia's copperbelt expansion was continuing, with increases in the African population of as much as 20 per cent per year. Secondly, permanent housing under stabilization was being provided by mining companies and the government on a scale unequalled in Africa.[119] African miners could now hope for a stable family life.

Almost all opinion was in favour of encouraging this labour stabilization but public opinion was ignored by the governor, whose administration remained the main defender of a migration system. The control of African influxes into urban areas was stiffened and labour exchanges were set up to see that men were hired in the rural areas for term contracts. This provided an alternative to permanent urbanization.[120]

While the availability of labour was quickly improving for better employers, the Labour Department in Lusaka continued to protect its foreign supplies, asking the Nyasaland administration to impose quotas on Tanganyikans recruited by Wenela and the RNLSC in Nyasaland as they were cutting into Northern Rhodesia's supply.

Recruiting on the Northern Rhodesian border with Tanganyika

and the Belgian Congo required a Northern Rhodesian recruiting licence, which was invariably refused. The hiring of those who presented themselves freely was still legal, and many such workers from the Congo were sent to Southern Rhodesia. The Northern Rhodesian Labour Department finally began to grant recruiting licences in order, as always, to extend control.[121]

These efforts, in fact, substantially succeeded in extending control. A good example is the problem of masquerading. Formerly, Northern Rhodesians had posed as Tanganyikans for recruiters in Northern Rhodesia, but Wenela was persuaded to stop recruiting Tanganyikans in Northern Rhodesia and began to recruit Nyasalanders instead. The tripartite documentation arrangements then made masquerading as a Nyasalander almost impossible. Some tried to pose as Angolans, but it was not much use.[122]

Unemployment

By the mid-1950s, only a few years after federation, it was apparent that a new era of labour supply had begun – a rapid transition to unemployment. There was quite suddenly a surplus of labourers for the more desirable jobs, particularly coppermine jobs. Unemployment in the copperbelt became so serious by 1958, at 5–10 000, that central and local authorities cofinanced a scheme to repatriate Africans to Northern Province and implemented rural job-creation projects. For the first time the governor began to consider allowing Wenela to recruit in the copperbelt.[123] Southern Rhodesia was also experiencing growing urban unemployment and took its first steps to slow the influxes, closing down free transport systems.[124]

The whole basis of inter-Rhodesian relations had reversed. Northern Rhodesia was no longer seeking to retain labour and Salisbury was taking measures to keep foreign labour out. When Salisbury terminated the Tripartite Agreement, as of 1960, the Lusaka administration was relieved of any responsibility to retain labour within the federation and began to allow any exiting worker a workbook – this when only a few years earlier it had been going to extremes to uncover outbound impostors.[125] Migration from Northern to Southern Rhodesia was nevertheless in decline, falling from 12 000 official exits in 1951 to 7000 by 1960.[126]

When Wenela's Barotseland quota was increased to 5000 in 1959, it absorbed the extra 1500 in two months and was given an increase

of 1000 the following year, as well as unsolicited quotas for nearly 1000 more in two other districts.[127]

The governor of Northern Rhodesia was growing nervous about the political fodder that Wenela recruiting provided his administration's opponents, whose base of power was mainly workers. African nationalism was growing rapidly among the stabilized workers of the copperbelt, where migration was generally abhorred. The United National Independent Party alleged that Barotse labourers were sent to work in South African collieries 'because nobody else will work there – it is too dangerous'. Recruits for South Africa in actual fact went only to the gold mines, where pay and conditions were considerably better, but the propaganda was still quite damaging.

On the eve of independence the Wenela operation in Barotseland became a major issue, with representatives in the Legislative Assembly caustically referring to it as 'forced labour' because poll taxes, unemployment and control of outside hiring left 'recruits' no choice.[128] But while the administration was vulnerable to criticism for allowing recruiting, it was equally vulnerable to the power of masses of unemployed should the recruiting suddenly end. Even Southern Rhodesian farmers soon lost interest in Northern Rhodesian labour and it became necessary to ask the Northern Rhodesia Federation of Employers to give preference to the hiring of unemployed Northern Rhodesians rather than aliens.[129]

The accumulated labour-retention apparatus of decades had fallen quickly away. Federation, built on a foundation of labour exchange, had become largely irrelevant to labour supplies and Southern Rhodesia would seek smaller and smaller cohorts of labour from its two confederates. Southern Rhodesia enjoyed substantial exports to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and more than its share of federal expenditure, but the growing African nationalism of these two territories could not be thwarted. By 1960 a British commission had recommended that the federation be dissolved so that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland could each be granted independence.[130]

Black opposition to labour migration was as important in the federation's dissolution as Nyasaland labour had been in the federation process itself. Dissolution was of course also underlain by the British government's desire to allow the separate granting of independence to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland without the embarrassment of granting independence to Southern Rhodesia's white regime.[131] There had been high expectations in 1953 of the economic advantages of a bloc of territories, with little real analysis. The reality was that

federation brought surprisingly little increase in investment and interrelationship between the Northern and Southern Rhodesian economies, and the economic links between the three parts remained overwhelmingly links of labour exchange.

What was unforseen was the swell of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia – Africans' drive for advancement and a change in their subordinate labour status. This subordinate status was entrenched in migration, a binding agent of federation. Suddenly migration had become not only less important economically, with labour supplies secure, but also a crippling political liability – something entirely in contradiction with Africans' rightful aspirations.

INDEPENDENT LABOUR RETENTION

Labour export from Zambia was quickly stopped by the post-independence government, despite growing unemployment. Seeking to keep wages down for expected fast growth and job creation, the government's rapid and effective action had been made possible by the long colonial struggle to control the outflows. Strong ideological opposition to supplying labour to white-minority regimes was a secondary cause of the ban, if complicated by political opposition from those hardest hit.

Almost immediately following independence in 1964, a decision was made to do what so many had wanted for so long – end labour export. There is a striking similarity to Malawi at the time of its boycott of jobs in South Africa in 1974. A climate of optimism, growth in employment and the belief that it was necessary to prevent real wages from rising too fast, all encouraged the new government to ban emigration. And just as in Malawi, the policy was at least partly intended to direct labour onto plantations, particularly those of the Zambia Sugar Co., for the plantations remained the hardest places to supply with labourers. Although growing unemployment was relieving the tension between internal development and labour export, the basis of political power and the objectives of those who had mastered it had changed even faster. Gestures of repugnance for South Africa's and Rhodesia's racist societies and their exploitation of labour

migrants were called for by a population fiercely conscious of the region's struggle against white rule.

By independence the number of Zambians working abroad was down to 50–60 000, or roughly 1.5 per cent of the population, the lowest level since about 1909 (see Figure 2). Wenela was still operating as far north as the Malawi/Zambia/Tanzania border area and the debate on whether to end Wenela's Zambian recruiting on purely political grounds was in full swing.[132] Opposition to Wenela was first and foremost ideological, but also developmentalist:

> The arguments against [Wenela recruiting] are: that the work is . . . done in a foreign country whose policies are, to say the least, out of tune with our own; that the actual mine to which the worker will go is not known beforehand; that the financial benefit to the worker seems low; and that people are drained away from the country who, if the application of development projects made employment available for them, might be better employed at home.[133]

In mid-1964 Wenela officials met with various ministers and government officers of Northern Rhodesia – about to be renamed Zambia – to discuss recruits' wages and conditions. The most damaging point for Wenela was that 41 per cent of its men were paid 4s per day or less, plus food, whereas the absolute minimum for a new recruit on the copperbelt had risen to 11/2d per day. The annual licence for 6000 Barotseland recruits was issued for 1965, but recruiting in the two supplementary districts was disallowed.[134] As for Southern Rhodesia, no labour contracting at all was allowed in 1965, and by the year's end only 400 were still legally on contract. Relations with the white regime deteriorated so badly after Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 that the border between the one-time confederates was closed.

Towards the end of the year all labour recruiting of any kind was prohibited in Zambia.[135] Contracts of foreign service were still provided for under the Act, with attestation, maximum durations and other now-standard terms, but it was decided to stop Wenela from hiring after 14 October 1966.[136] Anticipating protests over the loss of jobs, the Ministry of Labour published statistics showing that among Wenela recruits the previous year, 395 men per thousand had been admitted to hospital for injuries and accident, and a startling 953 per 1000 for disease.[137]

While the ban was publicly a political issue, the decision was also economic. Copper prices and production were booming again and the government was in a position to believe that its goal of 11 per cent average annual real growth was attainable. The 'Emergency', 'Transitional', and 'First National' Development Plans all heavily emphasized the creation of new jobs, aiming for 100 000 by 1970. Economic optimism was also buoyed by the promise of bountiful development aid.

Growth from 1964 to 1965, when the decision to stop labour emigration was made, was 10 per cent.[138] Planners were particularly averse to higher wages, especially any real wage increases above rises in productivity in the copper mines.[139] But despite encouraging job creation, only about 300 000 Zambians out of a labour force of 1.5 million had waged or salaried jobs when Wenela recruiting was closed down. The remainder were either subsistence producers on an estimated 400 000 family farms or among the unemployed – who numbered 25 per cent in 1969.[140]

The prohibition of some of the scant job opportunities available was therefore bound to breed resentment, especially when independence brought little immediate tangible benefits in rural areas. In Western Province, rural opposition to the government centred on employment, and the 1966 ban on further labour migration to South Africa became the leading issue for the flourishing political opposition.[141] Members of the Zambia National Assembly for Barotse Province warned the government of the dire spectre of unrest if the jobs were taken away before alternatives were provided.[142]

While there might have been some possibility of a policy reversal on the issue, the South African government was reported to have secretly told Wenela in 1967 that it would no longer be permitted to recruit labour from Zambia or Angola.[143] By 1969 the proportion of Zambia's population working outside the country had fallen to an estimated 1 per cent of the population.[144] By 1972 the Department of Labour had ceased to even mention labour emigration to other countries.[145] By 1984 there would be only about a thousand Zambians working legally in South Africa.

CONCLUSION

Modern Zambia evolved from an African's Africa, to a company-empire's hinterland province, to the British Empire's hinterland

protectorate, to a confederate of a stronger neighbouring colony, to a politically independent state. These successive changes were continually parallelled by shifting labour-export policy.

Migration and underdevelopment ensured that labour was Northern Rhodesia's biggest export until copper took over. The early Northern Rhodesian administration largely balanced its budget for Britain by exporting labour to Southern Rhodesia, despite internal protests from white settlers and mine owners. The administration also exported labour to the Congo despite the protests of the BSA. When a chance for copper-mining development made control of an increasingly scarce labour supply paramount, the administration was drawn into labour-export pacts, which improved control by coordinating governments' policies. These pacts were the basis for further negotiations until – just when secure labour exchange reached the pinnacle of its importance in mutual economic development – they were drawn into a federated unit guaranteeing freedom of labour movement within the federation's borders.

The federation's labour-supply role, however, became almost immediately irrelevant because of a growing surplus of labourers for hire. Migration became a focal point of African opposition to federation and white rule – a political metaphor for forced articulation to Southern Rhodesia for a people with a new dream of independent, internal development. After political independence, with unemployment reducing labour demand abroad, the government took the initiative and entirely banned labour export.

Stubbornly seeking its own course, yet negotiating frequently with neighbouring administrations where there was potential for mutual advantage, Zambia's emerging government's historical labour-export policy has been a long and painful conversion from aggressive labour export to a policy of labour containment. It took decades of struggle to create a capacity for interterritorial migrant control.

Notes and References

1. Macpherson, 1981, p. 154.
2. Livingstone, 1857, p. 215; cited in van Horn, 1977, p. 144.
3. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938, p. 29.
4. Buell, 1928, pp. 234–5.
5. Chipungu, 1988, p. 10.
6. Ohadike, 1969, p. 1.

7. Luchembe, 1982, pp. 122–9; Macpherson, 1981, p. 106.
8. ZANA BS1/16, Foreign Office to Secretary, BSA Co., 31 May 1902, and subsequent correspondence, fp. 2–. The North-Eastern administration introduced labour in lieu of cash until the Foreign Office had this stopped.
9. ZANA RC/256(1), Extract, RC Ellenberger of Bechuanaland Protectorate to Governor, NR, 01 Dec. 1925; Macpherson, 1981, p. 157. Smaller flows went to other destinations, of course, originally the British Central Africa Protectorate (early colonial Malawi) from where patrols hired or seized men to work for the Northern Charterland Company, and later on to South West Africa (Namibia) and Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana).
10. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938, p. 30.
11. Perrings, 1979.
12. Henderson, 1980, pp. 28–9.
13. North-Eastern Rhodesia's Rule No. 1 of 1907; North-Western Rhodesia's Proclamation No. 49 of 1907, which stated that it was 'expedient' to ban the northward movements, probably no accident of wording. The labour flow southward to the company's own mines, however was not interrupted – despite the disease's spread in that direction as well (ZANA BS2/107, various correspondence; ZANA BS3/65, Public Prosecutor to the Sec., Livingstone, 9 Jan. 1914). The London Sleeping Sickness Bureau, for one was unconvinced of the sincerity of the effort at disease control (ZANA BS1/81. letter from Sleeping Sickness Bureau, London, forwarded by Sec. of State to High Commissioner, Pretoria, dated 21 Jan. 1910, fp. 142–4; Perrings, 1979).
14. ZANA BS1/81, Pearson to Sec. to the Administrator, 31 Aug. 1909.
15. Perrings, 1979, p. 20.
16. Buell, 1928, pp. 535–6.
17. Perrings, 1979, p. 20.
18. ZANA BS2/27 Sec. BSA Co., NR, to Administrator, Southern Rhodesia, 15 Apr. 1911, fp. 57–60.
19. ZANA BS2/27 Sec. BSA Co., NR, to Administrator, Southern Rhodesia, 15 Apr. 1911, fp. 57–60.
20. ZANA BS3/133, vol. II, NR Administrator including correspondence on 'native employment'. The company agreed that they would pay poll taxes; be licensed by the Rhodesian government; defer home half of workers' pay; pay a minimum of 15s per month; provide accident compensation; set up medical control points; and limit the work period to 180 work days. The arrangement continued until 1926 in different parts of Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland except for wartime interruptions (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938, p. 30. Perrings, 1979, p. 22).
21. Heisler and Marwick, 1974, pp. 41–2.
22. Buell, 1928, p. 537.
23. Henderson, 1980, p. 30.
24. Perrings, 1979, p. 34.
25. ZANA BS3/65 Sec., Livingstone NR, 9 Jan. 1914, fp. 59.

26. Gelfand, 1961, p. 299.
27. ZANA BS3/27, copy of a cable from UMHK Director-General to Robert Williams and Co., May or June 1916, fp. 51; Robert Williams & Co. to Robert Williams Esq., London, 20 May 1916, fp. 52–6. The disruption of supply was serious and hiring shortfalls resulted. Increased wages, however, made it possible for Williams' agent in Angola to begin to send 200 men 25 capitãos per month. The arrangement with the Portuguese would last only a few years (Perrings, 1979, p. 37).
28. Perrings, 1979, pp. 55–61.
29. ZANA BS3/137, vol. 1, report of Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga, Jan. 1920, fp. 7–9.
30. ZANA BS3/137, vol. 3, Rhodesian Labour in Katanga, 22 Feb., Inspector's Report, fp. 2–5. Rhodesians were thereafter sent back once they had completed 150 work days.
31. ZANA BS3/137, vol. 1, report of Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga, Jan. 1920, fp. 9; Berger, 1974, p. 12.
32. See Appendix 2.
33. See for instance, van Horn, 1977. There is a good deal of excellent historiography of the African agricultural decline.
34. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938, p. 30; Heisler and Marwick, 1974, p. 41.
35. ZINA A11/2/8/17, telegram from Administrator, Salisbury, to Board of Directors, London, 13 Dec. 905.
36. ZINA A11/2/8/16, Administrator Coryndon of North-Western Rhodesia to Administrator Milton of Southern Rhodesia, 30 Mar. 1908, fp. 57–58. A North-Western proposal to allow private Southern Rhodesian agents to recruit in still-unreached areas was calculated to tempt the Southern Rhodesian Chamber of Mines into making concessions to maintain its monopsony. The whole thing nearly backfired when it was realized that the North-West lacked the legislation to block private recruiters if it wanted to. An act was hurriedly promulgated and the RNLB was then granted a monopsony in exchange for more cooperation on taxes (ZINA A11//8/16, Administrator Coryndon, North-Western Rhodesia, to Southern Rhodesian Chamber of Mines, 19 Mar. 1907).
37. Southward flows were also attacked under the usual guise of preventing sleeping sickness, while recruitment for the Rand was suspended in North-Western Rhodesia in 1907 (ZINA A11/2/8/11, fp. 15–16.)
38. ZANA BS1/33, Assistant Sec., BSA Co., to Administrator at Fort Jameson, 29 Sept. 1906.
39. ZINA A11/2/8/11, fp. 15–16. The RNLB was offered a monopsony if it would agree to compulsory worker repatriation and compulsory remittance of two thirds of pay, but it declined (ZINA A11/2/8/10, minutes of General Meeting, RNLB, 30 Aug. 1906, fp. 149–158).
40. Henderson, 1980, p. 30.
41. BSA Co. 1911–12, pp. 83, 94.
42. Gann and Gelfand, 1964, pp. 109.
43. BSA Co. 1911–12, pp. 83, 94. Improved supply was also due in part to the reorganization of the Labour Bureau.

44. Luchembe, 1982, pp. 132–4.
45. ZANA BS3/134, Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, to Sce., North-East Rhodesia, Agriculture and Commercial Association, Fort Jameson, 22 Apr. 1919; and to Chairman, North-Western Farmer's Association, 11 Oct. 1919.
46. ZANA BS1/81, report to M. le Representant, fp. 95–98, and subsequent correspondence.
47. ZINA A11/2/8/1, vol. 1, Sec. of Chamber of Mines, Bulawayo, to Editor, *Gwelo Times*, 8 Aug. 1905, fp. 48–51. To minimize the death rate, recruits were to be restricted to the summer months as in British Central Africa, and there was to be a maximum of only 2000 WNLA recruits per year. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1929, Transvaal Governor to Sec. of State, 6 Aug. 1906.
48. ZINA A/11/2/8/1, vol. 1, RNLB to Administrator, For Jameson 2 Dec. 1907, and subsequent correspondence fp. 15–21; memo on Labour Conference of 17 Dec. 1907, dated 24 Dec., fp. 4–8.
49. ZANA RC/256(1), Administrator, Windhoek, South-West Africa, to Sec. For Native Affairs, Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia, 1 Oct. 1925.
50. ZANA RC/249(1) General Rep. South-West Africa Co. erroneously sent to Sec. for Native Affairs, Salisbury and forwarded to Northern Rhodesia.
51. ZANA RC/249(1), Resident Magistrate, Mongu to Sec. for Native Affairs, Livingstone, 27 Mar. 1924.
52. ZANA RC/249(1), Sec. for Native Affairs to Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 28 Sept. 1926; and to Attorney General, Northern Rhodesia, 13 Oct. 1926; R.M. Mongu to Sec. for Native Affairs, 19 Oct. 1926.
53. ZANA RC/256(1), Resident Commissioner Ellenberger of Bechuanaland Protectorate to Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 1 Dec. 1925; Acting Resident Magistrate Mongu to Sec. for Native Affairs, 24 Dec. 1925; Ellenberger to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 19 Dec. 1925.
54. Buell, 1928, pp. 207, 234.
55. Northern Rhodesia, Dept. of Labour 1940, Annual Report for the Year 1940. By the Second World War only those living in the fishing areas of the south-eastern part of Northern Province were able to earn enough cash to avoid labour migration.
56. See Burawoy, 1982, p. 137.
57. Buell, 1928; Berger, 1974, pp. 19–20.
58. Perrings, 1979, pp. 89–92.
59. Perrings, 1979, pp. 74–7.
60. ZANA RC/255(1), Goode to Horner, 1 Feb. 1926.
61. ZANA RC/255(1), Eastern Rhodesia Agricultural and Commercial Association to Chief Sec., Livingstone, 11 Mar. 1926 and reply 10 Apr. 1926.
62. Berger, 1974, p. 12.
63. Parpart, 1980, p. 58.
64. Parpart, 1980, p. 65.
65. Rotberg, 1977, pp. 154–5.
66. Perrings, 1979, pp. 101–4.
67. Mhone, 1982, p. 73; Davis, 1932, p. 19; cited in Berger, 1974, p. 19.

68. Makings, 1966.
69. Nyasaland, 1937.
70. Heisler and Marwick, 1974, p. 53.
71. Native Labour Ordinance No. 41 of 1930, in Northern Rhodesia, 1930.
72. Ordinance No. 56 of 1929, in Northern Rhodesia, 1929, pp. 233–70.
73. van Horn, 1977.
74. Tripartite Inter-Territorial Agreement on Migrant Labour of 1936, reproduced in Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938, pp. 354–5.
75. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938, pp. 31, 36.
76. While Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had sought formal recruiting and deferred pay agreements, they were obliged to settle for voluntary remittances. Compulsory repatriation turned out to be unworkable, and only the pass system was a modest success.
77. Text of agreement reproduced in Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938, pp. 354–5.
78. Henderson, 1972, pp. 119–25.
79. Salisbury asked for implementation to be delayed, was refused, and then further complained about Northern Rhodesia withholding passports unless taxes were paid (ZINA S1561/5, Sec. for Native Affairs to Sec. to the PM 1 Oct. 1938). The issue continued for some time, Salisbury complaining in 1940 that not enough points of issue were being provided for the precious Northern Rhodesian passports (ZINA S1561/1, sub-file folder labelled 'Passports, Item 2').
80. ZANA NR3/51, Acting Commissioner to Chief Sec. Lusaka, 4 Mar. 1940; Chief Sec. to Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province, 16 Mar. 1940, fp. 25.
81. ZANA NR3/51, Governor Southern Rhodesia to Labour Commissioner, Lusaka.
82. Perrings, 1979, p. 120.
83. Mhone, 1982, p. 75.
84. Perrings, 1979, p. 118, Henderson, 1972, p. 122.
85. Mhone, 1982, p. 76.
86. Mhone, 1982, p. 73.
87. Henderson, 1972, p. 122.
88. ZANA NR3/586, No. 1 Governor, Northern Rhodesia, to Sec. of State for the Colonies, London, 27 Apr. 1960, fi. 78.
89. TNA SEC 25075/1, report by Gore Brown and Bush 1935; TNA SEC 25516, Report on a Survey of Labour Routes, General Labour Conditions and Recruiting as between Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika Territory, p. 1, fp. 31. By 1935 labourers in Tanganyika from Northern Rhodesia at one time numbered around 20 000.
90. TNA SEC 25075/I, report by Gore Brown and Bush, 1935.
91. TNA SEC 25246/I, various memoranda.
92. TNA SEC 25246/I, internal memoranda 15, 18, 28 Dec. 1937, fp. 16–20.
93. TNA SEC 25246/I, report of the discussions, fp. 69–88.
94. TNA SEC 25246/II, internal memorandum dated 14 Oct. 1940, fp. 17.

95. TNA SEC 25516, Shire Highlands Provincial Governor citing a letter from District Commissioner, Kasama, NR, to Lamb, Tanganyika Secretariat, 17 Dec. 1937 and 4 Jan. 1938, fp. 1–7; 'Report on a Survery of Labour Routes, General Labour Conditions & Recruiting as between Northern Rhodesian and Tanganyika Territory', fp. 31 et seq.
96. Baldwin, 1966, p. 36.
97. ZANA NR3/139, 'Interim Report on the Second Food Production Committee', fi. 2; *The Emergency Powers (Conscription of Natives for Farm Labour) Regulations, 1942.*
98. Northern Rhodesia, Dept. of Labour, 1944, p. 5.
99. Philpott, 1945, vol. pp. 50–2; Heisler and Marwick 1974, p. 54 citing *International Labour Review*, 1947, vol. 55, p. 380.
100. ZANA NR11/195, Dept. of Labour, Lusaka to Sec. for Native Affairs, Lusaka, 28 May 1957, fp. 100.
101. Oxenham, 1976.
102. Northern Rhodesia, Dept. of Labour, 1944, p. 5.
103. ZANA NR3/56, District Circular No. 12 of Chief Secretary's Office, fp. 8. Other than WNLA recruits in transit, Africans travelling through Northern Rhodesia to South Africa could only do so legally if they had first received permission from the commissioner for immigration and Asiatic affairs, Pretoria: 'Such permission is invariably refused, but when an African applies for it [he should proceed thusly . . .]'.
104. Northern Rhodesia, 1945, p. 6.
105. Ohadike, 1969, pp. 3–4.
106. ZANA NR3/53, District Commissioner Kalobo to Provincial Commissioner Kalobo, 28 Sept. 1943, fi. 37.
107. ZANA NR3/53, Provincial Commissioner Read to District Commissioner Senanga, 27 Oct. 1943.
108. ZANA SEC 2/209, H.R. Lincoln Negrobirthbrook to Secretary, Legislature, 1946, fi. 112.
109. ZANA NR3/60, vol. 1, Copper Mining Company's Manager to Economic Sec., Lusaka, 09 Dec. 1950.
110. ZANA NR3/60, vol. 1, Manager Wankie Colliery Ltd. to Director of Native Labour, Northern Rhodesian Government, Lusaka, 4 Apr. 1951; telegraph from Governor, Southern Rhodesia, to Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 09 Jan. 1951, fi. 20.
111. ZANA NR3/60, vol. 1, Nyasaland Government Rep. & Labour Officer for Northern Rhodesia, Johannesburg, to Acting Labour Commissioner, Lusaka, 11 June 1951, fi. 59.
112. *Northern News* (Northern Rhodesia), 'Drop in Wankie Coal Supplies to Mines', 29 May 1951; *Bulawayo Chronicle* (Northern Rhodesia), 'Copperbelt Coal Crisis May Affect Britain's Defence Drive', 29 June 1951.
113. ZANA NR3/60, vol. 1, cypher, Secretary of State, London, to Governor, Lusaka, 26 July 1951, fi. 89.
114. *Northern News* (Northern Rhodesia), 'Coal Cuts Will Close Mines', 18 Dec. 1951.
115. ZANA NR3/60, vol. 1, Northern Rhodesian Labour Commissioner to Wankie Colliery, 21 Apr. 1953.

116. African affairs, local government, housing, police, internal security, industrial relations, lands, mining and irrigation.
117. Heisler and Marwick, 1974, p. 74.
118. Zacklin, 1969, pp. 28–30.
119. Scott, 1954, p. 434.
120. ZANA NR3/60, vol. 1, extracts from minutes of councils, fi. 7–8.
121. ZANA NR3/588, Northern Rhodesian Labour Representative, Salisbury, to Labour Commissioner, Lusaka, 27 Oct. 1958; Provincial Commissioner, Jamieson to Labour Commissioner, Lusaka, 17 Nov. 1958, fi. 221.
122. ZANA NR3/586, no. 1, Acting Sec., Ministry of Labour and Mines to the Provincial Commissioner, Northern Rhodesia, 23 Dec. 1959, fi. 49
123. ZANA NR3/60, vol. 1, memo from Chief Secretary to Labour Commissioner, 4 Dec. 1958.
124. ZANA NR3/588 Otton to Kenny, 12 Nov. 1958, fi. 222–3; Southern Rhodesia, Dept. of Labour 1958, pp. 11–12.
125. ZANA NR3/92, Circular, Ministry of Labour and Mines, 19 May 1960, fi. 76.
126. Northern Rhodesia, Ministry of Labour and Mines, 1960, *Annual Report*, p. 72.
127. ZANA NR3/586, no. 1, Acting Sec. for Ministry of Labour and Mines to WNLA, 23 Feb. 1960, fi. 62; Governor Northern Rhodesia to Sec. of State for the Colonies, London, 27 Apr. 1960, fi. 78.
128. Northern Rhodesia, 1963, *Hansard*, no. 108N, 30 July, cols. 714–24.
129. CCTA, 1961, pp. 87–9; ZANA NR3/547, Notice of Question in Legislative Council, 11 Feb. 1963, and proposed reply.
130. Zacklin, 1969, p. 30; Lemkin, 1969, pp. 265–71.
131. See Lemking, 1969, pp. 265–71.
132. Macpherson, 1981, p. 152.
133. ZANA NR3/586, vol. II, Permanent Sec. to Parliamentary Sec. and Minister, Northern Rhodesia, 11 Mar. 1964, fi. 233.
134. ZANA NR3/586, vol. II, Minutes of the Meeting, between fi. 273.
135. Employment Act, Act No. 57 of 1965, in *Government Gazette Supplement: Acts 1965*, pp. 449–86.
136. Zambia, Ministry of Labour and Social Development, 1966.
137. Zambia, Ministry of Labour and Social Development, 1965.
138. Zambia, Office of the Vice President, 1969, pp. 1–2.
139. Bates, 1971, pp. 32–8.
140. Zambia, Office of the Vice President, 1969, p. 86.
141. Gertzel, 1984, p. 212.
142. *Zambia National Assembly Hansard*, Mr Nalilungwe of Kalobo, 10 Aug. 1966, p. 552.
143. MNA-RC, SEC 2/1, memo to Malawian President on Proposed Labour Agreement, 1 May 1967, fi. 38.
144. See Appendix 2 and Figure 2.
145. Zambia, Ministry of Labour and Social Services, 1972.

4 Zimbabwe: The Maintenance of a 'Labour Account Surplus'

Although the majority of colonial Zimbabwe's workers originated outside its borders, armies of labourers also made their way out of Zimbabwe, and especially *through* Zimbabwe to higher-paying employment in South Africa. Successive administrations therefore played a curious dual role, negotiating with South Africa to control outflows on the one hand, while negotiating with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to secure maximum inflows on the other.

The South African government was hardly cooperative, bargaining hard for access to Zimbabwe's neighbouring labour suppliers – Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland – in exchange for help in controlling the flow across the Southern Rhodesia/South Africa border. Multilateral negotiations quite often considered inflows and outflows together, and sometimes traded workers from one territory for those of another.

Swaziland, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia have all experienced these simultaneous labour outflows and inflows, but Zimbabwe's history best demonstrates the 'commoditization' of labour. Zimbabwe was the centre of the subcontinent's labour vortex – the grand central station of the region's migrants. The colonial government won its protracted labour-supply war with South Africa – most demonstrably by federating with its two labour-supplying neighbours, Malawi and Zambia, but also by considerable success in negotiating and implementing arrangements that restrained a worker's southward movements. The juggling to achieve a net inflow rather resembles modern foreign-exchange policy, and reflects the importance of the multiple labour statuses that were created by a regional state system.

With the arrival of labour surpluses in the 1950s, the entire dual policy of maximizing net labour inflows began to be reversed. Foreign labourers were increasingly confined to poorer-paying sectors,

while South Africa – also experiencing surpluses of labourers in select sectors by the 1960s – became more interested in the control of influxes. By the mid-1970s the government of Rhodesia had even signed an agreement to supply miners to South Africa, but this deal was ended by a new black government in 1980.

Zimbabwe's case demonstrates an important aspect of how competition and cooperation among Southern Africa's emerging countries increasingly caused them to function together as a labour-control system, and how the nature of this cooperation changed fundamentally as a result of unemployment.

GOVERNMENT BY COMPANY, 1899–1923

The British South Africa Company's development of Southern Rhodesia was dominated from the start by a struggle to attract sufficient labourers, with the company in direct competition with South Africa. Only a few thousand Southern Rhodesian Africans per year were tempted across the southern border during BSA rule, but incoming migrant labourers increasingly passed right through the company's realm, heading for the higher wages in the south. A battle began for London's support in resisting South African labour demand, and negotiations started regarding chaotic recruiting activity along the border.

Early European invaders skirted the Ndebele in Matabeleland in the west of the territory, preferring to impose themselves on the weaker Shona in Mashonaland in the east. When gold was discovered in the Tati district on Botswana's south-eastern border in the 1860s, the European miners who flocked there drew most of their African labourers from nearby Matabeleland in today's Zimbabawe.[1] By 1876 a recruiter was also operating in Matabeleland for the diamond mines of the future South Africa, but men were reluctant to go.[2]

Cecil Rhodes' agents had won two concessions of land for the British South Africa Company's territory and European settlers began to arrive in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, taking up huge tracts of land in what would eventually become Southern Rhodesia.[3] It was accepted doctrine at the Colonial Office that the way to administer Africans was to create reserves. By 1892 BSA had set up

'locations' in Salisbury, the administrative capital, where only those Africans who proved they were wage-employed could live. Taxes were illegally introduced two years later and a 'Native Department' was created to collect them.[4]

BSA's board and officers believed that taxes would 'to a certain extent furnish an incentive to labour which might otherwise be lacking'.[5] Creating a need, however, did not control the means of satisfying it. A Transvaal recruiting firm was already operating along Southern Rhodesia's southern border, and to BSA's frustration many were heading south to work, where the money to pay their taxes was easier to come by.[6]

Both the Shona and Ndebele had extensive precolonial experience of trade, thus they were ready when white consumers began to arrive. Some planted double crops in 1890 to supply the rush of white men while others were anxious to sell cattle and sheep. By 1894–95 the mines in Southern Rhodesia were unable to attract all the labourers they wanted, especially in Mashonaland. Many district officials started forced-labour systems, in which half the officers of the Native Department were thought to be actively involved. The Ndebele then reached breaking point and rose up in strength in 1896–97.[7]

Southern Rhodesia was having growing success attracting European settlers from South Africa and Britain. Hardly the poor pioneers of North American lore, the families arriving in 1913 brought with them average capital of £1240 – a substantial sum.[8] A Land Bank was established, making loans of several thousand pounds to such settlers at a reduced rate. Fencing loans, technical assistance, agricultural research, reduced rail rates for their crops and more were all provided. As soon as a settler pegged his farm, he regarded the Africans living on it as more or less his serfs and settled down to a prosperous life as an overseer.[9]

BSA was granted direct administration of the Rhodesias in 1899, much as several companies were granted rule over parts of Portuguese East Africa. The company's charter stipulated obedience to the Secretary of State regarding Africans, as there had already been several vetoed attempts to introduce forced labour.[10] BSA and the South African Chamber of Mines were exploring every avenue for increasing their foreign-labour supplies, even attempting to recruit from Abyssinia in 1900.[11]

While BSA officials sought labourers all over Africa, some of the Africans from the company's 'own' territory were walking across the

border to work in South Africa. The largest stream consisted of Kalanga from Matabeleland, especially the Plumtree, Tjolotjo and Kezi areas of today. The second was mainly made up of Shona speakers from Manicaland and Vakarangu from Victoria Province, but also included Hlengwe from the south-east.[12]

As soon as its charter was signed, BSA began actively to regulate labour-supply. The Natives Employment Ordinance of 1899 restricted recruiting to 'proper persons' and discouraged recruiting of Africans for work outside Southern Rhodesia.[13] Inducing an African to leave the territory for employment without a contract became illegal and chief native secretaries were empowered to stop foreign recruiting as they saw fit. Within Southern Rhodesia labour recruiting was still very harsh. The resident commissioner reported to the Colonial Office in 1900 that,

> [The natives of Rhodesia] work in the mines either from direct pressure brought to bear on them by the Administration, a pressure only short of force, or the necessity of earning enough to pay their taxes; this naturally does not make industry attractive.[14]

Despite the squeeze on the African population, labour supply could not keep up with the rate of investment and so the Southern Rhodesian administration – BSA itself until 1923 – took on responsibility for organizing a greater labour-supply. Thwarted in its attempts to obtain permanent immigrants or indentured labourers, BSA settled on circular migrant labour, the favoured option of the Colonial Office.[15] In 1901 Ordinance No. 18 was promulgated to regulate immigration from other than British or Portuguese possessions in Africa south of 12° south.[16] All immigrant labourers were to be contracted, with their employers paying security against their passage home. Females and children could not be introduced without special permission and any immigrant more than two miles from his place of employment on a working day had to carry a certificate from his employer.[17] By 1905 these foreign migrants made up 69 per cent of the 15 000 African miners in Southern Rhodesia.[18]

The influx of whites into Southern Rhodesia had been gaining momentum since 1902, when the company had begun to offer small mine claims in exchange for royalties. There was still great hope that mining development would turn out to be as huge as in South Africa. Railway lines were opened and trade was snowballing. Many Africans were doing well at cash-cropping and the sale of stock. Some were

becoming prosperous and many whites had already begun discussing how further to undermine them.

South African mines, meanwhile, were beginning their own voracious labour hunt throughout the continent and farther abroad, bringing in 50 000 indentured Chinese between 1904 and 1907 for instance, and doing everything they could to attract labourers from Southern Rhodesia. While Southern Rhodesian employers imported growing numbers of labourers from other territories, Southern Rhodesia's own workers were beginning to leave for the Rand in the future South Africa to mine its enormous gold deposits.

The administration balked at the idea of Chinese workers in Southern Rhodesia, but it was anxious for the Transvaal to import Chinese labourers because it would reduce demand for Southern Rhodesia's 'own'.[19] When the Indian government then refused a request to export labour to Southern Rhodesia, BSA's secretary in Salisbury became alarmed at the prospect of a labour crisis and began to take more steps to control the outflows and throughflows.[20] Railway fares were jacked up to discourage emigration and to make the transit of British Central African (Malawian) labourers to the Transvaal too expensive.[21]

Competition for labour between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa continued to intensify thereafter. When Wenela signed a deal with Portugal to recruit exclusively in the south of Portuguese East Africa, Southern Rhodesia became a signatory too, and was promised one eighth of the labourers recruited by Wenela in Portuguese East Africa in compensation for their exclusion from recruiting there, although Wenela never delivered.[22] When Transvaal Labour Commission hearings were set up after the Anglo–Boer War, BSA's board of directors in London telegraphed a warning to the company administrator in Southern Rhodesia that the purpose of the commission was to prove that South African labour-supply was inadequate. The company sent an official to testify how Wankie Collieries and Railways and Rhodesian development in general were also being retarded by labour scarcity.[23]

There was no question among the European community that peasant production would have to be undermined further in order to guarantee a wage-labour supply. 'Natives' growing 'rich' was quite intolerable and the key was land. In Matabeleland, whites had already been given the lion's share – almost all the best land – and in Ndebeleland whites' 37 per cent share was constantly expanded wherever the soil of reserves was considered 'too good for Africans'.[24]

While some of those stuck on the worst reserves had to resort to emigration almost immediately, many Africans held out well against the onslaught. By 1904 blacks were still growing 90 per cent of marketed crops, for instance, buoyed by the growth of the mining communities where less fortunate Africans had to work.[25]

At this point the BSA administration in Southern Rhodesia still envisioned full retention of the Southern Rhodesian labour supply, imagining it would supply the Transvaal only in the event of a labour surplus, and that it would charge stiff fees for the service.[26] There were only one or two thousand Southern Rhodesian migrants in South Africa and migration would not become a serious problem until after BSA rule had ended in 1923. The more immediate problem was how to minimize the number of men passing through to South Africa. When the WNLA requested permission to recruit in Southern Rhodesia in 1906 the BSA administrator was completely taken aback, particularly by the WNLA's intimation that the imperial authorities had no objection.[27]

Competition for labourers in British Central Africa (Malawi) and Mozambique also became an issue. South African recruiting from British Central Africa was restricted to the summer and to agricultural employment, as the death rate for British Central Africans in Transvaal mines had reached 10 per cent in 1906. Restrictions on recruiting served BSA's interests as the labourers they employed from such places were largely independent migrants while South Africa relied more on formal recruiting. Recruiting of Mozambicans via Rhodesia, however, was fully approved by the British Secretary of State as their mortality rate had fallen to 39 per 1000 per year – an acceptable 4 per cent.[28]

BSA's London office became quite concerned over seasonal labour shortage, suggesting that the hut tax be collected in December or January when hiring shortfalls regularly occurred, and that pressure for prompt payment be increased.[29] Complaints of a shortage of labourers nevertheless continued to increase from white organizations such as the Rhodesian Land and Mineowners Association. A new government notice was promulgated in 1908 to control the movement of recruits in transit through Southern Rhodesia. The BSA administrator could appoint places and times and all movements could be confined to such schedules.[30]

By this time a new realism about the future was setting in and BSA's board was facing the fact that it had overestimated the value of its mineral deposits. It became widely realized that the return on

company investments would have to come from white settlement instead. To diversify the European economy, a Land Settlement Committee and an Estates Department were set up and the Department of Agriculture was reorganized to encourage European agriculture.[31]


Over 20 000 Europeans were challenging Africans for their markets, their cattle, and more and more of their land. The dominant – even obsessive – issue had become how to obtain more African labourers.[32] Measures taken to increase Africans' need for cash included compulsory cattle dipping at the owner's expense, grazing fees, the charging of rent on land not given over to Europeans or reserves, a dog tax and a Private Locations Ordinance, which allowed the charging of rent or labour for tenancy on European lands.[33] By 1909–10 African taxes and fees totalled £209 423 compared with expenditure by the Native Department of only £52 640 over the same period. This approximate margin of administrative 'profit' remained throughout BSA rule.[34]

BSA still felt it had a 'right' to all labourers living under British rule, regardless of their administrative unit. The director, for instance, expressed 'great indignation' at the intention of the governor of Nyasaland to use every legal means to stop Nyasaland Africans from emigrating.[35] But while the director may have been indignant at Nyasaland's attempt to retain what he saw as his labour supply, he was equally indignant at the labour outflow from Southern Rhodesia and saw to it that a South African request to recruit miners in Southern Rhodesia was refused.[36] In fact the administrator was empowered to prevent *any* recruiting for foreign employment.[37]

Only about 3000 labourers from Southern Rhodesia were working abroad – mostly in South Africa. The population was 800 000, about the same as in Northern Rhodesia and only a little less than Nyasaland's one million, thus the proportion of the population working abroad was a comparatively low 0.4 per cent (see Figure 3). However the BSA administration could already see that its labour force was too small compared with the influx of white settlers and investment.

Southern Rhodesia North of 22°

The South African ban on recruiting African labour above 22° latitude excluded all but the southern edge of Southern Rhodesia, and so this border area became the focus of intense illegal recruiting. Any Southern Rhodesian African who made it across the border into



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 3 Zimbabwe: estimated population working abroad

South Africa was quickly hired. At the same time as growing labour demand in Southern Rhodesia drew in huge numbers from other territories, the burgeoning brawn drain to South Africa continued, placing a premium on BSA's development of migration control.

When South Africa passed Act No. 22 of 1913 prohibiting recruitment north of 22° latitude, employers in Southern Rhodesia were greatly relieved. Only 2 per cent of Southern Rhodesia fell to the south of 22°, but those living below the parallel could still be legally recruited under South African law. The distinction proved impossible and for a while BSA's labour officials issued passports to anyone bound for South Africa. Then, when the outflow became too great, it was decided instead not to issue passes for South Africa to anyone at all.[38]

Recruiting was secretly organized inside Southern Rhodesia to funnel men across the border, especially in the south-eastern corner. The naivety of Southern Rhodesians entering the Union often allowed recruiters to manipulate them into poorer jobs, and not the goldmine work they had sought. Many ended up in Natal collieries, where wages and conditions were worse than they had expected, while others were whisked away to South Africa's Messina copper mines.[39]

The general chaos raised the idea that controlled recruiting might

actually be a good thing. The Under-Secretary for native affairs, for instance, suggested that the best solution to the uncontrolled migration would be to establish a Wenela station and substation on the border to 'regularize' matters. However BSA's Chief Native Secretary would not hear of it. He was convinced that it would only encourage more migrants and complained that during four years of prohibition on recruiting north of 22° not a single African had ever been repatriated from South Africa.[40]

At a major conference of key 'native officials' from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the Southern Rhodesians successfully convinced their counterparts of their cause. It was recommended to the South African cabinet that the recruiting of all those coming from north of 22° be prevented, and that steps should also be taken to prevent such workers from being hired.[41] South Africa also agreed to attempt to place Southern Rhodesian migrants in jobs in the northern Transvaal, where wages were lower and might therefore dampen their enthusiasm.[42]

Far from decreasing, however, the numbers of Southern Rhodesians entering the Union continued to grow – and of Northern Rhodesians as well. By 1923 the Director of Native Labour in South Africa had asked to be relieved of his obligation to submit statistics, as the numbers had grown beyond his ability to cope.[43] The numbers of Southern Rhodesian Africans in South Africa were still not all that great, however – probably around 6000. The inflow to Southern Rhodesia was much larger, equal to about 66 per cent of its workers in 1921.[44]

Guarding 400 miles of common border was a daunting task. When one of the most notorious criminals in the border recruiting business was caught, one who 'recruited' primarily at gunpoint, it was learned that his real employer was the South African Chamber of Mines, which ran Wenela. Senior BSA officials, who had blocked a Wenela monopsony for so long, finally began wondering if it might not be such a bad idea.[45] It was too late, however, for their rule had come to an end.

SELF-RULE AND INTERTERRITORIAL LABOUR MANAGEMENT, 1923–66

The extent of African oppression in colonial Zimbabwe would not have been possible without huge supplies of foreign labourers,

particularly with some of Southern Rhodesia's own African labourers away working in South Africa, and especially as large numbers of foreign labourers passed through Southern Rhodesia to higher-paying jobs in South Africa. Development depended on the juggling of labour movements to maximize the net inflow. Realizing the limitations of unilateral action, the government moved to the bargaining table to strike multilateral deals that would entrench this profit on its labour balance sheet. Such negotiations for multilateral treaties epitomized the overall conceptualization of Southern African territories as labour units in an integrated regional economy, with the participating administrations sitting together and weighing the various possible combinations of inflows and outflows.

Southern Rhodesia received internal self-rule in 1923. London retained authority over legislation affecting the African population, and over mining royalties, as well as enormous influence in internal affairs. The Southern Rhodesian European population – one of the fastest growing on the African continent – had reached 34 000 and farming was booming, especially the export of tobacco which was especially labour-intensive.[46] The government used nearly every possible means to further European agriculture and discourage African farmers so that they would take up waged labour instead. Roads, land, markets, veterinary law, rents and grazing laws were all heavily biased in favour of European agriculture, prompting a continual stream of Africans into the reserves. Once in a reserve there was often little choice but to migrate back out to waged labour.[47]

Some small African farmers were nevertheless successful, especially those close to bigger markets such as the mines. Others found an income selling tobacco, forging hoes from scrap metal or selling hides.[48] The government therefore squeezed harder, decreeing in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, for instance, that 100 000 people should be added to those in the already crowded African areas.[49] The Maize Control Amendment Act of 1934 also set a higher price for maize bought from European farmers than from Africans. The Native Registration Act of 1936 then increased the effectiveness of the Pass Laws, controlling sectoral labour distribution so that European farmers could pay unskilled labourers less than other employers.[50] These were the final blows for many more African farmers, forced to succumb to dependence on wage labour in the space of a generation.

Despite the enormous coercion of the population, internal labour supply still met less than half the demand for wage labourers. A 'Supervisor of Facilities for the Passage of Northern Natives' was therefore set up in 1923, responsible for maintaining the migration routes of incoming labourers. Much to the chagrin of Southern Rhodesia, the South African government authorized the recruiting of alien farm labourers more than 20 miles inside the South African border (excluding Mozambicans). They gave the coy excuse that this would prevent recruiters from 'poaching' in Southern Rhodesia, but in truth it encouraged migrants to make their way deeper into South Africa where they knew they could be legally recruited.[51]

The Arrival of the Multilateral Era

The number of Southern Rhodesian migrants working in South Africa and elsewhere was less than 10 000 in 1923 – or less than 1 per cent of the population. However the economy appears to have bucked the region's trend of relatively slow growth in migrant numbers during the 1920s. By 1937 there were an estimated 33 000 Southern Rhodesian migrants working in the south, or about 2.5 per cent of the indigenous Southern Rhodesian population. Though the numbers would be much higher in the future, this was the peak of outflow in terms of the proportion of the population abroad.

The coming of the multilateral agreements was accompanied by a quite noticeable fall in the estimated proportion working in South Africa, thus from the Southern Rhodesian viewpoint the controls were a success. By 1950 there were only about 25 000 Southern Rhodesian migrants in South Africa, a less-serious 1 per cent of the population. In the 1960s and 1970s there would be a huge surge in numbers, reaching about 110 000 in 1976, but still only an estimated 1.7 per cent of the population (see Figure 3).

The multilateral agreements of the 1930s and 1940s between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and South Africa hinged on Southern Rhodesian competition with South Africa. The Southern Rhodesian government was intent on minimizing South African access to its northern neighbours' labour as well as on restricting southward flows of its own workers. The issues were interrelated, however, and bargaining increasingly dealt with the two together. The South African government persistently avoided full cooperation with Southern Rhodesia on the management of their common border, while Southern Rhodesia was generally successful

in securing preferred access to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland labour precisely by offering their administrations such cooperation.

In 1937 the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland entered into a Tripartite Agreement that guaranteed Southern Rhodesia first call on 'surplus' labourers for hire in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In exchange for this protection from South African competition, the Secretary for Native Affairs was authorized to guarantee greater cooperation in controlling migrants from its two neighbours, undertaking to turn back those without proper home documents and to facilitate remittances.[52] Such measures were designed to strengthen sending administrations' control over migrants. The secretary hoped that increased control would also improve their ability to prevent immigrant workers from percolating through to South Africa.

The thousands of migrants working inside Southern Rhodesia were suffering tremendous hardships. The long journey weakened them from the outset, and combined with poor food, heavy labour and squalid conditions many succumbed to pneumonia and dysentery. From what the migrants were hearing of the Transvaal's higher wages and generally better conditions, it must have sounded like their only chance to save a tidy sum and return home a hero to their family and farm. More and more migrants were therefore on a 'stop–go' route to South Africa, choosing to work in particular mines or regions in Southern Rhodesia because they were good places to desert from on the next leg of the journey to South Africa. The deserters' unendorsed passes were their biggest problem, necessitating faked loss or forgery. This kind of African resistance made the improvement of interterritorial cooperation on bureaucratic mechanisms especially important to the improvement of control over labour, driving the administration back to the regional bargaining table again and again.

Immediately following the Tripartite Agreement a complementary quadripartite deal was signed with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. The South African government had lifted the ban on recruiting those from north of 22°, and so the Chamber of Mines arranged to recruit 10 000 per year in Northern Rhodesia's Barotseland, plus 2000 per year in Nyasaland. In return they agreed not to encourage independent labour migration from the two territories. The quotas were later changed to 3500 and 8400 respectively.[53]

In 1938 the Transvaal Chamber of Mines asked for increased recruiting quotas in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, from 8400 to 15 000 in Nyasaland's case. The Native Affairs Secretary in Salisbury became worried, thinking that it might be more appropriate to *reduce*

the numbers that they themselves obtained under the Tripartite Agreement rather than allow South Africa's share to increase. The more labourers Southern Rhodesia took, however, the more it strengthened South Africa's case for extra labourers. Salisbury's Secretary for Native Affairs now estimated that clandestine emigration to South Africa amounted to 34 000 per year and was especially concerned that migrants' greater savings in the Rand would permit them to stay at home longer after their contracts had ended.[54] Only 15 000 miners in the Rand, he argued, meant as many as 45 000 fewer for Southern Rhodesia.[55]

The secretary was also becoming more confident that it was possible to control the border:

> I feel that much could be done by a more mobile and energetic [police] force – Europeans on motorcycles and some Native Constables on cycles.... If we stopped lorry services, the clandestine movements would be on foot, chiefly, and water supplies are few.[56]

Indeed, with the cooperation of authorities on Pretoria's side of the border, it was thought that clandestine traffic could be halted altogether. But this cooperation could only be obtained in a bargain that allowed South African mines to recruit within Southern Rhodesia – rather a contradiction.[57]

The Second World War brought large changes in labour allocations, and considerably more conflict among administrations. The war provoked large British investments in Southern Rhodesia, including an air training scheme with a surprising demand for Southern Rhodesian labourers to supply air stations, land and buildings.[58] Wenela implemented a wartime scheme whereby recruits who were rejected as unfit for the mines would be contracted to Southern Rhodesian tobacco plantations, though this did not apply to Nyasaland or to Northern Rhodesia's Barotseland, where Southern Rhodesian European farmers already recruited directly.[59] Nyasaland suspended Wenela recruiting on and off from 1940, but when the proclamation of 2 November 1942 again suspended all recruiting for outside, Wenela threatened to recommence recruiting clandestine migrants from Nyasaland who were making their own way to the Union, claiming the Transvaal Agreement had been broken by Nyasaland.[60] Many of these squabbles were settled at the African Manpower Conference, held between the four administrations in 1943.[61]

A host of measures were proposed in order to reduce clandestine

emigration. The railway could be reminded to check for passes before issuing tickets. Passes to southern industrial areas within Southern Rhodesia could be withheld in order to make it more difficult for Africans to get near the border. Customs could make sure that duty was charged on all dutiable goods brought home by migrants, reducing the rewards of emigration. And the most infamous of illegal recruiters could be prosecuted.[62] However the government was unwilling fully to pursue such options, for the administrators were intensely aware of the contradiction between their desire to control Southern Rhodesia's own labour outflows and their insistence that their neighbours should not do the same. After all, white employers already enjoyed a huge net labour inflow and it was unwise to push too far.

Nineteen out of 31 districts in Southern Rhodesia reported a labour shortage for January 1940, and it was thought that 'sufficient' labourers would have increased production by 20 per cent.[63] Officials in Salisbury still felt that many of the 'missing' labourers were 'unfairly' passing through Southern Rhodesia to South Africa, or were even being prevented from entering Southern Rhodesia in some cases, but they refused to unilaterally reduce their own outflows. The supervisor of native labour immigration received complaints of Nyasaland Africans arriving in Southern Rhodesia with Nyasaland passes authorized for the Union. This was questionable under the Tripartite Agreement, which gave Salisbury 'first call' on such labourers.[64] The Secretary for Native Affairs then complained of unfair restrictions on migrant labour outflows from its suppliers since the Tripartite Agreement had been signed, due particularly to poor information on the availability of passports in Northern Rhodesia. The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia even stated that implementation of the agreement had seriously depleted the Southern Rhodesian labour force.[65]

With rather poor timing, Nyasaland's acting governor then informed the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia that Nyasaland wished to increase its Wenela quota from 8500 to 10 000, and eventually 15 000. Northern Rhodesia, too, planned to give Wenela the right to recruit up to 10 000. The Prime Minister invoked arbitration by the British Secretary of State and the Southern Rhodesian veto was upheld, proving that the Tripartite Agreement had given the Southern Rhodesian government substantial control over its two neighbours' formal labour exports.[66]

Clandestine migration to South Africa continued of course, slyly encouraged by Wenela despite its undertaking in the Transvaal

Agreement not to do so. Eastern Transvaal farms depended on clandestine labourers from Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, and the South African government begun issuing clandestine migrants with six-month temporary residence and work permits once they were inside. Desertion from jobs in Southern Rhodesia to cross the border was increasingly common. When a conference was held between officials of the two Rhodesias, Nyasaland and South Africa to discuss how to control movements to South Africa, the South African representative was prepared to recommend that Africans from the three territories be detained if they tried to enter without passports, but in return he wanted the Tripartite Agreement's provision for Southern Rhodesia's preferential access to be revoked.[67] The only tentative agreement was on a suggestion that if South Africa would allow free entry with passports, and give permits to stay for only two years, Southern Rhodesia would issue passports freely and the flow would at least be 'regularized'.[68]

The Aftermath of the Second World War

Southern Rhodesia benefited from a number of swings in the world economy in the late 1940s. A UK dollar shortage increased demand for Southern Rhodesian asbestos, chrome and tobacco, and when the National Party took power in South Africa in 1948 a great deal of international investment was diverted into Southern Rhodesia.[69] Further expansion of African employment was again rapid and Southern Rhodesian Africans remained only a minority of those employed for wages in Southern Rhodesia, despite their rising labour-force participation.[70] The key mining sector remained especially dependent on foreign labourers, not least because of its low wages, which had dropped even further during the depression.

White-settler racism was similar in extremity to that of South Africa. Its foundations in land and labour policy supported an institutionalized white monopoly on skills. While some of the worst excesses in the treatment of Africans had disappeared with protective legislation, African labourers were still regarded as a commodity – something to be 'requisitioned'. Given similar overall conditions it is not surprising that the much higher wages paid by Rand mines had become an even greater attraction to Rhodesian labourers. Whereas the numbers of Southern Rhodesian workers in South Africa had fallen since 1923, the overall numbers crossing the border into South Africa, including third-country migrants, had increased. It was still,

apparently, not too difficult to slip across the Limpopo River and dry oneself in the sun on the southern bank.

Genuine improvements in physical border control were now made on the Southern Rhodesian side, and the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC) was created to marshall both internal and foreign labourers more effectively.[71] The 1948 Migrant Labour Act entrenched agreements between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that dated back to 1937, and the RNLSC made a deal with Wenela that anyone reporting to them who wished to work in Southern Rhodesia would be directed to the RNLSC.[72]

The parties were locked in an interdependent stalemate and in 1947 the three signatories to the Tripartite Agreement began to negotiate again with Pretoria's officials. The South African negotiators still argued that efforts to control the border would only force labourers outside the system, persuasively so it would seem, for the parties finally agreed to simple regularization of entry into South Africa, without restricting the numbers.

The government of Southern Rhodesia was finally agreeing to the concept of increasing control through non-obstructive legalization of cross-border flows. This was an idea that Pretoria had been proposing for decades, but it was now put forward without the former demand for reciprocal access to recruiting in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In fact, all recruitment of extra-Union Africans by licensed recruiters and farmers' agents was to be prohibited, even within South Africa. In return, certificates for migration to South Africa would be issued freely by the Southern Rhodesian government.

A further conference was not held between the four governments until that held in Salisbury in 1950. There, much the same terms were finally agreed to. The South African Prime Minister's aides consented to stop their administration from issuing permits to clandestine migrants and to 'to take effective steps to prevent the employment in the Union of any Central African without a permit'.[73]

Suddenly the South African side reneged on its commitments. The long drawn out negotiation process had apparently brought the South African External Affairs Department to the realization that it was getting 'the short end of the stick', and rancour was revived by its new proposal to set up 'collecting depots in the three Northern colonies'.[74] The whole concept had been for a 'passive' migration system, however, and not internal 'collecting'. Nyasaland's representatives on the Standing Migrant Labour Committee were shocked at the reversal, and remained adamantly opposed to such depots.[75]

The battle now went to London, where the South African External Affairs Department complained to the Colonial Office that it had heard that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia might ask the Colonial Office to suspend recruiting for the Rand. South Africa insisted on *more* mine recruits and dismissed the control of clandestines as a sending-government responsibility.[76] The Colonial Office proved unsympathetic, however, and that was the end of the discussions. Pretoria had overestimated its bargaining position.[77]

The Southern Rhodesian government and white employers remained the greatest overall beneficiaries of the multilateral era – due to an enviable position where many of the region's migrant labourers passed through Southern Rhodesia. The Tripartite Agreement had established Southern Rhodesia's preferential access to Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland labour supplies, and in 1950 the administration had even come close to winning a large-scale control deal with the South African government without extending recruiting rights in return.

The whole series of multilateral negotiations is most revealing for the manner in which administrations participated in what had become an interterritorial system for managing migrants. The administrations met regularly and negotiated on 'the whole picture' rather than on individual migrant flows.

Surplus

The Southern Rhodesian government's final victory in the protracted labour-supply war with South Africa was to federate with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia – its two main labour suppliers – in 1953. However before the 1950s were over Southern Rhodesian employers had achieved a labour-supply surplus. The administration's preoccupation with how to get more labourers was succeeded by attention to allocating a more than generous supply. Efforts to control the flow across the common border with South Africa virtually ceased and the government began restricting the employment of foreign labourers to lower-paying sectors.

The Federation of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias was formed in 1953 and was destined to last a decade. The principle of preferential access to labour was replaced by the stronger principle of free but

formalized movement within the federation, entrenching multilateral migrant control.

By the mid-1950s rapid economic growth under federation was changing white attitudes to the African population. Industrialization was creating an African middle class, which was hoped by many whites to be a buffer against African aspirations. African agriculture was more genuinely encouraged and African trade unions were legalized.[78]

At the same time life for some peasants was more insecure than ever. Many had been pushed off their land in the late 1940s as increasing rural economic stratification took place. Some lost everything while others managed to obtain expanded farms in special purchase areas. The worst-off headed for Salisbury, Bulawayo and the bigger towns to live in the small, dense areas growing up around white urban cores.

Foreign workers' share of Rhodesian employment had fallen to 52 per cent by 1954 and the spectre of unemployment loomed larger.[79] Following the introduction of a new economic policy in 1958, labour policy shifted away from a preoccupation with adequate supply at given wages to greater control of a more than adequate supply. The luxury of greater labour supply was converted into greater sectoral differentiation of labourers by nationality. Since wage gaps had widened to an extent that made it difficult for plantations to attract labourers, even with a surplus, it was decided to bar foreign labourers from the cities so as to direct them to rural areas.[80]

The Foreign Migratory Labour Act of 1958 closed Salisbury and Bulawayo to entry by new foreign migrants.[81] By 1960 it covered all municipalities and their surrounding areas, and by 1961 it was extended to cover the whole south-west of Southern Rhodesia, mining areas excepted.[82] In addition the free bus services on the Honde–Umtali and Chitwizo–Mtoko routes were withdrawn, and a free launch and bus service connecting Barotseland with Victoria Falls was also stopped. The number of migrants coming in from Nyasaland, Mozambique and elsewhere fell, although the number from Northern Rhodesia increased due to a fall in alternative opportunities on the copperbelt.[83]

The next step was to give 12-months notice to Northern Rhodesia of the termination of the Tripartite Agreement and to suggest negotiations on a new agreement that would give Northern Rhodesian migrants' taxes to the Southern Rhodesian administration.[84] The feeling was that Southern Rhodesia's improved bargaining position

should be reflected in better terms. When both the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian administrations balked, the Salisbury governor became arrogant, attempting to dictate conditions until negotiations collapsed.[85] Following this the Southern Rhodesian government repealed the legal basis for all its commitments under international migrant-labour agreements and ended the era of multilateral control.[86]

Federation also soon came to an end, in 1963, mainly in order to grant Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia independence without letting go of Southern Rhodesia's racist regime. The growing surplus of labourers made the whole labour-exchange aspect of union much less important. Nevertheless fears that the independence of supplier states would lead to withdrawals of their labour stimulated the reformulated Rhodesian government to accelerate labour-supply internalization.[87] The Closed Labour Areas Order was introduced with the aim of eventually replacing *all* foreign labourers. The process was slow, however, and foreign workers still represented 42 per cent of the labour force in 1965.[88]

Whereas in 1950 the number of Southern Rhodesian workers in South Africa was around 25 000, by 1966 it would be 75 000. This was an increase from about 1 per cent to 1.7 per cent of the population working abroad and would remain at this percentage or slightly higher until 1976 (see Figure 3 and Appendix 2). Despite the increase, however, the Southern Rhodesian government became far less concerned about labour emigration than in the past. With the new 'surplus', or unemployment, the issue of retaining labourers was dying and the positions of the Southern Rhodesian and South African governments was completely reversed regarding the desirability of the labour flow between them.

POST-UDI LABOUR EXPORT

Beginning in the 1960s a growing surplus of willing wage labourers caused a coalescence of interest in labour migrant control between Rhodesia's white regime and a similar government in South Africa. An era of genuine mutual cooperation in migrant control began under an arrangement seeking efficiently to document and circulate Rhodesian workers. In the mid-1970s the Rhodesian government even agreed to large-scale internal recruiting for South African mines, but this was abruptly ended upon the coming of majority rule.

In 1965 Southern Rhodesia's white government declared a state of emergency, overriding constitutional safeguards and opting for a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). When Britain declared that it would impose economic sanctions on the rebel regime, the Rhodesian Prime Minister threatened back that foreign migrant workers would be sent home if Rhodesian workers lost jobs under sanctions – a tactic that Pretoria's External Affairs Minister would mimic 20 years later.[89] The strident government reasserted the principles of labour internalization with the 1966 Closed Labour Areas Order, sealing off Salisbury, Bulawayo and other areas from new foreign workers.[90]

Although the number of foreign labour migrants was being reduced, there was no intention of changing the *internal* migration system. Reserves were merely recreated as tribal trust lands in 1967, and the allocation of land within these areas was basically returned to chiefs. The continuation of the 'migrating African worker' model of development was entrenched by an obligatory rural home.[91]

Immediately following UDI, Britain began to apply sanctions, banning oil exports to Rhodesia and almost all Rhodesian exports to Britain. There was a tremendous rallying to the fight against sanctions amongst the white community. While the South African government was nervous and Prime Minister Verwoerd declared South Africa neutral, white-Rhodesian defiance was very popular among South African whites. With their success under sanctions still very much in the air, the Rhodesian government was intensely interested in further strengthening economic ties with South Africa. Political relations, however, were cooler as Pretoria struggled to maintain its distance.

The 1966 Arrangement with Pretoria

The appearance of unemployment and then UDI quickly turned the tables on migration negotiators. By the mid-1960s labour supply at a given wage was increasing so rapidly in South Africa that the government there became interested in controlling the influx from Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere. Officials in Pretoria began to ask for the very cooperation on clandestine worker control that they had historically refused, while Rhodesian officials – enjoying this twist of fate – imposed conditions before they would agree to just the thing they had been begging for a few years previously.

The period 1966–76 was the time of Southern Rhodesia's historically highest numbers working abroad, virtually all in South Africa with 1–2000 more in Zambia. The highest peak in percentage terms, however, had been back in the late 1930s, when 2.5 per cent of the population worked abroad (see Figure 3).

A new arrangement between the two governments in 1966 recognized the 50–70 000 Rhodesian Africans thought to be employed in South Africa without Rhodesian identity documents, and agreed to 'regularize' their status. Administrative agreements were reached on travel documents, recruiting, repatriation, ports of entry and other matters. South Africa agreed not to permit the recruiting of Rhodesians while Rhodesia consented to the rehiring of former employees. Employment was never to exceed 18 months in South Africa without a return to Rhodesia, and border control was substantially improved on both sides.[92] This required Africans to carry Rhodesian passports, necessitating a large bureaucratic expansion.[93]

The legalization of clandestine immigration was now in the mutual interest of the two governments. Administrators in Pretoria began applying specific measures both to ensure that workers returned to Southern Rhodesia and to reduce clandestine immigration. The South African Labour Department negotiated an agreement with its Rhodesian counterpart that workers in South Africa had to apply for a worker's travel document. Illegal workers were given an amnesty to continue if they worked in agriculture or mining.[94]

By 1970 there were still thought to be 70 000 illegal Rhodesian workers in South Africa, and Pretoria again asked Salisbury to curtail the influx. Rhodesia held out for full diplomatic representation until Pretoria acquiesced and a Rhodesian diplomatic mission was set up in Pretoria. Even between two independent governments, labour exchange was proving the nexus of diplomatic relations.

Only 152 illegal Rhodesian workers came forward in this first amnesty.[95] Nevertheless the mutual systems appear to have been considered a success by both sides, who felt that growth in migration had to some extent been restrained. This seems arguable, for there was actually an increase, from an estimated 77 000, or 1.7 per cent of Rhodesians working abroad, in 1966 (almost all in South Africa) to about 111 000, or 1.8 per cent in 1976. However this was mainly due to new mine jobs that arose following the Malawian boycott. In fact, in contrast with the regional trend of the time toward a decline in the proportions of populations working abroad (see Figure 12 in Chapter 10), the proportion of the region's population going to South Africa

to work was still generally increasing (see Appendix 2). It was likely, therefore, that there was some containment effect in the case of these new policies on illegal migrants between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

South Africa was not alone in seeking to rid itself of the once-treasured Southern Rhodesian migrants in order to keep its jobs for its nationals. Zambia was also making Southern Rhodesian migrants an issue, the Minister of State there stating that those who had come in the last five years would be sent home.[96] This caused quite an uproar, including a ruckus in the Zambia National Assembly, where it was maintained that the issue was that the Rhodesians should go back home to fight the whites for liberation.[97]

A Labour Export Deal with Pretoria

By the mid-1970s the Rhodesian economy was going from boom to bust. Real GDP had risen by 9 per cent in 1974, but fell by 1.5 per cent in 1975 and by 3.6 per cent in 1976. The recession was particularly severe in the labour-intensive plantation sector, where the majority of foreign labourers by then worked. Employment fell by 1.5 per cent in 1975–76, the first such fall since 1966. This was particularly severe now that 65–70 per cent of African households had become primarily dependent on waged labour.[98] In fact, during the two decades from 1955 to 1975, the proportion of the Rhodesian African population in employment fell from 19 per cent to 15 per cent.

Worsening African living standards at a time of soaring aspirations were contributing to support for the liberation war. Early negotiations held with black nationalist leaders failed and so the guerilla war intensified. To the east, in Mozambique, the white Portuguese government was about to fall, and Rhodesia's white rulers' survival in power was increasingly in question. They were certainly in no position to aggravate the circumstances of African households by forbidding the taking of South African jobs.

South Africa's Chamber of Mines was by then suffering a severe labour shortage due to the Malawian boycott of South African employment since 1974. Since 1906 the Chamber of Mines had been asking in vain for permission to recruit in Southern Rhodesia, most recently in 1967. Interest was renewed in 1969 when the South African Chamber of Mines began to foresee its vulnerability to an interruption of labour supply by Malawi due to 'political complications'. At

the time of the Malawian boycott, the South African Chamber of Mines again asked to begin recruiting. This time it found that the attitude of the Southern Rhodesian government had changed due to its rising unemployment rate and mounting war of liberation. '[There] seemed to be some eagerness for us to commence operations in the urban areas around Salisbury . . . there were many unemployed in the area.'[99] A formal agreement was quickly signed, effective from the beginning of 1975.[100]

When Wenela recruiting commenced, the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines complained that it had been excluded from the negotiations. The two mining chambers subsequently met with that of Rhodesia asking that recruiting be confined to the urban unemployed with no mining experience – this in order to protect its own labour pool. The Rhodesian Associated Mineworkers Union then accused Rhodesian mine owners of attempting to create a 'captive' labour force in Rhodesia, where starting wages of 26 cents a shift were dwarfed by the South African Chamber of Mines' R1.60. Nevertheless the South African Chamber of Mines agreed and the first batches of workers began to arrive at the less-popular mines on the east and west Rand in 1975.[101]

It must have been infuriating for experienced miners to learn that they had been made ineligible for the new South African positions. The Rhodesian government had wanted to alleviate unemployment with foreign jobs – not alienate militant miners by sending off novices to earn pay four to five times higher than their own.

The Rhodesian government had in fact chosen to promote South African jobs rather than accelerate the expulsion of foreign labourers from its own economy. Farm employers also lobbied against the deal and won some concessions. All recruitment literature was banned because it spread so easily outside the urban areas officially designated for Wenela, and all correspondence with recruits outside recruitment areas was also banned. Workers holding certain registration certificates that indicated that they were part of the labour pool for tea and coffee plantations could also not be hired. When, during one of its Rhodesian recruiting peaks, Wenela attempted to have recruiting extended into the prohibited areas, the farm lobby easily had them blocked.[102]

The Rhodesian economy now had both a detailed sectoral policy on imported labour – who could work and where – and a new detailed policy on labour export, honed to target certain groups for South African jobs without affecting rates of pay at home. This was

an unusually complex system of labour exchange, even by Southern African standards.

The five-year agreement signed between Wenela and the Rhodesian government set down a minimum of 20 000 and a maximum of 50 000 workers per year, for 12-month contracts with a mutual option for one six-month renewal before compulsory repatriation. Recruitment of foreign labourers by Wenela was expressly prohibited, as was Wenela recruitment of Rhodesians already in South Africa.[103] The Rhodesian government was to receive R10 per contract and take charge of workers' 60 per cent deferred pay.

Rhodesian miners turned out to be a particularly educated and class-conscious group, prone to confrontation with mine management. They refused 'acclimatization' – a gruelling initiation by several days' exercise in a hot room. They demanded free work-clothing and complained of the food and discriminatory work allocations, and even staged several small strikes. Concern developed that they might bring their liberation struggle to the mines and more and more members of the Chamber of Mines decided that the number of Rhodesians was best restricted in favour of South Africans.[104]

Matters were highly unstable as the black liberation struggle approached victory. Recruitment by Wenela was up from 8622 workers in 1975 to 32 453 in 1976. However supplier countries had lost the position of supplier's advantage that had been afforded by Malawi's now-ended boycott, and Wenela was losing confidence in the beleaguered Rhodesian government's stability. In April 1976 the general manager of Wenela instructed the Rhodesian Office to limit recruitment to 1000 per month.[105] No sooner had this been announced than the South African Chamber of Mines also announced cuts in the recontracting of Mozambican workers, and the Rhodesian Office was told to stand by for higher recruitment levels after all. A new target of 40 000 Rhodesian recruits was set for 1977, only two months after the 1000 quota had been announced.[106]

The climate for migrants became even more volatile when Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith broadcast a speech in which he called black rule 'inevitable'. A Radio Zambia broadcast warned Rhodesians that those working in South African mines when Rhodesia 'became independent' would lose their citizenship, sparking refusals to work.

After March 1977 the South African Chamber of Mines saw the 'writing on the wall' for the Rhodesian regime and began to employ only those with valid reengagement certificates. The number of Rhodesians employed had fallen to only 7000 by 1979.[107] Altogether

the number working in South Africa went into steep decline after 1976, falling to 50 000 or only 0.8 per cent of the population by 1979. By 1986, I estimate that there were only about 20 000 working in South Africa, or about 0.2 per cent of the population (see Figure 3).

The Rhodesian Labour Department seems to have almost panicked at the implications of rapidly growing unemployment during the liberation struggle. Official figures and statements on the employment situation became wildly misrepresentative, full of 'astonishing contradictions' in an attempt to hide the truth.[108] The process of rural stratification, which had accelerated in the postwar period, was continuing. On the one hand the poorest were working for plantations or even lower-paying smaller farmers. On the other hand these smaller African farmers were becoming richer, employing more poor peasants, who were increasingly available for waged labour.

The coincidence of interests that had resulted in Rhodesian labour export to South African mines had proved fleeting. Rhodesia's increasing interest in employment opportunities abroad had occurred at Wenela's time of greatest need. But as the liberation war progressed to the point of making labour supply to South Africa potentially unreliable, Wenela's need passed. It then chose to reduce its vulnerability to the threat of a sudden interruption of supply when the white Rhodesian regime finally fell.

Several more bilateral deals on the migration of non-miners from Rhodesia to South Africa were signed in the 1970s. The objectives were the legalization of workers already in South Africa, their confinement to specified employment sectors, and the implementation of contract terms, including deferred pay. While the creation of legal channels of labour migration from Rhodesia to South Africa was a limited success, programmes to legalize those already inside South Africa were much less so. In any case, although they now shared a mutual interest in control neither side seemed too strongly motivated. The Rhodesian government was preoccupied with thwarting black aspirations for political power and wished to avoid exacerbating African unemployment at home. Pretoria, though determined that foreign labour would come only temporarily, was still relying on illegal labour in some sectors.

Majority Rule

Zimbabwe's new majority government swiftly ended labour export to South Africa. In a climate of intense ideological opposition between

black- and white-ruled states, the primary significance of labour export became political. The number working in South Africa quickly dwindled and the border became firmly closed to migrant labourers.

At independence Zimbabwe had one of the most unequal economies in the world. The white 3 per cent of the population commanded nearly two thirds of national income, whilst the remaining 97 per cent had at most the final third. Most of this third, or 72 per cent, came from wages, 12 per cent from subsistence income and 15 per cent from profits of non-incorporated businesses. With the majority so dependent on waged employment, it was hardly an easy context in which to ban labour migration to South Africa.[109]

There were serious grounds for economic optimism. Sanctions would be lifted, international loans would be available again, the uncertainty of the final years of war was over, and even the rains were good. Though it was still early when labour recruiting was banned, GDP seemed to be booming. It grew by 11 per cent and 15 per cent in 1980 and 1981, respectively, though the spurt turned out to be short.

Relations with South Africa at independence were mixed. A continued trade deal gave some Zimbabwean exports preferential access to the South African market, but Zimbabwe joined the anti-apartheid Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) at the same time. On the one hand the Pretoria government maintained a trade mission in Harare, but on the other Zimbabwe government ministers refused to meet their South African opposites.[110]

By independence the South Africa Chamber of Mines was only re-engaging miners in Zimbabwe, although it was still allowed to recruit in several districts if it wished. The new government of Zimbabwe was not bound under international law to uphold the terms of the three active agreements it had with Pretoria, but the trade agreement had been perpetuated, thus there was every reason to expect that the same would be done regarding migrant labourers.[111]

Following a 1980 meeting of the Southern African Labour Conference – an association of labour-supplying countries discussing cartel action in the region – Zimbabwe announced that it was to ban recruitment (which stood at 6300 in 1980). The South African reply was that it would send home 20 000 Zimbabweans employed in South

Africa.[112] The ban went ahead, however, and the Employment Bureau of Africa – the South African Chamber of Mines' reorganized recruiting arm – was reduced to a 'care and maintenance' operation for returnees in Zimbabwe until it closed its offices in 1983.[113]

The banning of labour recruitment was primarily a political act. Zimbabwe's new government's objectives were to increase its independence from South Africa; to impress its sincerity on a militantly anti-apartheid electorate that had just won a protracted war to overthrow its own white regime; to contribute to a spirit of independence and solidarity amongst SADCC members; and to maximize the development aid funds it would receive from anti-apartheid donors.

The new government intended in fact to end internal labour migration as well. At the time of the ban on recruiting in 1980, proposals were being considered for a much faster redistribution of land. The idea was to strike at the migrant-labour system's foundations in unequal land distribution, but such plans were largely a failure, undermined by white and black landowners alike.

By 1986 there were probably only 20 000 Zimbabwean migrant workers in South Africa, equal to just 0.2 per cent of the Zimbabwean population (see Figure 3 and Appendix 2). Before the decade was out the South African army had stretched an electric fence and sharp concertina wire along the banks of the Limpopo River, which separates South Africa from Zimbabwe, making it far harder to swim across.

CONCLUSION

Southern Rhodesia's labour export was part and parcel of labour import, a deliberate policy of developing a net influx of labourers that was initiated during the British South Africa Company period. The government was quite successful in maximizing the net labour gain, transporting foreign workers into the country en masse but refusing to permit foreign recruiters. Multilateral arrangements were integral to a period of stability, during which the white regime traded control for labour imports and labour exports for control. During this period the proportion of the Southern Rhodesian population working in South Africa fell.

Unusually, it was not its own labour exports that the South African government traded, but access to recruiting in supplier

countries. The Southern Rhodesian government had to tread carefully in demanding that outflows of its own labourers be curtailed when the majority of its labourers were coming in from other British possessions – territories whose own white employers were also demanding more retention of labour. At times the full capacity of the government to curtail outflows was not applied so as not to upset the regional migration status quo, which was so advantageous to Southern Rhodesian employers overall.

With the coming of unemployment the Rhodesian government quickly reversed this system, restricting foreign labourers and allowing South African mines to recruit on a large scale. This was advisable in order to absorb some of the growing number of urban unemployed. However it was also advisable for the white regime to protect employers' low wages in mining and agriculture, and so for a while the Rhodesian government had a detailed sectoral policy for both labour imports and exports – an especially complex system of labour exchange.

Labour supply took on a stronger geopolitical dimension under surplus, with one white regime supplying another with black labourers during the Malawian government's boycott. This was followed by abolition of foreign recruiting for primarily geopolitical and ideological reasons, and despite growing unemployment, when Zimbabwe's majority government came to power.

The Zimbabwean story, then, demonstrates the multilateral nature of Southern Africa's historical labour exchange. Policy focused less on bilateral sending–receiving relationships, and more and more on an emerging system of states.

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3. Buell, 1928, p. 213.
4. Mackenzie, 1970, p. 48. The company did not yet have the authority to impose taxes.
5. Palmer, 1977b, p. 304.
6. Jeeves, 1983, p. 405.
7. Phimister, 1977, pp. 257–8.
8. Machingaidze, n.d., p. 11.
9. Machingaidze, 1980, p. 60.
10. Article 15. Mushariwa, 1987.

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13. Natives Employment Ordinance of 1899.
14. ZINA A11/2/8/8, Cox, Colonial Office, to Secretary of the BSA Co., 3 Oct. 1901.
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17. ZINA A11/2/8/4, vol. 2, copy of Ordinance.
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19. ZINA A11/2/8/6, Fox and Jones to Milton, 16 Nov. 1903, and reply, fp. 2–; ZINA A11/2/8/7. Sec. of State, London, to High Commissioner, Johannesburg, 11 Mar. 1904, fp. 81.
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23. ZINA A11/2/8/1, vol. 1, telegraph 17 July 1903, fp. 75.
24. See Phimister, 1988, pp. 64–5.
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26. ZINA A11/2/8/1, vol. 1, BSA Co. Administrator, Salisbury, to BSA Co. Joint Manager and Secretary, London, 17 Sept. 1903.
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28. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1929, Governor of the Transvaal to Secretary of State, 6 Aug. 1906, p. 2.
29. ZINA A11/2/8/12, BSA Co. London to BSA Co. Administrator, Salisbury, 16 Dec. 1905, fp. 106–8.
30. ZINA A11/2/8/21, copy of notice. There were to be medical examinations upon entry to Southern Rhodesia, at which point vaccinations could be ordered, and from where recruits had to be accompanied by a representative of the recruiter or employer to the nearest train station and entrained there for a destination out of the colony.
31. Arrighi, 1973a, p. 336; Palmer, 1977a, p. 231.
32. Mason, 1958, p. 219; cited in Ranney, 1985.
33. See Phimister, 1986, p. 243.
34. Machingaidze, n.d., p. 14. By the end of the company's rule in 1923, taxes, fees, fines and customs duties totalled about £370 000 per year compared with expenditure of only £120 000.
35. BSA Co., 1911, p. 23.
36. ZINA N3/22/1, minute from Administrator's Office to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, received 17 Apr. 1912, fp. 153.
37. Under Native Labour Regulations: Ordinance No. 16 of 1911, Section 31.

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39. ZINA N3/22/4, vol. 2, statements of such recruits sworn before inspector of Native Affairs Dept., pp. 370–4.
40. ZINA N3/22/4, vol. 1, Under-Sec. to CNC, 26 Apr. 1918, and reply 14 May; correspondence between NC and BSA Administrator, fp. 168–182.
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42. ZINA N3/22/4, vol. 1, various correspondence, fp. 142–158, 159–.
43. ZINA N3/22/4, vol. 1, Acting Sec. for Native Affairs to CNC, Salisbury, 26 July 1923.
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45. Jeeves, 1983, p. 407.
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48. Phimister, 1986.
49. Palmer, 1977, p. 294.
50. Arrighi, 1973a, p. 346.
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62. ZINA S1561/1, Sec. for Native Affairs to Minister of Native Affairs, 3 July 1939.
63. ZINA S1561/6, 'Labour Shortage Now', received by Supervisor of Native Labour and Immigration, 5 Mar. 1940.
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66. ZINA S1561/5, 'Record of the Proceedings at Conference'. Salisbury, 5–6 Feb. 1939; Sec. of State, London, to Governor General, Salisbury, 19 Aug. 1939.
67. MNA-PA, LB 1/2/1, various.
68. MNA-PA, LB 1/2/1, note handed by Mr Bullock to Mr Smith.

69. Arrighi, 1973a, pp. 351, 355–7. Foreign investment quadrupled from 1947 to 1951, and by 1960 two thirds of profit in Southern Rhodesia would be accruing to foreign-controlled firms.
70. Malaba, 1980, p. 12. Employment of women as domestics and farm workers began to increase at this time.
71. Clarke, 1975, p. 186; see also van Onselen, 1980.
72. Clarke, 1974, pp. 31–2.
73. ZINA F137/186C(2), Notes of Conference held with the PM at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, 12 Aug. 1947, fi. 136.
74. ZINA F137/186E, High Commissioner of SA, Salisbury, to Chief Secretary, Central African Council, 16 Aug. 1951, fi. 136; Sec. for External Affairs, Southern Rhodesia, to Chief Secretary, Central Africa Council, 15 Oct. 1951, fi. 143.
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78. Arrighi, 1973a, pp. 359–62.
79. Hawkins, 1976, p. 111.
80. Clarke, 1974, p. 27.
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84. ZANA NR3/449, Prime Minister, SR, to Governor, NR, 26 June 1959, fi. 16/2.
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86. Southern Rhodesia, Dept. of Labour, 1960, pp. 11–12.
87. Malaba, 1980, pp. 13–14.
88. Government Notice No. 9 of 1964.
89. Rhodesia, Prime Minister's Office, 1965.
90. Rhodesian Government Notice No. 104; Boeder, 1974, p. 238.
91. Bush and Cliffe, 1984, p. 81.
92. Rhodesia/South Africa, 1966; cf. Whiteside and Patel, 1985, pp. 28–30.
93. Coetzer, 1980, pp. 101–2.
94. These measures let all workers stay until August 1969, after which they had to return home for a month before their old employer could rehire them (Clarke, 1978, p. 37). The travel document provided up to ten years' employment in this way. Employers were required to

deposit R20 per worker, which was only refunded if the worker could be proven to have arrived back in Rhodesia.

95. Coetzer, 1980, pp. 104–5.
96. *Times of Zambia*, 26 June 1967.
97. Zambia National Assembly, *Hansard*, No. 8, 28 June 1967, p. 515.
98. Clarke, 1978, pp. 3, 5, 74. The year following the deal with the WNLA, Rhodesia's minister of labour made the celebrated statement that: 'There is no unemployment in Rhodesia. The fact is that we have a shortage of labour . . .' The minister went on to say that there were more than 36 000 unfilled farm jobs as well as labour shortages in the mines (BBC interview, reported in the *Rhodesia Herald*, 'Farm Jobs Galore – Cronje', 13 Jan. 1976; cited in Hawkins, 1976, p. 103). Based on widespread unwillingness to accept the outrageously poor pay and conditions of farm jobs, the statement excluded all other evidence. It was the death rattle of the view that all those not employed in the 'white' economy were supporting themselves from farming on tribal trust lands. Only upon independence would employment creation for all be identified among Zimbabwe's principal economic objectives (Zimbabwe, 1981; cited in Mkandawire, 1982, p. 20).
99. McNamara, 1985, pp. 149–50.
100. Rhodesia/South Africa, 1974.
101. McNamara, 1985, pp. 149–52.
102. Clarke, 1978, pp. 15–17.
103. Clarke, 1975, p. 193; 1978, p. 18; Breytenbach, 1979, p. 33.
104. McNamara, 1985, pp. 163–78.
105. Clarke, 1978, p. 9. For a short while, the quota also calmed internal Rhodesian employers who were anxious that rising recruiting for SA would cause labour shortage or rising wages, particularly in plantation agriculture and especially tobacco.
106. Clarke, 1978, pp. 9–11.
107. McNamara, 1985, pp. 173–5.
108. Hawkins, 1976.
109. Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989, p. 42.
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112. Turner, 1981, p. 3.
113. TEBA, 1983.

5 Mozambique: Labour Export Policy and International Conflict

Labour flows are sometimes a part of open international conflict, when their control can be used as an effective weapon or even as a form of assistance from an ally. The Mozambican experience is one of the best examples of how geopolitical rivalry among states can determine the movement of labourers.

Mozambique has supplied many millions of years of migrant labour to other countries: to Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, São Tomé and Principé and – most recently – East Germany. For decades Mozambicans were the majority of labourers in the South African gold mines, with Portugal signing a long string of labour export pacts with its powerful neighbour, which set the pattern for such deals with others.[1]

Mozambique was a Portuguese possession, with interests already well-differentiated from those of Britain and its territorial administrations. The Portuguese government, therefore, right from the start drove hard bargains for supplying labourers to its neighbours. Mozambique was segmented into areas controlled by companies and estate holders – heavily penetrated by British capital – and areas that remained under direct Portuguese administration. Early Portuguese rule became exceptionally dependent on labour export, running first and foremost a labour-sending administration. The supply of labour was managed under a series of treaties, agreements and contracts with the South African and Southern Rhodesian governments, allowing recruiters access to labour in specified parts of Mozambique. Profoundly different labour-migration patterns and labour export policies resulted.

Post-independence labour export to South Africa demonstrates the determination of foreign labour migration flows by political processes, particularly the use of job-dependency as a weapon of geopolitical coercion. Independence caused a major fall in mine jobs for

Mozambicans and a sharp overall drop in Mozambican labour emigration. As a war of destabilization brought about economic collapse, Mozambique's government became desperate for secure South African jobs. The South African government then chose to blockade Mozambican migrants in order to further undermine Mozambique's attempted transition to socialism. For a while East Germany employed workers from its socialist African ally, but this was abruptly ended upon the reunification of Germany – yet another political transformation that caused a sudden change in labour flows.

Africans in Mozambique were already living in chaotic times before they were forced to begin labour-migrating in the second half of the nineteenth century. Precolonial Mozambique provided slaves through the Ngoni and Makua, who sold them to the Arabs and Portuguese on the coast. Slaves were still being exported at the rate of 15 000 per year in the 1830s. In addition to invasions by the Portuguese, Ngoni and other marauders, there were also persistent outbreaks of disease and cycles of drought.[2]

Over several centuries Portugal haphazardly expanded its influence inland. In 1891 it chartered a central area of Mozambique to the Moçambique Company, covering today's Manica and Sofala Provinces, and signed over use of the northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado to the Niassa Company. Most of the area in between was made into *prazos* – large personal estates – with the *prazeiros* granted self-administration of their holdings. The Portuguese government in Lisbon therefore remained directly responsible for only about third of Mozambique.[3] As Portuguese capital was less abundant, the Niassa and Mozambique companies came increasingly under the control of British capital, while the Zambézia Company, which acquired most of the *prazos*, was also British owned. The demand of these British investments for labourers was greater than in the Portuguese-run areas but both sides were happy to see African farmers succumb and seek waged work.[4]

In 1899 labour regulations, the Ennes Labour Code (Regulamento do Trabalho de 1899), made it illegal for men not to be employed in one of seven ways, including cash farming, waged labour or 'civil service'. Others were subject to *shibalo* or forced labour for the government.[5] The new dictates, which remained operational until 1961, made conditions much harsher for Africans – almost unavoidable

within Mozambique. Companies in the north that needed labour watched in frustration as tens of thousands of people fled to Nyasaland (Malawi) and Tanganyika (Tanzania) to escape. In the Portuguese-ruled south, however, below the Savé River, the administration was quite intent on marshalling the lucrative migration to South Africa and was hardly concerned for local employers at all.


THE MODUS VIVENDI WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Just as the post-independence government of Mozambique would inherit a migrant-labour dependency in 1975, so the Portuguese inherited such a pattern when they established their rule in southern Mozambique a century before. Large outflows of labourers were already occurring, making effective action impossible until they could better administer the migration. This proved possible only through bilateral labour-export deals. The early Portuguese role was therefore limited to shaping and controlling the outflows to the extent afforded by their bargaining position, channelling migrants to the Transvaal Chamber of Mines and guaranteeing a stable supply in exchange for as much revenue and other concessions as they could get.

Portugal quite purposely perpetuated the flows thereafter, preferring ready South African cash to longer-term local development. A crucial aspect of negotiations with South Africa was Lisbon's tireless insistence on measures to ensure that workers circulated back and forth, rather than emigrating permanently, thus the pattern continued for the duration of Portuguese rule.

Labour recruiting for French colonies was permitted as early as 1860 and a few years later Tonga workers were migrating to Transvaal farms and Natal sugar plantations.[6] This was followed, in 1875 and 1876, by decrees legalizing the movement of labourers to Natal and the Cape.[7] The Natal decree was parallelled by a treaty guaranteeing rail traffic to the capital's port of Lourenço Marques, providing a model for many decades to come.[8]

By 1887, only a year after gold mining began on the Witwatersrand, an estimated half of the adult male population of the Lourenço Marques district was away working at any one time – mostly in the



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 4 Mozambique: estimated population working abroad

Transvaal but also in Natal and the Cape.[9] Despite large-scale forced labour in the south, the Portuguese government was still obliged to import thousands of Chinese workers to construct new railways and ports. Southern planters were having an even harder time getting cheap labour.[10] Forced labour migration to the Portuguese cocoa islands of São Tomé and Principé began soon after, evolving into more voluntary labour export by the beginning of the First World War.

The first statute on labour emigration was decreed in 1897 to increase control and revenue.[11] A Department of Emigration was created, specifically to prevent *clandestinos*' movements across the border. Fees in gold were collected for each hundred recruits and migrants themselves were charged for an exit permit at the border. Any African caught returning home without a permit served 90-days' unpaid labour.[12]

By 1899 there were an estimated 80 000 Africans from the south of Mozambique working in the Transvaal – 2.6 per cent of the entire population of Mozambique and a much higher proportion of the population of the south (see Figure 4). The planters of southern Mozambique were struggling to find the low-paid labourers they wanted and looked on in mortification as the Lisbon government pressed for a deal to keep on sending labour to the Transvaal.

By the turn of the century the rounding up of men for labour recruiters had become one of the dominant activities of the administration.[13] Indeed, when tax collection and other labour-related

activities of the administration are considered, labour export was by far its greatest activity. The horror that Africans must have faced at the hands of the new European tyrants is suggested in this quotation from António Enes, administrator of Mozambique in the 1890s:

> I do not consider [the African] something to be exterminated because of the necessity for the expansion of the white race, although I may believe in natural inferiority.
>
> The State, not only as a sovereign of semi-barbaric populations but also as a depository of social authority should have no scruples in *obliging* and if necessary *forcing* these rude Negroes in Africa ... to work.[14]

The 1901 Modus Vivendi

By December 1901 a draft version of the *Modus Vivendi* was signed. The Transvaal's appointed recruiting agency could operate inside Mozambique if it paid Portugal certain fees, while the prewar bias in freight rates and tariffs favouring Lourenço Marques over Natal and the Cape was reinstated. The Transvaal government was also to endeavour to prevent *clandestinos* from entering, and – at Lisbon's insistence – contracts were limited to a year.[15] A secret deal between Mozambique and Wenela prevented other recruiters from obtaining a licence to recruit in Mozambique south of 22°.[16]

There was widespread discomfort with the *Modus Vivendi.* The Cape and Natal were of course disturbed at the restitution of rail rates and tariffs that discriminated against them, while many officials in Lisbon noted that the deal would retard Mozambique's own development.[17] The Portuguese curator in Johannesburg was most incensed that Wenela was encouraging women to become *clandestinos,* pursuing what appeared to be permanent outflows. The emigration of women was considered by the Portuguese to be one of their most troublesome problems concerning labour export, as they wished to prevent permanent emigration of the labour force so as to keep it circulating.[18] The Transvaal administration, for its part, had blundered somewhat. It had thought it was getting access to *all* of Mozambique, not realizing that Portugal had signed away the power to make such decisions in the larger part of Mozambique.

A pattern had now been set that would take Mozambique through more than 90 years of labour-supply negotiations with the South African government – a strange but enduring mixture of conflict and

contractual cooperation. The deal would be repeated in 1928 and 1964 with its essential form intact. Presidents Chissano of Mozambique and Botha of South Africa would lunch together on the Cabora Bassa Dam in 1988 and discuss the possibility of yet another such deal.

The 1909 Convention

The Portuguese administration was soon transforming the south into a giant, farming, African labour reservoir. More and more prime land was allotted to whites in the districts of Lourenço Marques and Inhambane, with more and more men and women forced to work for low wages.[19]

In 1909 the administration in Lourenço Marques signed a convention with the Transvaal government entrenching the *Modus Vivendi*.[20] Recruitment for the Transvaal mines was formally restricted to the area governed directly by Portugal, roughly that below 22° latitude plus a few other tracts of land. In return for the labour, 50–55 per cent of rail traffic into a 'zone of competence' in the Rand went through Lourenço Marques.[21] Portugal specified that compulsory return to Mozambique must be included in workers' contracts, so as to be enforceable under the law there rather than a mere treaty obligation.[22] The Transvaal government agreed but obstinately resisted a deferred pay system, claiming that it would discourage recruitment.[23]

Again there was a great deal of opposition. One prominent white Natalian was sufficiently vexed to refer to the convention as a *modus morendi*.[24] Many Portuguese opposed all labour export as harmful to the Mozambican economy, even arguing that it was immoral in that it separated families and caused monstrous mortality rates.[25] Reams of statistics and requests for information on the death rate were exchanged between the Portuguese curator in the Transvaal and Lourenço Marques.[26]

By 1909 there were about 92 000 Mozambicans working in South Africa, almost all southerners. They represented 2.7 per cent of Mozambique's entire population but a high 7–8 per cent of the population in the south. Moreover the proportion of the population absent was growing steadily (see Figure 4 and Appendix 2).

Smaller Portuguese employers increasingly found the competition for labourers overwhelming and were forced to import labourers from the north.[27] Along with some northern employers who wanted

the south's labourers for themselves, they established lobby organizations and even newspapers to promote their views on the labour issue. However the case that stopping migration to the Union would produce a cornucopia of labourers was far from clear.[28] The tax rate was so high, and local wages so low, that many Africans needed a South African job in order to survive.

The 1928 Convention

By this time the number of Mozambicans working in South Africa was an estimated 133 000, largely in the mines. This was about 3.5 per cent of the entire Mozambican population – or more than 10 per cent of the population of the south. Labour migration to Southern Rhodesia was also picking up. By 1930 at least 40 000 were working there and perhaps 5000 elsewhere (see Appendix 2).

With more than 10 per cent of the population away working in South Africa – the vast majority of them men – African life in the south of Mozambique was radically altered. Men returned home with venereal and other diseases and became estranged from their wives and children. Women were expected to carry out all work at home and often to feed the family on their own. Domestic violence, drinking and demoralization spread and more and more men failed to return home from their jobs.[29]

In 1921 the Union of South Africa government gave the required year's notice of its intent to terminate the convention of 1909. It was making a concerted effort to gain control of Mozambican ports and railroads. There was even a plan afoot to incorporate much of southern Mozambique into the Union in order to obtain its labour.[30] What followed was a dramatic exercise in brinkmanship.

After two years of fruitless negotiations to increase the Mozambican share of South African rail traffic, the Portuguese high commissioner in Mozambique broke off the labour convention without consulting Lisbon. South Africa's bluff was called and new recruits for the gold mines were restricted to only 350 per week, a highly popular policy among Portuguese settlers. The Union, however, managed to block loans of British capital to Mozambique by convincing the lenders that the revenue Portugal would need to make repayment would depend on the trade and transport agreement between South Africa and Mozambique.

The Lisbon government was deeply concerned. Migrants alone were bringing in £800 000 in foreign exchange, including a tenth of the

administration's direct revenue, not to mention trade and rail traffic.[31] Portugal also greatly feared the loss of labour control that would result from non-cooperation on the two sides of the border.[32] New taxes for exit permits were thus imposed 'with the sole intention of curbing clandestine emigration'.[33] Altogether Portugal would make 25 decrees that tinkered with labour-emigration control between 1909 and 1928.[34]

Unlike Britain and its possessions, Portugal did not award Mozambique's administrators much autonomy with regard to labour export. Lisbon officials felt that their high-spirited commissioner in Mozambique had exceeded his authority in breaking off the convention and he was recalled to Lisbon in disgrace, but the Union government itself abrogated the convention in 1923.[35] Changes in government took place on both sides of the bargaining table, with a new fascist regime in Lisbon further reducing Lourenço Marques' autonomy.[36] Conflict escalated again between the Portuguese and South African governments until Lisbon, too, threatened to renounce the convention, just as its spirited commissioner had done. This time the Union negotiators lost their nerve and settled.[37]

Despite the drama, the 1928 convention was much the same as that of 1909. Reciprocity of commerce was extended from the Transvaal to all of South Africa and a tariff system favourable to Lourenço Marques was reset. All bilateral payments were to be made in gold.[38] The convention was again confirmed in a revision of six clauses in 1934. The maximum of 80 000 recruits was modified to include a minimum of 65 000, guaranteeing Mozambique more stability.[39] Fees payable to Portugal were raised, and their payment switched back from gold to cash. South Africa also agreed to repatriate illegals, estimated by then at 20 000.[40]

Relations became quite stable after all this and the deal was extended for five more years in 1939, with the maximum number of workers increased to 100 000.[41] Deferred pay and taxes owed to Portugal became payable in gold again, if Portugal so chose, and were calculated from pounds at a fixed rate.

These bilateral agreements in 1901, 1909 and 1928 had hammered out an enduring set of terms. The *Modus Vivendi* was the very essence of the relationship between the two countries and most clauses remained intact for the rest of the colonial period. Numbers would change somewhat: the number of *clandestinos* would increase and the proportion of deferred pay would rise, but the labour-export relationship was fundamentally stable. Lisbon officials were quite preoccupied

with selling labour to South Africa, a trade they estimated to be far more lucrative than any alternative development course. As for officials in Lourenço Marques, they were given their orders and left to deal with their planters' complaints as best they could.[42]

SECOND FIDDLE: LABOUR EXPORT TO THE RHODESIAS

The concession of administrative power to the companies chartering most of Mozambique, apart from the south, resulted in rapidly diverging development policies with consequently different labour policies. Portugal moved to entrench the division of the country at the 22nd latitudinal parallel – later the 26th – leaving the area above the line closed to recruiting by South Africa until 1986. The South African government also introduced a ban of its own and Mozambique was divided into two quite different labour-export zones. Within the closed area, labour from what comprised the central segment of Mozambique went mostly to the Rhodesias, while migrants from the far north of Mozambique headed up to Tanzania and Nyasaland.

Labour export deals were signed with the Southern Rhodesian government in 1913, 1934 and 1947 – always to increase revenue and the control of migrants from the central area. Rhodesia offered Portugal money in exchange for exclusive recruiting – not so it could actually recruit on a large scale, but rather to keep South Africa's Wenela out so that its clandestine supply would continue. The balance of power shifted several times, with Portugal gaining the stronger position in 1947 – a time of labour shortage – only to lose it in 1960 under surplus. Mozambican numbers in Rhodesia fell steadily thereafter.

Conditions for Africans in central Mozambique were quite different from conditions for those living south of the Savé River. Many were forced to work for plantation companies such as Sena Sugar Estates or the Moçambique Company. As state-administered parts of the territory had far lower levels of income and development than company areas, they sent their labourers off to toil for the companies.[43]

Africans were caught in an especially complex scramble for their labour, for each small area had its own special arrangement ranging from contracts to forced labour. Africans usually managed to work

for only a month or two at a time, returning to their fields and often producing a surplus to sell to companies to feed their migrant workers.

At the turn of the century Rhodesia asked to recruit directly in Mozambique, along with the French, but the Portuguese minister pleaded shortage and refused.[44] Instead of direct access to Portuguese labourers, Rhodesia was assured that the Transvaal Chamber of Mines would give the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) one eighth of labourers recruited in Mozambique. The Transvaal mines were also to refrain from recruiting in Rhodesia or in what was then the Zambézia district of Mozambique, from where Rhodesia drew the most independent migrants. Though formalized in the *Modus Vivendi* of 1901, the obligation was completely ignored.[45]

From 1903 until 1913, and again after 1935, Wenela *did* recruit in Zambézia and in the north, in direct competition with Rhodesia. The British South Africa Company's administrators for Southern Rhodesia, based in Salisbury, continued to pursue wider recruiting in Mozambique, particularly in Moçambique or Zambézia Company territory.[46]

On the approximate third of Zambézia estates administered directly, the Portuguese had a high requirement for labourers themselves, but these jobs did not generate taxes. In 1902, therefore, Rand recruiters were permitted to operate in several parts of Zambézia provided they advanced recruits' taxes. The Niassa Company also began to supply labourers to South Africa and to southern Mozambican planters. The administration even began actively rounding up men for recruiters, including the large-scale shipping of men to the Portuguese cocoa-growing island of São Tomé. While some fled state-controlled areas to the *prazos* to avoid this cruel island labour, others moved in the opposite direction, to the Transvaal.[47] Economic and legal pressure on labourers was nevertheless steadily increased, with *clandestinos*, for instance – still the majority of migrants – given up to 20 months' forced labour if they were caught.[48]

Ban on South African Recruitment North of 22° Latitude

The House of Assembly in South Africa voted in 1912 to reject a new labour-export agreement with Portugal and ban all recruiting north of 22° latitude. Portugal simultaneously decreed its own ban to the same effect, a ban that was already effectively imposed in 1901

when recruitment by Wenela was restricted to areas under direct Portuguese government, and formalized in 1909.[49] While the high death rate among 'tropicals' was widely accepted as the reason for the ban, the underlying cause was region-wide competition for labourers between South Africa and other British investments, particularly in Southern Rhodesia and on British-owned plantations in Mozambique and Malawi.

There was indeed a complex mesh of interests. In 1906 London had briefly banned recruiting north of 22°; Nyasaland's administration was moving to impose such a ban more permanently by 1912; and Mozambique's administration had set up a tuberculosis commission in order to justify a ban of their own. London's Colonial Office sought a compromise between the demands of different British investments for labourers, for most of the capital that required labourers on Mozambican plantations was as British as that invested in the South African mines. South Africa's ban in 1913 was therefore pre-emptive. Mozambique's 1928 convention later restricted South African recruiting to the south of 26° latitude.[50] The South African ban was lifted in 1933 but the Portuguese prohibition remained until 1986, thus for most of the twentieth century Mozambique remained divided into two main labour-export zones.

The Tete Accord of 1913

With the ban at 22° putting Wenela out of the picture, the supply of labourers north of 22° increased. The BSA administration in Salisbury signed an accord with the Portuguese government in 1913 gaining access to up to 15 000 recruits at a time in permitted parts of Tête.[51] The RNLB would pay 1/6 per worker every three months, plus a passport fee of 15s and 7/6 customs duty for workers' imports coming home. Rail tariffs for returning Africans were not to be higher than outbound tariffs, and Rhodesia undertook to refuse passes to workers from Tete who desired work outside the bureau, thus helping the Mozambican government to control the outflows.[52]

The accord was unsuccessful in controlling *clandestinos* however. RNLB contract wages were significantly lower than those on the open labour market and *clandestinos* found they could take these jobs and also avoid paying Rhodesian tax by returning home once a year. In any case, workers merely had to lie about coming from Tete to avoid the accord's application. A report in 1915 found that as many labourers were moving out of Moçambique Company Territory to

Rhodesia as to the rest of Mozambique. Thanks to the ban, emigration to the Transvaal from the company's territory was only on 'a small scale'.[53]

In 1918 Portugal requested a modification of the accords of 1913 and 1914 with Salisbury. Their idea was to improve control by issuing certificates to all Africans born in Portuguese territory who had entered Southern Rhodesia after 1903.[54] Salisbury refused and pressed for a ten-year renewal as things stood. In the face of these clashing demands, and of course favouring the needs of Portuguese possessions such as São Tomé and Princípe, the governor replied to Salisbury that he was only willing to renew the agreement for five years, and only if it was made applicable to *all* Africans from Mozambique. He won on both points.[55]

Growth in labour migration to Southern Rhodesia was rapid. By 1920 there were 20 000 Mozambicans working in Southern Rhodesia at any one time. By 1930 there were 40 000, and by 1940 there would be about 70 000. The amount of labour migration to South Africa was still much larger than that to Southern Rhodesia but the rate of increase in migration to the latter was steadily catching up.

The only important destination for Mozambican labour *within* the Portuguese empire was still the plantation islands of São Tomé and Princípe. The numbers of Mozambican labourers there peaked at 10 000 in 1916–17.[56] This was relatively modest, but the Zambézia Co. was so upset that at one point it threatened to abandon its plantations.[57]

Labour migration to São Tomé and Princípe was initially a virtual death sentence. Even though they did improve, conditions remained more like forced labour than migration. 'Migrants' were often ordered into stockades with threats of a charge of vagrancy, and once captive it was common practice to keep them drunk until the boat came. However the system was gradually converted into more elective labour until Orde-Brown, in 1929, reported that the labourers were returning home quite satisfied after two-year stints.[58]

Mozambique's rulers were slowly learning the fundamentals of controlling labour emigrants – making passports free, for instance, in order to encourage their use. However the new modifications still had little practical effect on the flow of *clandestinos* to Southern Rhodesia. The curator in Salisbury was not even collecting enough fees and taxes to cover his office expenses and wrote the superintendent of emigration a long letter arguing for either stringent amendments to the new deal or its rejection.[59] At the point of

withdrawing the office in 1925 Portugal was unexpectedly offered an accord for a minimum £4500 per year, plus 50 per cent pay deferment and compulsory repatriation.[60] Portugal had apparently been bargaining from a stronger position than it had realized, for Rhodesia wanted Wenela kept out.

Following the fascist takeover in Lisbon, a corporate labour policy was developed in Mozambique and the Niassa Company and the *prazos* were dissolved into a one-state administration. Outside the Wenela monopoly south of the Savé, only Tete officially sanctioned foreign recruiting. Six hundred truckloads of workers were observed crossing out of Tete in 1929 and a minimum of 20 000 more Tete workers emigrated clandestinely to the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.[61] The comparison with 271 recruits under the agreement with Southern Rhodesia was laughable, but Salisbury continued to make up the £4500 and Portuguese officials in Lourenço Marques could see no way to improve the situation:

> What would we gain by renouncing the accord, which Rhodesia will certainly not renew on the present basis, when nothing could be more profitable than this?[62]

The Southern Rhodesian government's wily negotiators were paying for a recruiting right that they hardly used in order to protect their supply of *clandestinos* from Wenela competition. For its part, the government in Lisbon was preventing the larger drain that South African recruiting would cause, while still maximizing profits from the less preventable flows to Rhodesia.

A Shifting Balance

In 1947 the growth of the Rhodesian economy and the South African mines enhanced competition for labour and prompted the Southern Rhodesian government to enter into a number of renewed accords with its neighbours in order to secure their foreign labour supply. Portugal found its bargaining position improved and was able to win more concessions from Rhodesia, including more genuine cooperation on the regulation of *clandestinos*. In only a decade, however, surplus conditions arrived and the tables were again turned. Rhodesia then renounced the deals that had existed between the two governments since 1913.

The third agreement with Southern Rhodesia, signed in 1934, came at the end of a period of flux in Portuguese planters' labour supply. A new forced cotton-growing scheme was particularly successful in the Zambézia and Moçambique Company areas. Local administrations were free to decide if cotton-growing would be enforced through the Native Labour Regulations of 1930, which obliged Africans to 'work'.[63]

In 1930 the government had set up recruitment centres in Zambézia and Tete in a further effort to help Zambézia planters obtain labourers. Even businesses from other provinces were banned from recruiting in Zambézia. By the Depression's end, however, the planters were feeling renewed competition for labourers from abroad, and Rhodesia was again in direct competition with South Africa outside of Mozambique since South Africa's 22° ban had been lifted. The demand for labourers entered a new phase and Portugal again sought to reduce the flow to Rhodesia.[64]

Under the 1934 agreement, taxes continued to be collected only from Tete residents working in Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia agreed not to issue passes to Mozambican residents other than to travel home, in an attempt to make migration to South Africa more difficult. Passport and reengagement fees were raised and the maximum number remained 15 000 at a time.[65] A major reorganization of the Central Department of Native Affairs was also undertaken, specifically to improve its efficiency in dealing with the 'problem' of emigration.[66]

All workers in Rhodesia, no longer just those from Tete, were now subject to control whether they were legal or not, and the new RNLSC (Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission) had a hard time attracting recruits.[67] Rhodesia complained but its attempts to increase the area of recruitment and length of contract were blocked.

Portugal's advantage proved short-lived. By 1952 the RNLSC was again recruiting successfully in Tete. In 1958 the Foreign Migratory Labour Act was passed, barring foreign Africans from working in Salisbury and Bulawayo – the two largest cities and industrial centres. The Act was successively extended to more and more urban centres until all urban areas were included by the early 1960s, and all foreign blacks were confined to farm and mine jobs. Notice was then given to Portugal that the Tete agreement would be terminated.[68]

There were now more Mozambicans working in Southern Rhodesia than in South Africa, and Portugal stood to lose tax revenue of £100 000 per year. In 1949 there had been an estimated 133 000 in

Southern Rhodesia compared with 183 000 in South Africa – equal to a combined 5.7 per cent of the population. By 1957 the estimated number was 183 000 in Southern Rhodesia compared with 177 000 in South Africa. Altogether the proportion working outside remained the same, at about 5.8 per cent of the Mozambican population as a whole (see Figure 4).[69]

A new deal was drafted in 1961 reflecting Rhodesia's new interest in reducing influxes. There would be no recruiting in Mozambique by Southern Rhodesia. In a reversal, Salisbury's Ministry of External Affairs would fix a quota for the maximum number in Southern Rhodesia at any one time. Importantly, the Rhodesian External Affairs Department would retain the power to authorize or bar the movement of Mozambicans from the federation to any other territory besides Mozambique, giving the Rhodesian government a new restraint on movements to South Africa and reinforcing Mozambicans' inferior status in the Southern Rhodesian labour market.[70]

Portugal agreed to these arrangements at first, but then realized that the scheme would transfer much of the control over Mozambican labourers to Rhodesia. It balked, and unexpectedly supplied a quite different draft guaranteeing freedom of movement of Mozambican labourers within Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian government's new policies on alien labourers, however, were explicitly intended to restrict foreign labourers to poorer jobs – away from Southern Rhodesia's urban unemployed – and so it all fell through.[71]

What followed next was a startlingly successful exclusion of Mozambican and other alien labourers from Rhodesia, with more and more districts and towns closed off. Salisbury lost all interest in bargaining with Portugal as region-wide surplus conditions set in and labourers were forced to stream back into Mozambique. Portugal had underestimated the rise of unemployment and the erosion of its bargaining position, and Mozambican labour migrants in Rhodesia thereafter steadily declined.

LABOUR MIGRATION TO TANZANIA AND MALAWI

The northern part of Mozambique was the least-developed and least administered. Unlike the south, where labour migration began before the Portuguese were even installed, considerable pressure was brought to bear on the northern population first. Brutal compulsion

to perform waged labour provoked massive outflows northward, much of it longer-term or permanent flight. Emigrants, refugees and labour migrants, including a large number of 'labour refugees' – people fleeing a frequently fatal labour process and who often worked for wages in their place of refuge – streamed together out of the country. Only belatedly grasping the contradiction between its repressive labour policies and its inability to control the borders, Portugal changed its ways too late to undo the impact of the exodus.

Malawi

The Ennes labour code of 1899 prompted the first real flood of Lomwe people to British Central Africa (Nyasaland or Malawi). *Prazeiro* raids and official Portuguese expeditions into Lomweland and elsewhere in the north of Mozambique enforced a 'duty to work'. Lomwe were captured and chained together to build railways and roads and entire villages were press-ganged into plantation work. The Lomwe began to migrate from Mozambique in great numbers. Workers were at least *paid* on the plantations of the Shire Highlands or the sugar estates of southern Tanganyika, and while treatment was hardly just, there was no large-scale violence.[72] One hundred thousand Nguru people are estimated to have entered Nyasaland (Malawi) between 1900 and 1920, becoming the second largest ethnic group in Malawi, after the Chewa, by 1964.[73]

The measures provoking the exodus continued. Poll taxes were raised from 8s to 10s in 1922 and were collected largely in silver, despite the fact that workers were only paid in currency. Defaulters were arrested, and women were often raped by collectors.[74] By the early 1930s there were three categories of Mozambicans in Nyasaland: households attempting to settle; young single men who often found a wife locally; and temporary migrants who stayed for only three or four months.[75] Increased demand for labourers on new tea estates in Thyolo district then brought in another major wave of Lomwe labourers. Though they originally intended to return, many eventually decided to stay on rather than face forced labour at home.

A good number of Nyasaland planters only survived, in fact, by offering share-cropping tenancies to Mozambicans.[76] However there was considerable opposition from within the government and from Nyasaland Africans. Government officers blamed the immigrants for crowding and crime while Africans blamed them for driving wages

down.[77] The Northern Province Native Association, for instance, wrote to the government of Nyasaland that:

> If planters solved their labour question fairly and justly with regard to treatment and pay the Committee think there is enough labour in the country for its present needs that even though alien natives were declared prohibited immigrants, planting interests would not suffer.[78]

The administration took no action of course, and so many settled in Mlanje District – perhaps 100 000 – that they made up 75 per cent of the population there by 1936.[79]

Having understood that they were causing labour to flee, the Mozambican administration in Lourenço Marques began to relax somewhat the application of the new labour laws. Unpaid labour on disaster or 'native' services projects was stopped and a tax was levied instead in the belief that men would be less inclined to emigrate to avoid the tax than to avoid forced labour.[80] In 1938 restrictions were imposed on the movement of labourers across the border into Nyasaland. When a shortage of labourers for hire resulted, Nyasaland planters countered with better food and housing. Indeed they had little choice, for by this time over half of their labourers were from Mozambique.[81]

Tanzania

By 1940 the Mozambican component of the labour force on sisal plantations in Tanganyika had also become quite noticeable. Many men came with their wives, working for half a year or more. While the majority returned home, a few became semi-permanent squatters and were offered hoes and other tools by the Tanganyikan administration. A survey found that half of the 13 000 sisal workers in the southern Province of Tanganyika were from Mozambique.[82]

There was still tension between the Portuguese and Tanganyikan administrations, that respectively refrained from discouraging or encouraging the migrants in order to avoid inflaming the situation.[83] The Tanganyika secretariat was quite concerned not to lose the labourers:

> I have always been frightened lest the Portuguese Government should take steps to prevent labour leaving their country; indeed,

> I was cross-examined over it at Geneva by the Portuguese [ILO] Representative. To station a recruiter, who would undoubtedly go over the Portuguese border might provoke a crisis and I consider that the Provincial Commissioner should refuse a permit to recruit labour in the Southern Province without giving any reasons.[84]

The Portuguese government in Lisbon and its administration in Lourenço Marques were eventually provoked by the exodus to consider stimulating development of the north. A programme to promote peasant production of the candlenut tree was introduced after the Second World War in the hope of encouraging people to remain.[85] By 1948 the Provincial Commissioner for Southern Province in Tanganyika reported a tendency for migrants to return to Mozambique, due to a relaxation of the labour laws there and a supply of hard currency and consumer goods. Labour emigration to Tanganyika fell dramatically thereafter, causing serious hiring shortfalls.[86]

Unlike the flows elsewhere, then, the movements northward were never very successfully controlled. Ironically the Portuguese zeal for exploiting northern Mozambicans had provoked the mass emigrations that drained their labour supply. When they finally grasped the principle of encouraging the population to consider remaining, the flow of migrants was considerably diminished.

THE COMING OF CONTROL

The reduction of jobs abroad in the 1960s, especially in Rhodesia, and the arrival of surplus conditions within Mozambique itself prompted the negotiation of a flurry of deals on migrants with the government of South Africa. A new bilateral convention was signed, as was an agreement on non-Chamber-of-Mines recruiting and an agreement on passport control. Altogether the channelling and stability of Mozambican migrants in South Africa was improved, as was the extraction of revenue from the flows. *Clandestinos* finally began to decline in importance as governments achieved more of the control they had sought for so long.

By late 1964 the Frente de Liberação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), had little choice but to declare war. All around, African nations were

gaining political independence. The Mozambican people were dreaming of freedom and a better standard of living, but Portugal had no plans to relinquish its grasp. Despite a fair amount of industrialization, the country was poorer than most and there were few schools or health posts for blacks. The liberation struggle was the only way forward, and FRELIMO began to attack small administrative and military posts.

By 1966 the Rhodesian Foreign Migratory Labour Act of 1958 had been extended to all areas except selected rural ones that were especially dependent on alien labourers. Migration to Rhodesia was falling off sharply, and only in the north were Mozambicans still heading off in great numbers. FRELIMO's armed rebellion against Portuguese rule spurred even more to leave, particularly to new Malawian sugar estates.[87] The declining options for Mozambicans to work abroad propelled Lisbon to seek deals guaranteeing a sustained level of South African employment. As Pretoria was as anxious as ever to guarantee its supply, a flurry of new controls resulted.

A convention signed in 1964 by the Portuguese and South African foreign ministers updated the conventions of 1928, 1934 and 1940 with respect to the Chamber of Mines' recruitment.[88] Recruitment was still limited to south of the Savé River or 26° latitude, with Portugal reserving the right to limit recruitment further or even cancel Wenela's licence.[89] The deal was preceded by a semi-secret gold clause, which fixed at US$42 per ounce the rate at which amounts sent to the Portuguese would be converted into gold for payment. This was the real sweetener, for workers' deferred pay would thereafter be transferred in gold – 60 per cent of their wages beginning after the first six-months' work. When the price of gold later rose, Pretoria would sell the gold at the market price and remit the total to Lisbon. Profits from this were $125m in the period 1970–73.[90]

So far only the South African Chamber of Mines had been covered by the spate of new agreements. A special bilateral agreement regarding workers with three agencies other than Wenela was signed between Pretoria and Lisbon in 1966.[91] The Agência do Colocação de Trabalhadores para Africa do Sul (ALGOS) and two other organizations were allowed to recruit and supply non-Chamber mines if they paid recruitment fees to Portugal and agreed to terms that included compulsory contracts and medical examinations. Legal contracting of the previously illegal migrants was coordinated with a legalization campaign for migrants already in South Africa and a coordinated crackdown on those who did not come forward.[92]

The control of *clandestinos* had in fact become of mutual interest to Lisbon and Pretoria. While Lisbon wanted to increase revenue as always, Pretoria too had become interested in gaining control of illegal migrants. An Agreement on Passport Control Posts was also ratified in 1966, establishing posts at agreed sites in order to ensure that workers were channelled where other terms could be more effectively enforced. Only those with contracts would be allowed to enter South Africa for the purpose of employment, while illegal Mozambican immigrants were to be transported to a camp for identification and deportation.[93]

The suppression of illegal migration served to force migrants through the well-honed Portuguese revenue-extracting machinery. Those legally bound for the Rand were by now obliged to pay the Portuguese government encampment fees, application fees, document fees, passport fees, emigration fees, registration fees, 'assistance' taxes, hut tax, re-entry taxes and 'future income taxes'.[94]

In 1970, following meetings in Lisbon, the convention of 1964 was secretly amended to supply labourers to mines other than the Chamber's. The objective, once again, was the legalization of *clandestinos*, and a further agreement was made to tighten up border post and passport control.[95] The controls were a success and the number of Mozambicans employed outside the mining sector in South Africa declined in the 1960s. Rhodesia's internalization programmes and the decline of employment opportunities farther north also pared down Mozambican labour emigration until, for the first time, it was mostly regulated.

Overall, labour migration to destinations outside Mozambique was in steep decline (see Figure 4). Seventy years after the *Modus Vivendi*, Lisbon and Pretoria had finally achieved substantial control over migrant outflows, leaving the migrants more at the mercy of government policy makers than even before.

INDEPENDENCE: WAR AND LABOUR EXPORT

Post-independence labour export from Mozambique is an unusual case of the use of jobs as a weapon by a hostile employing power. The South African government perceived Mozambique's development as a threat to continued white-minority rule in South Africa and so added the withdrawal of employment opportunities to their already considerable arsenal. Fortunately Maputo was able to develop

an alternative labour export stream to the German Democratic Republic, which partly compensated for the loss of South African jobs. The flows of migrant labour among states were being determined along the battle lines of superpower conflict.

Having led Mozambique's African majority to victory, FRELIMO formed the newly independent government in 1975. During the liberation struggle FRELIMO leaders had vowed to end labour migration. The numbers to be brought home had become even higher when a transitional government allowed recruitment to increase from 100 000 to 130 000 per year before independence.[96] There continued to be a total of about 200 000 migrant workers in South Africa. With 20 000 more in Zimbabwe, migrants abroad amounted to 2.1 per cent of Mozambique's population in 1975 compared with 3.7 per cent a decade earlier (see Figure 4).

No sudden moves on the migrant issue were planned by the new government. FRELIMO faced enormous social and economic problems inherited from the Portuguese, and the war-stricken economy was expected to take years to absorb such numbers. With the formal transfer of power only a month away, FRELIMO's leader Samora Machel said they would discuss the labour contracts with Pretoria and not abruptly break off the flow:

> FRELIMO must before anything else create structures for those people. We are not hysterical revolutionaries, the ten year war tempered us.[97]

In the short term, the new Mozambican government in renamed 'Maputo' was expected to pursue better pay, health care, training, recreation, and death and injury benefits for miners. The Maputo government's long-term plan remained absorption of the migrants through development of the state farming sector, the rural sector and industry. It was estimated that it would be ten years before migration to South Africa could stop altogether.

FRELIMO and the Mozambican people were facing a difficult transition. There were foreign reserves of just one million dollars, and much of the country's capital had been expatriated. The literacy rate was under 5 per cent.[98] Only about 10 per cent of the adult rural

population spoke Portuguese and there were few written materials in African languages.[99]

The Maputo government was precariously reliant on South Africa. Mineworkers' contracts were providing 7–10 per cent of its total annual budget, with another 40 per cent coming from railway and port dues on Rhodesian and South African goods. South African tourism was also highly important, as was the South African supply of food and machinery.[100]

The first labour export negotiations conducted by Maputo's new negotiators were not with Pretoria but with Swaziland. In September 1974, under lobbying from citrus, sugar and cotton growers for cheaper labour, the Swaziland government sent a delegation to Mozambique to request contract labourers. The Swaziland government, however, had hardly enamoured itself to FRELIMO during the war of independence, being accused of handing FRELIMO members over to the Portuguese. Maputo refused to discuss anything until diplomatic relations were established between the two countries.[101]

Next, in March 1976, after repeated Rhodesian incursions into Mozambican territory to attack the rear bases of Rhodesian guerrillas, the border with Rhodesia was closed by Maputo and a virtual war began. The region became all but impassable to civilians and labour migration was halted until the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980.

The flow to South Africa was up that year to an estimated 209 000, or about 2 per cent of the population. The new government at least had a windfall in rising gold prices following the 1971 collapse of the international Breton-Woods gold-price agreement. The official rate at which deferred pay and fees were converted to gold remained $42, but under its agreement with Mozambique Pretoria exchanged the gold at the market price – which peaked at US$195 per ounce in 1974 – and then remitted Maputo the full amount. This was worth $250 million in 1975–76 and remained highly profitable until Pretoria ended the agreement in 1977.[102]

The windfall was offset, however, by a drastic reduction in Mozambican miners in South Africa. Maputo appeared to have instigated the cutbacks by causing a delay in supplying new passports, during which time immigration officers could only revalidate old ones for shorter periods. By the time new passports were again available it was clear that the close cooperation with Wenela of the Portuguese era was at an end. Maputo cut the number of Wenela recruitment offices provided with immigration facilities from 21 to four. Mozambicans in Wenela-affiliated mines fell from 114 000 in January

1976 to only 49 000 in 1977 and 38 000 in 1979, and then levelled out at around 45 000 until 1983.[103] Maputo also began to impose stricter controls on the illegal migration of workers into South Africa.[104]

The Mozambican government had waded into the job cutbacks when faced with a contradiction. On the one hand they were committed to ending the exploitation of Mozambican workers in South Africa in the long term. On the other hand both the unemployed and the national treasury needed the money badly. For their part, the white government in Pretoria and the Chamber of Mines had begun to reduce reliance on foreign labour-supply, down from about 75 per cent of the gold mines' labour force in 1973 to under 40 per cent ten years later.[105] Mozambicans were to be restricted to underground work on the 14 mines that still wished to hire, and neither novices nor workers with experience on other mines were to be accepted.[106]

The Chamber of Mines then set a new target for Mozambican recruiting of only 30 000 for 1977.[107] Decisions on foreign labour-supply were in fact being made more and more in Pretoria rather than by Chamber-member mines. Mozambicans had become the cheapest foreign miners available once the fixed gold rate was cancelled, but price did not influence political decisions. Agricultural workers from Mozambique were to be reduced as well, and only those employed prior to July 1972 were to be permitted to renew their contracts.[108]

Peasants in Mozambique were by this time suffering from reduced agricultural exports, sharply reduced jobs in South Africa, and no legal jobs at all in Rhodesia. Dependence on mine jobs was very heavy, particularly in areas with poor agriculture. A study in the Pembe area, with its poor soils and rainfall, found that only 30 out of 500 adult men had never worked a mine contract.[109] The Mozambican government began to emphasize state farms, leaving family farmers to fend for themselves. Many were urbanizing, moving to South Africa clandestinely or crowding outside Wenela's offices in vain. However, despite the fall in the numbers of Mozambican miners, the value of miners' deferments rose with pay increases – 140 per cent in absolute terms between 1975 and 1983 compared with only 10 per cent for export earnings.[110] At one and the same time Mozambique was both losing mine jobs and becoming more dependent on them.

In 1979 FRELIMO struck migrant workers another blow. Peasants who did not subsist wholly from agricultural production, or who were outside their district while their wives farmed, were reclassified among those whose land could be transferred to state farms. However heavy

tariffs on returning miners' commodity imports were lifted, and miners were encouraged to invest in farming.[111] Miners became an increasingly elite group in the countryside, not only because of their rising wages and falling proportion of the Mozambican labour force, but because of the growing destruction around them.

RENAMO (Resistáncia Nacional de Moçambique), assisted by Pretoria in its armed campaign of destabilization, was about to make the 1980s a devastating decade. Whereas the under-five mortality rate had fallen from 340 per thousand in 1975 to 270 per thousand by 1980, thanks to a concerted effort to deliver services to all, the systematic destruction of the 1980s would increase it to 375 per thousand by 1987.[112] Almost 500 schools were destroyed by RENAMO in 1982 alone, and all infrastructure was forced into steep decline, including water, health, education, electricity, road transport, telephones, postal services and agricultural extension. Mozambicans were reduced from a position of some pride in their overall economic and social advancement from 1975 to 1980, to one of growing anguish and drastically falling living standards by 1983.

The numbers of migrants working outside Mozambique had fallen by about half in the first four years of political independence, down to 100 000 in South Africa and virtually none in Zimbabwe–Rhodesia in 1979. They still numbered about 110 000 in 1984 when they were joined by 5000 in the GDR (discussed below). Altogether this was only about 0.9 per cent of Mozambicans – the lowest level since the nineteenth century.[113] Despite pre-independence dreams of ending labour migration – of a better life – life was getting worse because of the war, making mine work look better than ever.

The Mozambican government's decision to negotiate the Nkomati non-aggression and cooperation pact was strongly influenced by dependence on South African jobs and the foreign exchange they earned.[114] Pretoria threatened to send back many of the Mozambican farm workers in the Transvaal before the Nkomati Accord was signed in 1984, backing down only in the face of strong objections from white farmers.[115]

After the signing, Maputo began to press Pretoria for a new labour agreement through the accord's South Africa/Mozambique Joint Economic Working Group. During meetings in 1984, Maputo requested an increase in mine jobs for Mozambicans to 80 000, and ultimately 120 000, along with air transport from Maputo for recruits, higher attestation fees, a review of the remittance system and a new bilateral agreement. The Chamber of Mines, however, strongly

opposed a return to quotas, preferring less dependence on Mozambique and flexible quantities. It also opposed air transport and higher fees as too expensive. Attestation fees were to cover administrative costs, it argued, not to increase government revenue. It *was* willing to review the remittance system, however, as well as a new bilateral agreement without quotas.[116]

The South African labour minister also visited Maputo in 1984, in a party that included representatives from the Chamber of Mines and the Transvaal Agricultural Association. They talked with the Mozambican Secretary of State for Labour, and were thought to be continuing negotiations on a new labour agreement. Maputo asked for some return to a favourable exchange rate for miners' monies paid to Maputo, and for guarantees that the numbers of jobs would not be abruptly reduced. Mozambique still talked of ending dependence on migrant labourers, but in relatively mild language – a 'transformation of the present system' to benefit supplier countries.[117] A partial agreement to legalize the status of Mozambican farmworkers in the Transvaal was signed and the Chamber of Mines committed itself to spend R0.75 million to improve recruitment centres in Mozambique.[118]

ALGOS, the largest of the three private agencies covered under the 1966 agreement, was taken over by the Mozambican government from 1978. It originally supplied non-Chamber mines but in 1983 began to recruit farm labourers as well. An accord on agricultural recruiting was signed by the two countries in 1986, just before Pretoria announced a migrant blockade, and by January 1987 recruiting had stopped.[119] Talks were held on the subject of legalizing illegal Mozambican farmworkers in the Transvaal, mostly regarding the fees paid to Maputo. Raised to R35–40 per recruit, the fees were potentially substantial for 15 000 farmworkers, but the actual number legalized was much lower.[120] Recruiting then recommenced, at about 5–6000 per year for all non-TEBA recruits (The Employment Bureau of Africa – the new Chamber-of-Mines recruiting organization). Legalizations for 1988 totalled another 5000 inside South Africa, but despite these efforts the number of illegal workers hardly declined, and was even thought by ALGOS to be rising in 1989.[121]

More negotiations were held in 1985 and Maputo again tried for a minimum quota, this time for 90 000. The Chamber of Mines, however, would only commit itself to not reducing the number suddenly and without discussion, and ominously suggested that the International Monetary Fund be supplied with an estimate of only

50 000. Pretoria's representative at least expressly denied any intention to reduce the numbers and Maputo made unilateral concessions at subsequent talks, dropping the 26° barrier to recruiting, which dated back to 1901.[122] The labour minister even assured the Chamber of Mines' representative that they were discouraging Mozambicans from participating in strikes in South Africa.[123]

TEBA's demands were tough. Maputo was to abandon the fixed rand–metical exchange rate, which gave miners only 20 meticais per rand for their deferred pay compared with 100 on the black market, and was also to stop using the deferment system as a source of revenue.[124]

Maputo's exchange-rate policy, however, was not negotiable with a foreign employer. The generating of revenue from the flow to South African mines was nearly a century old and it was hardly the time for the FRELIMO government to choose to forgo revenue. The security request was particularly cynical given that Pretoria strongly backed the very RENAMO destabilization that endangered migrants, sometimes specifically targeting them. Perhaps its cynicism was rooted in the Chamber of Mines' suspicion – or even prior knowledge – that Pretoria was considering imposing a sudden ban on Mozambican workers.

Pretoria's Ban

An interesting aspect of the South African government's ban on Mozambican miners in 1986 was Pretoria's disregard for its mining industry's labour supply. Though Pretoria eventually compromised with the Chamber of Mines, allowing most of the Mozambican employees to continue, their original decision to ban the miners was taken for entirely political reasons.

With secret support from South Africa continuing after the Nkomati non-aggression accord, RENAMO's campaigns brought Mozambique to the brink of total collapse. There was systematic destruction of pipelines, railways, roads, ports, electricity pylons, trucks at harvest times, health posts, schools and whole villages. Four million out of 14 million people were reported to be in 'imminent danger of starvation'. Forty-two per cent of the population had left their homes because of the war and hundreds of thousands had fled to neighbouring Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland and South Africa.[125]

Feeling the government in Mozambique weakening, the South African government seized upon employment policy as yet another weapon. In 1985 the South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Nel, stated that one million blacks working illegally in South Africa would be sent home in retaliation for the international disinvestment campaign being waged against the apartheid economy – a threat also employed by the Rhodesian government in 1965. Later Nel retracted the word 'retaliation', explaining that a fall in employment due to successful international sanctions against the apartheid regime would oblige them to localize jobs. The following month South Africa's President Botha repeated threats to expel what he estimated were 1.5 million foreign workers in South Africa, including 600 000 working in the mining sector, and announced an investigation to decide how best to remove them.[126] According to the South African government, this would affect the 52 000 Mozambicans who were employed in its gold and coal mines in 1985; another 15 000 in mines outside the Chamber of Mines; 30 000 working legally in agriculture; and up to 170 000 working in South Africa 'illegally'.[127]

In July 1986 the government of South Africa announced that the employment of 'alien blacks', would henceforth come under the Aliens Act of 1937 and the 1972 Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act. Various other influx-control laws had been scrapped earlier in the year.[128] In October 1986, just one week after the US Senate overruled President Reagan's veto on economic sanctions against South Africa, Botha announced the expulsion of Mozambican mineworkers, officially in response to recent land-mine attacks on white-South-African farms near the Mozambican border. Those working were to complete their contracts and that would be the end of Mozambican mine labour.[129] The consequences were serious – potentially fatal for many of the estimated million Mozambicans who depended on migrants' earnings for some of their food.[130]

While foreign-labour policy was now a primarily political issue, shorter-term economic considerations could not be entirely ignored. When the major mine managers vigorously protested that they were too dependent on proportionally more skilled Mozambicans, Pretoria compromised.[131] Miners with seven years' experience or with jobs in the more skilled classifications – the majority – were exempted from the ban, while mines taking 20 per cent or more of their labour force from Mozambique could phase out the banned workers over three contracts.[132]

White farmers in the Transvaal lowveld also objected loudly to the

government's decision to expel foreign workers, claiming that they were a labour-intensive sector and had already suffered from drought in 1985. The move gave farmers until mid-November to register their Mozambican workers, after which they would be prosecuted. When the deadline came and went, only 6000 of the estimated 17 000 Mozambicans in the lower Transvaal had been registered.[133] There was also a crackdown on illegal workers, Pretoria confirming that 22 000 illegal workers had been deported to frontline states in the first eight months of 1986, including 13 000 to Mozambique.[134] The South African Defence Force then switched on a section of electrified fence between Mozambique and South Africa, and lined it with landmines.[135]

The Ban is Lifted

By 1988 there were still 47 000 miners among a total of some 90 000 Mozambican workers in South Africa.[136] In September Botha travelled to Mozambique to meet with Mozambique's President Chissano, and the possibility of increased Mozambican labour migration to South Africa was discussed.[137] Chissano reportedly arrived with a copy of the South African *Weekly Mail*, which had run a story on how RENAMO was allowed to enlist 'illegal' Mozambican workers imprisoned in South Africa.[138] RENAMO was also still attacking trainloads of migrants returning from South Africa, stopping trains with mines and then opening fire.[139]

The Maputo government was in no position, however, to resist détente with a country with the power to revive or finish off the ravaged Mozambican economy. Chissano appeared to accept Botha's assurances that South African support to RENAMO had genuinely ceased.[140] A meeting between the respective manpower ministers two weeks later discussed possible extensions to labour relations between the two countries, and before the year's end the Manpower Minister announced that he had lifted the 1986 ban on the employment of Mozambicans in South Africa.[141]

Officials in Maputo believed that it was the Chamber of Mines' relentless pressure on Pretoria that had brought about the elimination of the ban, but numbers did not rise at all immediately, remaining at 46 068 by February 1989 compared with 48 595 at the time the ban was lifted. There was then a brief flurry of recruiting for two months, with TEBA hiring more novices than it had for years, until the falling gold price reduced labour demand. Some sort of bilateral labour

agreement had been signed, although details were not released, and negotiations began immediately on a more substantial bilateral agreement to replace the 1964 convention. Maputo sought an increase in the number and Pretoria audaciously sought a guarantee from Maputo that workers would not be suddenly withdrawn.[142] Encouragingly, TEBA set aside R1.45m for repairs to its Mozambican recruiting centres, but RENAMO attacks on them then intensified.[143] The main recruiting point at Ressano Garcia was razed in July 1989, with 185 people killed. Along with the railway line to the border, the recruiting point would be attacked again and again.[144]

In Maputo the brief flurry of recruiting had drawn thousands to a small abandoned stadium on the outside of town. A Portuguese supervisor, with his fishing yacht moored at the nearby naval club, looked on as an assistant decided who would be recruited. Those who had been passed over milled about in frustration and it seemed for a moment as if all too little had changed.

Some of those passed over were correct in thinking it unfair. One of the reasons that the South African mines had pleaded with Pretoria to lift its recruiting ban was the high average skill level of Mozambican miners. When the recruiting resumed, TEBA therefore faced a need to reduce the average skill level of Mozambicans. The smaller quotas, however, meant that ordinarily it would hire only experienced workers, who would then rise even higher. To solve the problem, many skilled workers were turned away in favour of novices.[145]

Throughout the period of Pretoria's reduced job supply, the need for refuge and employment for Mozambicans had been steadily growing. By 1986 there were at least 450 000 people in Tete in need of emergency food due to the war. By 1989, 78 000 official Mozambican refugees were in Zimbabwean camps and at least another 100 000 were living among Zimbabweans, mainly adult men seeking work.[146] Both commercial and communal farmers in north-eastern Zimbabwe were warned not to hire Mozambicans, who had been accused of leading RENAMO bandits to easy Zimbabwean targets.

The curb on recruiting Mozambicans aroused considerable controversy in Zimbabwe, especially among large commercial farmers who depended on Mozambicans to pick their cotton and tobacco. The Commercial Farmer's Union maintained that there were large losses of cotton in 1988 due to a shortfall of local labourers for hire.[147] Nevertheless in 1990 the Zimbabwean security forces rounded up

truckloads of refugees found working on farms for very low wages, leaving some farmers with a critical labour shortage.[148]

Over a million Mozambican refugees had been pushed into neighbouring territories by the end of the decade. At least 700 000 had crossed into Malawi, largely in the three years 1987–89, amounting to 9 per cent of the total population there.[149] Just as in colonial times, a number of refugees sought waged work. Massive reception and feeding programmes were put in place but the negative impact on Malawi's economy was considerable, seriously depleting fuelwood and food supplies.[150] Some of these refugees became tobacco primers, while others became artisans. Land is so scarce that when fighting in Mozambique abated near the border in 1990, thousands of refugees in Malawi began to work crops on home soil again, but still returned to Malawi every evening.[151]

As the conditions worsened for Mozambique's poor, unemployed and underpaid, thousands more illegal refugees fled to South Africa and Swaziland in the hope of finding some means to survive. Soon there were dozens crossing to KaNgwane every day, and Swaziland began to insist that Maputo somehow take its refugee labourers back.[152] Farmers in South Africa meanwhile took full advantage of the desperate labour supply, causing an upswing in stories of the sale of children, unpaid farm labour and even slavery.

The lifting of the ban, then, had constituted only a slight easing of the pressure. Overall Pretoria had used the withdrawal of jobs as a weapon of horrible effectiveness. Having institutionalized a century-long dependency, it had transformed its strong bargaining position into a rare tactic of economic terrorism.

LABOUR EXPORT TO THE GDR

Not only were South African jobs cut as a result of geopolitical conflict, alternative employment was also developed along international political lines. Beginning in 1979, Maputo developed an alternative labour export stream to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The programme was initially a mixture of migration and development aid from an ally, but it quickly became purely labour migration. Financially very favourable to Maputo, especially when the number of workers in the GDR leaped to 18 000 by 1990, the migrants provided as much foreign exchange, and far more revenue, than workers in South Africa.

In 1979, just when Mozambican migration to South African mines had reached its lowest level since 1902, Maputo signed an accord with the GDR to send an initial 2000 workers.[153] Maputo's prime objective was practical training for its citizens with some consideration for employment creation and foreign exchange. The GDR government sought to relieve labour shortages in certain areas of its economy.[154] Of the total migrants who went to work in the GDR between 1979 and August 1988, the largest group were in light industry (36 per cent), followed by the fishing industry (19 per cent), chemicals (9 per cent) and mining/geology (8 per cent). The remainder worked in electronics, transport, agriculture, construction, as interpreters and at other odd jobs.[155]

Under the deal, 60 per cent of workers' pay was to be deferred in US dollars to the central bank of Mozambique.[156] Workers received exactly the total of their deferrals at the official exchange rate on the day the transfer was received, without interest or deductions.[157] Considerable social-security payments, deducted from the workers' earnings, were paid to the Mozambican government four times per year. While the government then assumed some liability under the German system, such as for accident compensation, the majority of the payments were net revenue. Workers, however, were required to pay no Mozambican income taxes, while the Mozambican and GDR governments split the cost of their air fares.[158]

The original arrangement with the GDR emphasized the training value of the contracts, stating explicitly that workers were to be placed in posts where, in combination with the professional training to be provided, they would have an opportunity to gain skills.[159] Projects were undertaken in Mozambique, with GDR finance and technical assistance, that would employ workers upon their return to Mozambique. Plans were made for textile factories in Cabo Delgado and Zambézia, an open-pit coalmine in Tete and an agricultural project in Niassa, but most were paralysed by growing war and banditry. As of mid-1989 only a Cabo Delgado textile plant was operating.

In fact only a small number of returnees have ever found employment befitting their GDR training. The greatest successes have been with railways and ports. Even where work in the same field did exist, there were never enough opportunities. Moreover the training and aspirations of a worker with years of experience in the modern, mechanized environments of East Germany were only painfully reconciled with wartime Mozambican conditions. Many returnees moved to South Africa to seek work illegally, particularly in the

'homelands'.[160] The Ministry of Labour eventually admitted that the programme had become a purely migrant labour stream.[161]

A Large Increase in 1988

Following the imposition of Pretoria's partial ban on migrants to South Africa, Maputo was able to expand migration to the GDR. Whereas new recruits had averaged 1936 in the three previous years (1985–87), and only 1393 per year over the whole nine years the programme had been in existence, protocols for 8000 new four-year contracts were signed in 1988.[162] The original protocol for the year was for 4500 migrants, but when these were absorbed by the GDR more quickly than anticipated another protocol was signed for a further 3500. By mid-1989 there were 18 000 Mozambicans in the GDR under the accord.[163]

An estimated total of $97 million in foreign exchange was received from labour migrants working in East Germany in the twelve months from July 1989 to June 1990.[164] This briefly exceeded the amount of foreign exchange provided by Mozambican miners in South Africa. Indeed net direct revenue of approximately $30 million from migrants working in East Germany during those twelve months was far greater than that from South African jobs.[165]

At the time of leaving Mozambique many were told it was for on-the-job training. This largely accounted for the atmosphere of discontent among many who returned four to six years later to find themselves with only poor prospects in a shattered country. The migrants also realized that their savings would have been double had they retained control over their money. Maputo had exchanged their German marks at the current rate when it received the payments. As the exchange rate plunged during the migrants' contracts, earnings would have been far greater had they been allowed to keep their savings in German marks. There was also no interest paid, despite the holding of money for up to three and half years.

The jobs in the GDR were cut off a couple of years later upon the reunification of Germany – yet another political transformation that sharply altered migrants' fate. All the Mozambicans workers were abruptly sent home in mid-contract to face an economy shattered by war. Many headed off again almost immediately, moving illegally into South African bantustans where there was at least some prospect of finding skilled work.

CONCLUSION

The history of Mozambican labour export demonstrates the considerable impact a country's position in a global state-system has on the emigration of its inhabitants. Both as the possession of a weaker colonial power, and as the post-independence target of Pretoria aggression, Mozambican labour export has been substantially determined by governments' foreign policies.

As Mozambique was a Portuguese and not a British possession, early divergence of its administration's interests from those of its neighbours was less an issue. Instead the already very separate interests of competing colonial powers were reflected in a labour-export policy that maximized Portugal's revenue from the outflows – a policy that substantially underpinned the poor development of Mozambique.

Throughout the colonial era it was Portugal that consistently demanded concessions from the government of South Africa to keep workers circulating. It was largely Lisbon officials who succeeded in limiting the length of contracts, restricting the admission of women to South Africa, obtaining compulsory deferred pay and pressing for the deportation of illegal Mozambican aliens in South Africa. These were the measures that ensured that Mozambican workers would return home between contracts, thus preserving the Portuguese extraction of revenue from their labour.

Mozambican independence arrived at a time of falling employment and growing government control of labour outflows. Embroiled in the conflict between newly independent socialist states and the entrenched white capitalist regime in South Africa, the fate of Mozambican labour migrants was dominated more by international politics than in any other country in Southern Africa.

Notes and References

1. I owe a particular debt in this chapter to the works that precede mine. In particular, Katzenellenbogen (1982) has provided a high-quality volume with a whole chapter on the Transvaal–Mozambique Convention of 1909 alone, while Ruth First's contributions, especially *Black Gold* (1983) remain unforgettable.
2. Henriksen, 1978, p. 65.
3. Vail and White, 1979, pp. 245–6.
4. Vail and White, 1979, pp. 246–50.

5. Harris, 1959, pp. 61–2; cited in Webster, 1977, pp. 256–67; cf. Hodges, 1982, p. 58.
6. Rego, 1910; Rosa and Trigo, 1986, p. 67; cf. Abshire and Samuels, 1969, pp. 173–4.
7. Mozambique, *Boletim Oficial*, 9 Outubro 1876, p. 275, Decree 246 passed 18 July 1876. First (1983) has the date of the 1875 decree as 1857.
8. Galha, 1952, p. 70.
9. First, 1983, p. 15; Katzenellenbogen, 1982, pp. 38–9.
10. Munslow, 1984, p. 83; Harris, 1982, p. 143.
11. Mozambique Statute of 1897.
12. Mozambique Statue of 1897; cf. First 1983, p. 212, and Katzenellenbogen 1982, pp. 40–1. A trustee posted to the Transvaal regulated documentation and reporting, charging workers 10s and keeping their passes until their employer brought them back at their contract's end to pay any further amounts.
13. Head, 1980, p. 93.
14. Mondlane, 1969, p. 37 [emphasis in original].
15. Mozambique/Transvaal Modus Vivendi of 1901, Article X. Article XII. The mines were to pay Portugal 13s for each contract, and 6d per month per worker for all extensions beyond the first 12-month contract (Article VI; Article IX). Employers had to pay 7s 6d for each returning migrant in lieu of customs duty on returning migrants' goods.
16. See First, 1983, pp. 18, 213. The deal was broken by Portugal in 1906 but the WNLA still established virtual monopsony (Ferreira, 1963, p. 70).
17. Katzenellenbogen, 1982, pp. 51–3, 80–2.
18. AHM-DSNI Caixa 120, Processo 88, pp. 21–24; 'Relatório da Curadoria de Jo 'burg', 1949, pp. 284–5. A later amendment required repatriation after contracts ended, but was not respected, provoking the Portuguese curator at one point to refuse to endorse passes and begin looking for a way to force workers to return to Mozambique (AHM-DSNI Caixa 19, 1908, Processo No. 69, Acting Sec. for Native Affairs Pretoria, to Curator of Labour, Johannesburg, 9 May 1908, and reply 4 June 1908; Curator to Secretary, 15 Jan. 1908).
19. Young, 1977, p. 75.
20. Mozambique/Transvaal Convention of 1909.
21. Mozambique/Transvaal Convention of 1909; cf. First, 1983, pp. 213–140.
22. AHM-DSNI Caixa 19 (1908), Processo No. 36, A/18/1, 'Preparação da Convenção de 1909'. The *Modus Vivendi* already specified that all Portuguese law regarding contracts must be enforced, thus it was only necessary to insert clauses in the contract to make them subject to Transvaal law. It was guaranteed that workers would not be forcibly kept at the mines, though they could renew for a second year.
23. Saldanha, 1931, p. 57. The Chamber of Mines later confessed that

Mozambicans spent four pounds out of five before leaving the Union.

24. Katzenellenbogen, 1982, p. 98.
25. Rego, 1910, p. 54, author's translation.
26. AHM-DSNI Caixas 41–46.
27. AHM-DSNI Caixa 197, Processo 94, Saldanha to the Governor General, Mozambique, 15 Dec. 1915. Planters complained that migrants were illogically migrating to farm work that paid less. In fact migrants were heading off in search of a job in the higher-paying mine sector but were sometimes forced to settle for a farm job in order to survive.
28. AHM-DSNI Caixa 197, Processo 94, 'Algums consideraçoes sobre o trabalho dos indigenas do Districto de Inhambane', by Augusto Cardozo; Saldanha, 1931, p. 314.
29. Young, 1977, pp. 66–81.
30. Buell, 1928, p. 30; Katzenellenbogen, 1982, pp. 128–30.
31. Vail and White, 1978, pp. 243, 259; Buell, 1928, p. 33.
32. AHM-DSNI Caixa 34, Processo 14 (1920–1), 13 documents on illegal issue of passes.
33. Mozambique, *Boletim Oficial*, 27 May 1926, no. 13, p. 77, trans. author's.
34. AHM-DSNI Caixa 12.
35. Vail and White, 1978, pp. 241, 261–263.
36. Buell, 1928, p. 31.
37. Galha, 1952, p. 111; Katzenellenbogen, 1982, p. 144.
38. Mine recruits were to be reduced from 100 000 in 1929 at a rate of 5000 per year (Portugal/South Africa Convention of 1928). Having asked for obligatory deferment of *all* salary, as with Mozambicans recruited for the Congo mines, the Portuguese had provoked the opposition of the British Foreign Office on the point and had to settle for only half of the last three months' pay (Saldanha, 1931, pp. 57–8). The mines were to pay a number of taxes to Portugal and the recruitment agency was responsible for repatriating workers to the border after a maximum of 18 months' work, the journey home not to cost more than the journey there. They could not rehire the same men for six months. One article obliged the South African government to assist in the prohibition of women from migrating to South Africa, while Portugal conceded that something had to be done to improve the efficiency of the port at Delagoa Bay, nationalizing it in 1929 (Articles 19, 11, 25; Munslow, 1984, p. 85).
39. Galha, 1952, p. 150.
40. Galha 1952, p. 150. Fees were by then averaging £2 2s 6d per worker, while workers still paid another 10s for their passport (Portugal/South Africa Revision of 1934. cf. First, 1983, pp. 217–18). Payment in gold was switched back to cash, and South Africa agreed to repatriate illegals, estimated at 20 000.
41. Portugal/South Africa Accord of 1939; cf. Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1977, pp. AI/vi–vii; cf. First, 1983, pp. 216, 218. The mines

were not to reduce the number of Mozambican workers faster than the rate of 12 000 per year and the minimum was to remain 65 000. A few further transportation concessions were made.

42. AHM-DSNI Caixa 97, no Processo number, 'sobre questionário de mão de obra indigena'.
43. See Vail and White, 1980, pp. 180–3.
44. ZINA A11/2/8/6, Foreign Office to Sec. BSA Co., 31 Jan. 1901, fp. 166.
45. Katzenellenbogen, 1982, pp. 49–50. The Chamber of Mines further undertook to supply Transvaal workers if they could not deliver Mozambicans.
46. ZINA A11/2/8/9, Gielgud, Manager RNLB, to Milton, BSA Co. Administrator, Salisbury, 31 Dec. 1903, fp. 162–4.
47. Head, 1980, pp. 48, 52–4.
48. Decree No. 402, 17 June 1905.
49. Decree No. 757, 27 May 1913.
50. Breytenbach, 1972, p. 21. The 22° ban having been experimentally lifted two years earlier.
51. Portugal/BSA Co. Accord of 1913. In addition to the bilateral accord, the RNLB was also required to sign an agreement with the Portuguese government (29 Sept. 1914).
52. Articles 7, 9, 14. The Portuguese, rather stupidly, tried collecting back taxes from all Portuguese migrants who reported to the curator in Salisbury, further discouraging migrants from joining the RNLB as this obliged 'reporting' (AHM-BSNI Caixa 197, Processo 101, Assistant Superintendent of Native Affairs and Emigration to Sec. of Native Affairs, 24 May 1912).
53. Vasconcelos, 1915, p. 87.
54. AHM-DSNI Caixa 19, Processo No. 61 (1919), (A/18/2), 'Paracer do curador dos indigenas Portugeses na Rhodesia sobre o Pedido do Governo Da Rhodesia Para a Renovação dos Acordos', Lourenço Marques, 30 Aug. 1918.
55. AHM-DSNI Caixa 19 Processo No. 61 (1919), Copy of Extension; Negoçiacoes para a renovação do Acõrdo existente; Poruguese Curator to Rhodesian Chief Native Commissioner, 14 Feb. 1919.
56. See Appendix 2.
57. AHM-DSNI Caixa 19, Processo No. 61, (1919), Newton, Acting Administrator Rhodesia, to Governor General of Mozambique; Governor to Secretary for Native Affairs, 7 Oct. 1918.
58. Report in TNA SEC 12566.
59. AHM-DSNI Caixa 19 Processo No. 61 (1919), Curator to Sec. for Native Affairs, Lourenço Marques 22 Dec. 1920; Letter of 30 Jan. 1921.
60. AHM-DSNI Caixa 120 (1930), '... observações ...', p. 21.
61. AHM-DSNI Caixa 120 (1930), '... observações ...', pp. 8, 10.
62. AHM-DSNI Caixa 120 (1930), '... observações ...', p. 22.
63. Issacman, 1985, pp. 17–22.
64. Adamo *et al.*, 1981, pp. 64–5.

65. Copy of the Agreement in Mozambique, *Boletim Oficial*, 26 Sept. 1934, 1 Sèrie, no. 39, pp. 615–21.
66. *Boletim Oficial*, 10 May 1943, 1 Sèrie, Supplemento ao no. 19, Portaira no. 5 (127), pp. 159–183.
67. Clarke, 1974, pp. 35–7; Munslow, 1984.
68. AHM-DSNI Caixa 56, file marked 'Receitas provenientes da emigracão para a Rhodésia do Sul', 1954–9. As of 1959.
69. See Figure 4 and Appendix 2.
70. ZINA F119/IMM5/12, SECRET – Second Draft, 'The Ministry of External Affairs . . .' Immigrants' papers would state their type of employment and area within Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury refused to refund any taxes but agreed to discuss the matter in 1963/4.
71. ZINA F119/IMM5/12, minute sheet to Mr Marsh 'Agreement on Portuguese Migrant Labour'.
72. Boeder, 1984b, pp. 14, 18, 24.
73. AHM-DSNI Caixa 197, submission to Lisbon of 14 Oct. 1915; Agnew, 1977, p. 383.
74. Alpers, 1984, p. 372.
75. MNA-PA, S1/2767/23, assorted correspondence.
76. McCracken, 1982, p. 31; Kydd and Hewitt, 1986, p. 531.
77. MNA-PA, S1/2767/23, letter from Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province, to Chief Secretary and enclosure, fi. 2–2a.
78. MNA-PA, NS 1/13/4, memo on alien African labour in Nyasaland, Jan. 1933, fp. 106–8.
79. MNA-PA, NS 1/13/4, Acting Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province, to Chief Sec. fp. 216; District Commissioner, Mlanje, to Chief Sec., 13 July 1936, fp. 223.
80. Head, 1980, p. 320.
81. Boeder, 1984b, p. 68.
82. Kuczynski, 1949, p. 344.
83. TNA SEC 24693/I, letter from G.F. Sayers to Kitching, Tanganyika Secretariat, 20 Mar. 1937, fp. 13.
84. TNA SEC 24693/I, File Notes of the Acting Secretary, 26 Mar. 1938, fp. 72.
85. Head, 1980, p. 321.
86. Large numbers of Mozambicans nevertheless remained, over 27 000 from the Maconde ethnic group of northern Mozambique alone in the 1948 census. Alpers, 1984, pp. 374–6.
87. Agnew, 1977, p. 383.
88. Clause XXXI replaced the entire 1928 Convention. See copy in Mozambique, Ministério de Trabalho, Centro de Documentação e Informação, file binder 'Historia Migratoria dos Moçambicanos para a República do Africa do Sul'. cf. Whiteside and Patel, 1985, p. 6.
89. A supplementary agreement immediately followed the 1964 deal, specifying a maximum of 110 000 recruits per year with an additional 30 000 possible with permission from Portugal. Reductions in recruiting were to be made at a rate of 11 000 to 12 500 per year down to a minimum of 60 000. Further reductions below 60 000 workers could

not exceed the rate of 2000 per year (see documentos I–VI, 13 Outubro 1964, effective 1 Jan. 1965, in Mozambique, Ministério de Trabalho, 'Historia Migratoria dos Moçambicanos para a República do Africa do Sul').

90. First, 1983, pp. 219–220; Katzenellenbogen, 1982, p. 154; *Notícias de Moçambique*, vol. 19, pp. 8, 12, Apr. 75.
91. Portugal/South Africa ALGOS Agreement of 1966.
92. Whiteside and Patel, 1985, pp. 12–13.
93. Portugal/South Africa Passport Agreement, 1966; Whiteside and Patel 1985, p. 9.
94. Rosa and Trigo, 1986, p. 68.
95. Portugal/South Africa Secret Accord of 1970, and Amendment on Passport and Border Control. cf First, 1983, p. 220; Whiteside and Patel, 1985, pp. 8, 10. Three years' notice was to be given of any decision to revoke or renegotiate the contract.
96. Documents relating to the Lisbon/Pretoria mineworker agreements, believed to have been highly favourable to Lisbon at Maputo's expense, were removed at the time of the Portuguese accession in 1974. Milazi, 1975, p. 130.
97. *Africa Confidential*, 'Mozambique Independence: No Bed of Roses', 20 June 1975, pp. 1–2.
98. See Saul, 1987, p. 11.
99. Egerö, 1983, p. 63.
100. *Africa Confidential*, 'Mozambique: which way the economy?', 4 Oct. 1974, pp. 1–2; *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1979, p. B341.
101. SNA DPM 214[III], fi. 40.
102. In April 1978, after an IMF agreement revalued South African gold reserves. See Rosa and Trigo, 1986, p. 59; First, 1983, p. 26; *Africa Confidential*, 'Mozambique: Economic Pragmatism', 14 Apr. 1978, p. 2; Zingel, 1985, p. 2.
103. Whiteside, 1985b, pp. 85–6.
104. Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1977, pp. 42–4.
105. Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1977, p. 16.
106. First, 1983, pp. 59–63. Henceforth TEBA would accept only workers in possession of a 'valid reengagement certificate' to return to their mine within eight months, and later on a specified date. A worker not issued with such a certificate upon completion of his contract became completely ineligible for future work.
107. Clarke; 1978, p. 10.
108. Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1977, p. 16.
109. Teachers, businessmen and the handicapped (Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1977, p. 117).
110. See Wuyts, 1986, pp. 144–8; Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1987, pp. 15–16.
111. Wuyts, 1986, pp. 102, 147.
112. See Saul, 1987, p. 113.
113. See Figure 4 and Appendix 2.
114. Zingel, 1985, p. 5.
115. *African Business*, Jan. 1985, p. 21.

116. James, 1987, pp. 6–8.
117. *African Business*, Jan. 1985, p. 21.
118. Davies, 1985, p. 36.
119. Interview with Mr Fidor Nassone, ALGOS, Maputo, 29 June 1989.
120. Mozambique, Ministério de Trabalho, 1987.
121. Interview with Mr Fidor Nassone, ALGOS, Maputo, 29 June 1989.
122. Mozambique/SA Chamber of Mines, 1985, p. 4.
123. James, 1987, p. 10. However, during the 1987 mineworkers strike in South Africa the Maputo Labour Ministry was reported to have stopped a train of scab workers that was heading for the mines. The ministry maintains that it was asked to stop the train by the Mozambican Federation of Workers (Organizaçao dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique) but did not act. The train did not leave, however, probably ruining Maputo's credibility with the Chamber of Mines on the issue of worker pacification. Interview with Mr Justinho, Senior Ministry of Labour Official, Maputo, 28 June 1989.
124. James, 1987, p. 9.
125. Marshall, 1987, p. 17; cited Saul, 1987, p. 113.
126. de Vletter, 1985. Botha's estimate is inflated from the 1.3 million cited by Dr Piet van der Merwe, Director-General of the National Manpower Commission, earlier the same year. Both include TBVC workers in their definition of 'foreign', accounting for the high figures. Still, there were 371 000 legally registered genuine foreign workers in 1985, or about 13 per cent of the total legally registered labour force inside the republic, with those employed in the Transkei, Bophutatswana, Ciskei and Venda not included. SAIRR, 1986(2): 729.
127. SAIRR, 1986(2): 732. In another statement the same year, Pretoria said there were 40 000 illegals and 150 000 refugees. *Boletim Semanal de Economica e Financia* 5(46): 7, 29 Nov. 1986.
128. SAIRR, 1986, vol. 2, p. 731.
129. *Weekly Mail*, 16–22 Jan. 1987.
130. *Domingo*, 11 June 1989, p. 3. One company that transported migrants' goods home safely claimed in 1989 to have distributed food to one million dependents of Mozambicans working in South Africa. The United Nations Development Programme sponsored a mission to identify pilot projects for the Mozambican government, and reception facilities were planned to meet returnees at the border and direct them to special regional centres (National Institute of Research (Botswana), 1987, pp. 21–6). However, one such project funded by the ILO had to be suspended for security reasons (SALC/X/6/Rev. 1, p. 7).
131. de Vletter's timely work based on access to Anglo American Corporation's computer data on employees demonstrated that Mozambican miners were a more skilled group than average (1986).
132. *Weekly Mail*, 16–22 Jan. 1987. Only skill categories 1–3 were banned, out of a total of eight. This was actually a much greater concession on Pretoria's part than is commonly realized. Of 65 667 miners in South Africa at the end of October, only about 15 000 were affected.

In addition, anyone who had previously worked in category 3 was allowed to be re-engaged in 4. As miners are usually promoted to category 2 within a few months of starting, the modified ban really only affected the lowest category (7) for those completing contracts. Numbers seemed to fall more than was necessary under the ban, then, down to 48 595 by October 1988 (Interview with Almando Manhiça, Chief of Migrant Labour Dept., Ministry of Labour, Maputo, 28 June 1989). This seems to conflict with the Chamber of Mines' open admission that it was promoting workers faster in order to keep them.

133. SAIRR 1986, vol. 2, p. 732.
134. And 5000 to Botswana, 2000 to Zimbabwe, 1500 to Lesotho, 400 to Swaziland, 22 to Malawi, three to Tanzania and one to Zambia. SAIRR 1986, vol. 2, p. 731.
135. In 1988. Interview with Fidor Nassone, ALGOS, Maputo, 29 June 1989.
136. See Appendix 2.
137. *Facts & Reports*, 1988(T).
138. See *Facts and Reports*, 1988, vol. 18 (X28).
139. *Facts and Reports*, 1988 (X95); *Tempo,* no. 976, 'Banditismo em Mocambique Manteve a Mesma Etiqueta', 25 July 1989; *African Business,* Jan. 1985, p. 21.
140. *Facts and Reports*, 1988(U).
141. *Southscan*, 5 Oct. 88; *Facts and Reports*, 1988 (Z113).
142. Interviews with Jorge Justinho, Diretor, Gabinete de Estudos, and Armando Manhiça, Chefe do Departamento do Trabalho Migratório, Ministry of Labour, Maputo, 28 June 1989, who left for Pretoria two days later to negotiate.
143. TEBA, 1988, p. 5.
144. *Star*, 21, 22 July 1989; *Tempo*, 25 June 1989.
145. TEBA's Swaziland manager confirmed that this was the case (Interview with Mr Wheelright, TEBA Manager for Swaziland, Mbabane, 18 July 89). When asked by the author, a TEBA representative in Maputo denied hiring many novices, but at the recruiting centre a rough sample of 30 recruits who had just signed on found that 30 per cent were novices. All insisted that many others with experience had been turned away, being told (falsely) that their mine had closed due to the falling gold price. The ban on less-skilled workers had created a situation where the Chamber of Mines needed to dilute the skill concentration amongst Mozambicans to reduce its dependence on them.
146. SAIRR, 1986, vol. 2, p. 732. Telephone interview with chief of the Refugee Dept., Social Welfare Dept., Ministry of Labour, Harare, 26 Sept. 1989.
147. *African Business*, 'MNR Bandits Terrorize North-East Zimbabwe', Aug. 1989, p. 20.
148. *New African*, 'Renamo Refugees', Mar. 1990, p. 23.
149. *Africa South*, 'A Country Desperate for Peace', Sep./Oct. 1989, p. 12. Refugees from Mozambique are believed to have arrived at a rate of

about 20 000 per month during 1988 and 1989. Interview with Mr W. Collins Asare, UNHCR official, Lilongwe, 5 June 1989.

150. *Southern African Economist*, 'How Malawi is Coping', Feb./Mar. 1989, p. 9.

151. *African Business*, 'Mozambican refugees cross border to farm', Apr. 1990, p. 15.

152. Interview with R.C.M. Bembe, Commissoner of Labour, Mabwane, 13 July 1989. There are 26 000 official refugees and at least another 5000 illegals in Swaziland from Mozambique, many of whom work in agriculture and trades. Hundreds have been deported, but little can be done to control them without Maputo's a help, which has not been forthcoming.

153. Mozambique/GDR Accord of 1979. Under the agreement each worker was entitled to the same pay, benefits and housing as a GDR citizen in such a job and location. Mozambican workers in the GDR were to pay the same social-security contributions and enjoy many of the same rights as GDR citizens, excluding the right to seek work freely or reside permanently. Subject to their good conduct, the workers received a stipend of four marks for every day spent in the GDR (5844 marks for four years), called a 'separation subsidy' in recognition of the special burdens of migrant workers. Most migrants were single due mainly to an age limit of 27 years and to the fact that single persons were more likely to reach the sole Mozambican recruitment point at Maputo.

154. Mozambique/GDR Accord of 1979.

155. Data supplied to the author by the Ministry of Labour, Mozambique.

156. After the initial training period, during which only a living allowance was paid, deferment of salary began at a rate equal to all net pay above the first 350 marks per month, until 60 per cent of the net was reached, and then 60 per cent thereafter.

157. Entitled to direct the fund to send their families up to 50 per cent of their deferments, most migrants would make only a single payment of 100 000 meticais (US$140).

158. Originally each government flew half the workers on its national airline, but the East German airline suspended its flights to Mozambique for two years, during which it paid Mozambique to transport its half. Maputo also set up a central Berlin office, seven regional offices throughout East Germany and a Maputo sub-department of the Ministry of Labour.

159. Mozambique/GDR Accord of 1979.

160. Interviews with Daniel Luis Marole, Head, Repartição de Apoio as Delegaçoês no Exterior, Ministry of Labour, Maputo, 28–9 June 1989.

161. The Mozambican breweries, for instance, have employed 'only a couple' of returnees who worked for East German breweries, and have no further demand for such workers, yet there were over 200 Mozambicans placed in East German breweries in 1989 (Marole Interviews).

162. *Mapa de controle de jovens enviados a RDA nos Anos 1979 à 1988.* Official table supplied to author by the Ministry of Labour.

163. Data supplied to the author by the Ministry of Labour, Mozambique.
164. This estimate is based on pay deferrals and social-security payments of US$ 10 515 361 and $5 729 645 respectively for the third quarter of 1988, when there were only about two thirds as many recruits on full pay. Data was taken from the ledgers of payments received made available to the author by the Mozambican Ministry of Labour in 1989.
165. If Mozambique's 46 068 miners with the Chamber of Mines as of February 1989 earned an average of R700 per month, of which they deferred 50 per cent (60 per cent for most months), then deferments would equal R193.5 million or $73.5m (R1 = US$.38) for one year.

6 Tanzania: A Successful Labour-Retention Policy

To understand labour-export policy it is useful to examine the conditions under which crossborder migration has been successfully minimized. While labour emigration did occur from colonial Tanzania, a number of policies successfully averted the relatively larger outflows experienced elsewhere. Africans were allowed to stay at home on the land to a larger extent than in many neighbouring territories, while successive administrations refused to allow foreign recruiters to gain a foothold.

The original German colonialists held no adjoining territories and developed Tanganyika independently, creating an enduring pattern of waged labour supply balanced with peasant production. While their era lasted only until the end of the First World War, they sketched the design that subsequent development would follow. The emphasis they placed on internal development, African production and labour retention was of considerable permanence. With their German inheritance, the British administration adopted one of the most successful labour-retention policies in the region, abstaining from applying so much pressure on the population that it would be forced out of the country to work, and resisting outside recruiting.

Of course the Tanzanian experience was not isolated from regional trends. The circulation of migrant labour outside the territory did become more substantial in the 1950s. Nevertheless, apart from labour for Zanzibar, foreign recruiting was only permitted from 1958, and the post-independence government decisively ended it three years later. Labour migration abroad never reached the proportions it did in many neighbouring territories, never even 1 per cent of the population. German, British and African administrations had all successfully practised restraint.

By the late nineteenth century there was a great deal of east–west trade in East Africa. More and more Arabs and Swahili were moving inland and there were three flourishing African trade routes moving such goods as salt, goats, ivory – and slaves.[1]

The German East Africa Company, first colonial administrator of Tanzania, tapped into existing African trade routes, where it was content to realize surplus indirectly through buying rubber, ivory or export crops from African producers.[2] Because the population resisted the company's rule rather more than anticipated, by 1891 the German government had itself assumed control.[3] Envisioning extensive plantation production, the new administration marked out 175 reserves for Africans and then distributed the remaining land among German settlers.[4] Just as in other powers' possessions, Africans were propelled across the territory to work in plantations, railways and towns. The period from 1908 until the outbreak of the First World War was a phase of great expansion in internal migration to areas of mushrooming labour demand.[5]

While the German government undoubtedly administered a brutal labour regime, the British tendency to depict German labour repression as far more violent than its own is difficult to reconcile with the net influx of labourers into the territory during the German era. Conditions were undoubtedly severe – for instance, on average 5000 Africans were sentenced to corporal punishment each year from 1901–13.[6] However some 25 000 foreign workers had found German East Africa their best option by 1913, many coming from British territories whose heavy taxes and lack of employment had obliged them to seek work from the Germans.[7]

Sisal became German East Africa's main export, employing a minimum of one third of all wage labourers in the territory, mainly internal migrants.[8] After an unsuccessful experiment with Chinese and Indonesian 'coolies', employers began recruiting Nyamwezi and Sukuma from the west, 4–5000 by 1900, and 13 000 migrants in Tanganyika district alone by 1910.[9] European settler farms grew up much as in Kenya, especially in the Moshi–Arusha area, and competed for workers with larger capital's plantations.[10] Settlers were each allocated several villages to recruit from – their own private labour reserve. Africans were later obliged by law to work for wages for at least 30 days out of every four months.[11]

On the British-ruled island of Zanzibar off the coast, a shortage of labourers at harvest time became chronic after the abolition of domestic slavery by the sultan in 1897.[12] Harvests twice a year drew a growing cohort of migrant mainland labourers from Tanganyika, numbering 65 000 by 1924 and 51 000 in 1948.[13] Other British concerns were also after Tanganyikan workers. As early as 1899 the British South Africa Company in the Rhodesias was competing with

the African Lakes Company for labourers from German East Africa, luring them into British territory with promises of higher wages – often false promises.[14] By 1900 the company had sent an expedition to North-East and East Africa in search of labourers. They were interested in recruiting from German East Africa but the German administration did 'not allow any foreign labour export'.[15] The British in North-Eastern Rhodesia began to lodge complaints with the German East Africa administration concerning reports of the brutal treatment of Africans who had crossed into their territory to work.[16] However the reported conditions did not seem to discourage the inflow.

German economic development was accelerating by 1903, with rapidly expanding plantations in Usambara, Central Region and Lindi. African cultivation was only encouraged in the cotton areas on Lake Victoria and the coast, where seed and instruction were given.[17] The German administration seemed intent on a better balance between peasant production and a waged labour supply compared with the British, and successfully increased both. Still, a hut tax was imposed in 1905, drawing the Ngoni in the south-west into spearheading the Maji rebellion.[18] German repression increased, and they increased their reputation for cruelty by carrying out massacres that were shockingly similar to their genocide of the Herero in German West Africa. Of the Maji, 120 000 died in warfare and subsequent famine.[19]

By 1908, then, the trickle of labour emigration was understandably growing. Nyamwezi were working in Mombasa and Kisuma ports in Kenya, as well as on Kenyan farms and for the Kenyan police. They were also in Uganda on the railroads, in Zanzibar on clove estates, and apparently already on the Rand. Tanganyikans from the south-west of the territory began to find their way to employment in the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. However the numbers outside German East Africa were small enough for the German community to remain largely unconcerned.[20] The administration was increasingly interested in regulating labourers' movements, but it delayed the introduction of a national pass system until 1912 for fear of sparking a Chagga uprising.[21]

The First World War in East Africa became the battle of the porters, each side assembling legions of load-carriers to transport supplies.[22] Work at the Lupa gold mines came almost to a halt for lack of labourers, and high wages might have ruined sisal producers had they not been supplied with conscripts.[23]


Germany lost its African possessions along with the war, leaving behind a structural economic legacy that would largely determine

subsequent development. As in German West Africa (Namibia), Germany had institutionalized internal migratory labour in a pattern similar to that in British colonies, but unlike Britain it had not instituted large-scale labour export.

THE BRITISH MANDATE

The British did not radically alter the existing development pattern in Tanganyika. They were constrained from confiscating land by their League of Nations mandate and had in any case acquired the territory too late to begin serious settlement and investment. A policy of African peasantization was adopted, sometimes even resisting the excessive demands of Europeans for the oppression of African producers. Though still pressing many into a well-developed internal migrant-labour system, and still heavily favouring Europeans overall, the administration did not provoke the extreme desperation for waged employment that the crushing of African farming did in many other territories. Labour policy remained explicitly neutral regarding the competing claims of peasant production and plantations, making it possible for Africans to remain inside Tanganyika.

Britain gained control of Tanganyikan land under a League of Nations mandate, awarded in 1919. The mandate was intended to protect the local population and expressly prohibited the separation of land and labourers. The British lack of interest in extensive investment and settlement coincided with the mandate's intention, prompting the colonial government to declare Tanganyika 'primarily a black man's country'. When the first British governor stated that Tanganyika's future lay in developing African cultivation, he earned himself the description 'negrophilist' from the editor of the *Dar es Salaam Times*.[24] Europeans found themselves limited to about 1 per cent of Tanganyika and a 'small is beautiful' approach to capitalism developed – with the proportion of Tanganyika's population employed for wages consequently remaining at just 4–5 per cent from 1913 until 1957.[25] Only about 10 000, or 0.2 per cent of the population, were working outside Tanganyika by 1925, far fewer than for all the other countries examined in this volume (see Figure 5 and Figures 9–12, in Chapter 10).



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 5 Tanzania: estimated population working abroad

European farmers and planters were of course chagrined at the peasantization policy. The Planters' Association of Tanga asked the government to give officials the power to make Africans 'available for work' and the *Tanganyika Times* advocated forced labour.[26] Employment on plantations was increasing rapidly, and the labour commissioner made it clear that labour supply was governing growth.[27] However the government remained unresponsive.

Though few were being forced to migrate outside Tanganyika for work, the pressure on Africans to labour for wages inside Tanganyika was already far from light. Hut and poll taxes raised over £400 000 in 1923–4, amounting to 40 per cent of British-government revenues in the territory.[28] European settlers' demands for more preferential treatment were also partially met by a 'gentleman's agreement' that African cash-crop production for export would not be encouraged, and the administration *did* crack down on tax defaulters. In Uha 3000 were sentenced to forced labour in a campaign that provoked a riot.[29] The administrative officer responsible reported that his firm hand had impressed the people and 'raised the possibility' of Waha going abroad to earn their tax.[30] While the administrators were opposed to the latter suggestion, they did agree to streamline internal labour migration, introducing a new Master and Native Servants' Ordinance and providing for the licensing of recruiters.[31] Tanganyika's tin mines, in particular, needed more systematic recruiting as two thirds of their labourers were coming from Uganda and Ruanda–Urundi.[32] Transit camps were set up and a new Labour Department created, which

then implemented a system to catch deserters, with the cooperation of their chiefs.[33]

Despite its growing involvement, the administration continued to practise moderation in subjugating the population to waged labour. For instance, when coffee growers proposed more specific schemes to deal with competition from Africans, they were roundly rebuffed.[34] The government wished Africans to remain in the peasant areas to produce food and to minimize Tsetse fly infestation, and they genuinely wished to encourage greater African production in certain areas, just as the Germans had. Recruiting of labourers for outside a district was to be kept below 10 per cent of adult males.[35] Officials were told that '[t]he first object of government is to induce the native to become a good producer', and were explicitly instructed to remain neutral regarding the competing labour claims of peasant agriculture and plantation production.[36] Exasperated, white farmers and planters in the Kilimanjaro region suggested that their area be transferred to Kenya to 'bring the settlers in the Highlands areas of Tanganyika under an administration calculated to encourage their material development'.[37]

Tanganyikan Africans, then, owed a debt to events that had subjected them first to German rule and then to British, rather than a British reign from the outset. They were still a subject people, forced by a myriad of measures to provide migrant labour for Europeans. But they were largely spared the more severe attacks on African production that would have resulted in obligatory labour migration to neighbouring territories.

MIGRATION TO ZANZIBAR

The supply of mainland labourers throughout Zanzibar's history allowed the island's planters to devote more of their valuable land to clove production than if all the labourers had remained on the island during the off season. Britain's free recruiting service for the clove planters on the mainland was the only such recruiting for outside Tanganyikan territory ever allowed, apart from a brief period of recruiting for South Africa just before independence. However the privilege of recruiting was not extended to the planters themselves, as Britain had wished. The Tanganyikan administration already had different interests in labour migration than the British government, and was quite intent on blocking further labour losses.

The British government took *de facto* political control of the island of Zanzibar in the 1870s, but it remained a separate territory until it was federated with Tanganyika in 1964. Following the abolition of slavery, a labour bureau was set up to bring over Nyamwezi to work on Zanzibar's clove plantations. A system of temporary, circular labour contracts failed and labourers were increasingly brought over under an open-ended arrangement. Incentives to return home included exemption from Zanzibar taxes for temporary labourers, and often exemption back in Tanganyika as well.[38]

Despite the tax disincentive and only seasonal waged work, many decided to settle in Zanzibar on small plots. The island's population was added to by 1500–2000 mainlanders per year between 1900 and 1950, until settlers became a more important source of African labour than migrants. However, temporary migrants continued to be an important component of the peak-season labour force, an optimal situation for the planters, who needed basic labour-supply security but at the same time wished to conserve the island's scarce land. Many of the African 'settlers' stayed for only a few years before moving back to the mainland.[39]

In 1913 control of the island passed to the Colonial Office, which took a more active interest in Zanzibar's affairs than had the Foreign Office, even establishing a recruitment service for Zanzibar planters on the Tanganyikan mainland during the 1920s.[40] By 1936, however, it could no longer afford to provide this service and requested permission from the Tanganyikan government for the planters to carry out their own recruiting. The chief secretary of Tanganyika and others were increasingly opposed to any outflow of labour, even to Zanzibar. The political price of granting such permission would have been high given the mood of mainland employers, and so it was refused.

Not to be so easily thwarted, the Zanzibar administration then requested permission for employers to at least go over and spread the word, without actually recruiting.[41] In a confidential memo to his mainland counterpart, the Acting Chief Secretary of Zanzibar explained that he was still under heavy criticism from Indian employers for the withdrawal of the administration's recruiting service. The Indian community, he wrote, was accusing the Tanganyikan administration of purposely causing a labour shortage in order to undermine the price of the Clove Growers' Association's shares. The mainland Chief Secretary's reply pointed out that recruiting was illegal, an answer that remained the same when the request was repeated in

1944.[42] There were shortages of labourers in Tanganyika, he explained, and any labour export would be at the expense of Tanganyika's vital sisal, rubber and pyrethrum production.[43] By the war's end Zanzibar had been forced to improve considerably its ability to attract permanent residents.[44]

Having acquitted itself of an inherited responsibility to supply labourers to its fellow British possession, the Tanganyikan administration had still managed to uphold its no-recruiting principle, which had become fundamental to its labour policy.

LABOUR RETENTION POLICY

From the mid-1920s until 1950 – the crest of the regional labour migration wave – the administration in Tanganyika resisted a barrage of pressures on its labour and development policy. Firstly, repeated requests to recruit directly for foreign jobs were refused. The policy on emigration remained 'no recruitment, no restriction'. Secondly, pressure from the gold mines and from European farmers and planters to discourage further African production and to press more people into waged labour through heavier taxes was resisted, at least compared with neighbouring practices. The successful result was that – compared with other territories – Tanganyikans stayed at home.

Once economic activity had regained its former pace, the interwar period was characterized by wildly fluctuating labour demand and supply. The territorial administration in Dar es Salaam alternately declared shortage and plenty every year or two between 1925 and 1938.[45] In these circumstances the labour commissioner was understandably reluctant to allow in labour recruiters from other territories, and all requests for foreign recruiting rights were stubbornly refused.[46] On one notable occasion the governor of Katanga in the Belgian Congo wrote to his Tanganyikan counterpart to ask for recruiting rights across Lake Tanganyika in Kigoma, particularly for the Office Central du Travail. This was followed by a visit from the Belgian consul pleading for concessions, but all requests were unceremoniously turned down.[47]

The only exception to the policy of labour containment continued to be recruiting for Zanzibar's clove plantations.[48] While

border-crossing by labour migrants was booming region-wide, the number of Tanganyikans leaving for destinations such as the copperbelt was growing much more slowly – and in some cases even falling.[49]

By 1931 the estimated number of Tanganyikans working outside the territory was only 20 000, or about 0.4 per cent of the population. By 1936 the number reached a temporary peak of about 39 000, or about 0.7 per cent of the population. This proportion would be reached again in the first half of the 1950s, but Tanzania's rate of labour export would always be relatively low (see Figure 5).

In 1930 the Colonial Office found it necessary to clarify its 'Native Policy in East Africa'.[50] Reasserting its commitment to the principle of trusteeship for the population, it guaranteed preserved land rights and an African man's 'freedom' to choose work:

> in accordance with his own wish, either in production in the Reserves, or as an individual producer upon his own plot of land, or in employment for wages, whether within the territory in which he has been resident or beyond its border.[51]

Reserving African land tenure was the cornerstone of labour policy. During the first year of the Depression an estimated 30–35 000 African wage labourers were dismissed and wages fell by 20 per cent. The former labour commissioner saw the drop as a 'startling illustration' of the value of African ties to the land. Asserting that Tanganyika 'hardly possessed a proletariat', he wrote of the 'elasticity of the social contract', which spared the prosperous part of the community the burden of relieving unemployment. There was not even cause to expect a loss in tax receipts, he reported.[52]

While labour export was discouraged, the administration and Europeans in general had little objection to labour import. A number of applications to import labourers into Tanganyika were received in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and were generally approved as long as contracts and repatriation were provided. Labourers were soon arriving from Kenya, Portuguese East Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Ruanda and Urundi.[53] Many Europeans thought it scandalous that the local African population was being let off so lightly when it was necessary to bring in more and more foreign labourers. By 1932 the Lupa gold diggings – which offered the 12 000 highest-paying jobs for Africans in Tanganyika – were employing mostly Northern Rhodesians and Nyasalanders with copperbelt experience. The mines were growing fast again and their labour forces' foreign

proportion continued to rise.[54] When appeals were made to the government for allocations of local labourers to the mines, the Chief Secretary gave his opinion:

> I think it would be most dangerous and impolitic to vary our agricultural policy on account of the mines. Serious mining in competent hands never anywhere has any difficulty in drawing labour from agriculture and the trouble is likely to be excessive calls of this nature rather than shortage of labour. There are always many thousands of young unmarried men available for the labour market but Sukuma and Nyamwezi labour has a very good idea of its own value.[55]

Sensitive to criticism of Tanganyikan labour policy aired in the British House of Commons, the government was forced to set up the Longland Commission to find out what areas could provide more mine labourers. The commission advised the mines to try higher wages and better conditions, adopting the Belgian estimate that only 10 per cent of adult males could be absent at any one time without damaging their community. This was estimated to be a maximum male waged-labour force of only 72 000, beyond which labourers would have to be drawn from Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Urundi.[56] Despite the hue and cry, the Dar es Salaam Chief Secretary emphasized to the governor that his position on increasing taxes to stimulate the waged labour supply also remained the same:

> There can be no question of increasing the native tax solely for the purpose of forcing natives to work for Europeans. The tax is fixed at as high a figure as possible, due regard being had to the capacity of the native to pay and to the services which he gets in return.[57]

The refusal to press more Africans into jobs caused employers to draw in ever more foreign labourers, becoming somewhat too dependent on them in fact. Mozambicans, 'the salvation of the sisal industry', at one point caused a critical labour shortage in Southern Province simply by going home for their planting season. At the same time 3000 Tanganyikans were estimated to have left Southern Province to seek higher wages elsewhere within the territory.[58]

The influx of more long-term Mozambican immigrants, driven out by the introduction of forced cotton growing, caused the Tanganyikan governor to worry that the Portuguese might be provoked into

closing the border.[59] The director of agriculture was among those who argued that the sisal industry should be assisted to obtain more local labourers.[60] The Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association Labour Bureau (SILABU) employed 140 000 workers but claimed that it needed 20 000 more to expand production, asking for preferential access to labourers in districts such as Kigoma in the west.[61] Businessmen there retorted that the district should be closed to outflows of labourers in order to encourage its own development, but the Governor eventually decided overtly to favour the plantations, even conscripting on their behalf.

In 1938 another commission on labour supply and welfare recommended that the government place more transit camps for migrants along railways and roads, a day's journey apart on foot, and a labour inspectorate was formed to do this. Labour export was not mentioned at all, however, despite a considerable outflow to Uganda. The 'no-recruiting' principle was still so rigidly enforced that even a request to recruit a mere 50 workers passing through Tanganyika from Urundi and Ruanda was vetoed. Nevertheless an African's right to work where he pleased – inside the territory or out – was reaffirmed.[62] The Tanganyikan committee on labour put the total number of foreign labour migrants inside Tanganyika at approximately 45 000 in 1938, two thirds from territories to the south and one third from Belgian territory.[63] In comparison the number of Tanganyikans working outside the territory was estimated at 24 000, mostly in Uganda.[64] Tanganyikan whites therefore had a comfortable net labour inflow.

Wenela's Opening Bid

The South African Chamber of Mines' recruiting arm began making overtures to the governor of Tanganyika during the Second World War. The administration, which was all too aware of the dangers of allowing Wenela to gain a foothold, steadfastly refused. However the number of clandestine migrants going outside the territory to work was nevertheless beginning to increase.

Upon the outbreak of the Second World War there was widespread fear that tens of thousands would again be recruited as *tenga-tenga*, or porters, as they had been in the First World War. The army was

quick to reassure employers that African recruitment for this war would be limited to the King's African Rifles, but as military conscription grew, SILABU was quick to advise the government that the industry was 'being denuded of labour'.[65] In response to their complaints, conscription for private agriculture was steadily increased, just as under the Germans in the First World War. By 1945 over 26 000 Africans were being forced to work on plantations to produce food, pyrethrum, rubber and, especially, sisal.[66]

The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela), representing most of South Africa's gold and other miners, requested permission to recruit as soon as the war began. To begin with it asked for permission to take on Tanganyikans who had crossed into Nyasaland to seek recruitment. However the British Secretary of State was opposed, and a quite united administration at Dar es Salaam was even more adamant.[67] The reply sent to the Colonial Office was that:

> under present conditions everything possible should be done to prevent the present trickle of natives to the Rand developing into anything of the nature of a flow. The Songea District from which the bulk of the natives would come is one of the principal labour reservoirs of this Territory, particularly for the sisal industry in the Tanga and Central Provinces. In addition, the growing native tobacco industry in that district might be seriously endangered by the withdrawal of any considerable portion of the male population ... to the Rand.
>
> This Territory is not in the same position as either Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland in this respect, since there is ample opportunity for local natives to obtain the money they require for their needs either by obtaining employment in Tanganyika agricultural or industrial enterprises or by themselves producing economic crops.[68]

The Tanganyikan economy, however, paid a price for its administration's non-cooperation. The development of trade with South Africa was hampered by the Mozambique Convention on labour export, trade and transport whereby Tanganyikan imports into South Africa were routed through Lourenço Marques, bearing the extra cost of the diversion and competing with Mozambique's own exports. South

Africa imported 8000 tons of Brazilian coffee in 1937 compared with only 1000 from Tanganyika, though the latter had a 6000 ton surplus at comparable quality and price. Similarly, only about 10 per cent of South Africa's groundnuts were from Tanganyika, with much of the remaining 90 per cent imported from as far away as the Netherlands East Indies, despite a surplus of 10 000 tons in Tanganyika.[69] The annulment of this discrimination was an obvious bargaining goal for Dar es Salaam, but it was not pursued.

Despite the governor of Tanganyika's refusal to export labourers, the voluntary emigration of Tanganyikans increased. Wenela tactics for attracting more labourers across the border to Nyasaland included providing recruits with a new khaki uniform and shiny boots when they were setting off for home, so that others would witness their new prosperity. By 1942 Wenela was happily recruiting thousands, accepting their identity cards as Tanganyikan authorization and ignoring the protests of the Chief Secretary of Dar es Salaam. The Nyasaland administration was of little help. The Chief Secretary there stated openly that he would allow attestation of Tanganyikans in Nyasaland.[70] Wenela recruitment had risen to 6000 Tanganyikans in Nyasaland by 1953.[71]

Tanganyikan labourers also took to using Rhodesia's free transport scheme, *ulere*, to work in Southern Rhodesia or to reach South Africa.[72] This prompted the Southern Rhodesian government in Salisbury to also request permission to recruit Tanganyikan labourers directly in 1944.[73] In response the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam asked his counterpart in Salisbury to cut down on illegal immigration instead.[74] The Chief Secretary in Salisbury then repeated the request, informing the Deputy Governor of Tanganyika that he would like to come for a visit to discuss the matter, but the reply he received was so abrupt that the matter was shelved.[75]

The conditions for refusing Wenela, however, were rapidly fading. Recruiters in Uganda and Kenya were soon finding it easy to transport Tanganyikans across their borders during the night.[76] Though the no-recruiting, no-restriction policy was relatively successful, it would soon become irrelevant, and South Africa and even South-West Africa would begin to complain of a Tanganyikan influx.[77] A number of provincial commissioners and the labour commissioner himself began to reconsider emigration policy, concerned to maximize tax collection and other revenues arising from the outflows, but anxious to ensure that migrants returned.[78]

Labour Import

In the Tanganyikan case, labour import was necessary to promote labour retention – bringing in foreign labour rather than exerting further pressure on the home population to provide more waged labour – pressure that would have increased labour outflows. Senior decision makers in Dar es Salaam were quite conscious of this, deliberately opting to import labour from Ruanda–Urundi rather than force the population to provide more waged labour at home.

The end of the Second World War brought little immediate relief from the problem of labour shortfalls and the gold mines were forced to operate at a loss while they awaited the return of military conscripts to Tanganyika. Northern Province planters would have been unable to harvest had they not been declared an essential service – allowing them to recruit men forcibly for 60-day stints.[79] The Tanganyikan administration looked to its neighbours in desperation, and in 1945 negotiated a deal with the Belgian government to obtain labourers for SILABU. Tanganyika's major concern throughout was to prevent the permanent settlement of the labourers.[80] Workers were contracted for three years at a time, with employers obliged to allow their families to accompany them, but equally obliged to repatriate them all upon completion of their contracts.[81]

The Ruanda–Urundi labour flow to Tanganyika was an old, established tendency attributable in part to the much higher population density in the two small territories, and in part to a pattern of development in which food shortages had forced many to seek wages to survive. In the 20 years from 1925–45 there were several large-scale migrations of famine refugees into Tanganyika, where they became an economic burden. While coercive control was probably impossible, the establishment of labour camps with attractive food and accommodation, together with the 'absence of any sort of coercion or undue control', successfully canalized their movements.[82] In 1950 the Northern Province administration began to recruit labourers from Ruanda–Urundi, mainly for road construction. After only small-scale recruiting for the first few years, the central secretariat in Dar es Salaam decided to step up the hiring. The administrators were well aware that they were choosing to import labour rather than make it more 'available' at home:

> Ruanda–Urundi is, at the moment, the only point in the subcontinent from which there is an uncontrolled migration of African labourers.... Tanganyika itself is suffering more from a lack of availability than an actual shortage of manpower.... The Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias and Angola are all in the position where their indigenous populations are insufficient to meet their industrial expansion. In all of the other territories there are now afoot programs of internal development which must absorb much of their present labour-export potential.... Both East and West Portuguese Africa have received large grants to aid development and are now actively conserving labour.... The position appears to me to be simply this; we must have labour; Ruanda–Urundi, at the moment, offers it.[83]

The administrators, however, failed to foresee the coming of labour surplus. While SILABU was recruiting over 5000 year on three-year contracts by 1953, labour supply began quickly swelling within Tanganyika and recruitment from Ruanda and Urundi had ceased by 1960.[84]

At a time when neighbouring European settlers were hungry for labourers, the Tanganyikan administration had persisted along a course that discouraged larger labour outflows. Although migration to work outside Tanganyika still grew, Africans were never subjected to pressures so great that they left the territory *en masse*. The majority remained farmers, and labourers were instead imported on a considerable scale.

A DECADE OF LABOUR EXPORT

The number of labourers going outside Tanganyika to work grew and grew in the 1950s, due to the increasing stabilization of a full-time proletariat, growing unemployment and a considerable wage gap with neighbouring-country employers. The policy of non-recruiting became increasingly problematic in the new era of unemployment, and the governor and his aides eventually relented in favour of the revenue and control that organized contracting offered. A large new processing centre was set up for labourers in Southern Province and foreign recruiters were finally allowed to operate.

Large-scale stabilization of the Tanganyikan labour force took place in the 1950s, based on nuclei of workers processing primary products such as cotton and sisal, and fuelled by growing import-substitution industry. The demand for agricultural and mining labourers began to stabilize somewhat in turn, while the expansion of demand for service workers, particularly domestic servants, created a fourth sector of permanent waged workers.[85] Strikes won wage increases, which made it possible to subsist entirely on a waged-labour basis, and the trend to permanent waged employment began to be expressed in labour law. For instance the 1955 Employment Ordinance, which replaced the Master and Native Servants Ordinance, regulated both migrant and stabilized labourers, with successive amendments increasingly in favour of the latter.[86]

In the 1950s Britain recognized the failure of the smallholder policy it had so halfheartedly pursued. Alarmed by the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, the British government adopted a new policy of promoting 'progressive farmers' – African and European alike. However Africans found that they could only obtain deeds after long struggles and the policy failed. Nationalists such as Nyerere, the visionary future leader of independent Tanganyika, rallied support for the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) over the issue, contending that Tanganyika would quickly end up in the hands of the few.[87] Nonetheless the land policy undoubtedly inhibited fuller proletarianization. Urban growth was modest, and the possession of land ensured that migration was not the mainstay of large segments of the population, but rather just one means of earning cash.

Despite Tanganyika's land policy, the era of surplus labourers had arrived, with active job-seekers often outnumbering available jobs. By 1950 the Tanganyikan government was admitting to greatly increased emigration, stating that there were at least 5–6000 Tanganyikans working in the gold mines in South Africa, 4000 in the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt, and 1500 in Southern Rhodesia.[88] Renewed emigration to Uganda and Kenya was also reported.[89] The governor announced a survey on the possibility of restricting labour emigration, and was then reluctantly obliged to accept the survey's recommendation that 'no effective legislative measures can be taken to control or restrict the freedom of movement of persons proceeding outside the territory to work'.[90]

By 1955 the number of Tanganyikans in the Rhodesias and South Africa was believed to have risen to 21 000. Embarrassed, the central secretariat stopped reporting for 1956 and 1957 – and then confessed

in 1958 that a startling 25 000 Tanganyikans had been counted passing a single border post into Uganda.[91] In 1945 labourers from Tanganyika employed outside the territory had numbered an estimated 34 000, or a low 0.5 per cent of the population. By 1951 this had risen to 58 000, still a modest 0.7 per cent. It would stay at roughly this level throughout the 1950s, with labour migration to South Africa becoming steadily more important (see Figure 5).

The Gulliver Report was commissioned in 1954 to again investigate migration abroad.[92] Two districts, Mbeya and Rungwe, accounted for 80 per cent of the more than 20 000 thought to be in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, while Southern Province as a whole accounted for 87 per cent, particularly because of the Nyakusa's acute shortage of land.[93] Migrants from Tanganyika were almost entirely short-term labour migrants, having little desire to settle in the countries they visited. They headed to the copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia and farms around Lusaka; to the Wankie mines in Southern Rhodesia and farms around Bulawayo and Salisbury; to South African mines; and to the port of Beira in Mozambique to work as stevedores.[94]

In the report's opinion the provision of specific recruitment facilities for employment in the south would increase the number of labourers leaving the territory, but the establishment of non-recruiting, labour-migration agencies would facilitate control and tax collection without amplifying the flows. Although to some degree the exodus directed productive energy away from local development and agriculture, Gulliver thought it was not seriously undermining local development. In his own words he was 'playing down' the negative side of labour emigration.[95] Recommending against any attempt to physically restrict migration as a 'makeshift policy of despair', the report still urged greater supervision, meaning of course coming to terms with the indefatigable Wenela.

A Deal with the WNLA

Resigned to the necessity of improving control over migrants in general, the governor's adopted method of marshalling the outflow was to set up a major labour exchange in the south. Any recruiter, local or foreign, could go there to sign on labourers. Wenela was the first, and was soon taking away over 10 000 of the fittest each year, drawing loud complaints from Northern Rhodesia, whose supply of independent migrants was diverted. But Wenela offered the most to the

Dar es Salaam Treasury, delivering over £300 000 in deferred pay annually. Surplus labour-supply had forced the administration in Dar es Salaam to adopt much the same posture as neighbouring administrations after all.

When negotiations finally began on a quota of 10 000 Tanganyikans for Wenela, the news was received with alarm by Northern Rhodesian officials. Particular exception was taken to Wenela establishing new recruiting stations on Tanganyika's borders with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. However there were already many unemployed Northern Rhodesians in the copperbelt, where Tanganyikans represented only 11.5 per cent of the labour force. Northern Rhodesian companies therefore seemed disproportionately nervous at Wenela's intrusion.[96] The Northern Rhodesian Acting Commissioner for Labour and Mines enquired whether the Governor of Dar es Salaam would permit recruiting of Northern Rhodesians inside Tanganyika, and attempted to poison the blossoming relationship between Tanganyika and Wenela by suggesting that Wenela's real designs were on Ruanda–Urundi:

> I have been told by the Head of [Wenela] himself that he regards Ruanda–Urundi as the only reservoir of native labour left in East, Central and Southern Africa and that he is determined to tap this reservoir for the South African gold mines. No doubt your sisal growers and the employers in Uganda who depend on this labour fully appreciate this fact.[97]

The commissioner was suggesting that Wenela would begin by hiring Ruanda–Urundi labourers already inside Tanganyika, but that when numbers increased they would offer to 'normalize' matters. Tanganyika began negotiations with Northern Rhodesia for a labour-supply pact, proposing that recruits be repatriated free of charge and that Tanganyikan officials be allowed to visit work places at employers' expense. The Northern Rhodesian government, however, was not *that* concerned.[98]

By 1957 a major new government labour exchange and transit centre had been opened in Tukuyu in the south.[99] By 1959 it was open to all workers and employers, regardless of whether the employer was inside or outside the territory.[100] In the case of foreign employment,

a formal agreement with the Tanganyika Labour Department was necessary, and required annual renewal. The *active* recruitment of Tanganyikan labour for extraterritorial employment was still prohibited. Only those who came forward 'spontaneously' could be engaged.[101] Wenela was the first foreign recruiter to use the scheme, under an agreement for 10–12 000 recruits per year. In return Wenela immediately stopped hiring Tanganyikans in the Nyasaland protectorate.[102]

The Tanganyikan government had been finally forced into the familiar position of labour-exporting administrations throughout the region, trading access to their labourers for foreign exchange, revenue and control. While it was a victory for Wenela, it did not enjoy it for long.

SELF-RELIANCE FOR JOBS

Tanzania's newly independent government was the first in the region to ban labour export. In the context of a growing surplus of willing labourers throughout East Africa, the new government possessed both the means to control outflows and a radically revised interest from its predecessor.

Independence brought major revisions of the Tanganyikan fabric under the powerful and idealistic leadership of Julius Nyerere. Nyerere promoted economic development within the context of *ujama*, a modified traditional philosophy emphasizing social cohesion. Initially the government was more conservative – retaining the 'progressive farmer' policy for instance – but in 1967 the Nyerere government declared itself for no less than an entirely new social order.[103]

In reaction to the 1960 Sharpeville massacre of 69 people by the South African police, notice was given to Wenela by the Tanganyikan government that the 1959 agreement would be cancelled after the required six months. Following independence in 1961, all contract-labour recruiting was banned. Wenela was banned as well, and all its Tanganyikan assets were confiscated in 'protest against South African racial policies'.[104]

There was no evidence of an economic need to bring workers home. The ban was ideological and political in origin – the product

of Nyerere's vision of a prouder, more self-reliant people. However not all Tanganyikans agreed with Nyerere's sacrifice of their jobs to the anti-apartheid struggle. Opposition to the decision was widespread in the main migrant-sending areas such as Rugwe district, which had been about to receive a new Wenela airstrip. The loss of the large amounts of money spent by the recruiting organization in its Tanganyikan operations was as much the cause of complaint as the loss of miners' jobs. A feature article in the Dar-es-Salaam *Sunday News* reported that people felt the action 'would hurt Tanganyika more than it could possibly hurt South Africa'.[105]

Wenela's response to the ban was to return to recruiting Tanganyikans in Nyasaland just as they had before the 1959 agreement, increasing their Nyasaland quota at Fort Hill to allow for Tanganyikans diverted across the border.[106] For the time being Tanganyikans were free to seek work independently in South Africa, or to cross the border into Nyasaland.

In 1962 new Tanganyikan legislation was enacted to complete the process of conforming law to a newly stabilized labour force, effectively ending the legal status of migrant labour if not yet the practice.[107] The Northern Province Labour Utilisation Board had been shut down at the end of 1961 and SILABU was closed in 1965.[108] Influxes were also stemmed, with special immigration provisions for Arabs revoked in February 1962.[109] Tanganyika and Zanzibar's close relationship, historically dominated by labour flows, resulted in their union as 'Tanzania' in 1964, internalizing any remaining seasonal migration from the mainland. Finally, following Nyerere's historic declaration of a socialist path and a worker–peasant alliance, all Tanzanians were prohibited by law from seeking work in South Africa.

Inflows however continued. Ten thousand refugees crossed into Tanzania during the first three months after FRELIMO's armed struggle began in Mozambique in 1968.[110] Refugees became Tanzania's second major foreign-policy issue, after apartheid. Almost 400 000 people from neighbouring countries were living in Tanzania by 1969, coming from Mozambique, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda in particular but also from Malawi, the Congo (Zaire), Uganda and Zambia. Inflows from such countries as Malawi and Zambia continued to exhibit the high male/female ratios characteristic of temporary labour migration. A high proportion of Rwanda-born residents, as well, were labour migrants.[111]

In comparison, in the censuses of the late 1960s, there were 127 000 Tanzanians in Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and Malawi, in that order

of importance – a comparatively modest 1 per cent of the population. Most of these had left in search of waged employment, but of a more long-term nature than conventional labour circulation, which was declining throughout East Africa.[112] Less than half the absentees, an estimated 50 000, could be considered labour migrants in 1969, or about 0.4 per cent of the population. The rest were conventional emigrants. Clandestine labour movements continued, particularly across the border with Kenya, but there were fewer and fewer opportunities for Tanzanians to work in neighbouring countries.

Despite plans to interrupt precolonial patterns of internal labour migration, they substantially continued, with large numbers travelling to other parts of the country to work in commercial agriculture. Directed internal labour migration to development projects became a major feature of the postcolonial economy. Projects such as the Mufundi Pulp and Paper Mill, undertaken in 1977, attracted thousands of workers from the rural labour force.[113] In comparison the policy of active labour containment internationally was impressively effective. When a 1984 study on modern labour migration in Tanzania surveyed Ludewa, formerly a major labour exporting district and still a major source of internal migrants, the research found no evidence at all of workers being temporarily outside Tanzania.[114]

CONCLUSION

Tanzania's minimization of labour export is traceable to the setting of its original colonial development agenda by a German rather than a British administration. German rule sought more balanced internal development and labour supply than the administrations of many of Tanganyika's neighbours. When the British gained control of Tanganyika after the First World War they were constrained by their League of Nations mandate and by the late addition of the territory to their empire, thus they tended to elaborate the existing development patterns. This divergent development path gave the administration a very different attitude to labour outflows, and its restraint regarding labour emigration facilitated internal economic development. European demands for more subjugation of the African population to waged labour – pressure that would have also increased the tendency to leave the territory to find work – were substantially resisted and thrusts at recruiting for abroad were parried for decades. Only when unemployment had set in did Dar es Salaam's chief consent to

foreign recruiting, and this for only a few years before it was ended upon independence.

The policy of successive administrations was labour retention and it succeeded. The origin of the policy was in the nature of the state government in all three cases: firstly in the isolated possession of a minority colonial power; secondly in the limited and late mandate of the British; and thirdly in the exceptionally ideological position taken by the Nyerere government after independence, which went as far as to make it illegal for Tanganyikans to seek work in South Africa. Altogether then, Tanzania was created along labour-retentive principles because of the particular position it occupied in an overall pattern of state system formation.

Notes and References

1. Gwasa, 1969, p. 87.
2. Rodney *et al.*, 1983, p. 8.
3. Egerö, 1979, p. 15.
4. Buell, 1928, p. 487.
5. See Iliffe, 1979, pp. 153–4.
6. Iliffe, 1979, p. 150.
7. See Hartman and Wilmott, 1969. The translators of selected files on the German East African administration's labour matters observed: 'We expected to read about a tough ruthless administration of a "no equality, in church or state" type with emphasis on "Kiboko." In fact we have found evidence which contradicts this widely held opinion'. Hartman and Wilmott 1969, Introduction.
8. Rodney *et al.*, 1983, p. 7.
9. Iliffe, 1979, pp. 151–2.
10. Rodney *at al.*, 1983, p. 11.
11. Iliffe, 1979, p. 152.
12. Buell, 1928, p. 275.
13. Low estimates, from censuses conducted in the inter-harvest period. Egerö, 1979, p. 25. However these were people who reported themselves as 'belonging to mainland tribes, thus many were probably settlers. A number, as well, were not from the Tanganyikan mainland but from Nyasaland. A harvest-time census in 1967, three years after unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar into Tanzania, found 56 000 'mainlanders', of whom only 16 500 were born in Tanganyika and 4000 in other African countries.
14. ZANA BS1/33, extracts of complaints included with Gibbs, Manager of the ALC, to Directors, ALC, 25 Feb. 1899.
15. ZINA A11 2/8/2, Tulloch to Sec BSA co., 1 Mar. 1901, fp. 59.

16. ZANA BS1/81 BSA Co. Administrator, North-Eastern Rhodesia to Sharpe, Nyasaland, 8 Jan.
17. Moffett, 1958, p. 81.
18. Buell, 1928, p. 450.
19. Moffett, 1958, pp. 75–6. How are we to reconcile this slaughter with the influx of 25 000 African labour migrants from British territory, mentioned above? It would seem that German labour policy was distinct from a barbarous attitude in battle.
20. Iliffe, 1979, p. 162.
21. Iliffe, 1979, pp. 153–4.
22. Fendall, 1921.
23. Rodney *et al.*, 1983, p. 14; Sago, 1983, p. 73.
24. Ingham, 1958, pp. 11–12.
25. The confiscation of land where the African population density was above two households per square mile was prohibited (Mueller, 1981, pp. 465, 468). In 1913 there were 172 000 employed for wages or salaries out of a population of 4.1 million (Buell, 1928, pp. 425, 496; Tanganyika Territory, 1931, p. 10). In 1957 there were 430 000 waged labourers out of a population of 8.8 million (Inter-African Labour Institute, 1958, p. 18).
26. Buell, 1928, p. 507.
27. Orde-Browne, 1926, p. 98; cited in Buell, 1928, p. 507.
28. Deduced from Ingham, 1958, pp. 11–12.
29. Iliffe, 1979, p. 289.
30. Rodney *et al.*, 1983, p. 19.
31. Cap. 50 of 1928.
32. Hurst, 1959, p. 68; Kaijage, 1983, p. 4.
33. Orde-Browne, 1926.
34. Mueller, 1981, p. 469; Ingham, 1958, pp. 12–17.
35. Shivji, 1986, p. 34.
36. MNA-PA, s2/23/25, *Agriculture and Labour*, issued 5 Aug. 1926, fi. 10A; enclosure to dispatch no. 473 of 2 July 1925, fi. 6b.
37. Buell, 1928, p. 493.
38. Clayton, 1976.
39. Clayton, 1976.
40. TNA SEC 26059, confidential memo from Acting CS, Zanzibar to Acting CS, Tanganyika, 22 Sept. 1937.
41. TNA SEC 26059, Acting CS Zanzibar to Acting CS Tanganyika & confidential memo, 22 Sept. 1937.
42. Under Section 10 of Tanganyika's Masters and Native Servants Ordinance, Chapter 51. TNA SEC 26059 Acting CS Tanganyika to Acting CS Zanzibar, Oct. 1937; handwritten note, 30 Sept. 1937.
43. TNA SEC 26059, CS Zanzibar to CS Tanganyika, 6 June 1944, and reply 4 Aug. 1944, handwritten file note of Tanganyikan LC, 19 Feb. 1944.
44. Some of what may be the best files on the recruitment of labourers for Zanzibar during the period 1920 to the 1950s, such as Secretariat File 15696, remain classified confidential today and are kept at Tanzania's State House where they cannot be consulted.

45. Complaints of labour shortfalls were widespread by 1925, but only localized in 1927–8 (Tanganyika Territory, 1927, p. 72). In 1930 widespread shortage provoked sisal producers to lengthen the working day (Tanganyika Territory, 1930, p. 47). The Depression alleviated the matter until 1935, when a general shortage of labourers for hire was again reported particularly in Lake Province. Dar es Salaam noted that it was 'obvious that wages would have to rise', and by 1936–37 the matter had become more serious due to expanding production in virtually every sector (Tanganyika Territory, 1935, p. 81; 1936, p. 77; 1937, p. 89). In 1938 the situation had again reversed, this time due to declining mine and sisal production, and poor African harvests (Tanganyika Territory, 1938, p. 45).
46. For instance, the Magadi Soda Company was refused permission to advance fares to former employees who wished to return to their old jobs in Kenya, despite support by the Provincial Commissioner of Mwanza Province, the proposed source area (TNA SEC 10218/I, letter from Chief Labour Officer, Magadi Soda Co. to CS, Tanganyika Territory, 6 Apr. 1927, fp.1; and reply 30 Aug. 1927, fp. 15). The Labour Commissioner believed it was a scheme to set up general recruiting (TNA SEC 10218/I, letter to CS, Dar es Salaam, 2 June 1927, fp. 5). Similar requests to recruit Tanganyikan labourers were made by, among others, a Tanganyikan captain in Kenya, a fuel contractor for the Kenya/Uganda railroad, the Roan Antelope mine in Northern Rhodesia, and a Belgian Congo contractor. All were promptly refused and Tanganyikan Chiefs instructed to block any interest in 'straying' abroad (TNA SEC 10218/I assorted correspondence and internal memoranda, 3 Dec. 1927–2 May 1929, fp. 16–33).
47. TNA SEC 10218/I, assorted correspondence and memoranda, 1–15 Aug. 1929, fp. 35–64.
48. Iliffe, 1979, p. 308.
49. An estimate of Tanganyikans seeking work in Uganda suggested 19 110 had gone in 1936, 14 000 in 1937 and 11 000 in 1938 (Kuczynski, 1949; cited in Egerö, 1979, p. 25).
50. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1930.
51. Ibid., p. 12.
52. TNA SEC 19560, 1931.
53. TNA SEC 18641/I, various correspondence and notes. A request for Tamil labourers was turned down on the grounds that it might result in an influx of Tamil settlers and provoke an outcry from Europeans, as Indian settlement had in Natal and Fiji, and a request to import Seychellois labourers was also refused for similar reasons.
54. Tanganyika Territory, 1932, pp. 53, 58; 1936, p. 77. The gold mines later switched back to mainly local labourers – two thirds from within Southern Province and only 25 per cent from neighbouring Territories (Tanganyika Territory, 1938, pp. 85–9).
55. TNA SEC 23047/I, memorandum to CS, 1 Sept. 1935, fp. 10.
56. TNA SEC 23047/I, Extracts from the Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Finance, 12 Nov. 1035, fp. 54–54H; *Report of the Longman Commission on Labour in Tanganyika Territory*, pp. 19, 21.

57. TNA SEC 23047/I, file note, CS to Governor of Tanganyika, 1 Nov. 1935, fp. 35.
58. TNA SEC 24789, *Annual Labour Report Southern Province*, pp. 1, 4, fp. 45, 48.
59. TNA SEC 21484, Sayers to Kitching, 20 Mar. 1937, fp. 13.
60. Sago, 1983, pp. 72–3.
61. TNA SEC 24693/I, letter from Director of Agriculture, Morogoro, to CS, 30 Nov. 1936, fp. 1.
62. TNA SEC 10218/I, assorted correspondence and memoranda including request by the Kenya Sisal Company, 27 Feb. 1937–21 Apr. 1938, fp. 66–90. Another company was prosecuted and fined for taking labourers from the territory at the time (1–19 Oct. 1938, fp. 91–103).
63. Tanganyika Territory, 1938, p. 9.
64. See Figure 5 and Appendix 2.
65. TNA SEC 27638, letter from chief Political Liaison Officer, Nairobi to Governor, Dar es Salaam. TNA SEC 24693/II, Extract from Minutes of a Sisal Meeting held at Government House, 18 Oct. 1941, fp. 6.
66. Orde-Browne, 1946, p. 10.
67. TNA SEC 10218/II, letter from John Martin to British Secretary of State, 11 Dec. 39, fp. 132, 1B.
68. TNA SEC 10218/II, letter from Freeston Tanganyika Secretariat to Boyd, Colonial Office, 25 May 1940, fp. 118–123.
69. TNA SEC 28645, Report of Comptroller of Customs on Trade with South Africa, 17 July 1940; *Cape Argus*, 2 July 1940, 'Union's Chance in Tanganyika', in TNA SEC 28645.
70. TNA SEC 10218/II, letter to the WNLA's General Manager for Tropical Areas, Harare, 29 APR. 1942, fp. 112.
71. Colby, 1956, p. 8.
72. TNA SEC 10218/II, letter from Governor of Southern Rhodesia to Governor of Nyasaland, 17 Aug. 1943, fp. 87.
73. TNA SEC 10218/II, Acting CS, Tanganyika, to The Chairman, Commission to Enquire into the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia.
74. TNA SEC 10218/II, letter from CS of Kenya to CS, Conference of East African Governments, Nairobi, 23 May 1946, fp. 84.
75. TNA SEC 10218/II, Tanganyikan Governor's Deputy to Governor, Southern Rhodesia, 9 July 1947, fp. 69.
76. TNA SEC 10218/II, letter from CS of Kenya to CS, Conference of East African Governments, Nairobi, 23 May 1946, fp. 84. The next morning it appeared to be legal to recruit them.
77. TNA SEC 35023, various letters and memos.
78. TNA SEC 35023, letter to provincial commissioner, Southern Highlands Province, from another provincial commissioner. The most probable form for control to take was an effective pass system, but the informal mooting of the option by then raised a surprising current of European opinion in favour of the freedom of the African labourer to choose work outside the territory. *Tanganyika Standard*, letters to the editor, 20 Aug. 1948; and letter from LC, Tanganyika to the Honourable Member for Social Services, Tanganyika, 13 Apr. 1949, in TNA SEC 10218/II, fp. 33, 37.

79. Under Section 8(i) of the Native Authority Ordinance, in TNA SEC 11127, memo to CS, 6 Aug. 1946.
80. Orde-Browne, 1946, pp. 14, 15.
81. Tanganyika Territory, 1947, pp. 122; 1950, p. 121.
82. Orde-Browne, 1946, pp. 48–9.
83. TNA SEC 23047/II, memorandum to the Consulting Engineer, n.d.
84. Tanganyika Territory, 1950, p. 121; 1953, p. 62; 1960, p. 99.
85. The British Empire's leading labour consultant, Orde-Browne, began to lobby in favour of 'stabilization' in Tanganyika as early as 1946 (Orde-Browne, 1946, p. 22).
86. Shivji, 1986, pp. 107; 149, pp. 182–222.
87. Mueller, 1981, pp. 475–8.
88. Tanganyika Territory, 1950, p. 123.
89. Tanganyika Territory, 1951, p. 119; 1952, p. 133.
90. TNA SEC 41467, memos from Governor Twining, 'Proposal for Enquiry into the Supply of Labour', file notes. The survey was also to investigate the potential for importing greater numbers of labourers from the Belgians (Tanganyika Territory, 1952, p. 132).
91. Tanganyika Territory, 1953, p. 60; 1954, p. 63; 1957, p. 94; 1958, p. 120.
92. Gulliver, 1955b, p. i.
93. Gulliver, 1955b, pp. A2–4, A8.
94. Gulliver, 1957, p. 33; 1955b.
95. Gulliver 1957, p. 61; 1955b, p. C1.
96. ZANA NR3/456, NR LC to CS, Lusaka, 12 Sept. 1957, fi. 69.
97. ZANA NR3/456, Northern Rhodesian Commissioner for Labour and Mines to Nyasaland Labour Commissioner, 15 Feb. 54, fi. 12.
98. ZANA NR3/456, Acting Sec., Copper Mining Companies to Sec. for External Affairs, NR, 18 Nov. 1957, fi. 84.
99. ZANA NR3/456, Northern Rhodesian LC to CS, Lusaka, 12 Sept. 1957, fi. 69.
100. ZANA NR3/456, LC, Dar es Salaam to LC, Lusaka, 5 Dec. 1957, fi. 92. Employers paid a recruitment fee of 20s and a further 20s at the time of a recruit's discharge. This covered accommodation at the Centre, medicals, attestation fees, the issue of an employment book or ID card, and assistance with sending deferred pay, remittances or worker's compensation.
101. Hurst, 1959, p. 80.
102. ZANA NR3/586 No. 1, Acting Sec. for Ministry of Labour & Mines to PC, Northern Province, Northern Rhodesia, 23 Dec. 1959, fi. 49.
103. See Mueller, 1981, p. 486.
104. *Northern News* (Northern Rhodesia), 1 Feb. 1961.
105. Quoted in *Northern News* (Northern Rhodesia), 4 Apr. 1961.
106. SNA LAB/ND/1, Notes of Discussions by the Labour Officer and the DC with the DC, Native Recruiting Corporation Ltd., Stegi, 24 June 1961, fi. 46.
107. Shivji, 1986, p. 149.
108. Government Notice No. 276, published in the *Tanganyika Gazette*, 16 Feb. 1962, vol. XLIII, no. 7, p. 74; Lawrence, 1975, p. 114.

109. Government Notice No. 49, published in the *Tanganyika Gazette*, 16 Feb. 1962, vol. XLIII, no. 9, p. 53.
110. Minja, 1971, p. 91; Rweyemamu, 1969, p. 100.
111. Egerö, 1979, pp. 36–7.
112. Egerö, 1979, p. 28.
113. Shuma, 1984, p. 166.
114. Lwoga, 1985, pp. 215–16.

7 Lesotho: Labour Export, Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations

Lesotho's development epitomizes in several respects the importance of labour export in developing international relations in Southern Africa. The proportion of Lesotho's waged labour force working outside the country has been the largest of any country on the African continent. From an estimated 3000 workers in 1844, already a high 6 per cent of the population, the number away working in South Africa peaked at an estimated 209 000 in 1970 – equal to 20 per cent of Lesotho's population. The proportion then fell to 8 per cent by 1990.

A high proportion of emigrants has been the outstanding feature of this small enclave-state's political economy, the result of a colonial process that accorded colonial Lesotho separate administrative status on the one hand, but denied it any development that would have given it a correspondingly independent economy on the other. Lesotho's economy is, unarguably, the most underdeveloped by labour migration in Southern Africa.

Following the subjugation of the Sotho kingdom in the nineteenth century and its confinement to a mountainous area, the struggle for power between chiefs and the British administrators unfolded mainly around migrant flows, eventually recentralizing power in the monarchy. African agriculture went into decline due to hostile policies and high levels of absenteeism. Weak and surrounded, Lesotho was administered for decades as a giant labour camp.

Basutoland's two major political parties emerged in the 1950s, divided on their policy vis-à-vis Pretoria, the dominant issue of post-independence politics. As Lesotho reached political independence, its migrants became a base of political opposition to the Lesotho and South African governments, and to their mutual interest in labour control. The South African government effectively installed both the first leader, Chief Jonathan, in 1965, and then his replacement, General Lekhanya, twenty years later – based on the common goal of a passive and stable migrant-labour supply. It was of mutual benefit to

the two governments that workers from Lesotho enjoyed employment in one country and *de jure* political rights in the other.

This asymmetry between the formal political independence of the Lesotho state and the extreme economic dependence of its economy has been of great importance in determining the government at home, where the security of jobs abroad remains the major domestic political issue. Most of Lesotho's workers still work in South Africa today – so strong a dependency that Lesotho's very statehood remains in question.

THE SUBJUGATION OF A KINGDOM

Withdrawing into the mountains away from the European invasion, the people of the diminished Lesotho kingdom found themselves surrounded by emerging South Africa. Ironically their survival as a separate territory under British administration provided the mechanism of their further subordination to South African labour demand. Territorial and administrative differentiation was not the path to independence, but rather was the structure that facilitated extreme *dependence.*

Much of the credit for the emergence of an independent Lesotho is traditionally given to Moshoeshoe for his unification of various groups into a well-defended kingdom in the first half of the nineteenth century – a time of tremendous migration for Africans and Europeans alike.[1] Labour migration to the emerging South Africa was provoked by the loss of the most fertile half of their land to their white neighbours, exacerbating a confusion of movements. Within the kingdom households were fleeing from war, famine or other calamities on the southern highveld.[2]

Waves of refugees from war, plague, drought and other peoples' migrations washed in and out of the shrinking Lesotho. Many of the poor were encouraged by Moshoeshoe to head for the Orange Free State, where they fell into semi-feudal arrangements with European farmers. Trading their surplus grain for Boer cattle, the Sotho retreated in the face of continuing land seizure, withdrawing to the more mountainous areas that they had once been reserved for

grazing. From this sanctuary the chiefs began to send migrants back out to work for the enemy – to obtain guns.[3]

Law played an especially early role in managing Lesotho's labour flows, particularly to the Cape. By 1828 the Cape Colony required passes for all foreign Africans, reinforced by a proclamation in 1837.[4] Once the Orange Free State became independent of the British it negotiated the Smithfield Agreement in 1855, empowering missionaries and chiefs to issue passes to Basotho entering the Free State to seek work. When the Free State reneged soon after and refused to recognize passes issued in Moshoeshoe's kingdom, the chief wrote and asked the president of the Free State to 'open the roads' to migrant labour.

Moshoeshoe's consolidation of power stratified Sotho society, ensuring that the poor suffered most from continuing wars with the Boers and were forced to head off to work for their attackers. By 1865 it was a stated objective of the Free State to reduce the Sotho to dependence on waged labour for white farmers. The Free State was ready to declare full-scale war on the Basotho to seize their land and labour. Britain resolved the situation by taking over and demarcating what was left of their land, provoking tens of thousands more to migrate both inward and outward.[5] For some time it remained unclear whether the future Lesotho would remain a separate territory. It was next attached to the Cape Colony and Moshoeshoe's successor found himself 'paramount chief' in a much reduced Basutoland.

A period of economic prosperity followed in the 1870s. The ox-drawn plough facilitated a boom in agriculture, particularly the export of wheat, sorghum, maize and wool. Trading stores sprung up quickly, and although taxes were payable in kind, taxpayers were increasingly making a good enough income to pay in cash.

At this very moment of somewhat renewed self-sufficiency, the diamond fields of Griqualand West, an annex of Cape Colony, were opening, creating an insatiable new demand for labour. The Free State's white farmers soon lost their labourers to the mines. When the farmers appealed to Basutoland villagers to come and harvest their grain, the *Volksraad* printed that the Sotho had replied that they were willing to hire European burgers for the same purpose.[6] The farmers resorted to violence, seizing migrants' guns and successfully pressuring the Free State administration to introduce taxes.[7]

Basutoland's temporary rulers in Cape Colony were successful at promoting labour emigration. By 1877, following Cape government


initiatives to improve recruiting, there were an estimated 5000 Basotho working for the Cape railway alone.[8] By 1880 the diamond diggings of the future South Africa had become very dependent on Basotho labour. But Basotho were not only the majority of labourers there, they also supplied the grain to feed them – their main alternative to working in the mines themselves. Cash cropping still brought in an estimated five times more cash than labouring.[9]

Labour migration may have been responsible for Basutoland's survival at one point. When 4000 Basotho suddenly returned home to fight the Gun War – against the Free State's attempt to disarm them – the mines were forced to stop production.[10] The Basotho fought and triumphed in defence of their right to possess arms – guns bought largely with their mine earnings.[11] In frustration the Cape disannexed the kingdom, providing the Basotho with their last three years of political independence for over 80 years.[12] Basutoland then came back under British rule – a protectorate under the High Commissioner in Cape Town with the paramount chief remaining the ultimate African authority.

The vice was closing for many Basotho, who were increasingly forced to pay the hut taxes introduced after the first British takeover. The taxes were doubled to a pound under Cape rule, halved and then redoubled by the British, and became every African's preoccupation.[13] In 1875 the Free State imposed a duty on Basotho grain to raise revenue, but with the knowledge that it would edge the balance of alternatives towards waged labour.[14] Serious competition from Australian wheat soon made the situation worse – especially as the British failed to construct transport links from Basutoland to help it compete.[15]

The number of migrants working in the future South Africa was growing fast, up from 3000 in 1844 to 10 000 by 1875, or 8.5 per cent of the population (see Figure 6). This was a far higher proportion than in any other country in the region. The estimated 1.9 per cent of Botswana's population working in South Africa by 1880 comes closest but is much lower (see Figures 9–12, Chapter 10).

Even before the end of the nineteenth century the main elements of the future Lesotho's political and economic development had been cast. The Basotho found themselves under rulers who were hostile to their independence and economic development but who chose to continue to administer them as a separate territorial unit. This contradiction between the territory's political and economic statuses would dominate its development for a century to come.



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 6 Lesotho: estimated population working abroad

UNDERDEVELOPING A LABOUR ENCLAVE

Lesotho's colonial development was an exceptionally straightforward case of creating a colonial labour reserve. There was very little internal development to compete for labourers and Britain quickly bowed to South African demands that resilient African agriculture be put down. The colonial history of labour-supply relations with officials of the South African government and Chamber of Mines consisted mainly of peaceful haggling over terms, in order to maximize the British administration's revenue. Government policy was almost purely labour-export policy. The police became labour-export police while the chiefs became the local labour controllers, and the orientation of labour policy could hardly have been more external.

It was entrenched in the South African constitution that Basutoland, along with Bechuanaland and Swaziland, would one day be turned over to South Africa and it could not have been administered more to South Africa's benefit in the meantime. By 1905 Basotho working in South Africa numbered an estimated 25 000, equal to 7.2 per cent of the population. Discounting a brief plunge during the Boer War, the proportion of the population working in South Africa remained above 6 per cent for 150 years, from the 1840s until the 1990s.

The institutionalization of labour emigration steadily progressed. A new law in 1907 laid the basis of Basutoland labour law, requiring attested contracts and stipulating relatively short maximum periods of six to nine months.[16] Recruiters were licensed, advances to recruits were limited to £2, and forced labour was limited to certain tribal obligations.[17]

Chiefs' percentage of the taxes they collected for the British soon made them an instrumental part of the labour-supply system. The Native Recruiting Corporation for the Chamber of Mines in the Transvaal (NRC), introduced a voluntary deferred pay system in Basutoland, Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape in 1918, and the Basutoland government began appropriating interest on workers' deferments just as the Lesotho government would be doing 70 years later.[18]

Despite the lack of interest in their development, the Basotho were still far from entirely dependent on labour migration. Basutoland wheat exports to the Orange Free State and other parts of the new Union of South Africa were holding their own in 1910.[19] However the time was approaching when the British and South African governments would no longer tolerate Basotho earning much cash outside of labour migration.

The First World War brought telexes from the Union urgently requesting thousands more labourers and offering concessions to the administration, such as the payment of recruits' taxes.[20] Basotho were reluctant to go and it was only when chiefs asked their young men to 'serve the empire' that any numbers were obtained. Despite new legislation, recruiting was out of control. In one village alone there were 4 labour licences and allegedly 148 licensed runners to recruit for the Union.[21]

The Basutoland resident commissioner's overall bargaining position was weak for, like so many in Southern Africa, his administration was dependent on South African jobs so that taxes would be paid. Of course a good deal of the revenue was spent on facilitating migration and many concessions were made to recruiters, such as the provision of free buildings and free medical examinations.[22] Basutoland officers did conduct negotiations with labour agents in 1917 for a labour proclamation giving Basutoland more control, but before it could be promulgated, the Union parliament introduced its own bill to control the agents.[23] A heated clash then occurred between the British high commissioner in Cape Town and the resident commissioner of Basutoland, the former seeking to protect recruiters'

leverage in the labour market and the latter defiantly defending some restrictions.[24] The Empire's interests prevailed in the end.

The 1921 census found 47 000 declared absentees in South African labour centres, equal to 9 per cent of Basutoland's population.[25] Women made up a fifth of these migrants and more and more measures were taken to restrict their exit. It was in the mutual interest of the South African government and the Basutoland administration to keep male migrants circulating between their jobs and their families – who were forced to remain behind. South Africa sought to import only workers while Basutoland depended upon circulation for its taxes – indeed for its population. A 'Native Women Restriction Proclamation' in the Union in 1915 provided for the arrest and expulsion of women, but it was not enough.[26] The resident commissioner of Basutoland eventually succeeded in blocking women's migration by arranging for chiefs to restrict women's movements.[27]

The 1920s were a turning point for Basutoland agriculture. Up until 1920 the protectorate had been a constant net exporter of maize, a main staple food. Then – throughout the 1920s – imports and exports were approximately balanced. Basutoland was no longer a net exporter but remained at least self-sufficient. By 1930, however, Basutoland had become a steady net importer of maize.[28]

The number of migrants working in South Africa appears to have declined a little during the 1920s, frustrating the administration's quest for more revenue. Tax collection was proving inadequate for the administration's needs and so collectors were stationed at the mines. Workers were unwilling to pay, sparking another issue that would smoulder on into the 1980s. The hidden problem was that chiefs opposed any system that would exclude them from the collection of taxes and their resulting cut.[29] Along with Swaziland, Basutoland's administration instructed its officers to pursue taxes more vigorously. The Chamber of Mines refused to become involved in the campaign beyond circulating posters advising workers to pay up. The problem this time was that the South African government was competing with Basutoland for taxes.[30] This issue became the focus of an unusual amount of cooperation between the three High Commission Territories' administrations, who would eventually begin to collect their taxes together through the Rand Agency.[31]

Another migration issue was desertion by workers, a problem that prompted the NRC to agree to introduce voluntary deferred pay. Those who had deferred pay sent home were less likely to desert for fear of losing their savings, while large cash advances encouraged

desertion before repayment had been made, especially as recruits could then get another job.[32] Unable to cope with tracking down all the deserters, recruitment organizations threatened to close, forcing the government secretary to transform the Basutoland police into a labour police, spending months away patrolling the mountainous interior with their lists.[33]

Britain was openly running the protectorate as a giant labour camp. When the government secretary finally pointed out that nothing at all was being done to benefit the workers themselves, the resident commissioner in the Lesotho capital of Maseru wrote a reply that proved him beyond even understanding the secretary's reproof:

> I doubt whether a plan for benefiting the mine boys could be profit-earning or even self-supporting, unless a large profit were made out of a brewery run in conjunction with it, seeing that beer is about the only thing that a native will give much more for than it is worth.[34]

Seemingly nothing would provoke the sympathy of Maseru's administrators for their charges. For instance, when workers at one mine complained that they were starving, the Resident Commissioner quietly accepted the word of a Union native commissioner that they had adequate food, and did not investigate the matter further.[35]

Peaceful Haggling and the Centralization of Power

There was little doubt that Lesotho should be mainly a labour-supplying area, but there were, as always, a number of smaller issues. The government secretary, for instance, objected to the NRC illegally charging men for their medical examinations, or for the cost of treatment for veneral disease.[36] When the Chamber of Mines slyly initiated a 33 per cent increase in rail fares home – making them equivalent to three months' wages and so discouraging workers from returning home – Maseru's assistant commissioner was afraid that the reduction of migrants' spending power would hurt the Basutoland economy.[37] Soon the Resident Commissioner also wanted compulsory deferred pay implemented to bring more money into the protectorate, but the NRC was by then standing on the 'moral principle' that it should be voluntary.[38] Altogether the mood was one of cooperative haggling and the colonial era passed without a major altercation over labour export.

Temporary labour 'surplus' in the Depression demonstrated the weakness of Basutoland's future bargaining position, when unemployment would be become permanent. The Union asked both Basutoland and Swaziland to halve the number of their labour migrants to the Union, making it impossible for Maseru's negotiators to argue about terms until labour demand increased.[39] In 1932, in response to the demands of the Union's white farmers for protection from the imports of African-grown produce, the South African prime minister asked the British Secretary of State for restrictions on wheat farming in Basutoland. Jan Smuts, then Minister of Justice, repeated this request more successfully in 1933, threatening to impose restrictions on recruiting foreign labour for British-owned mines in the Union and to unilaterally incorporate the High Commission Territories into South Africa if African exports were not stopped.

Agricultural production in Lesotho had already begun to decline in absolute terms. Women were largely working the fields alone, and often without the equipment that men had previously used, thus the 1930s were a time of rapid agricultural decline.[40] South African agriculture was meanwhile booming and white farmers were crossing into Basutoland to sharecrop.[41] The proportion of the Lesotho population working in South Africa was growing faster, detracting further from the viability of agriculture at home. With investment in family farms falling, the growing absenteeism was accompanied by steadily slipping yields. And with growing population, fewer and fewer people could hope to support themselves from agriculture. As Colin Murray puts it, they were no longer farmers who took occasional waged work. They had become a class of workers who still 'scratched' at the earth.[42]

Basotho chiefs had been remarkably successful in protecting their power. The administration, so intent on coopting them for its purposes, suddenly found that it had empowered them rather more than intended. A special commissioner was called in to resolve the political impasse between chiefs and colonialists, and duly reported that Basutoland was 'ruled by its Chiefs'.[43] Indeed the necessity of chiefly cooperation in the First-World-War recruiting drive had made it clear that chiefs were the ones who controlled the labour flows.

A subsequent attack on chiefdom placed the chiefs on salaries rather than a commission for collecting taxes. This further undermined Basotho agriculture by gradually breaking down chiefs' pivotal role in allocating resources and coordinating collective efforts on projects such as irrigation and drainage works.[44] In contrast with the

diminished status of chiefs, however, the Basotho monarchy's power was partly restored.[45] A strong monarchy better served British rule and labour export, facilitating matters without controlling them as the chiefs had. In order to centralize their command the British had recentralized the African authority through which it was exercised.

When the Second World War came, unlike in the First World War there was no stalling recruitment while awaiting chiefs' support.[46] About 4 per cent of the population, or 22 000, were enlisted and quickly sent overseas.[47] The total number working in South Africa was by this time up to an estimated 68 000, or approximately 11 per cent of the population.[48]

With absenteeism exacerbated by the war, the Basutoland administration had an unexpected – if uselessly late – change of heart about labour export. The resident commissioner admitted that Basutoland's taxation was 'high' and 'unfair', causing labour emigration that 'is excessive and not in the best interests of the country or the Basuto'. In addition the commissioner made the intriguing comment that migration 'retards healthy political development'.[49] In response to these concerns, recruiting law was consolidated into a new proclamation that at least empowered the resident commissioner to fix a maximum number of recruits from a particular district.[50]

The Path to Independence

The 1930s, 1940s and 1950s were the decades of greatest growth in the circulation of labour to South Africa (see Figure 6). By 1950, I estimate that there were 100 000 working there temporarily. By 1961 a figure of 168 000 can be estimated, equal to nearly 19 per cent of the population.

Just as in other emerging nations, labour migration became a major issue of African nationalism, though in Lesotho's case the relationship between politics and migration was particularly extreme. The political movement Lekhotla-la-Bafo had led anticolonial protests since 1913, oriented to migrants and peasants. More serious political nationalism developed from the beginning of the 1950s. By 1952 the Basutoland African Congress had been formed, merged with Lekhotla-la-Bafo and become the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The BCP was allied with the cooperative movement, the Basutoland Federation of Labour, the Communist Party and the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). Migrants formed the core of BCP membership, and were often also members of the ANC.[51]

A second organization, the Basotho National Party (BNP), coalesced more conservative interests, including the lower chiefs and the catholic hierarchy, in 1962. A 1959 constitution scored a victory over royal power, which might otherwise have been revived by the accession of Moshoeshoe II, but the dynamic between the party power bases and royal authority continued.[52] Chief Jonathan would use the monarchy to legitimate his power in 1970 and General Lekhanya would do the same in 1985.

As the preconditions for political independence developed, economic dependence on South Africa continued to deepen. By 1955 foreign exchange brought into the protectorate by migrant miners totalled £677 000, compared with the £1 796 000 derived from cattle and grain.[53]

In 1963 the South African Prime Minister conceded the inevitability of making the High Commission Territories into independent states, and not part of South Africa. He suggested that industries could be built near South Africa's borders with the territories so that their citizens could cross into South Africa to work.[54] In anticipation of Lesotho's independence and in response to a changing labour-supply within South Africa, Basotho became restricted immigrants there in 1963. Border posts went up and travel documents were required, refining a system used to restrict Basotho workers to mainly mining and agriculture. Thousands of Basotho were being cleared out of South Africa's urban areas, but despite this trend to worsening economic dependence, nominal political independence in the enclave state was ushered in.

EMPLOYMENT ABROAD BUT POLITICS AT HOME: LESOTHO'S POLITICAL STRAITJACKET

Lesotho's post-independence labour export policy has closely related foreign policy and domestic politics. Lesotho's economic dependence on South African mine jobs actually increased after independence, making the protection of mine employment for Basotho the key issue in domestic politics. Miners became an important bloc in Lesotho's electorate, and on one occasion were virtually prevented from voting when they became an opposition stronghold. The Lesotho elite found themselves in a situation in which its working class could not easily vote, and so they facilitated Pretoria and the Chamber of Mines repression of any 'troublesome' Basotho found engaging in labour organization or politics.

Lesotho's extreme example provides the clearest evidence of the reciprocal benefits to sending and host governments of separating workers' country of political participation from their country of employment, as well as of the implications of such a severe job dependency for a state's autonomy.

At independence Lesotho was reliant on South Africa for all its imports and exports, communications, technology and most employment, and this strictly limited its practical economic policy options, to say the least. There did exist, however, a considerable breadth of political opinion. Jonathan's BNP – which had urged voters throughout the campaign to 'think of your stomachs' – was disposed to open diplomatic relations with the South African government. This was a popular policy amongst the dependents of miners, who were afraid that radicalism would interrupt the flow of remittances.[55] The largest opposition party, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), saw the liberation of South Africa's black majority as inseparable from the independence of Lesotho, but also grudgingly conceded the short-term necessity of cooperation with the apartheid regime.[56]

South African government officials were very interested in Lesotho's politics. During elections in 1965, on the eve of independence, Chief Jonathan was the only candidate allowed to campaign amongst migrants in South Africa – who were at least 25 per cent of eligible voters.[57] The Afrikaner Broederbond, a semi-secret organization for Afrikaner supremacy, funnelled more than a dozen loudspeaker-equipped Landrovers to the BNP, enough to make a considerable impact in the tiny country.[58] Pretoria's representatives gave the BNP more money and a meeting was arranged between South Africa's Prime Minister Verwoerd and Jonathan.[59] The South African official bureaucracy also went out of its way to provide transport to migrants going home to vote. Some were even allowed to register in South Africa and thousands made the trip home to the ballot boxes.[60]

Jonathan and the BNP won the election narrowly, suggesting that Pretoria's influence had changed the outcome. After the elections the South African government delivered 100 000 bags of emergency grain to Jonathan personally, and Verwoerd met with the leader almost immediately – actions designed to enhance his standing.[61]

Lesotho's economic outlook was bleak. With very little industry, what infrastructure that did exist was oriented almost entirely outward to the surrounding South Africa – a 'ringworld' with a hinterland

interior. There were at least six migrant workers in South Africa for each wage worker inside Lesotho, making the wage structure entirely incompatible with development at home.[62] Fifty-five per cent of the labour force had waged employment while the other 45 per cent were farmers. The mountainous, rocky landscape afforded about 0.4 hectares of arable land per person, an amount that population growth and soil erosion would nearly halve by 1989 to a plot only 45 metres square.[63] The new national government depended on British grants for two thirds of its budget and faced the task of creating a government apparatus where Britain had left only a skeleton.[64]

Immediately following independence it was still easy for migrants to find non-mining work in South Africa. Mine work was poorly paid and attracted mostly young men, who performed several contracts separated by long intervals.[65] The Chamber of Mines did not seem at all worried by Lesotho's formal independence and increased its Basotho cohort quite dramatically in the five years that followed. However government leaders in Pretoria refused to sign the United Nations Convention on Land-Locked Countries, withholding transit rights in an ominous warning that Lesotho could be held hostage to secure its government's cooperation.[66]

Lesotho's Employment Act of 1967 entrenched provisions very similar to those of 1942.[67] The labour commissioner was given authority to withhold recruiting permits after taking into account 'the possible untoward effect of the withdrawal of adult males upon the population of Lesotho and their health, welfare, morality and development'. This was not to be taken too seriously as maximum revenue for the Treasury remained the Maseru government's goal with regard to migrant labour. However, the Act did include provisions for transport standards, medicals and one-year contracts that were genuinely intended to protect the workers.[68]

The Employment Act of 1977 contained quite a few clauses on labour migration, largely of little consequence.[69] It did, however, give employers the right to terminate contracts if *for any reason* they were unable to fulfil them.[70] This permitted 'troublemakers' to be easily weeded out by employers – but a worker whose wife had died, for instance, was still unable to end his contract early.[71]

Bargaining from Temporary Strength

Though originally supported by Pretoria, Jonathan turned out to be more unruly than it had bargained for. When Malawi's migrant

labour boycott in 1974 left the Chamber of Mines with a sudden and severe labour shortfall, the Lesotho dictator was quick to capitalize on the advantage and implement compulsory deferred pay. However opposition to the pay deferral and other grievances among miners soon turned Jonathan's advantage into his Achilles' heel, especially as he failed to exploit even the limited possibilities for additional internal development and thus alternative employment.

By 1970 more than a century of steadily increasing labour migration to South Africa had finally peaked. An estimated 209 000 migrants were working there, comprising 19.6 per cent of Lesotho's population. This was the historic high point, both in numbers and as a proportion of population. By 1976 the number was 200 000, where it remained until 1981. With population growth, however, the proportion of the population working in South Africa by 1981 was down to 14.4 per cent, after which the actual number began to fall (see Figure 6).

The decline of agriculture's importance was continuing unabated. A growing proportion of households had no land, while average farm size was continuing to decline. More and more rural households were not even bothering to plough what remained of their plots and a large increase in South African mine wages in the 1970s resulted in a massive increase in the amount of land left fallow.[72]

Elections were held again in 1970, aided to an unknown extent by the South African government. This time the South African government left migrants to find their own transport home to vote as they were known to have become an opposition stronghold. Voter registration in South Africa was also not possible this time and few made the necessary double trip.[73] When Jonathan lost, anyway, he suspended the constitution and adopted the elitist *pitso* or council of advisers to the king, declaring himself *Tona-Kholo*, or chief advisor. The king was then whisked out of the country for an 'extended holiday' in The Hague, but was brought back later as a restricted, 'constitutional monarch'.[74] Pretoria's funds had helped to equip the police mobile unit used in the regime's seizure of power.[75] Though an elementary parliament was restored in 1973, Jonathan was very firmly entrenched.

The Lesotho government signed a labour export agreement in 1973, similar to those signed by Botswana and Swaziland. The deal was apparently instigated by Maseru officials as they wished to install

their own labour representative in South Africa and was virtually identical among the three countries. The South African government was given a veto on any agreements between Lesotho and recruitment organizations, while another article ended the mobility of Basotho among South African employers.[76] An office was to be set up in South Africa to administer deferred pay and remittances, to 'defend worker's rights and conditions' and to collect taxes – actually only a small set amount dating from the original colonial taxes.[77] Lesotho officials began to toy with the idea of fully taxing migrant earnings in the late 1970s, in line with a World Bank argument that this would discourage migration to South Africa.[78] Certainly the taxes forgone were high, but their collection was entrenched in the agreement as a responsibility of the Lesotho government, making them difficult to obtain.[79]

Following the signing of the act, relations with South Africa's rulers regarding migrants began to deteriorate. When five Basotho miners were among 11 shot dead during a strike in late 1973, Jonathan called for a United Nations inquiry. A vote on whether to exchange ambassadors with South Africa took place soon after and almost all Lesotho's interim National Assembly walked out.[80] Average monthly employment in all South African mines had doubled over the previous decade – from 58 378 in 1963 to 110 227 in 1973. But in 1974 recruitment in Lesotho abruptly declined, falling one third during the first six months compared with 1973.[81] South African mine managers were nervous about the stability of Lesotho's supply and were cutting down.

It was the boycott of South African jobs by the Malawi government that turned the tables for Lesotho. The Lesotho government had begun negotiations at independence to have voluntary deferred pay deposited with the Lesotho government. Negotiations became quite tense in early 1974, just before falling recruitment in Lesotho was reversed by Malawi's boycott of South African work. The Chamber of Mines had chosen the wrong country to worry about and was soon employing all the miners from Lesotho that it could get, strengthening the Maseru government's hand enormously right in the middle of the testy negotiations. At a meeting that September between officials from the two governments and the Chamber of Mines' labour organization, just when it was becoming apparent that Malawi's boycott might very well be long term and the Chamber of Mines would suffer very serious labour shortfalls, Jonathan let it be known that compulsory deferment to the Lesotho National Bank of

60 per cent of mine workers' pay would be introduced, and Pretoria and the Chamber of Mines gave in.[82]

Opposition to the pay-deferment scheme was the main issue in strikes at several gold mines. Workers demanded to see Jonathan, clashed with other workers and looted mine property. Much of the discontent related to opposition to other BNP policies, which workers felt their money would be used to fund. In several cases miners returned to work after being addressed by Lesotho government representatives. Many more protests followed, however, including a strike at Vaal Reefs, from where 6–7000 Basotho were repatriated.[83] Trying their best to appear uninvolved, mine management asked the Lesotho government to suspend the legislation, but the reply from Maseru was a firm 'no'. A compromise was finally made to unfreeze one half of the deferred pay of those currently on contract. Things settled down and workers began to realise that the scheme had at least one advantage – it returned their money even when they had deserted.[84]

Jonathan's 1975 announcement of 'Moshoeshoeism', a philosophy that stood for the use of a great variety of methods, peaceful and violent, to unite people in periods of conflict, marked the beginning of a five-year slide in relations with the South African government.[85] In addition to his increasingly strident stances and what was considered to be his assistance to the ANC – the leading organization in the South African anti-apartheid struggle – the white regime's leaders were also dismayed to see him establishing ties with communist countries. By the late 1970s the Pretoria government was refusing to allow concessions to Basotho workers, disallowing Anglo American's move to include Basotho among those who could be housed in married quarters at the mines.[86] The Maseru Department of Labour was also showing some muscle, closing down two of the MLO's recruiting offices because they were controlled from a regional headquarters in South Africa rather than from within Lesotho.[87]

Unlike most other labour exporting countries in the region, Lesotho was becoming *more* dependent on jobs abroad. During the late 1970s the official position of the Lesotho government had been employment-creation at home, with continued absorption of the residual labour force in South Africa. The Second Five Year Plan, for 1975/76–1979/80, envisioned an increase in the labour force of 60 000 of which half would be absorbed into new jobs in Lesotho and half would migrate to South African jobs.[88] Government planners in Maseru were rather optimistically counting on higher South African employment. The Third Five Year Plan was a little more forthright about dependency

on miners, who provided 46 per cent of Lesotho's GNP in 1977–78: '[D]uring the 1970s the most valuable asset for any household was a man who could work in the mines of South Africa'.[89]

Increasing dependence was causing unusual social change. Combined with growing labour surpluses for the mines, the wage increases of the 1970s were making miners into an elite core with relatively high incomes and secure careers.[90] But the labour force was growing far faster than mine jobs or other employment, leaving a lower proportion of families with an employed miner. Illegal jobs were declining too. Whereas illegal Lesotho workers inside South Africa had before received only relatively small fines or short jail sentences, deportation had now become the rule – with employers there liable to considerable fines.[91] Additionally, many of the jobs that Basotho illegals had previously cornered by accepting low wages or undesirable work were now the object of competition from more and more 'illegals' from South Africa's 'bantustans'.[92]

This was a new era in the social transformation of Lesotho. The growing scarcity of the all-important miner in rural households was making the stage of a household in a 'household life-cycle' the most important determinant of rural income. If a family was the right age to be headed by a male miner it was likely to be in the highest income bracket.[93] This became the principal dimension of continuing socioeconomic stratification.[94]

Alternatives to South African jobs were not developing. Crop production in Lesotho had been increasing only modestly between 1934 and 1976. Given the large increase in population over the period, agricultural productivity had fallen dramatically.[95] Many blamed this on male absenteeism but others disagreed, pointing to ecological problems, poor practices and so on.[96] The Maseru government had largely encouraged tractors, machine harvesting, high-cost credit and bureaucratized marketing – entirely the wrong strategy for masses of small landholders. The number of rural households without land had increased to 25 per cent by 1986.[97] Not only was considerable scope for employment-creation in agriculture being ignored, monetary, fiscal and trade policy all remained unadjusted to maximizing labour demand. Prestigious capital-intensive 'development' projects were undertaken instead of more productive investment or incentives to labour-intensive manufacturing.[98]

Labour action was increasingly repressed. The Lesotho Mine Labour Worker's Union (LMLWU) began to organize Lesotho migrant workers in 1981, but lost its base at the Letsêng-Lu-Terai diamond

mine when it closed the following year (and offered the workers jobs in South Africa). The government, meanwhile, 'unified' the Lesotho labour movement under the Lesotho Congress of Free Trade Unions (LCFTU).[99] Colonial trade-union legislation from 1964 remained on the books through the 1980s, requiring organizers to submit lists of members to the government and only allowing strikes after elaborate procedures.[100] When 300 workers struck at Lesotho Flour Mills in 1988, the military sacked them all and threatened to ensure that they would never be rehired anywhere in Lesotho.[101]

Jonathan seemed to be leading his government down a contradictory path, allowing the economy to slide into ever-greater dependence on employment in South Africa on the one hand, while failing to cultivate passable relations with either the workers or the white-minority government on the other.

Regime Replacement

With a subject economy dominated by labour migration to South Africa, domestic political power in Lesotho is ultimately dependent on foreign relations with the South African government. Jonathan allowed these relations to deteriorate to the point that the population felt that jobs abroad were threatened. Pretoria officials then forced a crisis that greatly exacerbated these fears and Jonathan was overthrown. Jonathan's political autonomy had exceeded his country's meagre economic position and had ignored the special political implications of employment dependency.

By the beginning of the 1980s it was clear that the economy of Lesotho was not enjoying much domestic growth. The large increases in GNP per capita in the 1970s were based almost entirely on the large increase in miners' real wages in South Africa – which went up by 330 per cent from 1972–76. At home, the largest share of GDP was arable agriculture, followed by livestock. Investment of wage increases in cattle, goats and sheep led to overgrazing. In 1979 the number of people per square kilometre of arable land had reached 280 or 0.36 hectares per capita, and there was shockingly little industrial development.[102]

The 1980s were fundamentally different from previous decades with regard to the absolute number of Basotho migrants employed in

South Africa. The 200 000 estimated to have been employed there in 1981 had slipped to 166 000 by 1986. This was down to 10.5 per cent of the population – from almost 20 per cent in 1970. By 1990 the figure would be down to an estimated 140 000, or 8 per cent of the population. The proportion of the population working in South Africa had not been that low since the Great Depression (see Figure 6).

The 1980s brought intensified symmetry between Lesotho's domestic political scene and foreign policy with South Africa, especially labour export policy. The decade began with the brief possibility of a new alliance between Jonathan and President Botha – who met showily at a border post and pledged to fight cross-border insurgency together. Détente was short-lived however. Under the influence of a new wave of educated government employees, Jonathan and BNP increased their support of the ANC in the 1980s, and generally took a more sympathetic stance on the black South African struggle – which served to attract more foreign aid. A new party then formed in the vacuum to the right of the BNP, and a former opposition-party chairperson accepted South African support to arm and train a Lesotho Liberation Army in nearby South African 'bantustans'.[103]

Official relations with the government in Pretoria collapsed completely following a South African Defence Force raid on Maseru in 1982, in which 42 people were killed. When Jonathan announced that Lesotho was therefore at war with South Africa, the gist of the response from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs was that 141 000 Basotho working in South Africa 'were not aware that their country was at war with South Africa', a thinly veiled threat to expel them.[104] When the Jonathan government refused to comply with the South African minister's demand for the expulsion of all ANC cadres from Lesotho, the South African government staged a border slowdown – choking off Lesotho's fresh-food supply until Jonathan agreed to arrange for 24 ANC members to leave.[105]

The possibility of further restrictions on Basotho employment within South Africa continued to loom over official Lesotho–South Africa relations, but Maseru officials took at least some consolation from the opposition of mining companies to such a measure. When a South African radio show expressed the opinion that Lesotho's 'obstructionist' attitude should be met with tight border restrictions, several mining executives expressed alarm. Pretoria's Foreign Affairs Department was rumoured to be poised to restrict the number of miners from Lesotho to only 65 000 unless Lesotho signed a non-aggression pact like that signed at Nkomati with Mozambique. South African

mining houses reacted by immediately 'ordering' more Basotho labour, apparently to 'stock up'.[106]

The South African warnings were directed at the wavering political base of the Lesotho government. Workers were blaming the Maseru government for the growing numbers turned away by TEBA, both for what they felt were prohibitive attestation fees of R10.15 per worker and for failing to come to some compromise with the South African government.[107] The fees were comparable to those charged by other countries, but workers believed that a more accommodating foreign policy would increase their employment opportunities.

The South African government was now moved to tax Basotho migrant miners and farmworkers for the first time, although only 13 per cent of miners earned enough to be taxed. This violated the 1973 agreement, which had left taxation an option for Maseru.[108] The Lesotho government had in fact been considering taxing the miners itself, as it was under pressure to do so from the International Monetary Fund. Pretoria's revenue officials are likely to have been aware of this.[109]

Maseru officials had long taken seriously the threat of a mass expulsion of its workers. Following the expulsions of the 1970s and subsequent recommendations from the IMF and the World Bank, a Labour Construction Unit was established in 1977. The idea was to have a vehicle with which quickly to create more public-sector jobs in the event of mass repatriations, although the prospects were dim for a successful expansion of the organization on the necessary scale.[110] Most migrants were less-educated than average Lesotho residents and had acquired only rudimentary skills. The least skilled were also the most likely to be expelled.[111] Lest there be any doubt as to the extent of Lesotho's vulnerability to expulsions, one study calculated that a reduction in mineworkers from 120 000 in 1985 to 42 000 in the year 2000 would halve real private consumption throughout the country.[112]

As preparations for the 1985 elections got under way, both the government and the opposition began campaigning on the platform that *they* were the party successfully to negotiate continued employment in South Africa. Rumours continued to circulate that the Pretoria government intended to reduce the number of Basotho miners.[113] In March 1985 Lesotho government representatives, at an official dinner with the Chamber of Mines, 'appealed for Basotho mine workers to be allowed to come home to register for the forthcoming general election'.[114]

One can assume, however, that a government that was genuinely intent on facilitating the voting would have found a more convenient way than having them travel home twice – first to register and again to vote. The migrant-worker vote was a burning issue as early as a year before the scheduled elections, with migrants numbering 150 000 of the estimated 740 000 potential voters and far more politicized than average.[115] The government found itself outflanked on the right by the new National Independent Party – running on a platform of full diplomatic relations with Pretoria.[116] Miners, meanwhile, were widely known to largely support the BCP on the left.

Relations with Pretoria had begun to thaw somewhat in early 1985 after Jonathan had seriously tightened up the border, specifically in order to help the South African government control the ANC's underground movements. When 3000 Basotho miners were dismissed in April for joining a strike called by the South African National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Jonathan still maintained his commitment to improved relations. The South Africa–Lesotho intergovernmental liaison committee held a cordial session only a few months later.[117]

It was a case of too little too late. When Jonathan cancelled his rigged elections in the face of opposition boycotts, including an overwhelming lack of registration by miners, the South African government seized the opportunity to exacerbate the tense political climate with a border blockade. The blockade was designed particularly to encourage the fears of those dependent on South African miners and Jonathan's rule came quickly to an end. The Lesotho Paramilitary Force, led by Major-General Justin Lekhanya, established a military council and agreed to the Pretoria Foreign Affairs Department's demand that the ANC contingent be expelled, whereupon the border blockade was lifted.[118]

DÉTENTE

The new leader quickly demonstrated his understanding that the white government in Pretoria was his compulsory ally – and that migrant workers were his opposition. In fact both Pretoria and Maseru politicians faced the same threat of an oppositional base – organized labour, particularly mineworkers – and acted in concert against them. As labour surpluses grew, Lesotho found itself in a weaker bargaining position than ever.

Following the coup the new Lesotho leader wasted no time in demonstrating his government's conciliatory stance vis-à-vis Pretoria, including migrant-labour control. Lekhanya visited South Africa in order to warn Basotho migrant workers directly that they should not get involved in South African politics by joining the NUM, mentioning in the same breath that the Maseru government was hoping to negotiate South African cooperation in a massive new water development project. The president of the NUM was quite taken aback:

> Lekhanya comes here to negotiate conditions of employment for one tribe! Working conditions should be the same irrespective of place of origin. Who is he negotiating for? As far as I am concerned he only represents those who put him in power. We reject any deals or negotiations General Lekhanya makes with anybody. We have our own organization to negotiate working conditions and wages.[119]

Whilst in South Africa to discuss the possible effect of sanctions on the employment of Lesotho nationals, Lesotho's labour minister drove home the new conciliatory stance and was quoted as saying: 'Southern Africa is like a zebra. If you damage the white parts the black parts will also die'.[120] This was music to Pretoria's ears, calculated to assist it with the anti-sanctions campaign in which it threatened to expel migrants if sanctions cost the South African economy jobs. The huge new water development deal was given the Pretoria government's go-ahead the following month and TEBA announced plans to upgrade office and boarding accommodation at three main recruiting stations in Lesotho.[121] Lesotho's new leader held back only on the South African request for diplomatic representation, ducking the issue by saying that 'bilateral communications were already excellent'.[122]

During the critical NUM strike in South Africa in 1987, Maseru officials also cooperated openly in allowing TEBA to supply the Chamber of Mines with scab labour to replace strikers'.[123] Several thousand Basotho miners lost their jobs permanently in this new pattern of collusion between their government and the Chamber of Mines.[124]

These developments encouraged Basotho miners to turn to opposition parties even more than before. The Communist Party of Lesotho announced in 1988 that it was strengthening its ties with migrant miners in South Africa in an effort to 'revitalize' the party.[125] General Lekhanya was ruling a government whose biggest and most

threatening base of opposition support was outside the country, one more good reason to make sure that they were not sent home. The proportion of the population working in South Africa was falling, down to its lowest level since the 1920s, but absentees remained a group of overwhelming importance.

Relations with TEBA, however, were still not entirely comfortable. The growing surplus of labourers was shifting the tables further and further in TEBA's favour and the organization was reaping the benefits. By 1989 it had begun to undermine Lesotho's Deferred Pay Fund. TEBA's savings bank 'TEBA Cash' was reintroduced with an 8 per cent interest rate – compared with approximately 6 per cent with the Deferred Pay Fund. TEBA began opening on Saturdays to allow workers who were home on weekend leave to withdraw their deferments from the fund in Maseru, where TEBA – not the Lesotho government – still made disbursements. Workers were not intended to have access to their deferred pay until their contracts were completed, but they were allowed to exploit an emergency clause to get to their savings prematurely. Many of the workers were then taking the cash back to South Africa and depositing it with TEBA Cash, where they had demand accounts, higher interest, and could purchase goods at cheaper South African prices.[126]

The amount of money involved was not small for Lesotho. TEBA was disbursing about R1 million per day in Maseru. Deposits with the Deferred Pay Fund were R72.8m by 1 August 1989. The Lesotho Bank was paying the Lesotho government 14.5 per cent interest on the fund, while the government was only paying miners 6 per cent. Miners knew that if they were to deposit their own funds in a private account at home they could earn 14.5 per cent.[127] Tens of millions of rand were therefore being siphoned out of Lesotho illegally, but TEBA refused to discuss it.[128]

As growing regionwide unemployment continued to strengthen, TEBA looked set to keep pushing its advantage. As TEBA's Lesotho manager put it, '[The Lesotho] Government is very, very careful not to antagonize TEBA in any way'.[129] Maseru officials remained intensely concerned at miners' falling numbers, down to only 113 000 by July 1989 due to the falling gold price, and feared to go below 100 000 – even as low as 90 000 – if the price did not recover.

By early 1989 the Lesotho government had agreed to sign a new labour-export agreement to replace the 1973 agreement. The deal was very much along the lines of the model agreement developed by frontline states in the Southern Africa Labour Conference meetings

but included a reciprocal agreement on Lesotho–South Africa trade missions, a major concession for diplomatic recognition of the apartheid regime that had long been avoided. Pretoria looked as though it might horsetrade on the tax issue in exchange for this concession.[130] Signing was delayed throughout 1989, however, when Lesotho's Foreign Affairs Ministry balked at the trade missions after all – provoking a toughening of Pretoria's stance.[131]

As the 1990s began the Lesotho economy was even more dependent on South African jobs. With an increasingly politicized working class, the compromises necessary to keep the jobs also seemed more unacceptable than ever on the domestic political scene. The South African regime was hardly about to slacken its leash on Maseru, while Lesotho's workers in South Africa were unlikely to grow fonder of a government they considered unacceptable. The two governments therefore continued to share a mutual interest in the depoliticization of workers, which was well served by having them cross the border to go to work.

The Lesotho economy and population remain so desperately dependent on South African employment that it is difficult to imagine how the workers could be forced out. The coming of majority rule in South Africa may therefore lead to a 'special relationship' between the two countries, which might be the first step towards greater union. Because of labour migration, Lesotho has never had sufficient economic independence to maintain full political independence, and thus some form of political integration with South Africa may be inevitable.

CONCLUSION

Historically developed as a labour-reserve enclave – a virtual labour pen within South Africa – emerging Lesotho could hardly have been administered more in line with South Africa's interests. Indeed the preservation of colonial Lesotho's separate administrative status seemed paradoxical given the lack of interest in its development. The territory's individual identity only served to aggravate its economic subjugation, with the British administration defending the Lesotho economy only slightly. Throughout the story of labour export there was a steady decline in the productivity and viability of agriculture, a 'textbook case' of the relationship between labour emigration and underdevelopment at home, particularly the negative effect of absenteeism on agriculture.

In Lesotho, internal political form was adapted to labour export. Chiefs were made the early organizers of the flows but were disempowered when they proved too independent. The administration of migration was thereafter centralized better by the British, along with help from a strengthened monarchy. Following independence South African influence over Lesotho's domestic political scene virtually installed the new leader, and then twenty years later – when he had become uncooperative – caused him to be overthrown. The leading issues were always dominated by Lesotho's migrant labourers in South Africa. Lesotho had become a 'passive labour system'.

While any poor enclave state would be severely dependent economically, and thus bound to find itself nearly politically internalized within the surrounding state, such a severe migrant-labour dependency has particular political characteristics. With its workers largely outside its borders, the migrant-sending government is able to maintain what might be an otherwise untenable position regarding them, adding further to the political leverage of the surrounding state on whose good will it depends. The larger state, for its part, benefits from the classic depoliticization of foreign workers, giving the two governments a strong mutual interest in using their lopsided relationship for labour control.

Notes and References

1. Weisfelder, 1977.
2. Cobbe, 1982, p. 120.
3. Kimble, 1978, pp. 162–6.
4. Weisfelder, 1977, p. 166.
5. Kimble, 1978, pp. 183–6, 9, 124–6; Buell, 1928, p. 167; Tylden, 1950, pp. 53–110. Fifteen thousand Basotho migrated back to the Free State in despair to engage themselves as servants to farmers there.
6. Keegan, 1986, pp. 124–6.
7. Cobbe, 1982, pp. 120–7.
8. Cobbe, 1982, p. 125.
9. Keegan, 1986, p. 56; Kimble, 1982, p. 137; Cobbe, 1982, p. 123.
10. Cobbe, 1982, p. 123.
11. Weisfelder, 1977, p. 167.
12. Buell, 1928, p. 168.
13. Rugege, 1979, p. 6.
14. Keegan, 1986, p. 13.
15. Ström, 1986, pp. 25–6; Weisfelder, 1977, pp. 168–9.
16. LNA S3/5/18/1, Proclamation No. 27, amended version.

17. LNA S3/5/18/1, Proclamations No. 48 of 1912; No. 11 of 1913; No. 11 of 1913.
18. LNA S3/5/18/9, Dept. of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa, 20 Oct. 1919.
19. Keegan, 1986, pp. 247, n. 22; 248, n. 54.
20. LNA S3/5/18/11, Native Labour Superintendent, South Africa, to Tully, Basutoland, 21 Dec. 1914.
21. LNA S3/5/18/7, final page of a letter from Assistant Commissioner, Leribe, [n.d.].
22. LNA S3/5/16/12, Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, 9 Oct. 1917.
23. LNA S3/5/18/7, Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, South Africa, 15 Feb. 1921 and attached Draft Proclamation.
24. LNA S3/5/7, High Commissioner to Resident Commissioner, 28 Feb. 1922, and reply; HC to RC, 5 Apr. 22 and reply. More and more children were being forced to sign on to cancel a parent's debts (LNA S3/5/18/7, Govt. Sc., Basutoland to Director of Native Labour, Union of South Africa, 7 Oct. 1921). Basutoland's Council was also seeking compulsory deferred pay, and the NRC had soon rejoined the fray with its own agenda (LNA S3/5/18/7, Govt. Sec. and Deputy Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, 19 Sept. 1922).
25. Basutoland Census, 1921, p. 6.
26. LNA S3/16/1, [in box no number], Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner for South Africa, 12 Sept. 1930.
27. LNA S3/16/1, [in box, no #], Resident Commissioner, Basutoland, to Sec. for Native Affairs, Pretoria, 24 Mar. 1931. Resident Commissioner, Basutoland, to Sec. for Native Affairs, Pretoria 2 Jan. 1931. Stull, Basutoland women remained the largest group of women on the Rand well into the 1940s, provoking further measures such as their prohibition from purchasing rail tickets without passes (Cobbe, 1982, p. 3).
28. Murray, 1981, p. 18.
29. BNA S387/5, Memo, Govt. Representative at Johannesburg, fi. 1, p. 2–3.
30. LNA S3/5/18/1, Circular, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Maseru, to all Assistant Commissioners.
31. LNA S3/5/18/1, various correspondence among the HCT administrations. The Rand Agency was originally set up to collect taxes for Basutoland alone, after Basutoland sent a representative to South Africa in 1922, and Swaziland and Bechuanaland later joined.
32. LNA S3/5/18/2, calculations attached to Resident Commissioner to Govt. Sec. 12 July 1929. One employer offered a 90-day contract at 5, per week, which, after the advance he gave them, returned them to Basutoland with only four days' pay.
33. LNA S3/5/18/7, Circular on Labour Deserters, 1 Dec. 1925; Stephens Labour Organization to Govt. Sec., Maseru, 30 Nov. 1925. The police were overly zealous, frequently jailing innocents (LNA S3/5/18/4, Assistant Commissioner to Resident Commissioner, 29 June 1931).
34. LNA S3/5/18/0, Sulton to Govt. Sec., 2 Feb. 1928.

35. LNA S3/5/18/3, John Raelesi to Resident Commissioner, 11 June 1930; Director of Native Labour, South Africa, to Govt. Sec., Basutoland, 1 Mar. 1930, and reply.
36. LNA S3/5/18/2, Assistant Commissioner, Qacha's Nek, to Govt. Sec. 13 Feb. 1929, 20 May 1929, and internal minutes on the matters.
37. LNA S3/5/18/4, Midgely to Assistant Commissioner, Maseru, 16 Mar. 1931; Assistant Commissioner to Govt. Sec. 11 June 1931.
38. LNA S3/5/18/9, Paramount Chief Lerotholi to Resident Commissioner, 19 May 1931; NRC to Govt. Sec., 2 June 1931. Only in 1949 would the Maseru administration, along with the other two High Commission Territory administrations, win a significant concession on deferred pay. Once begun, voluntary deferment would become binding until a worker returned home. BNA S.177/8/3, NRC to Resident Commissioner, Bechuanaland Protectorate, 14 Mar. 1949, fi. 263.
39. LNA S3/5/18/4, Sec. for External Affairs, South Africa, to the Imperial Sec. High Commissioner's Office, South Africa, 30 Mar. 1931.
40. Ström, 1986, pp. 26–7.
41. Robertson, 1987, p. 38.
42. See Murray, 1981.
43. Great Britain, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1933, p. 49.
44. Ström, 1986, p. 27.
45. Weisfelder, 1977, pp. 171–3.
46. See Gray, 1953.
47. Weisfelder, 1977, p. 172.
48. See Figure 6 and Appendix 2.
49. BNA S.464/1, Memo by Resident Commissioner, Basutoland, 3 Nov. 1942, fi. 12.
50. Proclamation No. 5 of 1942; see Basutoland, 1942.
51. Southall, 1984, pp. 86–7.
52. Weisfelder, 1977, pp. 175–6.
53. Quirion, 1958, p. 47.
54. Ström, 1986, p. 65.
55. Spence, 1968, pp. 44–8.
56. Ström, 1986, p. 65.
57. *Paratus* (SA), 'Lesotho', Apr. 1983; in *Lesotho Clippings*, Apr.–June 1983, p. 271. The 25 per cent is my estimate based on the fact that absentees were 12 per cent of the *de jure* population (calculated from Lesotho: Physical Planning Division, 1989, p. 6), and thus likely one quarter of adults. If anything, this is a modest estimate as, after a decline in Basotho migrants' numbers in South Africa to 1986 and a 63 per cent increase in population, migrants in South Africa were still estimated at 20 per cent of the electorate.
58. Wilkins and Strydom, 1978, p. 370.
59. Ström 1986, p. 65; *Cape Times*, 15 Oct. 1983; in *Lesotho Clippings* Oct.–Dec., p. 219.
60. Interview with Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
61. Spence, 1968, pp. 44–8; Brown, 1979, p. 233.
62. This is the official census figure for 1966, which found other absentees to be less than 25 per cent of miners. Breytenbach (1972) estimates

112 000 'spontaneous' migrant workers in 1970, far more than the 97 000 miners, a figure McDowall considers high (1973, p. 1). Somewhere above the official estimate and below the Breytenbach estimate is almost certainly correct.

63. As of 1989 there were 11 716 square miles or about 30 000 square kilometers, of which 3900 square kilometers were arable, equal to 390 000 hectares for a population of 1.8 million, or 0.217 ha. per person.
64. Cobbe, 1982, pp. 4–6; Wallis, 1977, p. 6.
65. Cobbe, 1986, p. 28.
66. Kowet, 1973, pp. 253–4.
67. Act No. 22 of 1967; Report of the Basutoland Select Committee on Labour Organization (1962), Paragraph 8, cited in Kaburise, 1981.
68. The drafting of the Act's migrant labour provisions had been bungled, however, much energy having been devoted to winning periodic compulsory repatriation so that the government would benefit from a fresh attestation fee. It was realized afterwards that the WNLA was already paying re-engagement fees (Kaburise, 1981, pp. 5–6).
69. Act No. 14 of 1977.
70. Section 26.
71. See Rugege, 1979, p. 16; Kaburise, 1981, pp. 13–14.
72. Huisman, 1982, pp. 62–4.
73. Interview with Lesotho Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
74. Eight months in The Hague, The Netherlands. Ström, 1986, pp. 61–3.
75. Woodward, 1986, p. 154.
76. Lesotho/SA agreement of 1973. This mobility had originally been established, subject to the initial employer's agreement, by the 1967 Employment Act.
77. Wallis, 1977, p. 16.
78. ILO, 1979, p. 74.
79. Interview with Lesotho Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989. Lesotho had also become responsible under the agreement for the provision of recruiting facilities, a clause that it would circumvent by requiring recruiters to provide facilities in order to obtain their licences.
80. *Africa Confidential*, vol. 14, no. 20, 5 Oct. 1973. The idea of an inquiry was angrily rejected by the South African Prime Minister. Lesotho stopped recruiting for that mine, and when further deaths among Basotho miners followed, feelings ran even higher.
81. Calculated from data in Jenness, 1975, p. 4.
82. McNamara, 1985, p. 107. The 1974 Act and Regulation were superseded by the Deferred Pay Act of 1979 (See Supplement No. 1 to Gazette No. 24 of 13 July 1979) and Deferred Pay Regulations of 1980 (See Supplement No. 2 to Gazette No. 27 of 8 Aug. 1980). Normal family remittances were taken from net wages and not remittances for the first 20 per cent, meaning that a worker who wished to send one fifth of his pay or more to his family was forced to live on the remaining one fifth.

83. Horner and Kooy, 1976, pp. 7–9.
84. Rugege, 1979, p. 30; McNamara, 1985, p. 107–121.
85. Ström, 1986, p. 62.
86. Lipton, 1980, p. 174.
87. Wallis, 1977, p. 12.
88. ILO, 1979, p. 66.
89. Lesotho, 1979.
90. Ghai, 1987, p. 16.
91. Cobbe, 1982, p. 3.
92. Cobbe, 1986, p. 28.
93. Murray, 1980, 1981.
94. See van Kuilenburg, 1986; Spiegel, 1980. The dominance of stratification by household development cycle was particularly important where the soil was poorest.
95. ILO, 1979, p. 86.
96. Wykstra, 1978; Leathers, 1978.
97. Lesotho, Physical Planning Division, 1989, p. 35; ILO, 1979, p. 113.
98. ILO-SATEP, 1986.
99. *Bosebetsi*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 1–6.
100. Lesotho, 1964.
101. Researcher at Institute of Labour Studies, Maseru, 7 Aug. 1989.
102. Kuilenburg, 1980.
103. Ström, 1986, pp. 71–2.
104. Foreign Minister Pik Botha, quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail*, 'Pik is trying to divide Lesotho says Minister', 13 Apr. 1983; reproduced in *Lesotho Clippings* Apr.–June 1983. The threat was made clearer in June when Pretoria warned that 'the Government of Lesotho would have to accept responsibility if employment opportunities for its citizens are jeopardized' by deteriorating relations. *Guardian* (UK) 'Ministers meet after action at Lesotho Border', 3 June 1983, in *Lesotho Clippings*, Apr.–June 1983, p. 325.
105. *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 Feb. 1984; in *Lesotho Clippings*, Jan.–Mar. 1984.
106. Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, p. 171.
107. Oral evidence in Thabane and Guy, 1984, p. 18.
108. Interview with Lesotho Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
109. *Friend* (South Africa), 22 Feb. 1984; reproduced in *Lesotho Clippings*, Jan.–Mar. 1984, p. 77. Lesotho continued to raise the tax issue but its position was weakened by its imposition of taxes on South Africans working in Lesotho, and its expectation that they would be exempt from South African tax (interview with Lesotho Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989).
110. Cobbe, 1986, p. 43. Several smaller projects were also created for returnees. A Food for Work Programme was set up with the intention that it might play an emergency role and another Agriculture Department programme intended for returnees was taken up by non-migrants only. Private organizations such as the Christian Council of Lesotho also started small-scale projects for migrants (University of Botswana, National Institute of Research, 1987, pp. 15–20).
111. ILO-SATEP, 1985, p. 39.

112. One of the big multipliers of the impact of migrant decline was that migrants were the main source of customs union revenue for Maseru. Even a gradual withdrawal of only one half of Basotho migrants from South Africa would have caused a one third fall in private consumption in Lesotho, and a huge drop in Maseru's revenue (MhLanga, 1986).
113. *The Nation* (Lesotho), 23 July 1985; reproduced in *Lesotho Clippings* July–Sep. 1985, p. 27.
114. *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 Mar. 1985; reproduced in *Lesotho Clippings*, Jan.–Mar. 1985, p. 75.
115. *Chronicle* (Zimbabwe), 8 Feb. 1985; reproduced in *Lesotho Clippings*. Jan.–Mar. 1985, p. 47.
116. *Star*, 19 Mar. 1985; reproduced in *Lesotho Clippings*, Jan.–Mar. 1985, pp. 79–80.
117. Southall, 1986, p. 14.
118. Southall, 1986, pp. 1–17.
119. *South African Labour Bulletin*, 1986, vol. 11, no. 7 (August).
120. *Guardian*, 10 July 1986, reproduced in *Lesotho Clippings*, July–Sep. 1986.
121. *Sunday Times* (Business Times, South Africa), 17 Aug. 1986; in *Lesotho Clippings*, July–Sep. 1986, p. 38; *Lesotho Today*, 19 Nov. 1986; in *Lesotho Clippings*, Oct.–Dec. 1986, p. 123.
122. *Sowetan*, 25 Sept. 1986, in *LC*, July–Sep. 1986, p. 72.
123. Interview with TEBA's administrative manager for Lesotho, Mr Seth Sethloho, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
124. NUM, 1989, p. 8.
125. *Facts and Reports*, 1988(L); citing *Citizen* (South Africa), 26 April 1988.
126. Interview with Lesotho Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
127. Interview with Mr Sekamane Lesotho bank official responsible for Deferred Pay Fund in Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
128. Interview with Lesotho Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
129. Interview with TEBA's administrative manager for Lesotho, Mr Seth Sethloho, 9 Aug. 1989.
130. Interviews with TEBA's administrative manager for Lesotho, Mr Seth Sethloho, 9 Aug. 1989; Lesotho Labour Commissioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989.
131. Interview with B.C. Gondwe, economic affairs officer, UNECA, Lusaka, 17 Oct. 1989.

8 Swaziland: Managing a 'Labour Account Deficit'

The people of Swaziland escaped the more extreme job dependency of their two sister territories, Lesotho and Botswana, due mainly to their country's better land, its success at attracting investments, its access to labour from Mozambique, and to efforts by the colonial Swaziland administration to prevent labourers from leaving. Nevertheless the proportion of Swaziland's population working in South Africa was still in the 4–6 per cent range for 70 years – lower than Lesotho, Botswana or Malawi, but still higher, for instance, than Zambia (see Figure 11, Chapter 10).

The Swaziland record on labour migration to South Africa has four particular features.

Firstly, much of the historical contradiction between Swaziland's internal economic development and continued labour export to South Africa was relieved by the supply of Mozambican labour. When labour migration to South Africa caused shortfalls of labourers at existing wages, the administration introduced early measures to try to keep more workers inside. However it lacked the control to make this work, and so more and more Mozambican migrants came in instead.

Secondly, the Swaziland administration restricted outflows to South Africa more successfully in the 1950s. International investments were fuelling a rapid economic expansion, which reoriented the administration's labour-export policy to internal capital's needs. Constraints were put on recruiting in 1975 by the South African Chamber of Mines and there was a noticeable dip in labour migration to South Africa as a result.

Thirdly, despite the success of the 1950s, the independent Swaziland government failed to again restrict recruiting when a sudden increase in recruiting for South Africa slowed domestic economic growth. The primary focus of labour-export policy had shifted again – to foreign policy and the political power of Swaziland's growing unemployed. Labour had become a base of support for political opposition to the royalty and the monarchy was careful not to strengthen the opposition's hand.

Fourthly, as a result of the Swaziland government's policy of non-confrontation regarding labour supply, it was rewarded with substantial increases in South African mine jobs in the second half of the 1980s – a time when foreign recruiting by South African mines was declining in *all* other countries.

PARTITION, MONARCHY AND LABOUR EXPORT

The coming of capitalist relations to the subcontinent had already plunged Swaziland into a new social transformation by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a hundred years before labour migration to jobs outside Swaziland became important. Eighteenth-century Swazi social structure had been based on elders' control of the cattle that younger men needed for brideprice, but the coming of trade in the early nineteenth century gave young men an alternative way to acquire cattle, sparking innovations in social organization. A strong chieftaincy emerged, with age regiments, groups of men who passed together from boyhood into adulthood, in charge of the collection of cattle and cultivation of fields for the king.[1]

The exportation of maize became quite important from about 1850 to 1890. The plough was introduced, and men – the only ones who could exchange cattle to obtain a plough – seized control of initiating cultivation and final marketing, with women providing much of the labour in between.[2] This was an intermediate period between the early dominance of cattle ownership in social relations and the coming dominance of land ownership.

The Swazi began to sell prisoners of war and slaves to Afrikaners in the mid-nineteenth century.[3] King Mbandzeni (1874–99) reigned over the swift reduction of Swaziland to an international pawn, conceding vast tracts of Swazi land. The discovery of gold and tin deposits brought increasing numbers of Boers and British into the territory, locked in conflict for a share of Swaziland's future. A second convention with the British in 1890 reguaranteed Swazi independence, but the Boer republics seized 75 per cent of Swazi land.[4] As with Lesotho, the British ceded the diminished 'Swaziland' to the Transvaal in 1894.[5] Following the end of the Boer War in 1902, the British reluctantly resumed control, ruling Swaziland for over 60 years as an unofficial protectorate under the high commissioner in South Africa.

By this time there was a steady stream of internal labour migrants to the north-west of Swaziland to work in the gold and tin mines.

There was also some early independent emigration to the nearby Barberton gold mines, to farms in the eastern Transvaal and to the north of Natal.[6] An attempt was made in the 1890s to obtain recruiting rights in Swaziland for Natal or the Transvaal, but it was not permitted.[7] By 1894 perhaps 1000 of Swaziland's estimated 69 000 inhabitants were away working in today's South Africa, and except for a pause during the Boer War the number absent would climb fairly steadily for the next 80 years.

The Transvaal administration first taxed the Swazi in 1898, but in the wake of the previous year's devastation of the cattle herds by rinderpest, the new poll tax of £2 per year on males and 10s on females proved too severe and had to be postponed.[8] The powers of the Swazi monarch were drastically reduced the same year, and the Swazi became subject to Transvaal law, including the Master and Servants Law, which imposed strict punishment on Africans who broke their employment contracts.[9] Shortly before his death King Mbandzeni naively granted a Transvaal man a 15-year monopoly on labour recruitment.[10]

Like the British administration, the royal administration was forced to tax the population to support itself. In 1903, when the queen regent's income was cut by Britain, the Swazi rightly declared that Britain was in breach of contract and that Swaziland therefore reverted to them. They were, of course, ignored.[11] The queen regent then turned to taxation in order to purchase land, fund public projects against cattle disease and pay for King Sobhuza II's education.[12] In a meeting with the high commissioner the following year she pleaded to have the British taxes reduced or lifted, but the high commissioner retorted that the men could easily earn their taxes in South Africa, which was 'starving for labour'.[13]

At the hearings of the Transvaal Labour Commission at the time, a labour recruiter from Swaziland explained that the queen of Swaziland was herself in the employ of the Native Labour Association for £30 per month.[14] Encouraging men to migrate to the mines, the queen was also taxing them between three and five pounds of their annual pay of about £20. At one point she contracted herself to supply the Witwatersrand with 5000 workers for a fee of £2 each.[15] The monarchy's direct involvement in labour supply endured into the 1940s, longer than anywhere else in the region.

There were already some internal labour shortfalls in Swaziland in the early twentieth century, which were solved by drawing in Mozambican women to pick cotton. The best estimate is that about

2000 Swazi were away working in South Africa by 1904, or about 2.4 per cent of the 85 000 inhabitants. Representatives of the Swaziland Chamber of Mines and Industry met with the high commissioner in 1905 to discuss how to retain labour within Swaziland to work in the mines. The high commissioner suggested a rebate on taxes to those labourers who stayed in Swaziland but the response, instead, was to take measures to increase the overall labour supply. This was a strategic error given the administration's inability to control labour emigration, and taxes on Swazi Africans became the highest in Southern Africa as a result of the attempt.[16]

In the 1907 land partition, the Swazi and a community of about a thousand European settlers were each granted 37 per cent of what remained of Swaziland, with the rest reserved for the British Crown and other uses. The Swazi lands were divided into over 30 separate parcels.[17] The new division of land not only aggravated Swazi labour emigration, but also conversely encouraged European immigration.[18] British and Afrikaner settler capital was invested in beef ranching, and later tobacco and cotton.[19]

The land partition was a turning point in the transformation of rural African society from a cattle-ownership basis to one of land ownership. Cattle for bridewealth could now be bought with savings from labour migration and so the allocation plots of the now scarce land became the new basis of authority. This system provoked increased economic differentiation of Swazi homesteads through less equal access to land for petty commodity production, resulting in further labour migration of the newly impoverished.[20]

The partition also marked the beginning of a period of acquiescence in the labour drain, during which only faint-hearted efforts were made to limit the outflow. Recruiters' needs were largely accommodated by the British administration, while the Swazi monarchy tapped the flow of wealth by controlling migrants at the local level. An ample supply of Mozambican labourers compensated for Swazi absentees, relieving somewhat the contradiction between internal development and labour export.

In 1909 a South African corporation obtained title to the 15-year recruiting monopoly that the king had granted in 1899, and attempted to enforce its right to be supplied with 'as many good healthy Swazis as possible from 17 to 45 years of age'. It was entitled to 'delivery' within two weeks of requesting recruits, and also had the right to prevent all other recruiters from operating.[21] However the resident commissioner declared the monopoly invalid, for when the king had

made the original deal the approval of the executive council of the South African Republic was required for it to be binding.[22]

Swaziland, then, was developing a little better than colonial Lesotho or Botswana. The resident commissioner and his subordinates had already partially reoriented the goals of their administration regarding labour export – to satisfy internal employers' demand for labourers. Despite the resulting effort to increase the overall labour supply, including exceptionally high taxes, massive emigration had still not resulted and there was a promising supply of Mozambican labour available if it did.

CHAMBER OF MINES RECRUITING

The Chamber of Mines' recruiting arm set up shop in Swaziland in 1913. There was some conflict between this recruiting for the Transvaal mines and Swaziland's own labour needs, and so attempts were made to keep more Swazi at home. Swaziland was also in competition with the Chamber of Mines for the Mozambican labour it had hired to replace Swazi recruits in South Africa. By the 1920s, however, the Swaziland administration decided that the home labour supply was adequate and became a quite cooperative labour supplier, streamlining and maximizing the flow to the Rand.

By 1911 there were an estimated 5800 Swazi away working in South Africa, amounting to about 5.5 per cent of the estimated population. Chiefs were still locked in a struggle with the colonial administration for the right fully to control and allocate land in their reserved areas. In a few more years they would win this right and it would assist them a great deal in maintaining their power.[23]

The Transvaal Chamber of Mines' Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC), established itself in 1913 by contracting traders to supply recruits. The storekeepers found that recruiting and the extension of credit to customers were quite complimentary. They continued recruiting into the 1950s – long after the NRC established direct operations in 1928.[24] Recruiting received boosts when Africans were required to move off 'European' tracts of land in 1914, and when heavier taxes were introduced the following year.[25] In fact the policy

of squeezing households to make them send men out to wage work, without the ability to contain them within Swaziland, was possibly even exacerbating labour shortfalls at the low local wages. In response, a new policy forbade the recruiting of any Swazi male whose tax receipt indicated that he was working for an employer within Swaziland or was paying his land rent with service. Such measures were of limited effect however.

South Africa and Swaziland were coming into conflict over Mozambican labour supply. The NRC began to defend its monopoly on recruiting in southern Mozambique, gaining a prohibition on the recruiting of Mozambicans within Swaziland.[26] A decade later the issue of transit passes to Mozambicans on their way through Swaziland to South Africa was also prohibited.[27] When this only stimulated clandestine transit, the whole policy was reversed and the South African Chamber of Mines opened an official port of entry into Swaziland for Mozambicans on their way through to South Africa, complete with rest camps en route. Swaziland's docile resident commissioner was told that Swaziland would benefit from the control exercised over 'an otherwise spasmodic and uncontrolled clandestine emigration from Portuguese territory', and from the use of rest camps by Swaziland migrants.[28]

The benefits, however, were dubious. The labourers were being funnelled directly through Swaziland, raising their status in the labour market and bypassing Swazi employers. The employment of 'Portuguese natives' in Swaziland in 'times of local labour shortages' had been formally approved for periods not normally exceeding six months. Those from north of 22° were not to be allowed to enter and the government secretary specifically instructed that, 'Requests to Portuguese Authorities should of course not be made on the subject'.[29]


The NRC was soon well established, with a headquarters at Stegi, a headquarters for Wenela (The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, the Chamber of Mines' other recruitment organization) in southern Mozambique and other recruitment centres in northern Natal and eastern Transvaal. Potential Swazi recruits were offered advances of up to £5, often used to pay their accounts with the storekeeper–recruiters. Recruiting was heaviest in the bigger towns and in the least developed 'African areas', where the administration's officers would round up those who had defaulted on their taxes and give them a 'choice' between the NRC and convict labour.[30]

The penetration of recruiters went further. The resident commissioner in Swaziland was next asked by the NRC to permit the introduction of the assisted voluntary system (AVS) to supplement recruiting by 'forwarding' independent migrants as well.[31] Swaziland's government secretary and resident commissioner attempted to hold out for compulsory tax deduction and some guarantee that workers would return, but their small administration's position was so weak that it conceded on all the issues.[32] Once the AVS system was functioning smoothly the NRC also asked that the issue of travelling passes for the Rand be stopped for those migrating independently.[33] While unable to do more than restrict such passes, the resident commissioner was as cooperative as possible, and also acquiesced on a request to reduce the NRC's tax-collection responsibilities: The commissioner was 'anxious to remove any factor which might weigh adversely against native labourers from Swaziland proceeding to the mines'.[34]

The seriousness of the transformation of Swaziland into a labour reserve was by this time becoming more apparent. By the time of the Great Depression labour had become Swaziland's principal export, fetching £55 000 in deferments and remittances compared with £51 000 from cattle exports.[35] Sir Alan Pim's *Report on the Economic Condition of Swaziland* (1932) found this most barren of the African areas overpopulated and overstocked.

The sobered British administration responded with a further resettlement scheme, using repurchased lands to lower the population density.[36] Most of the remaining 157 000 acres held by the British Crown, the last 3 per cent of Swaziland, was also set aside in 1942 for settlement by some of the growing number of squatters. When the colonial administration went forward with this new settlement area in 1946, and set up a director to allocate the land in 1946, it encountered tough opposition from the chiefs – who felt that their control over land was being ignored. The administrators could not easily go over the chiefs' heads on such an issue and the collected land was instead sold to international interests.[37]

The South African government delivered several stunning blows to the Swaziland economy, imposing 'veterinary' restrictions on the importation of Swazi cattle to Johannesburg and Durban, and creating protective cotton and tobacco marketing boards that lasted until the Second World War. This was a violation of South Africa's Customs Union Agreement with Swaziland, but the South African government evidently preferred Swazi labour to Swazi produce.



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 7 Swaziland: estimated population working abroad

Swaziland development and labour export appeared to be following much the same path as those of Botswana and Lesotho at this point. The region's classic combination of tax pressures to earn money and the undermining of alternatives to waged labour was pushing the African population into a downward spiral of underdevelopment and labour migration that would leave it devastated.

Still, it was not too late. By 1940 there were about 9000 Swazi or an estimated 5 per cent of the population, working in South Africa. This compared well with the 24 000, or nearly 9 per cent of the population, estimated to be working away from Botswana, where there had been a surge in mine recruiting. For Lesotho, 68 000, or about 11 per cent of the population were away. In Swaziland labour migration had been holding at a roughly stable 4–6 per cent of the population for 30 years, and there was still the potential to prevent huge increases in the face of South African demand (see Figure 7).

GOVERNING MIGRATION WITH LABOURER SHORTFALLS

What happened next is quite instructive. While Swaziland's administration had so far been suppliant to the NRC, postwar economic growth converted it into a defender of internal labour-supply. The growing importance of Swaziland's own economic development under a substantial white-settler population caused a reorientation of

labour export policy to internal capital's interests. There was no doubt about the administration's ability substantially to control migrants, especially through restrictions on recruiting and growth in emigration, and the proportion of the population working in South Africa was visibly constrained.

European farmers complained of a desperate shortage of labourers for hire during the Second World War, begging the resident commissioner to stop labour export to employers other than the South African gold mines – particularly to South African coal mines. As usual they were refused.[38] By the war's end, however, with continuing shortages, Swaziland's administrators at Mbabane became genuinely concerned about the effect of labour emigration on the availability of labourers at home.

An asbestos mine had opened as the war began, and major forestry plantations were started in the Pigg's Peak and Usutu areas, employing rapidly growing numbers.[39] New public roads, canals and construction projects made the Swaziland resident commissioner face the difficulty of hiring labourers for the administration's own purposes. More foreign recruiters had joined the fray, along with local wattle, sisal and sugar producers, and they were all competing fiercely. The NRC was forced to raise wages and shorten contracts in order to compete with Swaziland recruiters.[40]

The upswing in employment at home began to depress the number of emigrants, and the resident commissioner consequently had a change of heart about labour export, deciding that retention of the labour force was desirable after all. The administration began to discourage long-staying Swazi working in non-mining jobs abroad. Migration was keeping 25 per cent of able-bodied men away, or about 9000 out of an estimated total of 36 000, and the feeling grew that Pretoria was opportunist, pleading inability to control migrants in times of hiring shortfalls but acting effectively to reduce any excess at other times.[41] The government secretary wished aloud that his administration could be given the authority not to renew Swazi migrants' stay in South Africa.[42]

The 1950s brought a number of irrigation projects for the production of sugar, cotton, rice and citrus fruits, while the Anglo-American Corporation made major investments in Swaziland coal and iron ore, shipped out via Mozambique on a purpose-built railway.[43] The Lonrho

Corporation began large sugar developments as well.[44] The European population was growing much faster than previously, nearly doubling in the decade 1946–56. The European Advisory Council was reorganized in 1949 but remained only advisory, dominated by larger British settler interests, but with the voice of 'new capital' becoming louder and louder.[45]

In 1951 Mbabane's rulers tilted even more decidedly towards the labour requirements of internal employers, stating that they now envisioned:

> gradually discouraging our labour from seeking employment outside the Territory and this must apply even in the case of gold mine labour.... We should concentrate on the improvement of conditions of pay, etc. for local labour & limit our action in regard to migrant labour to the gradual reduction of [recruiting] licences.[46]

The government secretary was actually more concerned about upward pressure on wages than absolute hiring shortfalls. Of the estimated total available labour force of 43 000, over 10 000 more were in waged employment 'on large projects' within Swaziland and an estimated 10 000 more were in South Africa. Competition for labourers was expected to continue to rise and senior Mbabane officials and leading white figures were concerned that South African-provoked wage increases might slow Swaziland's internal development.[47] During consultations with district commissioners on a new Native Labour Proclamation in 1951, district officials frequently suggested stricter amendments on foreign recruiting, such as pay deferral or a month's compulsory leave in Swaziland before contract renewal – or at least employer-paid transport.[48] There was certainly room for improvement. Many Swazi were still being engaged for the heavy South African mine work without so much as a medical examination.[49] Employers' groups in Swaziland eventually won other provisions, such as permission to offer higher pay advances than foreign recruiters were allowed to offer.[50]

The NRC responded to this new opposition by intensifying recruiting. It held 47 cinema showings in the tiny country in 1953, including westerns and films of 'native tribal ceremonies' to draw crowds to its recruiting advertisement. Total attendance was estimated at 34 000, out of a total Swaziland population of only 275 000.[51] This served to provoke Mbabane officials further, and the government secretary

decided to refuse to issue new recruiting licences, or even to allow the transfer of existing ones. The NRC began to feel the squeeze and repeatedly requested 'emergency licenses' or transfers. Very soon it was bowing to Swaziland's assertive requests for worker compensation and for health care of migrants with tuberculosis.[52] When the NRC made further requests to extend recruiting facilities in the Pigg's Peak Area it was bluntly refused on the ground that labourers should remain in the area.[53]

The number of formally employed Swazi recorded within Swaziland rose from 7548 in 1951 to 17049 in 1961, an average annual growth of over 8 per cent. The number of foreign African workers in Swaziland rose from 1807 to 3570 over the same period, while the South African gold mines' Swazi cohort of about 6000 remained roughly stable.[54] Overall, migrant labourers going off to South Africa were growing in number, but in the 1950s growth was kept down to about the level of population growth, averaging about 4 per cent of the total population. This was accomplished despite aggressive attempts by South African recruiters to increase recruits' numbers in Swaziland, and without even border posts on the Swazi side or any real capacity physically to control the border at all.

In contrast, growth in the proportion of Botswana and Lesotho populations working in South Africa was considerable during the 1950s. By 1964 5.1 per cent of Swaziland's population was working in South Africa compared with nearly 10 per cent and 19 per cent in Botswana and Lesotho respectively (see Figures 9–12, Chapter 10). By 1964 Swaziland would have more workers employed within the country than outside, an important accomplishment by the standards of High Commission Territories and labour-reserve economies in general.

THE SURPLUS SIXTIES

Just as elsewhere in the region, the overall increase in labour supply in the 1960s outpaced even Swaziland's rapid job-creation. A growing influx of foreign labourers into Swaziland also contributed to the arrival of unemployment, which made it unnecessary to continue to discourage labour migration to South Africa. Instead, unemployment and political nationalism made the first priority the provision of sufficient jobs and a reduction in the number of positions held by foreign Africans.

The 1960s were a time of important labour unrest. There was as yet hardly any protective legislation for workers, as pointed out in the important Catchpole Report of 1961. Europeans on the advisory council were busy discouraging an African trade-union movement for fear of its political power. Strikes broke out in 1962 and 1963, and the pulp and timber workers formed the first union in Swaziland. Just as the Europeans had feared, the union was militant: 'The union envisages a time when all unions of Swaziland will unite in a Swaziland federation of labour'.[55] The still-colonial state stepped in with a 'law and order approach'.

With independence nearing, Swaziland's 'traditional' rulers were in competition with other educated and wealthy Africans for control of the soon-to-be independent government. The rulers had a large base of support among the rural population, and so the alternative contenders for power sought to establish their base of support among waged workers.[56]

By the end of the 1950s only the timber industry, with its appalling conditions, had hiring shortfalls. The 1960s brought the expansion of asbestos mining at Havelock, the opening of iron-ore mines in the north of Mbabane and an industrial complex at Matsapa, but the new jobs were still far fewer than the new job-seekers.[57] Unemployment was arriving quickly – brought on by a growing population and a growing labour-force participation rate, and aggravated by labour import from Mozambique.

With unemployment, the principal political pressure on the government regarding the labour market shifted to the cry for a reduction in the number of foreign workers. In 1962–4 non-Swazi represented 20–22 per cent of all black workers on firms with more than 50 employees. The government administration in Mbabane had itself relied almost exclusively on Mozambican labourers for construction and other public works in the 1950s.[58] The Government secretary still remained more concerned for employers than employees, of course, and took to keeping documents in an unusually secret file on continuing recruitment from Mozambique.[59] However the importance of the foreigners was too infuriating to Swaziland's unemployed for the issue to go away, with the share of more responsible positions held by foreigners a particular grievance.[60] The African Labour Proclamation was soon amended to oblige employers to repatriate foreign workers at their contract's end, and by the late 1960s foreigners' 20–22 per cent share of jobs had declined to 15 per cent.[61]

Alongside the return to open recruiting, post-independence Swaziland continued to enjoy sufficient economic growth to palliate its dependence on the South African economy. Allied with foreign capital and fostering an internal middle class, the ruling monarchy was avoiding the confrontation with South Africa – and with its own labour force – that would have resulted from any interference with recruiting. Shortage and surplus of labourers for hire within the small economy, at existing wages, were varying severely with South African recruiting levels – including a major shortfall in the mid-1970s – but the government refused to respond to employers' call for restrictions.

The numbers of Swazi working in South Africa continued to rise, up from about 12 000 in the census of 1956 to 19 000 in 1966.[62] Of the 80 per cent of wage-employed who were still rural dwellers, 44 per cent were now employed outside Swaziland.[63] The proportion of wage-employed women working outside was a similar 36 per cent.[64] Altogether the 19 000 migrants in South Africa amounted to about 5 per cent of Swaziland's population of 370 000.[65] Though 5 per cent of population was modest compared with Botswana or Lesotho, and considering Swaziland's close proximity to South Africa, the country was still suffering a net loss of about 12 per cent of its labour force. The administration, however, was no longer concerned about upward pressure on wages. Labour-export policy reverted to more or less the pre-Second-World-War position, seeking only to increase the acquisition of skills by Swazi working in South Africa in order to eventually replace foreign African workers back home:

> The maintenance of employment opportunities in South Africa is too important for any risks to be taken of antagonising the Republican Government, but it should be possible by closer oversight of permits, particularly in relation to the repatriation of workers, and by pressure on employers in return for the issue of permits, to persuade employers to undertake more methodical training of local people.[66]

The whole labour and employment policy issue in Swaziland was becoming much more highly politicized. Labour action in 1963 was a focus for the organization of an African political opposition, most significantly during the Ubombo Ranches strike. The Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) – a wing of the Swaziland Progressive Party – was quickly developing strong support.[67]

An official report on the strikes recommended that an enquiry be

made into the issue of foreign labourers in Swaziland, who were implied to be contributing to the unrest by both provoking resentment of their presence and participating in labour organizations. The report recommended that foreign labourers be reduced to 10 per cent of the employed labour force.[68] Border posts were also to be erected on the Swazi side of crossing points. Just as in so many other countries in Southern Africa, Swaziland's physical border control was initiated in order to control incoming labour supply.

Another interesting outcome of the report was that steps were to be taken to provide more Swazi nation land close to employment centres, so that more Swazi could become permanent waged workers.[69] This move was particularly revealing, aiming to allow full-time employment without necessitating urbanization and separation from subsistence production. Wary of the urbanization and proletarianization of its rural power base, the new Swazi rulership was seeking a way to provide more access to full-time waged labour without actually encouraging people to leave the land.

There had been, then, a number of important shifts in the final years before independence. Unrestricted labour export had been resumed under growing unemployment and the reduction of foreign workers had been undertaken. These were policies that responded foremost to the growing political power of Swazi workers.

INDEPENDENCE

Swaziland's formal political independence in 1968 was followed by considerable economic development and job creation, which soon dwarfed the importance of South African employment. Taking steps to oust foreign labourers, Mbabane's decision makers found that wages were becoming increasingly stratified – making labour-export policy a more difficult compromise. Its poorest-paying industries were floundering for lack of labourers, while at the same time growing unemployment was costing the monarchy popularity.

A new constitution had been drawn up by the British by the end of 1963, under which a European/monarchist alliance swept the elections in 1964. Pan Africanism and African socialism were only second fiddles in Swaziland compared with the monarchy's heart-tugging

appeal to preserve 'the Swazi way of life'.[70] The 1966 constitution laid down universal suffrage but recognized the paramountcy of the re-empowered monarchy, with Sobhuza II as king and head of state. Independence was reached in 1968 after the monarchists gained 80 per cent of the popular vote.[71] Following a steep drop in support in the 1972 elections, the traditional rulers abolished party politics, attacked the labour movement and imposed a state of emergency.[72]

Upon independence Swaziland's GNP was R46m (US$64m). Of the two biggest cash crops – sugar-cane and cotton – less than 10 per cent of the acreage was cultivated by Swazis, the rest being farmed by European settlers and British and South African planters.[73] Waged employment, which had not increased in the final years prior to independence, was estimated at 48 300 out of 183 000 people of working age. There were 8000 Swazi away working for the South African Chamber of Mines, a number back up from a slide from 10 000 to 6000 from 1962–67.[74] Altogether there were about 20 000 labour migrants working abroad, an estimated 4.8 per cent of the population, which was – roughly speaking – still a very stable proportion of the population (see Figure 7).

Half of the Mbabane Treasury's total revenue of R15m, or about one sixth of Swaziland's GNP, was coming from customs-union payments from South Africa, much of them due on migrants' imports upon their return home. There was, however, a healthy trade surplus of R8m – mainly from exported iron ore, forestry products, sugar and asbestos. Only 8.5 per cent of exports and 31.1 per cent of imports were to and from South Africa.[75]

The conquerors of Swazi nationalism, rooted in an ideology of 'traditionalism', had depended on an alliance with the South African government, which would assist as necessary in preventing the emergence of a more democratic – thus potentially less cooperative – political order. The Swazi rulers were far from puppets, however, with their own specific relations with the Swazi population. Labour migration has been one of the chief interdependencies between the monarchy's assertion of power and Pretoria's achievement of its interests. Labour flows to South Africa served the modern 'traditional' Swazi state's reliance on authority exercised through rural communities – quite a few of which still partly depended for their existence on migration to South Africa.

Swaziland was fortunate in continuing to attract investment in the post-independence era. Modern-sector employment rose from

60 000 in 1966 to 94 000 by 1982, with manufacturing becoming almost as important as agriculture. By 1976 official data of the Department of Labour showed internal, formal-sector employment of 60 000, excluding 9000 seasonal agricultural workers, amounting to about 13 per cent of the population, or more than in any majority-ruled country in Central or Southern Africa.[76] However 800 plantations were accounting for most growth in agricultural output, with the output of the peasant sector growing no faster than the population.[77]

One of the first challenges facing the new government was dealing with the foreign-labour issue. This was still a delicate balancing act between the sensitivity to wage rates of labour-intensive foreign investments and the Swazi labourer's resentment of foreign workers. Matters had been aggravated by five years of falling Chamber of Mines recruitment, putting pressure on the Swaziland government to reallocate more jobs at home to Swazi citizens. Foreign labour's share of employment had fallen from 16 per cent in 1964 to 11.3 per cent in 1967, but this was not enough to quiet dissent. Half of Mozambicans outside the most senior jobs were illegally employed, thus the first steps taken were to tighten immigration legislation – making employers responsible for keeping special records of their non-Swazi employees and encouraging them to hire Swazi wherever possible.[78] Predictably, industries such as sugar, which for decades had been dominated by foreign labour, were reluctant to comply and it was made an offence to hire a person without a residence permit. Talks were held with the Malawi government to arrange for the repatriation of Malawians in Swaziland as well, after a maximum stay of two years.[79]

The crackdown, however, was quickly reversed. By 1972 the sugar plantations were reporting losses due to shortages of cane cutters, and were given permission to recruit in Mozambique.[80] Portugal, however, wanted Swaziland to negotiate a bilateral labour-supply agreement before recruiters would be allowed to operate.[81] The shortfall of workers was very clearly due to the low wages and poor rations offered for the heavy plantation work, and the Federation of Swaziland Employers itself wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister to call attention to the 'drastic problem of unemployment'.[82]

Poor attention to the needs of workers cost the government ground in the 1972 elections, the chief reason why the NNLC won one of Swaziland's eight constituencies. It was then that the government reacted oppressively, making political parties illegal and temporarily imprisoning several opponents, including the head of the NNLC.[83]

SPARING PRECIOUS LABOUR

The increases in recruiting for the South African mines that were permitted during the Malawian employment boycott were sufficient to slow Swaziland's domestic economic growth. But this time, unlike in the 1950s, there was no restriction on outflows. Adequate employment was too volatile a political issue to reduce foreign jobs and South Africa had become too aggressive a neighbour to be antagonized, and so a new labour-export deal was signed.

The metamorphosis of the Swazi rulership had resulted in two sets of institutions. On the one hand there was the monarchy and institutions of the 'Swazi nation', while on the other there was the newer constitutional structure, including a parliament and a political party – Imbokodvo. Led by King Sobhuza, however, this was clearly 'the king's party' and emerged with every seat in parliament following the post-independence elections and appointments.[84]

The popularity and confidence of organized labour and the opposition parties was rising by the 1972 elections. The opposition took three seats in areas where there were large numbers of workers on plantations and estates. King Sobhuza's attempt to deport one of the new opposition MPs was blocked by the Appeal Court and he then decided to shut down the constitutional structures. Parliament was dissolved, and all political parties – even the king's own – were banned. Labour unrest and trade unions were a particular fear of the king's and he made statements on the 'Swazi tradition' – meaning *no* tradition when it came to such political expression.[85]

The subsequent moves of the government were marked by a good deal of caution regarding the balance of labour exchange. There was a strong awareness that labour was the opposition's card and that it would not do to strengthen their hand unnecessarily. Jobs for workers in South Africa were to be protected, even when it meant that employers paid higher wages.

Most of the Mozambican labour force was withdrawn from Swaziland upon Mozambique's independence in 1975. As this occurred at the same time as the Chamber of Mines doubled its recruiting of Swazi – due to the Malawian boycott – there was soon a considerable shortage of workers in Swaziland's plantation sector. Sugar, cotton and citrus growers began to clamour once again for

restrictions on migrants heading to South Africa, and demanded that the Swazi ruler strike a deal on renewed labour supply with the new Mozambican government.

A delegation was sent to Mozambique to ask for Mozambican labourers, among other things, but discussions were rejected by the Mozambicans until Swaziland established diplomatic relations.[86] The two governments were hardly on good terms due to royal collaboration with the Portuguese during Mozambique's war of independence. Mbabane officials were worried and even began to consider constructing an alternative railway to South Africa to relieve their dependence on the line to Mozambique.[87] Denied Mozambicans, the citrus industry then asked for permission to recruit labourers in South Africa's 'homelands' and Malawi.[88]

The Federation of Swaziland Employers, more familiar now with the complexities of simultaneous labour shortage and unemployment, wrote on behalf of the citrus and sugar industries to ask that 33 recruiters for South Africa operating in Swaziland – apart from the Chamber of Mines' reorganized Mine Labour Organisation (MLO) – should not have their permits renewed at the end of 1974. When the Labour Department responded by suggesting that citrus and sugar growers should hire recruiters and raise wages, the federation argued persuasively that their wages were already higher than in many South African agricultural jobs, expressing bewilderment at the continuing exodus.[89]

There was some truth in this. Migrants were being drawn to South Africa more by intersectoral wage differences than by higher wages for the same job. However conditions on the worst plantations in Swaziland were still abominable. Pineapple plantations operated appalling slums, systematically exploiting women, in particular, who were shut out of most South African jobs and thus had fewer options. Pay deductions were exaggerated and in one case water was even being sold from the police station across the road.[90]

Labour migration to South Africa had increased a little faster than population growth since 1970, rising from 4.8 per cent to an estimated 5.3 per cent or 25 000 of the 456 000 inhabitants, in 1974. With a surge to 21 000 miners by 1976, the total number of migrants reached a peak of about 29 000 or 6 per cent of the population – the highest proportion working away since 1936.[91]

The higher outflows were clearly causing labour shortages at home, where Swazi still had the best employment alternatives of any national group of migrants abroad in the region.[92] The Swazi Department of

Labour admitted that the lack of growth in domestic employment in 1975 was directly attributable to higher South African recruitment and wages.[93] In February 1977 the king appealed to Swazi employers to raise their rates of pay to South African levels to keep workers from leaving.[94] This was no easy task however. The real income of Swazi on the South African mines had been Em176 per year in 1970 (1 emalengeni = 1 rand), compared with the real Swazi urban income per worker of Em467, and real per capita rural income of Em32. By 1976, whereas real rural income was exactly the same and real urban income only marginally more, real mine income in South Africa had risen spectacularly. The mine/urban ratio had changed from 0.38 to 1.26 in only six years.[95]

At the same time, the importance of revenue from migrants for Swaziland's economy as a whole was no longer so high. Despite the wage hikes, the total inflow into Swaziland via the Chamber of Mines, mainly voluntary deferred pay but including fees, taxes, cash advances and remittances, was only Em3.2m, of which less than Em50 000 was direct government revenue.[96] The political significance of jobs abroad was eclipsing their economic importance.

While unemployment had been nearly nil in the 1950s, by the late 1970s it had risen to a level at which the government became concerned about 'social stability'.[97] Despite the movement that had provoked their clampdown in 1972, the rulership had experienced comparatively little political opposition since independence. Originally allying with foreign capital, the new and relatively poor ruling class had by the 1970s begun to facilitate their own accumulation as well. A Land Speculation Control Bill regulated foreign land acquisition in order to get more land into the hands of better-off Swazi. Other measures included the encouragement of small-scale production through the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) and the Ministry of Commerce and Cooperatives' facilitation of Swazi ownership of trading concerns.[98] While still concerned to create an attractive climate for foreign investors, internal capital accumulation was growing in importance.

Swaziland's rulers were probably very tempted at times to restrict migration abroad, but they continued to be wary of ex-South African migrants' active political dispositions and of the labour movement in general. It remained imprudent to restrict the access to work in South Africa of their political opposition's strongest potential base, even though it would lower wages and increase labourers' numbers at home. The government declared that its policy was 'free labour

mobility' and made it clear that the South African Chamber of Mines could recruit as many workers as it liked.[99] When an ILO report suggested that Swaziland needed a more aggressive domestic employment strategy to reduce dependence on South African employment, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning hotly submitted 26 pages of objections, arguing that migration abroad results from productivity differentials – not unemployment at home:

> Because 17 000 labourers go to the mines in the R.S.A., the conclusion cannot be drawn that there is un- or under-employment in Swaziland. The only valid conclusion to be drawn is that some Swaziland workers prefer to work in the R.S.A., more so now because of improved conditions of work including remuneration.[100]

Negotiations between Mbabane and Pretoria were therefore very cordial when negotiation of the 1975 bilateral labour-export deal began. The ILO urged Mbabane to press for compulsory deferred pay and an increase in recruiting fees from Em1 to Em10, to match those of Botswana and Lesotho.[101] The eventual agreement still left deferred pay voluntary, at Pretoria's insistence, but transferred custody of the deferred pay fund to the Swaziland government, which began to pay interest on workers' accounts. Detailed discussions took place on the exact terms for the establishment of Swaziland's representatives in South Africa.[102] The only other important change was a clause making any agreement between the Swazi government and a South African recruiting organization subject to Pretoria's approval.[103]

Negotiations with Pretoria dragged on even after the agreement was signed, particularly for compulsory pay deferment. Pretoria and the mines were genuinely concerned at the potential level of worker opposition to a compulsory scheme and may have been doing the Swaziland government a favour by refusing.[104]

The same system used to cut back the recruitment of Mozambicans was also applied to Swaziland in 1977. This was hardly because of the modest wrangles but rather due to the declining gold price and labour-force internalization policies of the Chamber of Mines. While valid early return or re-engagement certificates still guaranteed re-employment, quotas were set for each mine on a weekly basis. From the historical peak of 21 000 Swazi engaged with the Chamber's mine at one point in 1976, the numbers fell back to the 1974 level – averaging only about 10 000 from 1979–84.[105] By the end of the year the

hiring shortages in Swaziland had reversed to a glut of labourers, seeking even the worst jobs.[106]

Another issue closely related to labour migration was now reaching a climax. Pretoria wished the official South African 'homeland' of KaNgwane to be returned to Swaziland. Originally Swazi territory, it was signed away to the Transvaal in the late nineteenth century by the British. In the apartheid spirit of 'separate development', the offer was for Swaziland to take possession of a barren piece of land 90 kilometres long and from 5–19 kilometres wide in exchange for accepting responsibility for an unwillingly denationalized population of 0.25 million, many of whom were forcibly relocated there from elsewhere in South Africa. When King Sobhuza, who had in principle favoured the return of KaNgwane to Swaziland, died in 1982, Pretoria attempted to pressure the interim rulers by refusing to assist with the collection of Swazi taxes from migrants in South Africa – this despite an obligation to do so under the 1975 agreement.[107] Pretoria's thinking was that the nearly 50 per cent addition to Swaziland's population could support itself through labour migration to South Africa.

The Swazi parliament, with diminished powers, had been restored in 1978, though the new MPs only enacted into law the decisions of the king and his advisors. The opposition parties' base of support continued to centre on organized labour and workers in general, as well as students at the university. King Sobhuza's death provoked an intense struggle for power that lasted several years – even a quick succession of queens – until a revised royalty was re-established.[108]

The Swazi government was surviving and had successfully avoided confrontation with both Pretoria and Swazi labour migrants. When the jump in South African labour demand stalled the Swazi economy in 1975 – amidst demands from employers for reduced recruiting – no action was taken to keep labourers at home. A new labour-export deal was signed in fact, with the monarchy at Mbabane remaining quite cooperative.

BUCKING THE TIDE

Swaziland emerged in the second half of the 1980s as the most trusted supplier of labour to South Africa, thus its contingent in South African mines was increased to its highest stable level in history. The main importance of the jobs to the Swaziland government was no longer

revenue but the provision of jobs to the unemployed, though foreign-exchange earnings were still significant. On the South African side, the Swazi share of mine jobs was comfortably modest – too small to strike much of a blow if the Swazi were suddenly removed as the Malawians had been. Given the Swazi government's cooperative attitude, the South African mine managers decided to increase considerably their orders of Swazi miners. This was a time when all other foreign nationalities' numbers in the mines were in decline – part of an overall Chamber of Mines strategy to minimize the mines' vulnerability to any one state.

Though not conceding on the KaNgwane issue, the interim Swazi monarchy was still by far the most compliant of Pretoria's neighbours, bargaining very gently compared with Pretoria's rocky labour-supply relations with Mozambique, Malawi and Lesotho. The Swaziland government also signed a secret non-aggression pact with South Africa in 1982, under which the ANC representative in Swaziland was expelled.[109]

The succession of a new king then took place, promising a new era of stability legitimized by 'tradition'. The new boy-monarch's powerful advisors remained aware of the necessity to cooperate with a Pretoria that could very well dislodge them. Being so nearby, Swaziland recruits also fit into the Chamber of Mines' new scheme of 'career migrants' – miners who more or less went on regular leave home with a degree of job security. Swaziland was therefore the only supplier-country honoured with an increase in Chamber of Mines recruiting in the second half of the 1980s. Its contingent jumped from 11 000 in 1984 to 18 000 in 1989 – the highest level in its history apart from the time of the peak of the Malawi boycott emergency – with the same level planned for 1990.[110] Asked why Swaziland's numbers had increased so much, a top Swaziland labour official replied that the Swaziland government had a reputation for being 'obedient and cooperative'.[111]

Mine jobs may have been on the rise but other work for Swazi in South Africa was falling off fast, down from 29 000 or 6 per cent of the population, in 1976 to 17 000 or only 2.6 per cent, ten years later – the lowest proportion since about 1904 (see Figure 7). With 70 000 jobs in its own growing formal sector by 1989, Swaziland was far from critically dependent on South African jobs, though they were

still a major source of foreign exchange.[112] More importantly, the poor were still very vulnerable to Chamber of Mines hiring – perhaps even increasingly vulnerable. Low-skilled South African work for Swazi had been declining outside the Chamber of Mines due to a clamp-down, and was estimated at 4000 in 1989.[113] Migration of skilled Swazi to South Africa's 'homelands', however, was markedly increasing, though the actual numbers were unknown.[114] By 1983 income differentiation had reached the point where 20 per cent of Swazi rural households had cash incomes of less than Em20 per person per year and these were the households that could use a mine job.[115]

In early 1989 Swaziland initiated renegotiation of the 1975 agreement, in keeping with a decision by the Southern African Labour Conference that all supplier countries should do so. Uninterested in compulsory deferred pay – even defending workers' right to choose – the main Swaziland requests were for improvements in workers' conditions, including contributions to the Swaziland National Provident Fund's retirement scheme; more married quarters – at least for visiting spouses; and the elimination of racial discrimination.[116]

With non-mine jobs falling away and unemployment growing in Swaziland, the least educated and poorest of the rural population were quite dependent on South African mine employment – often their only hope of a liveable income. This was the importance of the work in the mines to the Swazi government, which deserves some credit for its rare example in putting migrants' interests at the top of its negotiating list.

CONCLUSION

The administrators of colonial Swaziland began in much the same way as their counterparts in Botswana and Lesotho, promoting labour export and little else, but also importing Mozambican labourers for their own needs. Following the Second World War, however, faster economic development caused labour-hiring shortfalls, prompting the resident commissioner to restrict the amount of recruiting for South Africa. Surplus conditions returned in the 1960s and the administration again concentrated on maximizing labour export. Labour import also continued, despite growing African opposition to the presence of foreign workers.

An estimated 5.5 per cent of the population was working abroad by 1911, peaking at 6.3 per cent in 1936 (see Figure 7).[117] The proportion

of Swaziland's population working in South Africa hovered between 4 per cent and 6 per cent from 1908 to 1978, which was considerably more stable than for other countries. However, though Swaziland's labour export remained at a lower level than Botswana or Lesotho's, it was still high – roughly comparable to Mozambique's if we disregard labour inflows.

The greatest contribution of Swaziland's labour-export history to our understanding of the phenomenon at a regional scale is the success of the administrators in clamping down on foreign recruiting in the 1950s, followed by the decision not to do so again when labour shortages reoccurred in the 1970s. The first decision demonstrated the capacity of even a tiny dependent territory to retain labour, even one nearly engulfed by a powerful neighbour. The Swazi government resisted the damaging labour drain in order to keep wages down for local employers, thereby successfully reinforcing a trend to greater internal employment and demonstrating how its interests in labour flows had broadly diverged from South Africa's. In the 1970s the decision not to similarly retain labour again – in similar circumstances – reflected a second major shift in policy orientation. With regionwide unemployment, the independent government was by then both able and obliged to pay more attention to the working majority's needs than to those of employers.

Like Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland's case also demonstrates the considerable importance of simultaneous inflows and outflows of labour, creating labour statuses varying by country of *de jure* residence. Had it not been for the ready supply of Mozambican labour – if, for instance, Swaziland had been a complete enclave like Lesotho – either Swaziland's rate of economic development or its rate of labour emigration would have been much lower, almost certainly the former. Mozambican workers were variously encouraged and discouraged – depending on labour scarcity. Their availability, in fact, facilitated the differentiation of the Swaziland government's interests in labour export from those of Pretoria and Britain by keeping their relations with the South Africa government from becoming too antagonistic because of labour shortages.

Notes and References

1. Neocosmos, 1987, pp. 84–5.
2. Neocosmos, 1987, pp. 86–8.
3. Bonner, 1977, pp. 126–56.

4. Potholm, 1977, p. 131.
5. Booth, 1983, p. 16.
6. Booth, 1981, p. 6.
7. de Vletter, 1981, p. 48.
8. Booth, 1981, p. 8; de Vletter *et al.*, 1981, p. 48.
9. No. 13 of 1980. Booth, 1981, p. 8.
10. SNA RCS 23/10, *Power of Attorney* granted M.J.J. Groebler, 9 May 1899. Booth traces this concession to the queen regent, who succeeded the king.
11. SNA J 138/05, Report of a Deputation to Pretoria, 4 July 1905.
12. Booth, 1983, pp. 28–9.
13. SNA J 138/05, Notes of a Meeting Milner and the Queen, 13 July 1904.
14. Winter, 1977, p. 28.
15. Booth, 1981, p. 7.
16. Booth, 1981, pp. 6–8.
17. McFadden, 1982, p. 144; Fransman, 1978; Crush, 1978. However, conventional history that the land given the Swazi was poorer than average (Booth, 1981, p. 5) would appear to have been wrong. The African share of land was of average quality overall. Scott, c. 1950, p. 438.
18. Scott, c. 1950, p. 437.
19. Daniel, 1982, pp. 92–5.
20. Neocosmos, 1987, pp. 89–92.
21. SNA RCS 5/4/15 and 529/15; SNA RCS 23/10, South Africa Merchant's Corporation Ltd to Resident Commissioner, 14 Jan. 1910.
22. Under Law 3 of 1898. SNA RCS 23/10, Government Secretary to South Africa Merchant's Corporation, 26 Mar. 1910.
23. Neocosmos, 1987, p. 92.
24. de Vletter *et al.*, 1981, p. 49.
25. Scott, c. 1950, p. 436; Daniel, 1982.
26. SNA RCS 429/26, Circular No. 23 of 1913.
27. SNA RCS 429/26, various correspondence.
28. SNA RCS 123/34, Transvaal Chamber of Mines to Resident Commissioner, Swaziland, 9 Feb. 1924, and reply.
29. SNA RCS 29/28, Government Sec. to the Assistant Commissioner.
30. Booth, 1981, pp. 9–12.
31. Swaziland workers could apply to an NRC office for an advance for transport to the Rand without signing a longer recruitment contract, whereby transport to the job was free. Upon arrival, workers had 12 days to find a job. Almost all AVS workers elected voluntary deferred pay, presumably because its voluntary nature was little known. Cash advances of up to £1 were made, and the current year's taxes of £1 15s or more could be deducted. AVS workers were guaranteed that no distinction would be made between them and recruits in the work place. See SNA RCS 663/28, NRC 'AVS Procedure in Swaziland'.
32. SNA RCS 663/28, Assistant Commissioner, Swaziland, to Government Secretary, Swaziland, 14 Mar. 1928.

33. SNA RCS 404, NRC District Superintendent, Bremersdorp, Swaziland, to District Commissioner, Central District, Swaziland, 5 Aug. 1941.
34. SNA RCS 557/32, NRC to Resident Commissioner and reply, Swaziland 6 July 1932.
35. McFadden, 1982, p. 144.
36. Booth, 1983, p. 23.
37. Neocosmos, 1987, pp. 96–7; Scott, c. 1950, p. 441.
38. Booth, 1981, pp. 11–12.
39. Potholm, 1977, p. 139.
40. When Swazi complained that they were too small a minority to be eligible for supervisory roles, the NRC concentrated them on particular mines so their promotion would be inevitable (SNA SEC 835, District Commissioner, Bremersdorp, to Govt. Sec., Mbabane, 18 Sept. 1948); Both, 1986, p. 139.
41. BNA S. 464/1, Draft memo to be presented on behalf of High Commission Territories from Resident Commissioner's Office, Bechuanaland Protectorate, fi. 89, 1943.
42. SNA RCS 404, NRC District Superintendent, Bremersdorp, Swaziland to Govt. Sec., Mbabane, 16 Aug. 1948.
43. Potholm, 1977, p. 139.
44. Daniel, 1982, pp. 92–5.
45. Booth, 1986, pp. 134–5.
46. Booth, 1986, p. 143. The cited file is now among the many misfiled or lost in the archives.
47. Symon, 1954, p. 96.
48. SNA GS 544, District Commissioner, Pigg's Peak, to Government Secretary, Mbabane, 1 Dec. 1951, fp. 99–100.
49. NRC, 1954, pp. 11–13; 'Historical and Statistical Brochures' filed at TEBA office, Mbabane.
50. SNA GS 544, Peak Timbers Ltd to Govt. Sec., 30 Jan. 1952, fp. 116–17.
51. NRC, 1954, Stegi Report, p. 19; 'Memorandum on the functions, scope and activities of the Native Recruiting Corporation in Swaziland and adjoining territories', p. 14. Population from ILO, 1977a.
52. SNA LAB/ND/1, Notes of meeting between the District Superintendent of NRC and the Govt. Sec., 10 June 1958, fi. 27.
53. SNA LAB/ND/1, Office Notes on Meeting, 5 Apr. 1957, fi. 21.
54. Swaziland, 1963, p. 2.
55. Cited in Fransman, 1982, p. 61.
56. See Fransman, 1982.
57. Potholm, 1977, p. 139.
58. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1958, p. 11.
59. Booth, 1986, pp. 143–4.
60. Swaziland, 1963, p. 58.
61. Catchpole, 1960, Appendix V. In a typical exclusion pattern, foreign workers – from Central Africa as well as Mozambique – were increasingly concentrated in mining (57.2 per cent), sugar (27.8 per cent) and other agriculture, excluding cotton (38.2 per cent) (de Vletter

et al. 1981, p. 52; Holleman, 1964). See also Swaziland, Dept. of Labour, *Annual Report 1966–67*, p. 2.

62. Swaziland, 1966. Figures are actually for temporary absentees, assumed to be all working in South Africa.
63. Daniel, 1962, pp. 59–60.
64. Humphreys and McClelland, 1964, p. 278.
65. See Figure 7 and Appendix 2.
66. Swaziland, 1963, p. 58.
67. Fransman, 1982, pp. 64–6.
68. The Swazi National Council was particularly antiforeigner: '[F]oreign labour is a threat to law and order.... They have no homes and many live on the proceeds of criminal activities'. Employers on the other hand complained that Swazi workers were less educated and less accustomed to mechanized things. They tended to work more seasonally, it was said, as they had lands nearby and obligations to the chiefs. See Pearce *et al.*, 1966, pp. 7–15.
69. Pearce *et al.*, 1966, pp. 15–33.
70. Potholm, 1977, p. 149.
71. Potholm, 1977, p. 152.
72. Daniel, 1982, pp. 99–100.
73. Calculated from data in Waitzenegger *et al.*, 1970, pp. 399–400; Daniel, 1982, pp. 92–5.
74. Swaziland, Dept. of Labour, 1969, p. 2.
75. Waitzenegger *et al.*, 1970, pp. 412–44.
76. Colclough and Digby, 1978, p. 1.
77. Ghai, 1987, p. 11.
78. Swaziland, Dept. of Labour, 1966–7, p. 2; SNA LAB/Mc/1/II, Office Notice 10 Aug. 1967, and Memo from Chief Immigration Officer to Labour Commissioner, 20 Sept. 1967.
79. SNA LAB/Mc/II, Report on Foreign Labour at Mhlane Sugar, 8 May 1968; Mtg. of the Malawi delegation with Swaziland authorities, 20 Feb. 1970.
80. SNA DPMO 615, Mhlume Sugar Co. Ltd to Deputy Prime Minister, 24 May 1972, fi. 1&2.
81. SNA DPMO 615I, Northern Mill Group Committee to DPM, 22 Nov. 1972, fi. 30.
82. SNA DPMO 615I, 29 Sept. 1972.
83. Potholm, 1977, pp. 140–2.
84. Daniel and Vilane, 1986, pp. 54–8.
85. Daniel and Vilane, 1986, pp. 56–8.
86. SNA DPM 214III, Minutes of Acting Permanent Secretary, Deputy Prime Minister's Office, 19 Dec. 1975.
87. *Times* (UK), 14 Oct. 1976, p. 1.
88. SNA DPM 214III, fi. 40.
89. SNA DPM 214III, Federation to Permanent Sec., DPMO, 16 Sept. 1974; 11 Oct. 1974 fi. 4, 6; Labour Commissioner to Swaziland Citrus Board, 28 May 1975, fi. 28.
90. Intersectoral differences accounted for the attractiveness of South African wage rates, and not a great disparity in pay between Swaziland

and South Africa within the same sector. Agribusiness *did* pay considerably more than their South African counterparts, experiencing shortages due to the drain to higher-order sectors in South Africa, while South Africa's influx controls in urban industrial areas guaranteed sufficient supply to low-wage farm work. High wage sectors in Swaziland, despite rates below those in South Africa were able to compete successfully for labour supply. Bevan and de Vletter, 1977; McFadden, 1982, pp. 149–61.

91. See Figure 7 and Appendix 2.
92. Doran, 1977, p. 8; de Vletter, 1982, p. 116. There were 32 000 absentees, 95 per cent of whom were of working age. One quarter of these were women, of whom only a minority were non-working dependents.
93. Down about 100 to 48 513. Swaziland, Central Statistics Office, 1975, p. 5; Swaziland, Dept. of Labour, *Annual Report 1975*, p. 5.
94. de Vletter *et al.*, 1981, p. 67.
95. Doran, 1977, p. 29.
96. SNA DPMC 7/4/II, TEBA to the Permanent Secretary, DPMO, 25 Mar. 1980; ILO, 1977b, p. 195. This would be up to Emóm by 1979.
97. Fransman, 1982, pp. 82–3.
98. Winter, 1977, pp. 40–3.
99. Swaziland, Dept. of Labour, *Annual Report 1975*, p. 5.
100. Swaziland, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1977, p. 10.
101. ILO, 1977b, pp. 200–1.
102. SNA DPMC 524, Correspondence and drafts of the Agreement; SNA DPM 7/5/II.
103. Swaziland/South Africa Agreement 1975; Mbabane was to have an office block and nine houses built to their specifications to house their labour representative's offices. In fact it was over this that negotiations had dragged on rather long, as Mbabane did not wish the office to be mistaken for a diplomatic office under the apartheid regime. Pretoria had actually 'pressed very hard' for the signing of the Lease Agreement between the two countries (SNA DPM 7/4, Permanent Sec., Foreign Affairs, to Perm. Sec., DPMO, 20 Apr. 1979, fi. 53).
104. SNA DPMC 7/4, Minutes of a Meeting of Swaziland Officials with the RSA Government and Labour Recruiting Organizations, 2 Dec. 1975, fi. 24.
105. Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1977, p. 45.
106. Swaziland, *Third National Development Plan 1978/1979–1982/1983*, p. 53.
107. SNA DPMC 7/1/III, Swaziland Labour Representative to Director-General, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information, South Africa, 13 Aug. 1982; 1 Mar. 1983. The Article of the agreement is no. III(a)(i) of General Notice 121/1975.
108. Daniel and Vilane, 1986, pp. 56–8.
109. Booth, 1989, pp. 44–8.
110. Swazi miners with the Chamber of Mines are all now on 45-week contracts followed by 60–90 days' home leave. On average, Swazi

miners go home every two months during a contract (interview with Mr Wheelright, TEBA's Swaziland Manager, Mbabane, 18 July 1989; Swaziland, Dept. of Labour, *Annual Reports*). Recruiting during the boycott was temporarily as high as 21 000, in 1976, but then fell by over half. Recruiting was once before at the 18 000 level, in 1963 but fell to 11 000 the following year (see Swaziland Dept. of Labour, *Annual Reports*; interview with TEBA's Swaziland Manager, Mbabane, 18 July 1989).

111. Interview with senior labour official, 1989, Mbabane.
112. *African Business*, 'Commodities help sustain growth', Mar. 1989, no. 127.
113. Swaziland, Dept. of Labour, *Annual Report, 1988*, p. 45.
114. *New African*, 'Brain Drain', Aug. 1989, p. 20.
115. de Vletter, 1983, pp. 53–7.
116. Interview with Labour Commissioner Bembe of Swaziland, Mbabane, 13 July 1989.
117. See Appendix 2.

9 Botswana: From *Goromente* to the Government of Labour Export

In most other labour-exporting territories it was the effort to muster more wage labourers internally that provoked Africans to cross territorial boundaries to work. However in Botswana there was so little internal development and waged employment that taxes compelling Africans into the wage economy were *intended* to force them outside. Colonial administration consisted primarily of labour-export administration, with virtually no consideration given to internal development, thus little demand developed internally for its labour supply.

Even by Southern African standards Botswana's British colonial administrators were embarrassingly inactive, mostly applying the taxes and tolerating the South African tactics that transformed the country into a labour-supplying appendage. Labour policy did not become genuinely oriented to internal development until after independence, by which time there was already growing unemployment – thus a stage of primary orientation to the needs of internal capital was effectively skipped.

In contrast with the depressing colonial years, Botswana experienced phenomenal economic growth following independence, led by the development of several large mines. For a country so long dependent on South African jobs, the rate of expansion was almost miraculous and soon made migrants in South Africa much less important for the national economy as a whole. For the rural poor, however, the jobs became paradoxically *more* important – South African mine wages rose considerably at a time when local rural alternatives to such jobs continued to decline. As the new unemployed moved to the cities and became a potential base of political opposition, the Botswana government became especially passive with the South African mine recruiters, preferring to keep as many jobs as possible for as long as possible.

In no country in Southern Africa were the colonial administration and subsequent independent government more docile in the provision of labour to foreign employers. Political independence and fast economic growth failed fundamentally to change policy on labour export, apart from improved regulation of recruiting and a fleeting effort in the mid-1970s to extract more revenue. The century-long relationship between the Botswanan government and the South African mine recruiters remained one of embarrassing suppliance.

EARLY LABOUR MIGRATION

Accounts of Botswana's late-nineteenth-century prosperity, with crop surpluses and developed trade, are as convincing as the accounts of its subsequent economic strangulation in the twentieth century. In 1885 Southern Bechuanaland became the colony of British Bechuanaland and was passed to Cape Colony, leaving the remainder as Britain's Bechuanaland Protectorate. Britain had no intention of developing the dry and desolate expanse, wishing only to hem in the Germans and Afrikaners and maintain a link to the interior. Economic development did not even become an official objective of the Bechuanaland administration until 1966.[1]

The town of Mafeking in the western Transvaal, 25 kilometres *outside* Bechuanaland, served as the seat of government and was also the headquarters of the labour-recruitment agencies operating in the protectorate. Together with Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland, Bechuanaland was one of three High Commission Territories, with their 'resident' commissioners remaining responsible to the British High Commissioner is South Africa.

Most of the reserves created for Africans within Bechuanaland were quite large in proportion to their population – Botswana remains the least densely populated country in the world today. Nevertheless dry-land farming and herding were so land-intensive that land supply was still a constraint on the subsistence economy.[2] The small white population – just 1700 in 1920 – was ceded only 3 per cent of the land, compared with the 50 per cent given to whites in Zimbabwe or 87 per cent in South Africa. But these were the rare lands with better soils and rainfall, thus their loss was still a blow to the African population.[3]

Precolonial Batswana had migrated even more than most peoples in Southern Africa, swirling out of the Transvaal in the face of

Afrikaner expansion to settle in the marginal country beside the Kgalagadi Desert.[4] Livingstone's subsequent 'discovery' of Lake Ngami, in the north-west of today's Botswana, brought in larger numbers of Europeans who usually settled at the headquarters of one of the Tswana tribes.[5] These new traders were the ones who spread the word about employment in the south, directing many to their first Southern African jobs during a major drought in 1847–53.[6]

Chiefs were initially opposed when around 1870, Batswana began to go to work in the diamond mines of Griqualand West, part of the future South Africa. They were concerned at first that their Basarwa slaves or Bakgalagadi servants might desert them for the new jobs, but when this proved not to be a problem they became more interested in migrants' new earnings. Soon they imposed a levy that required each migrant to use part of those earnings to purchase and bring home a gun.[7]

The main preoccupations of the British administration regarding Africans were – as elsewhere in the region – the creation of tribal reserves, the promulgation of recruitment regulations and the levying of taxes. Senior officers at Mafeking deliberately provoked labour migration to the south in order to raise the taxes they needed to balance their budget.[8] The hut tax of 10 shillings, which was imposed in 1899 and later raised to £1, was a crushing burden that many could only pay if someone left the protectorate to find work.[9] Chiefs actually organized the collection of the taxes in exchange for 10 per cent of receipts, and they became even more ardent supporters of the exodus.[10] The resident commissioner was pleased with the way things were going and busily set about administering the migration, placing particular emphasis on gaining control over recruits and recruiters through the application of passes and licences.[11]

In 1896 the Native Labour Supply Association began recruiting in Botswana for Transvaal employers, expanding its operations in 1901 after becoming the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela). Wenela held a recruiting monopoly until the South African Chamber of Mines formed the Native Recruiting Corporation, or NRC, in 1912.[12] There was also some recruiting for the Rhodesian gold mines through the British South Africa Company.[13] Most *official* recruiting was for the South African Chamber of Mines, but overall migration abroad, including independents, was much higher. By 1897 there were an estimated 4000 working in what would become South Africa, equal to some 3.4 per cent of the protectorate's population. The level of migration must have surged even higher after a huge

rinderpest epidemic killed most cattle in 1899, but was then presumably cut off by the Boer War. Such numbers did not return to South Africa again until after the First World War.[14]

THE BAN PERIOD

The continent-wide ban on South African recruiting north of 22° latitude split Botswana into two zones, much as in Mozambique. While the ban held, the Botswana administration at Mafeking extended the supply of labourers to alternative employers in South-West Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This provoked complaints from Botswana's internal employers, who lobbied Mafeking's officers to allocate the labour supply more in their favour. Few concessions were made to them, however, as their numbers were small and as the economic development of the protectorate was considered quite irrelevant. The major dynamic encouraging labour export remained the budget-balancing of Britain's caretaker administration.

It was clear by 1912 that the British government would not be investing at all in Bechuanaland's development. From 1912 until 1931 the administration was forced to operate entirely on the basis of revenue it had collected itself. The largest source was hut taxes, accounting for about 40 per cent of revenue overall and in some years even the majority. Of the overall budget, 80 per cent was spent on policing and on central and district-level administration. Policing was of course primarily a labour-control and tax-collecting function, as was much of the business of district administration, thus the main activity of 'government' was labour export.[15] The *goromente*, as it came to be called in the Setswana language, must have seemed little more to Africans than a migration machine, pushing the population off to South Africa to work. There was very little provision of services for Africans – virtually no expenditure on health and education, for instance – which were left largely for missionaries to provide.[16]

The 1913 Immigrants Restriction Act of South Africa banned recruitment of Africans from north of the 22nd parallel, restricting activity to the larger, southern portion of the protectorate. The Ngwato reserve, the biggest, was restricted, as was all of the Tawana reserve and the Tati district near Francistown. Though the south remained

open, Wenela withdrew from the country entirely until the ban was repealed in 1934, leaving only the NRC with its network of trader–recruiters.[17] However more and more households were steadily becoming dependent on South African jobs to pay their taxes, and their migrant members still made their way through the less formal networks to South African employment, preferably in the mines.

During the First World War thousands of men were sent to work in South-West Africa while the chiefs conscripted more for duty in France.[18] With more and more men rounded up for railways, quarries and docks in South Africa, Bechuanaland's white farmers began to complain again of labour shortage.[19] The farmers were especially indignant at the rising migration rate of women – their cheapest source of labour – but little was done and the women continued to make it out to the Union, working mainly as farm labourers or domestic servants.[20]

In the early 1920s Haskins and Sons began to recruit in the Kgalagadi and in the Caprivi Strip (then administered by Bechuanaland) to send men from the north to the diamond mines of South-West Africa.[21] The Tati Company, mining gold in the east of Bechuanaland, immediately asked that the recruiting be suspended and an enquiry held. Along with Tuli Block farmers, the company was losing its supply of day labourers to the South-West African diamond mines, which paid more than twice as much as they did. The company argued lamely that the South-West African mines were actually paying *less* and that the company only wanted to protect the workers from their own folly,[22] but the magistrate in Tati was unconvinced:

> There is a good deal of the dog-in-the-manger attitude in evidence. At the present time the Tati mines can obtain all the labour they want, if they will only pay for it, and, being a branch of an enormously wealthy Corporation, it must be presumed that they are in a position to do so.
>
> The same might be said of the farmers, who have become so used to paying ridiculously low wages to their labourers that they become hysterical at the prospect of having to pay them a wage sufficiently attractive to prevent their leaving.[23]


Chiefs also supported the recruiting – mainly because additional hut tax increased their 10 per cent commission – and one even wrote to the South-West African recruiters to ask them to hire as many as

possible.[24] Tati and Tuli employers at least managed to have their labour market segmented somewhat, obtaining a ban on the recruiting of *alien* labourers for South-West Africa. The effect of this was to reduce the alternatives of migrant Rhodesian workers inside Bechuanaland. About 1400 Bechuanaland labourers per year continued to go to South-West Africa until recruiting was stopped during the Great Depression.[25]

The British High Commissioner in South Africa consistently defended labour export from the protectorate. In 1926, for instance, the European Advisory Council asked that recruitment be stopped during the planting season, but the High Commissioner refused and suggested instead that more *formalized* recruiting be encouraged, in order to at least ensure that the migrants would return.[26]

While hut taxes were far from light by the mid-1920s, many Bechuanaland households were still quite able to pay their taxes from the proceeds of animal husbandry.[27] A number of Union policies were therefore implemented – if not solely to reduce alternatives to labour migration, with full knowledge that this would be among the desirable effects. In 1924 the Union government embargoed imports of Bechuanaland cattle weighing less than 800 pounds, a clear violation of the South Africa Customs Union Agreement. This was principally done to protect white South African farmers from African competition, without undermining Afrikaner farmers in the protectorate, whose cattle were generally heavier. African cattle accounted for 90 per cent of Bechuanaland's exports and more than half were initially blocked.[28] In 1933 the Union imposed a more serious, near-total blockade of Bechuanaland exports of every kind. *All* cattle, grains, dairy products, hides and karosses, handicrafts and fruit were barred on the pretext of a quarantine against foot-and-mouth disease.[29] This was a major and deliberate contributing factor in the surge in labour migration that occurred in the 1930s (see Figure 8).

As the British High Commissioner in South Africa was continually urging the 'resident' commissioner at Mafeking to pursue higher levels of labour export, the commissioner reacted with pleasure when development of a new pneumonia vaccine led to the lifting of South Africa's ban on recruiting north of 22°.[30] The Chamber of Mines, however, wanted to open up the north for recruits in transit from Northern Rhodesia and Angola, as much as for Bechuanaland recruits, while the resident commissioner argued for intensified recruiting in



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 8 Botswana: estimated population working abroad

the south. The Chamber of Mines won, of course, and Wenela constructed a major new road in the north, from Kazangula to Francistown.[31] As soon as the ban was lifted the South African government quietly lifted its ban on Bechuanaland beef.

The protectorate's officers were soon falling over themselves to help Wenela, proving themselves more zealous recruiters than even Wenela itself. When Africans were slow to respond to the new 'opportunities' the resident commissioner became concerned – worried that Wenela might give up. District officials were also alarmed, calling for Wenela to advertise and offer pay advances, as the NRC did, and badgering the chiefs to help.[32] Magistrates were instructed to apply more pressure on the population and one subsequently reported back:

> At each of the places visited I selected all able-bodied men and had them lined up and examined by the Medical Officer for general fitness. I made it very clear that they were not being coerced into going to the mines or anything else but if they failed to do something towards paying their Hut Tax they would have to take the consequences. . . . I am embarking upon prosecutions on a large scale and I feel that the result will be extremely satisfactory. The quota for recruitment north of 22° has already been completed and I have agreed with [Wenela] that it would be possible to send [more] forward.[33]

This, then, was surely what *goromente* meant to Africans under its rule in Bechuanaland. For many it must have meant little else.

Wenela was widely considered to be doing Bechuanaland a great service. Once the road was built, Wenela's lorries became the only public transport and by 1952 Wenela had built the Francistown airfield for transporting foreign recruits. A major new recruiting office was also set up in the extreme north-west corner of Bechuanaland, to attract recruits from Angola and South West Africa.[34] By 1960 Wenela had built and was maintaining 1920 kilometres of roads, twelve bridges and causeways, and six transmitter stations, providing the only telecommunications in some remote areas.[35]

The most senior officers of the administration at Mafeking were quite impressed with all this and continued to treat internal employment and development with virtual contempt. When the Tati Company complained that its supply of labourers was dwindling and asked to recruit in Southern Rhodesia, the assistant resident commissioner replied that it should raise its wages and hire internally instead. Alien labourers were a waste, he said, of 'no use' as they 'seldom pay tax'.[36]

By 1930 the best estimate is that the number away working had risen to about 10 000. The 1930s, however, would witness a tremendous jump in labour migration to outside destinations. By 1938 over 21 000 would be absent, mostly men working in South Africa, but also 3000 women working as domestic servants in Southern Rhodesia. Altogether the number of migrants working abroad had risen to about 9 per cent of the population (see Figure 8).

MODERATE REGULATION

In the 1930s the British government and the Mafeking administration began to face the social disintegration caused by their zealous propulsion of labourers to jobs outside the protectorate, especially when the 1930s brought a major surge in migration. Pressure for reform originated in Britain but the Bechuanaland administrators also began to conceive of their interests in labour policy as being distinct from those of other parties, particularly from those of Pretoria. Migrants' conditions were increasingly regulated, for instance, and certain kinds of recruiting were even disallowed. However there was simply not enough employment within the protectorate for there

to be much disagreement that the migrants should continue working in South Africa.

Apart from the installation of a large recruiting infrastructure, economic development in the protectorate was virtually at a standstill by the end of the Depression. The Tuli Block's European farmers were succeeding at intensive crop production and animal husbandry, and Tati mining was still employing a few hundred, but development throughout most of the protectorate was just not taking off.

The lifting of the ban and the penetration of recruiters throughout the protectorate caused a huge increase in labour migration to South Africa in the 1930s. This contributed to a growing British interest in the effect of the exodus, and the commissioning of a series of investigations and reports.

In 1993 an official report condemned the effects of emigration and underdevelopment.[37] Magistrates throughout the protectorate reacted with great indignation, insisting that massive labour migration 'did not affect tribal discipline, birth or mortality rates, welfare and development, or family life'.[38] Chiefs, however, agreed with the findings and one pointed out that birth rates had fallen; that family ties and traditional morality were declining; that abandoned women were migrating to the towns; that rural agricultural development was being seriously retarded; and that 'as a rule [migrants] come back poor and worn-out'.[39]

In 1934 the ILO recommended some modest changes, such as no longer charging recruits for their transport to work, but the resident commissioner was concerned that there might be a cut in the number of recruits.[40] His administration, however, did slowly begin to conform more to the British policy of at least improving the regulation of labour migration abroad. In 1937, for instance, recruitment in Botswana was prohibited for all foreign farm jobs as their conditions were particularly cruel. This was done partly to satisfy Bechuanaland's white farmers and partly because it was hoped that the former farm workers would instead be channelled into better jobs. Senior officers had never been that enthusiastic about farm labour as it earned them few taxes.[41]

In 1939 another report, commissioned from Mafeking, charged that labour migration was undermining the cattle industry by diverting people from raising stock.[42] This was widely agreed to be true, but

even European employers – the traditional defenders of internal labour supply – urged caution in reducing labour emigration as long as the migrants' taxes represented one quarter to one third of protectorate revenue.[43]

The resident commissioner went on to introduce new recruiting laws, which restricted employment to South Africa's proclaimed labour districts, with their protective legislation.[44] Compulsory deferment was the main migration issue, favoured by chiefs and employers but opposed by recruiters. Migrants, however, had so little idea that the savings system actually *was* 'voluntary' that the proportion of migrants whose pay was subject to deferment had already reached 99 per cent. Among those on the 'Assisted Voluntary System' – the forwarding system for channelling independent migrants – pay deferral was used by 60–70 per cent.[45]

In response to continuing complaints about the negative effects of massive labour emigration, a respected scholar named Issac Schapera, who had already written on the subject, was commissioned to conduct further research. His evidence was even more damning than that in previous work, indicating that men were deserting their families, agricultural and community ties were declining, and that various diseases were spreading. His recommendations included shorter contracts, compulsory repatriation, tax relief for the poor and more development at home.[46] Another proclamation followed, allowing limits on the number of recruits from any district or reserve and prohibiting chiefs from involvement in recruiting.[47] Medical examinations and free transport to work also became mandatory, and the maximum contract length was temporarily shortened.[48]

These actions, however, were piecemeal responses to a powerful problem. The Second World War demonstrated that the British government in London had still not fully grasped the effect of emigration on African agriculture. When the war began, work in the South African gold mines was pronounced an essential service.[49] The NRC then agreed to restrict recruiting to facilitate army enlistment. By 1943, 10 000 of Bechuanaland's men were away in the army – a net increase of about 6000 in the total working outside the protectorate.[50] Despite the increase, however, London also wanted the High Commission Territories to increase agricultural production to supply a surplus to Britain. A 'war lands' policy was therefore introduced to encourage African agriculture, but it was woefully inadequate to overcome decades of apathy with regard to development.[51]

In 1942 the resident commissioner estimated that of the 60 000

taxpayers in the protectorate, 30–35 000 were working in South Africa at any one time.[52] This was much higher than the 20 700 estimated for the following year in Schapera's more thorough study, but if the resident commissioner had meant to include those 'helping out' in Europe's war, then the total working outside Botswana was indeed about 31 000, or 9.4 per cent of the population.[53] It is interesting that the official data from Mafeking were beginning to err on the high side. Indeed, continuing the trend from before the war, the mood in Mafeking was definitely changing. The new resident commissioner was now openly *opposed* to migration to South Africa:

> We are fortunate in having ample living room and, with the proper development of our own agriculture and industrial resources, I believe we can keep our young men happy and contented in their own country.[54]

'Proper' development of agriculture and industry, however, would remain lacking. Despite the softening of Bechuanaland's official policy, there was no budget for investment in internal development and thus only minor changes in labour-export policy could be made. Wenela continued to recruit north of 22°, from where independent migrants were still illegal in South Africa, and the NRC continued to recruit in the south.[55]

It was becoming clear, at least, that the interests of Mafeking officers in exporting labourers were noticeably different from those of the Pretoria government and South African employers in importing it, and rather different from Britain's as well. For instance, when the chief secretary of Nyasaland suggested that the High Commission Territory administrations join with those of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to bargain jointly with Wenela, the high commissioner hurriedly quashed the idea. This was the first motion for a labour-supplier cartel in Southern Africa, potentially a powerful bloc, and Britain was not in favour.[56] In another example of diverging interests, the South African police asked that Bechuanaland migrants who 'deserted' their jobs be extradited back to South Africa, but the Bechuanaland administration offered only to prosecute within the protectorate.[57] The NRC was still quite impatient with this, and even asked that those who were caught and imprisoned be sent back to their jobs upon release.[58]

The administrations of Southern Rhodesia and South-West Africa also found that their counterparts in Mafeking began negotiating

more firmly in the 1940s. Permission for the RNLSC to recruit directly was finally granted, but it was not allowed into the coveted Ngamiland until 1955. As it turned out, it had difficulty hiring there and never signed on more than 1000 per year.[59]

Passes for those heading off to work for South-West Africa's white farmers were approved once again in 1949, and extended to all South-West African employment in 1954.[60] There were railway and telephone projects that needed labourers and a large Luderitz crayfish factory alone requested nearly a thousand. With a real labour shortage on its hands, the South-West African administration asked that Bechuanaland Africans be free to cross the border at any point. The resident commissioner, however, insisted on controlled entry at agreed border posts and suggested that the South-West African administration set up a recruiting agency inside the protectorate.[61]

The 1950s were the decade of emigration's greatest increase, the number rising by over 20 000 to more than 50 000, or 10 per cent of the population, by 1961. This was the highest proportion of the population ever to have been away from Botswana (see Figure 8). Longer-term labour surpluses then began to appear in the mid-1950s, with Transvaal farmers actually ceasing to complain. In 1957 Pretoria banned the entry of independent migrants from the territories. Women were hit hardest by this as almost all of their jobs were uncontracted, but the border was not well patrolled and clandestine crossing continued. Pretoria had merely 'illegalized' a part of its labour force.

Despite all the fuss in the 1930s and 1940s about migration's socio-economic impact, very little of importance was done. A few modest improvements were made in the regulation of migration, but they were nothing compared with the control – or at least influence – exercised in other territories. Moreover the belated dreams of internal colonial development and employment were faint and fleeting. While throughout most of the region the 1950s brought major new investments and development plans, in Bechuanaland they brought only modest expansion in the facilities for beef production, and half-hearted attempts at rural extension work. The protectorate's colonial rulers ran it as a labour reserve right to the end.

INDEPENDENCE: GROWTH AND THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN JOBS

In contrast with the gloomy colonial years, after independence Botswana's diamond-fuelled economy executed a dazzling escape from

reliance on South African employment. Over just 25 years, jobs in South Africa dropped from more than three quarters of employment for Botswana citizens to only a tenth. The new government became emboldened and when Malawi declared a labour-supplier's boycott – improving the bargaining position of all labour-supplying states – more aggressive efforts were made to take advantage of the situation by increasing government revenues.

When Botswana attained political independence in 1966, with universal adult suffrage and majority rule, it was one of the poorest, most dependent countries in the world. Much development had to start from scratch, symbolized by the construction of a new capital city, this time *inside* the country. Over half the state's annual budget of US$22 million in 1966–67 came from British grants to the Botswana government, and there was considerable British pressure not to enlarge the deficit by allowing relations with South Africa to deteriorate.[62] The new government's first statements and documents did stress the urgency of reducing dependence on South Africa, but a later policy document considered that the continuation of labour migration was 'inevitable' since growth in employment at home would be slow.[63]

The chiefs and their network under the colonial state had formed a new political party in the early 1960s, joined by educated supporters such as teachers and civil servants. This party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), won the first elections and kept on winning, contested by a weak but legal opposition. A new trade-union movement began gaining strength as internal employment grew, posing a mild urban-worker's challenge to the BDP.[64]

About 55 000 Batswana were thought to be working in South Africa in the year that independence took effect, equal to 9.8 per cent of the population (see Figure 8), while inside Botswana there were at best 20 000 wage-employed. This compared rather badly with Swaziland, for instance, where internal employment had exceeded jobs in South Africa by 1963–64. Of those working away from Botswana, 23 000 were in the mines and a smaller number on farms. The remainder were employed in a great assortment of occupations in manufacturing and services.

As recruitment, transport and law all favoured male migration, women tended to be a higher proportion of migrants in areas near the South African border – as high as 32 per cent in some areas.[65]

Miners with the Chamber of Mines peaked at 35 000 during a drought in 1970, and at 38 000 during the Malawian boycott of 1974–76.[66] From the late 1970s the number of independent migrants fell quite dramatically and Chamber of Mines jobs began to dwindle as well, down to only 17 000 by 1990. By this time, however, internal employment had soared past the 200 000 mark.[67] Remarkably, migrants in South Africa had dropped from three quarters of employed Batswana to only one tenth in the space of 25 years – the fastest such conversion on the African continent.

Until 1961 each of the High Commission Territories had remained vulnerable to incorporation into the Union of South Africa – a concept entrenched in the South Africa constitution since 1910. After South Africa's secession from the Commonwealth, however, the British Government acknowledged that the three territories should become independent states. In 1963 Botswana posted a labour representative to South Africa to renew passports and so on. As in so many Southern African countries, this labour representative became the first diplomatic representative of the now independent state.[68]

Pretoria wasted no time in demonstrating its power over the Gaborone government, proceeding quickly to build a three-metre-high security fence along much of their common border. Only South African trucks, and not Botswana's, were allowed to bring goods into South Africa, while telephone cables connecting Botswana to the outside world through South Africa were subject to 'breakages'. Beef, Botswana's largest export, was transported via South Africa's refrigerated railway cars, which could be easily withheld. Pretoria officials seemed to expect Botswana's complete colonial dependence to continue, and angrily disputed Gaborone's declaration of a few kilometres of common border with Zambia.[69]

Botswana's economy took off fast, with the Gaborone government's budget already balanced by 1972–73.[70] New diamond, copper–nickel, and coal mines expanded rapidly, and thanks to good rainfall as well – and a better deal in South Africa's customs union – all expectations for growth and revenue were exceeded. Real GDP per capita rose 670 per cent between independence and 1981–82, with mining's share growing from 2 per cent to 37 per cent and agriculture's declining from 42 per cent to 9 per cent.[71]

After production began at Orapa – the largest diamondiferous kimberlite pipe in the world – the Botswana government began to receive 52 per cent of the gross profits and later won an increase to 65–70 per cent. The cattle industry boomed as well, as the arid

climate supported little competition for the ranchers and their government-assisted quest for land. In consequence greatly increased production capacity was concentrated into fewer and fewer hands.[72]

Jobs trebled to 60 000 between 1964 and 1975, boosting the formally employed proportion of the population from 4 per cent to 9 per cent.[73] A new 'wages policy' or 'incomes policy' was introduced to try to prevent an increase in the rural/urban wage gap and encourage investment. Botswana mines, for instance, were allowed to pay Batswana far less than those of South Africa.[74]

With all this fast growth, then, the economic importance of labour migrants working in South Africa declined considerably for the national economy as a whole. However the jobs were actually of increasing importance to a select group of poorer rural households. The declining number working in South African mines contributed a shrinking share of gross national income, foreign exchange and total employment, on the one hand, but pay hikes during the 1970s actually boosted the share of total rural income brought in by migrant workers on the other. An average worker's deferments and remittances rose from 16 per cent of per capita rural gross national domestic (household) income to 46 per cent.[75]

The ruling BDP's popularity continued to be overwhelming. There were several opposition parties, but none could hope to be a serious contender for power, winning a few seats in parliament at best. The one potential base for a more viable political opposition were the workers. In an historic strike at the Selibi-Phikwe mine, for instance, workers refused a hearing to Vice President Masire (the future president), and rocked his car menacingly during his rather hasty retreat.[76] The BDP, however, was keeping the trade-union movement firmly under its thumb. A very conservative trade-union centre was set up in the 1970s with the BDP's blessing, and when the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions was finally formed in 1977 it was saddled with a constitution of docility drawn up and imposed by the government.[77]

There was little difference at this particular point between the labour-export policies of the three former High Commission Territories. In 1973 Botswana signed a labour-export treaty that was nearly identical to those signed by the Lesotho and Swaziland governments in 1973 and 1975.[78] An addendum set forth terms of cooperation on passport control and border-crossing movements. Both sides would cooperate in regularizing migration through a system of approved recruiting and documentation.[79] Little, as usual, was accomplished in

the new deal to improve the worker's lot, and the Minister of Health, Labour and Home affairs told parliament that any application of pressure in this regard would only reduce demand for Batswana.[80]

The Post-Boycott Period

The action taken by Malawi in 1974 to withdraw its workers from South Africa stimulated changes in Botswana's position. President Khama was heard to be considering demanding major pay increases for Batswana by late in the year, presumably by threatening to pull out the Batswana miners as well. However the high wage increases granted to miners in South Africa over the next few years soon made the demand irrelevant.[81]

In fact the Botswana government suffered a *weakening* of its bargaining position in the long term because of the boycott. The country's main importance to the South African Chamber of Mines, especially with regard to northern Botswana, had been as a transport route for recruits from other countries – mainly for the Malawians who had been withdrawn. Before the boycott over 80 000 Malawian men per year had been passing through Francistown to the South African mines, compared with just 2040 recruits a year hired in northern Botswana itself.[82] The boycott made the main Botswanan operations of the Wenela Air Service uneconomical and the service was reduced.[83] The recruiting station at Shakawe, too, in the extreme north-west of the country, had been established back in the 1930s to recruit Namibians and Angolans, but by the mid-1970s Angolans were instead being recruited inside Namibia's Caprivi strip.[84]

For a while, therefore, it seemed as if Gaborone was reluctant to risk the drop in recruiting that could result from tougher bargaining. When the OAU passed a resolution in 1975 that all countries should withdraw their workers from South Africa, Gaborone successfully introduced an amendment that this would only apply once more jobs had been provided at home.[85] Then, in 1976, the Gaborone government found its courage and boldly increased the attestation fee from R1 to R40 per recruit. Botswana's supply of miners that year was up to an all-time high of 40 000 due to the Malawian pull-out and subsequent wage increases, which had attracted more Batswana. In reply to the increase, Wenela and other recruiters suspended recruiting and Wenela threatened to close some of its now marginal northern offices. Gaborone had in fact waited too long – for

the Chamber of Mines' boycott-induced labour shortage was passing – and so a compromise of R10 was quickly reached.[86]

Following this incident the Botswana government remained at least a little more resistant to pressure from Wenela than before. In one incident in 1976, for example, the Botswana government sent trucks into South Africa to pick up hundreds of Batswana streaming home to escape the violence at their mine.[87] The following year, too, Gaborone refused to recognize the forthcoming 'independence' of Bophuthatswana, the official South African 'homeland' for Setswana-speakers.[88] More migrant miners were recruited in Bophuthatswana in the first month of 1977 than in the whole of 1976 – resulting in restrictions on recruitment in several countries, including Botswana. No novices were accepted from Botswana for 10 months, the first time that Chamber of Mines labour recruitment had been restricted since independence, and this restriction was subsequently reimposed several times.[89]

Northern Botswanan recruits were becoming unpopular because of their high recruiting cost, R118 compared with only R5 in the rest of Botswana, and the costly air transport had been replaced by trucks.[90] When Wenela and the NRC were replaced by an integrated 'TEBA' (The Employment Bureau of Africa), they began to dismantle the recruitment infrastructure in Botswana, closing remote offices and cancelling all transportation for recruits. Northern Botswana, supplying less than 1 per cent of South African mine labourers under surplus conditions, had become an expendable source.[91] Only those with valid re-engagement certificates were being taken, and only if they made their own way to recruiting centres in the big towns up to a thousand kilometres away. Recruitment's emphasis shifted to the more populated south east, precisely the part of the country with the most employment already, while recruitment in the north fell to only 12 per cent of the previous year's level.[92] The Botswana Department of Labour only managed to negotiate a special arrangement with TEBA to at least give some preference to the isolated Kavango area in the north west.[93]

The independent government in Gaborone was generally after as much revenue as possible from emigration, largely ignoring the potential for improvements in migrants' conditions and therefore behaving much as the colonial administration had. The government therefore decided to collect the full local government tax due on miners' South African wages. Miners still had only Botswana Pula 6.00 in taxes deducted from their wages, but the law required that

they pay full income tax of P84 if their income was P1000 or more per year – the tax category to which the majority of miners belonged. The uncollected taxes represented approximately P2m.

TEBA simply refused to collect the taxes, being wary since its disastrous involvement in the introduction of Lesotho's compulsory deferral system. Gaborone then informed miners that they should make arrangements for the payment of their own tax in monthly instalments. When only a single miner had paid up after two months, meetings were organized at the mines to discuss the matter. The officials were chased back into their car as soon as they arrived and were then rocked back and forth inside the vehicle to the point of overturning. The incident must have seemed alarmingly similar to the treatment that President Masire had once received at the Selibe-Phikwe mine. By the end of the year the government was reduced to saving face – making an 'exception' for the miners in South Africa because they were 'unemployed'.[94]

The actual number of migrants was falling rapidly. Having reached an estimated peak of about 70 000 in 1976 – thanks to the Malawian boycott and resultant surge in mine recruiting – both mine and non-mine jobs had thereafter sharply fallen. By 1981 the estimated number of migrants working in South Africa was down to 42 000, just 4.2 per cent of the population compared with 8.9 per cent only five years before.[95] The proportion continued to decline more gradually throughout the 1980s (see Figure 8).

While the Gaborone government had at least begun to bargain harder with Wenela since 1974, it had gained little for its efforts and its overall bargaining position had even eroded further as South African mines internalized more and more of their labour supply. Gaborone had then unhappily attempted the direct extraction of further revenue from the miners themselves – only to be stung by an unexpectedly militant group. The lesson that miners were a force to be reckoned with would hang over labour-export policy thereafter.

THE 1980S

The 1980s were a decade of return to fundamental passivity regarding labour outflows. Botswana's improved bargaining position of the 1970s had been quickly washed away and the recruiting offices began to close. However the economic growth that was relieving the

country's reliance on migrants' income was continuing to exacerbate conversely many poorer households' reliance on their migrants' earnings. As the migrants were a politicized and self-assertive group, the government decided to slow the shrinking of their job opportunities by making virtually any concession the South African recruiters requested.

With soaring GDP and tremendous infrastructural development, the ruling BDP continued to enjoy enormous popularity – even among the rural poor who were the most marginalized from the growth. Services to the remotest villages improved steadily, with most initiatives attributable directly to the BDP. The party continued to win large majorities in elections every five years, and other parties – along with the potential for a workers' opposition – were easily held in check. The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions, for instance, was still burdened with a constitution that specified that the federation's key positions be held by people with full-time jobs, usually within the civil service. Indeed, with such a small population of around one million people, many careers in Botswana had only one path – the civil service – making the personal price of activism particularly high.

While the BDP government was pragmatic in its dealings with its white-ruled neighbour, it was nevertheless generally careful to show a certain disdain. Regarding labour migration, however, there was an uncharacteristic lack of restraint in the 1980s. Officials in Gaborone became so shy of confrontation on the issue that they even considered boycotting a meeting of officials of the region's labour-supplying countries because of its anti-labour export agenda.[96]

There was a delicate balance between not threatening migrants' jobs on the one hand, and not being perceived as completely cowering from Pretoria on the other. Public rhetoric, therefore, was quite important, with the Minister of Home Affairs declaring that 20 000 Batswana working in South African mines was 'not something the Government of Botswana is proud of'.[97] The Minister of Labour went so far as to state that Botswana must pursue the complete elimination of labour migration to South Africa by 1985, citing the existence of labour 'shortages' on Tuli Block farms while thousands still went off to work for farmers in the Transvaal.[98]

But while the government sounded as if it intended to wind down emigration, officials were actually busy seeing to it that it was

entrenched. Diplomatic notes were quietly exchanged with Pretoria to guarantee the maintenance of recruiting facilities, and the Labour Department made plans to build a large – and permanent – new labour office in South Africa, with an expanded staff.[99] In response to Gaborone's cooperative attitude, the Chamber of Mines offered a guarantee in 1980 that it would reserve approximately 20 000 mine jobs for Batswana until at least the end of 1984.[100]

Complaints continued from employers within Botswana, who were seeking a reduction of the number of workers away. Batswana farmers requested a special ban on the migration of women to South Africa as women were still their lowest-paid labourers, just as in colonial times.[101] Women farmworkers had already been hit hardest by South African legislation excluding independent migrants, and the ratio of Batswana women to men on South African farms was thought to have fallen from 4:1 to 1:4 from 1977–81.[102]

The farmers, in fact, sounded more like a group of planters in turn-of-the-century Nyasaland than farmers in an independent country. In the Barolong area they complained bitterly that their experienced labourers were migrating to South Africa and called on the government to force their labour to stay.[103] In response the government decided that South African farmers wishing to recruit in Botswana should pay P100 for a recruiting licence and P5–10 per recruit, with some further stipulations regarding minimum pay and conditions.[104]

Botswana government policy now distinguished between mining and non-mining employment in South Africa. *Farm* jobs in South Africa could be sacrificed in order to satisfy Botswana farm employers, but everything possible was still being done to please the Chamber of Mines. TEBA went on to further rationalize its operations, however, closing its northern offices just as it had threatened when bargaining over fees. The Maun, Shakwe and Rundu recruiting stations were shut down in 1981 and notice was given that the Kavango station would close in 1984. The Chamber of Mines at least gave its assurance that stable demand for about 20 000 Batswana would continue, and when the Botswana President appealed the decision to close the offices, TEBA compromised and kept the Francistown office open.[105]

The new Botswana Employment Act of 1981 imposed virtually no constraints on TEBA's activities, going as far as Lesotho had done in giving the employer the right to terminate the contract unilaterally – but not the worker.[106] The Act permitted the longest terms of engagement of any supplier country – a total of two years and nine

months – and was worded so as not to interfere with TEBA's unilateral withdrawal of internal transport for recruits.[107] The Botswana government's overriding concern was to 'prevent precipitous changes in levels from occurring.[108] It was not, apparently, forgetting the nightmare scenario of 20 000 angry ex-miners suddenly arriving back home.

Economic prospects for the country as a whole continued to be very rosy in the 1980s, although the rapid growth was characterized by underindustrialization and increasingly stratified distribution of the benefits of growth.[109] The minerals sector still supplied a reliable two thirds of exports, and thus one third of GDP and one third of government revenue.[110] Employment growth, led by the construction sector, was a very impressive 15 per cent from 1987 to 1988, with total employment up to 168 500.[111]

However, despite this growing internal employment the 17 431 Batswana mine employees in 1989 were still supporting at least 90 000 people, some of the poorest among Botswana's 1.27m population.[112] Plenty of these were people who would have to eat less if they had no miner in their household. In contrast, three quarters of Botswana's non-miners working in South Africa had only one or no dependents, and the same proportion had returned home with no savings at all.[113] Miners, then, were key, and they were hanging onto their relatively high-paying jobs – even at the price of perpetual absenteeism during their working lives.[114]

Deferred pay from miners in South Africa was no longer very important to the Botswana government, which had massive foreign-exchange reserves. The rate of subscription to the deferred pay system was unusually high, apparently because it was *still* unclear to workers that it had become voluntary again back in 1964. Workers were subjected to considerable pressure if they attempted to exercise their right to opt out. When TEBA Cash – TEBA's alternative savings system – was introduced in 1987, the Chamber of Mines accused Gaborone of paternalism on the issue and asked that miners be encouraged to choose freely between TEBA and Botswana funds. The Botswana Labour Department reacted very negatively and wanted to respond by making deferment compulsory again. But the Botswana cabinet refused, and conceded to TEBA's request.[115]

The cabinet was aware of a continuing erosion in its bargaining position concerning the migrants. The Chamber of Mines' labour surplus had grown to the point where it could even afford to stop hiring Batswana altogether should it so wish. The AIDS issue was believed to have accounted for the final breakdown in negotiations

on labour supply between TEBA and the government of Malawi, and at a semi-secret meeting between permanent secretaries of the SALC labour-supplying countries and representatives of the Chamber of Mines, the president of the Chamber of Mines had quietly hinted that the same thing could happen to Botswana – privately informing the Botswana Permanent Secretary of Labour that the incidence of the HIV virus among Botswana's TEBA recruits had overtaken that of Malawi's.[116] This only served to demonstrate, however, that AIDS was just one factor in the breakdown with Malawi – and apparently not the major factor since no similar break-off occurred with Botswana.

From an estimated 42 000 Batswana migrants in South Africa in 1981, the number fell to 32 000 by 1986 and an estimated 25 000 by 1990. This amounted to only 1.9 per cent of the population compared with 4.2 per cent at the start of the decade (see Figure 8). Mine employment of Batswana was down to 17 000 by 1989, the lowest level since independence. While Botswana was in an excellent overall economic position to let the South African jobs continue to dwindle, 170 000 wage-employed was still too low a figure for a population of 1.27m, and new entrants to the labour force still outnumbered new jobs. Many Batswana still needed a Chamber of Mines job.

Quite apart from the migrants' needs, the governing party also had a clear interest of its own in maintaining migrant systems – both inside the country and out. Having governed since independence, the party still had very patriarchical foundations, while support for the opposition party was strongest among members of the emergent working class. Migration helps to preserve a patriarchal rural society, inhibiting the urbanization that may one day transform Botswana's staid political scene. Of migrants who returned to Botswana in 1984–85, 23 per cent were unemployed compared with a male average of 14.7 per cent for the 35 plus age group, to which almost all returnees belong.[117] Ex-migrants are judged to be more politicized than average and are known to be largely opposition supporters, keeping the Gaborone government understandably averse to any increase in their number – especially if they are going to be unemployed.[118]

The question of the re-employment of ex-miners and other migrants upon their return to Botswana became a focus of policy research and dialogue in the 1980s, particularly after a threat by Pretoria to repatriate migrants under international economic sanctions. Official policy, however, was not to single out returned migrants for special programmes, as employment creation should be for all.[119]

A week of riots in the capital in 1987 ended the age of innocence. Though sparked by accusations of witchcraft and child abduction, there were strong political overtones to the unrest, including a link between the accused 'witch' and the president's wife. Crowds of thousands gathered day after day, accusing the police of a cover-up and demanding a response from the state. Scenes of police charging and tear-gassing made it clear once and for all that the BDP's potential political Achilles' heel was in the growing ranks of urban workers.

Since 1989 there has been no change in the Botswanan government's stance on migration. At that time only five TEBA recruiting offices remained, all in the south, and a further reduction was foreseeable. When a TEBA delegation arrived in Gaborone to seek further cuts in costs, including the waiving of the P10 per worker recruiting fee that the Botswana government had attempted to raise to R40 in 1976, the government was again prepared to compromise.[120]

Cooperation, however, still fell short of signing a new labour-supply treaty. Alone among the four remaining major labour-exporters of the Southern Africa Labour Conference, Gaborone refused to negotiate a new bilateral labour agreement along the lines of a model agreement settled on by the conference. Pretoria had asked for an exchange of diplomatic representation through 'trade missions' – a facility designed to save governments from the embarrassment of having full diplomatic ties with South Africa's white-minority regime. Malawi set up such a diplomatic mission in the 1960s and the demand for one was at least tentatively agreed to by Lesotho in 1989. The Botswana government decided to refuse even to discuss any new bilateral agreement, specifically in order to avoid formal diplomatic ties.[121]

By 1990 the estimated number of migrants in South Africa was down to 25 000, or under 2 per cent of the population, lower than at any time since the First World War. The government's objective remained the preservation of jobs, largely regardless of revenue or ideology, while in principle maintaining an anti-apartheid stance.

CONCLUSION

Throughout Botswana's colonial history, Britain and its local bureaucracy almost entirely disregarded internal development and the demands of internal employers, being preoccupied with overseeing the labour-export system that financed the protectorate's costs. The

subjugation of the protectorate to outside interests in its labour-supply was so blatant as to call into question its having its own administration. Bechuanaland was just a labour reserve and its separate territorial administration only a temporary convenience.

When the administration did develop a potentially significant orientation to internal interests on labour export, in the 1940s, it was not in a financial position to implement its ideas for development. There remained little internal demand for labour, and thus the interests of the Bechuanaland administration regarding labour issues did not diverge far from those of South Africa and Britain. The colonial administration's labour policy became distinct mainly on the *terms* of migration, disallowing certain kinds of labour emigration, for instance, where the benefits were thought to be too small.

It is interesting that the coming of relief from the Botswana government's economic dependence on foreign jobs did not bring an end to its passivity regarding what were considered 'undesirable' migrant flows. No Southern African country had a better record of economic growth than independent Botswana, but the dependence of the rural poor, and thus a particularly political vulnerability to the loss of South African jobs, proved harder to escape. There was a temporary weakening of South Africa's bargaining position in the 1970s, due to the Malawian boycott, and this did stimulate the Botswana government to press temporarily for greater financial benefits. However this was only a fleeting exception in a history of exceptional compliance to South African labour demands.

Notes and References

1. See Parsons, 1977; Sillery, 1974, pp. 76–81; and Taylor, 1981, p. 58.
2. Particularly in the Batlokwa, Bamalete and Tati reserves.
3. Sillery, 1974, p. 128; Mudzinganyama, 1983, pp. 53–5; Schapera, 1943, tables vii and xii. Land was alienated from the Lobatse, Tuli, Tati and Ghanzi areas severely reducing the size of the Batlokwa, Bamalete and Tati reserves, from where migration rates were consequently higher. The relationship between population density and migration rates is obscured by the proximity to South Africa and main transport and communication routes of the more densely populated areas.
4. Peoples such as the San, who became subordinate to the Batswana, were forced into the Kgalagadi itself (Nangati, 1980, pp. 125–33).
5. Schapera, 1947, p. 7.
6. Taylor, 1981, p. 60.

7. Cuzen, 1985, p. 6.
8. London subsidized expenditure in the protectorate 45 years out of the 81 they kept it. Massey, 1980a.
9. Hermans, 1974, pp. 90–6; Leepile, 1981, p. 33. The tax remained for 20 years, and was then supplemented by a native tax of first 3, and then 5s in the pound, which was mostly paid to Tribal treasuries (Hermans, 1974, pp. 90–6).
10. Taylor, 1979, p. 100.
11. Proclamation No. 6. A proclamation in 1907 required recruiters to submit details of work and wages, forbade the inducement of Africans to leave their present employment, and forbade labour contracts with chiefs or headmen. Passes were introduced for every African leaving the protectorate two years later (Proclamations No. 45 of 1907 and No. 7 of 1909. See Schapera, 1947, p. 28).
12. Leepile, 1981, p. 33.
13. Mushariwa, 1987, p. 10.
14. See Figure 8 and Appendix 2.
15. Massey, 1981, pp. 12–13.
16. Massey, 1981, p. 12.
17. Schapera, 1947, pp. 29, 76, 79.
18. Schapera, 1947, p. 29.
19. Wylie, 1982, p. 43.
20. Izzard, 1982, p. 295.
21. Schapera, 1947, p. 29.
22. BNA S.2/9 Tati Company General Manager to Resident Commissioner, 26 June 1923, fi. 12; minutes of an enquiry held at Francistown, 17 July 1923.
23. BNA S.92/9, Acting Resident Magistrate, Francistown to Resident Commissioner, 3 July 1923.
24. BNA S.92/10, Chief Ramokale Tselawa to Haskins & Sons.
25. Schapera, 1947, p. 29. Northern Labour Association (NLO) in South-West Africa also asked for a permit to recruit miners from the Tawana reserve. They planned to build a road into the area and the administration was favourably impressed at the prospects of greater revenue and a free road. Only the opposition of the chief delayed matters until the slump of the mines in 1930, whereafter the NLO lost interest (Taylor, 1979, pp. 101–2).
26. Schapera, 1947, p. 94.
27. A magistrate writing in the next decade made it clear: 'When applicants for passes to proceed outside the territory in search of employment are questioned why they wish to go, the reply practically invariably given is "in order to obtain money to pay my taxes".' (BNA S.436/12, Acting Additional Resident Magistrate, Mochudi, to Govt. Sec., 1 July 1935, fi. 1).
28. Massey, 1981, p. 81. Exports to the Congo, Angola, the Rhodesias and overseas sales eventually made up the loss but prices had been forced down.
29. Hubbard, 1983, pp. 143, 174–5. Altogether, it is difficult to judge just how much the economy of the protectorate was affected by the

restriction. Exports were stimulated by the price drop, and the increase in Rand gold production after the depression stimulated demand for Bechuanaland cattle, the import of which was not really controlled. (Hubbard, 1983) It is certain that poorer herders suffered the most, their only real alternative being labour migration, which did increase quite a lot (See Ettinger, 1972, pp. 21–4).

30. BNA S.344/3, Gemmill to Rey 21 Aug. 1933, fi. 3.
31. BNA S.344/3, telegram, Resident Commissioner, Bechuanaland, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 27 Oct. 1933, fi. 16. The Resident Commissioner considered the two matters related.
32. BNA S.344/3, Resident Magistrate, Serowe, to Goodman, 28 Feb. 1934, fi. 44A.
33. BNA S.344/3, Magistrate, Serowe, to Assistant Resident Commissioner, 3 Apr. 1934, fi. 57.
34. Taylor, 1986, p. 22.
35. *Mining Survey*, 'Eight African Countries Benefit from Operations of Native Labour Organizations', Dec. 1952, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 22–4.
36. BNA S.344/4, Assistant Resident Commissioner to Resident Magistrate, Francistown, 22 May 1934.
37. *The Pim Report*, Great Britain, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1933; Schapera, 1933–4.
38. BNA S.436/12, Reports of Magistrates: that is, Acting Additional Resident Magistrate, Mochudi, to Govt. Sec., 1 July 1935; Serowe Resident Magistrate to Govt. Sec. 5 July 1935.
39. BNA S.436/12, Seboko Mokgosi, chief of the Bamalete, 28 June 1935, fi. 6a.
40. However in 1937 they did recommend that wages take account of the cost of transport, apparently because Britain was anxious to be in a position to ratify the ILO's Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention. The WNLA and the NRC began to pay the rail fare *to* the mines for recruits, and for those who worked at least nine months under the Assisted Voluntary System – a plan assisting migrants who preferred to make their own way to South Africa (Cuzen, 1985, p. 72).
41. Wylie, 1982, p. 439.
42. Massey, 1981, p. 115.
43. Leepile, 1981: 34; Taylor, 1979, pp. 107–8.
44. BNA S.114/7/1, circular for Govt. Sec. 9 Dec. 1937, fi. 37.
45. BNA S.177/8/1, NRC to Govt. Sec. Bechuanaland, 19 Dec. 1938, fi. 64c, and subsequent submissions by chiefs; WNLA manager to Govt. Sec., 3 Jan. 1939; WNLA circular of 11 Aug. 1936, fi. 58b; Govt. Sec. to District Commissioner, Kasane, 29 Apr. 1937, fi. 14; notes on Resident Commissioner's conference, Pretoria, 31 Dec. 1947, fi. 210. Pay and rations had to be at a certain level if an employer was to be exempted from paying for repatriation, and the recruiter had to demonstrate that workers *would* return, which the administration felt could only be guaranteed by pay deferment.
46. Schapera, 1947, pp. 200–21.
47. Native Labour Proclamation No. 56 of 1941, copy in BNA S.114/7/2;

explanatory memo attached to Draft, consolidating Proclamation in ~/1, fi. 92.

48. BNA S.114/7/2, WNLA to Govt. Sec., Bechuanaland, 4 Feb. 1942; minutes, fi. 268. The WNLA's reaction was to declare that it was not subject to the new law because it did not 'recruit': 'natives . . . spontaneously offer their services at WNLA offices'. But when NRC tried the same thing, they were forced to conform.
49. BNA S.93/6, various correspondence.
50. Schapera, 1947, pp. 31–8; Sillery,1974, p. 144.
51. Leepile, 1981, p. 37.
52. BNA S.464/1, Resident Commissioner, Bechuanaland, to Govt. Sec., 5 Dec. 1942, fi. 5. Draft memo of Resident Commissioner's Office 14 Apr. 1943, fi. 43, fi. 81, 89.
53. See Figure 8 and Appendix 2.
54. BNA S.387/5, letter to Govt. Sec., 5 Dec. 1942.
55. SNA SEC 835, Priestman to Native Affairs, 8 July 1948, fp. 105.
56. BNA S.464/1, High Commissioner to Barton, 14 July 1949.
57. BNA S.387/6, Minute of Resident Commissioner to Govt. Sec., p. 6.
58. BNA S.387/6, Resident Commissioner to all District commissioners, 11 Jan. 1943, fi. 11.
59. Clarke, 1974, pp. 35–49.
60. BNA S.387/8, District Commissioner, Ghanzi, Bechuanaland, to Native Commissioner, Gobobis, South-West Africa, 15 June 1949.
61. BNA S.387/8, 23 Aug. 1957, fi. 18.
62. Hermans, 1973, pp. 203–4.
63. Botswana, 1966; Botswana, 1972, p. 2.
64. Sekgoma, 1979, pp. 50–51.
65. Braz, 1979, p. 30.
66. Taylor, 1981, pp. 67, 84, 92.
67. Total absentees were estimated at only 22 000 in 1990, although this was probably an underestimate. The 17 000 employed for the Chamber of Mines is a projected annual average quoted to the author during an interview with Mr Mookodi, TEBA's Botswana manager, at Kgale Siding, 4 Sept. 1989; Botswana, 1987, p. 1(2.4).
68. Hermans, 1973, pp. 203–4.
69. Hermans, 1973, pp. 198–206.
70. Hermans, 1974, p. 89.
71. Mhozya, 1984, pp. 2–3.
72. See Hubbard, 1983.
73. Colclough and McCarthy, 1980, pp. 149–55.
74. Chihana, 1986a, pp. 36–41.
75. Chihana, 1986b, pp. 21–41.
76. *Africa Currents*, no. 4, 1975/76; Massey, 1980b, pp. 13–14.
77. Sekgoma, 1979, pp. 51–3.
78. Whiteside and Patel, 1985, pp. 43–51.
79. Whiteside and Patel, 1985, pp. 25–8.
80. *Botswana Daily News*, 17 Mar. 1971.
81. *Africa Confidential*, 22 Nov. 1974, p. 7.
82. Massey, 1980a, p. 98.

83. Air Service was confined to the northern Botswana service where recruitment was temporarily increased due to the shortage caused by Malawi's withdrawal (Cuzen, 1985, p. 79).
84. Air transport from Shakawe was stopped in 1978, and the office closed in 1984 (Taylor, 1986, p. 22).
85. Massey, 1980b, p. 10.
86. Massey, 1980b.
87. *Botswana Daily News*, 19 Nov. 1976.
88. *Botswana Daily News*, 21 Nov. 1977. Setswana is the mother-tongue of 92 per cent of Batswana.
89. Massey, 1980b, p. 13.
90. Cuzen, 1985, p. 88.
91. Massey, 1980b, p. 14.
92. Taylor, 1986. Comparison for the first quarters of 1977 and 1978. Massey, 1980b, p. 1314.
93. Cuzen, 1985, p. 88.
94. Interview with Acting Labour Commissioner Lebang, Gaborone, 6 Sept. 1989. Up until 1981 Botswana maintained a representative of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands at the Botswana labour representative's office at Roodeport to collect the P6 tax. When the representative was recalled for misappropriation of funds in 1981, it provoked talks with Pretoria that pointed out that Botswana had no legal authority to collect tax in South Africa, under either country's laws, and the post and collection of the tax was subsequently withdrawn. South Africa's taxes remained applicable but almost all miners, incomes were below a taxable income.
95. See Figure 8 and Appendix 2.
96. UN/ECA/MULPOC, 1978; cited in Massey, 1980b, pp. 12–13.
97. *Botswana Daily News*, 26 June 1979; 28 Feb. 1980.
98. *Botswana Daily News*, 28 Feb. 1980.
99. *Botswana Daily News*, 5 Mar. 1980.
100. Field, 1982, p. 777.
101. Wylie, 1982, p. 48.
102. Izzard, 1982, p. 305.
103. Wylie, 1982, pp. 401, 403.
104. Almost all South African farmers agreed to pay on a monthly basis, to stop advancing workers' pay, and to provide food and housing, work-free public holidays, medical treatment and repatriation.
105. Interview with Acting Labour Commissioner Lebang, Gaborone, 6 Sept. 1989; *Botswana Daily News*, 14 Aug. 1984.
106. Signed 30 Nov. 1982; Article 50(1).
107. Article 51. Article 69(f).
108. Botswana, CSO, 1982, p. 76.
109. The Bank of Botswana found that Botswana's Gini coefficient had risen to a very high 73 in 1986, leaving 70 per cent of rural households with only 17 per cent of total rural income (Botswana, Bank of, 1987).
110. Ghai, 1987, p. 6.
111. Botswana, CSO, 1987.

112. Average rural household size was 5.3. Botswana, CSO, 1989, vol. 14, no. 1 (March).
113. University of Botswana, National Institute of Research, 1987, pp. 29–34.
114. A survey for the 12 months ending 30 April found that of 60 659 resident Batswana citizens who reported having worked in South Africa at one time, only 3421 had last returned to Botswana within the last 12 months (Botswana, CSO, 1985a, p. 94). Pretoria informed Gaborone in 1987 that there were 90 000 Batswana in South Africa who could be repatriated, but this was undoubtedly a gross exaggeration intended to intimidate the Botswana government, possibly by including many permanent emigrants of Batswana origin, or perhaps even including those with South African passports. Interview with Acting Labour Commissioner Lebang, Gaborone, 6 Sept. 1989 (Letsatsi, 1984).
115. Interview with Lebang, Acting Labour Commissioner, Botswana, 6 Sept. 1989. It is not clear yet whether deferment has fallen as a result.
116. Interview with B.C. Gondwe, economic affairs officer, UN-ECA, Lusaka, 17 Oct. 1989.
117. Cownie and Osafo-Gimah, 1988, pp. 15–16.
118. Skills learned in the mines and in most other jobs abroad are mostly inapplicable in Botswana, but the training with new machinery of an ex-migrant with some machine skills is more efficient than the training of a novice. In an ironic twist, a request from Botswana's Association of Botswana Building and Engineering Contractors for permission to *import* semi-skilled construction trades workers such as bricklayers was granted in 1989, one firm asking for an initial 500. Only 20 per cent of the imported workers can be simply hired, however, the remaining 80 per cent being required to work with local trainee counterparts on the job (*African Business*, March 1989, no. 127; interview with Lebang; Majetlantle and Mhoza, 1987, p. 38).
119. Interview with Lebang.
120. Interview with Lebang; interview with Mookodi.
121. Interviews with Lebang, Mookodi.

10 Conclusion: The Struggle to Control Labour Export in Southern Africa

The previous chapters have told eight somewhat different stories, covering approximately a century, thus it has been necessary to include a good deal of information specific to a particular country or era. An attempt has been made to give as complete an account as possible of the eight governments' policies on labour export, along with an overview of the volume of migration from each.

This chapter seeks both to compare experiences and evaluate more generic tendencies. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the present names of countries will be used as much as possible. Material explored in the previous chapters will be referred to without citing sources again.

SETTING THE SCENE

Africans originally migrated throughout the continent in a complex, swirling pattern. Europeans invaded, displacing Africans in a series of advances and taking control of enough of their land to end the former patterns of movement. Initial European investments were made on a small scale in plantations and farms.

The first major wave of African migrants under capitalism went to work on the plantations, on terms evolving from slavery to waged labour. Outright legal enslavement was brought to an end through the legal apparatus of colonizing and colonial states, and was followed by the rise of forced labour – usually conducted by state officials. Forced labour soon gave way to 'migrant labour', which became the most important form of labour for Europeans in Africa during the transition to capitalism.

At the chronological starting point of this work – the late nineteenth century – we can picture a Southern Africa with various colonial

outposts in the process of installation. The states and colonies of future South Africa were relatively well formed, but the remainder of the subcontinent was only at the very beginning of the process of modern state formation. Interterritorial border lines were being formally agreed to among the colonial powers just when labour migrants' movements among the territories were picking up.[1] The new administrators set up shop in a convenient location inside their territories (or outside in the case of colonial Botswana), and applied themselves to the task of extending their authority.

Of course these colonialists were hardly given the job of creating a system of politically independent states. While they had a clear idea of the geographical limits to their authority, and of their duty to facilitate the expansion and enrichment of their metropolitan power, it was hardly clear in many cases exactly *what* they would be doing. The major impetus for their installation had been competition with other metropolitan powers for the acquisition of territory, presumably to realize surplus value. This required occupation by force and the creation of a capacity to effect change.

Further capital investment on the subcontinent was extremely nodal, concentrated on prime plantation land, mineral deposits and clusters of white-run farms, and drawing in labourers from wide areas. As population, resources, rates of white settlement and investment varied among the new units, differential economic development accelerated, with concurrently differential labour demand and supply reflected in varied wage rates. Industrial development would follow and would result in even more highly concentrated employment of waged labourers, especially in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

Just as the legal apparatuses of colonial states played an important role in the ending of slavery, they also sped the transition from relatively small-scale forced labour to larger-scale migrant labour. From the turn of the century the British Colonial Office sought to ensure that recruiting was privatized so that local administrations would play only a regulatory role, thereby eliminating the direct linkages between state and labour recruiting that normally caused forced-labour systems to evolve.[2] Similarly, chiefs' direct involvement – although at first very useful to the British – was progressively discouraged as chiefs more and more became appendages of the colonial state or the colony's government.

The forms of the new European administrations varied from the outset. British Africa was ruled as a combination of territories, protectorates and colonies. Protectorates were a more formally declared

possession than a territory, while a colony's white settlers were given limited internal self-rule. Zambia and Zimbabwe were soon placed under the administration of a company, which was at first interested in mineral deposits and only later in agriculture and settlement. Malawi's first administrators arrived to supervise a dense African population, but only a few hundred white families running plantations. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were placed under the authority of the British High Commission in Cape Town, and were essentially given caretaker administrations, although some substantial settlement would take place in Swaziland. In Tanzania, Germany was fairly aggressively promoting plantation production and gold mining. In Mozambique, Portugal had chartered out much of the land to companies, giving them full administrative power, and was slowly establishing European settlements and agriculture on the rest.

While overseeing the emerging capitalist economies and their territorial affairs was doubtless a busy task, the job was modest compared with the complex administrations of a few decades later, and both were simple compared with the role of modern states. Within all the territorial administrations, the original officers were at first mere extensions of the mother state – with no more local allegiance than modern ambassadors have to their hosts. This was particularly apparent with respect to Britain, which had possession of six of the eight countries examined here.

What then were the processes by which the interests of the administrators – the colonial states' unwelcome 'ambassadors' to Africa – diverged from the objectives of their home governments and from each other? How was the process propelled along to the point where the governments of the new 'countries' were sending their own ambassadors to neighbouring 'capital cities'? The lines on the minds and maps of the new administrators were infamously at odds with the ethnic and geographical patterns of Africa. How and why were those lines eventually manifested in today's important borders, delineating what became the primary units of control over people's movements and rights?

LABOUR EXPORT AND EMERGING STATES

In the Introduction I suggested that there has been a simple progression in the autonomy of administrations cum states with regard to labour export. Underlying the gradual development of control over

labour export in Southern Africa was an evolution in the primary labour export orientation of those administering emerging governments, through three main stages.

The first orientation was allegiance to the labour needs of the home state, or in the case of company rule, to the company. The original colonialists were there to further the interests of the colonial government and economy. In the case of British possessions, this often meant supplying as much labour as needed to neighbouring British investments. Portugal, too, was interested in selling labour to British investments. In Tanzania, however, the German administration wanted to retain as many labourers as possible, as there was sufficient internal investment to exploit them.

The second stage involved primary orientation of the administration to internal capital's interests in the making of labour export policy. In general, an attempt was made to contain labourers within a given territory, or at least better to contain labourers of certain statuses for specific groups of employers. The timing of this stage varied as much as the rate of development, thus in some territories there was so little internal employment that the administration remained oriented to outside labour demand until after political independence. By that time there was a labour 'surplus', at least from the employer's viewpoint, thus the stage of 'internal capital orientation' was effectively skipped.

The third stage of labour-export-policy orientation arrived with a region-wide surplus of labourers at given wages and conditions, the long-term result of a process of stimulating and marshalling a supply of wage labourers. For many countries labour surplus had arrived in the late 1950s, just preceding the coming of their political independence in the 1960s. This was the point at which labour export began to decline region-wide as a proportion of population (see Figure 12). Soon, only South Africa, with its large and booming economy and apartheid government, would continue to require hundreds of thousands of foreign workers. Surplus conditions in the labour market freed administrations of the responsibility for allocating labourers among competing employers – internal or external – thus allowing the formulation of policy in a manner more oriented to the particular interests of those running governments. Such concerns were usually dominated by the maximization of revenue and foreign exchange brought in as a result of migrants' employment abroad. Wherever government revenues and foreign-exchange balances were not critically dependent on labour export, policy making frequently became dominated by a government's perceived political interests.

Let me return to the central proposition – that the evolution of the power to control labour flows among the jurisdictions of different territorial administrations was of major importance in the formation of a Southern African regional state system. In the Introduction I referred to the process of 'state formation', meaning not only the creation of an apparatus within a dominant power bloc, but also the global process defining a grid of states. I quoted the following definition of the elements of that process:

- continuity of the political order must be established within the unit;
- discontinuity must be established with the environment in which the unit is found;
- and rules must be established for the control of boundary crossing.[3]

With these elements in mind, I would like to go over the role of the development of sending-administration policy on interterritorial labour migration.

Early economic differentials among territories were exacerbated by differential rates of economic development and accumulation facilitated by interterritorial labour migration. Indeed the growth of the differences was facilitated by the territorial boundaries themselves, and the importance of the new political units grew and grew. Land confiscation, taxes and discrimination were used in various combinations by the new administrations to undermine African autonomy and to force the population to work for Europeans. This was usually intended to provide a greater *internal* supply of willing labourers, though in the cases of Botswana and Lesotho, in particular, the provocation of labour export was quite intentional. Whatever colonial intentions, the new wage labourers invariably responded to growing differentials in opportunities among territories, crossing borders wherever they thought it worthwhile. Further pressure was steadily applied to force the African population to perform waged labour, but the differences between rates of employment and pay among territories made cross-border movements more and more attractive.

There were two important and interrelated reasons for the development of administrators' desire for control over emigration. The first was the wish to 'contain' labour for internal employers, keeping enough African labourers inside a territory to avoid any increase in wages. The second was the aim of the state administration to extract revenue directly from workers, both at home and from those who

worked abroad. These two ambitions were strongly articulated by the use of taxation to stimulate the supply of African wage labourers. But there was also a very fundamental contradiction between these two aims, at least for administrations whose employers offered wages that were lower than in neighbouring territories. On the one hand increased taxation of Africans was desirable for revenue, and to force more workers onto the migrant labour market. But on the other hand early administrative control of border-crossing labour migration was inadequate to prevent labour migrants from leaving. Pressure within the territorial 'container' could not exceed its strength, thus increased control was intrinsic to increased wage-labour supply in all but the fastest-developing areas. 'Containment' therefore became one of the driving quests of administrators.

Of course it was neither necessary nor easy to simply prevent all workers from leaving. What was needed was a degree of influence over their movements. The capacity to govern was constantly expanded throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras in order to further control over labour, as well as in indirect consequence of the desire for labour control – often very specifically the desire to control interterritorial labour migrants.

Indeed there was a virtual 'symbiosis' between administrative capacity and labour migration as all eight administrations were so heavily dependent on taxing the African population. It is very doubtful whether European employers could have attracted the labour supply they needed without the application of taxes and other state measures. And it is equally doubtful whether European administrations could have survived – and rapidly expanded – without their revenue from African wages. As economic differentials and thus wage differentials grew, migrants increasingly tended to cross the new borders. This necessitated further expansion of the administrative capacity for control, accomplished particularly through the coordination of the taxation apparatus with other growing functions, such as the issue of passes. Soon there were camps, transport laws, identity documents, market discrimination to pare down Africans' options, contract law drawn up especially for African workers, recruiting regulations and a great flock of officials doing the stamping, attesting and – most of all – collecting.

Many laws were promulgated, largely in the context of migrant-labour management. For many years labour departments performed the functions of immigration/emigration departments for Africans. Districts were at times known as labour districts and the first or

second official at the district level was very often a labour official. In fact labour control largely *was* early government. Botswana's colonial *goromente*, in particular, appears to have done little else. Mozambique's administrative centre in the south of Portuguese East Africa had become a giant labour export camp by the turn of the century and remained that way for decades. In such places labour matters and African taxation were the core of administrative work.

Interterritorial borders grew in importance, mainly because of the will to control the flow of labourers across them, and only to a smaller extent to control the movement of other migrants, goods or capital. The patrolling of boundaries and the requirement of travel documents to cross them were introduced and strengthened almost entirely in order to marshall labour movements.

Africans found that their status vis-à-vis European administrators increasingly varied across the borders. The physical control of these boundaries, however, was rarely more than partially effective when attempted by one administration alone. Other administrative measures were far more important in the 'containment' process. Taxes, permission to enter or move, seek work, reside, bring dependents, change jobs or be recruited for a foreign job varied more and more with what was becoming the new 'national' status.

One of the complexities in the evolving pattern of interterritorial labour migration was simultaneous labour outflow and inflow in the same territory, an interterritorial 'ripple effect' among labour markets. While Africans were emigrating from one territory to better-paying work, those from other territories with even poorer opportunities were migrating *in* to work at the lower-paying jobs. This ripple effect created even subtler labour statuses – allowing three or four nationalities of labour to be ranked in a hierarchy of mobility. Labour exporting administrations often maintained the layered market by restricting the migration of their foreign labour force to third territories.

In Zimbabwe, negotiations became a particularly delicate game of maximizing the net labour inflow, an interesting parallel to modern foreign-exchange accounting. In Tanzania there was also a net labour inflow and a policy of keeping it that way. Swaziland, too, experienced inflows from Mozambique alongside outflows to South Africa, but was left with a 'deficit'. Still, without Mozambican labourers Swaziland's economic development would have been slowed considerably. A particularly bizarre case is that of Zambian labour export to Zaire's Katanga in the early 1920s, where there was once a sudden change in exchange rates in favour of Zambia that caused an abrupt reversal in the direction of net labour flows.

These processes were accompanied by a staged increase in the new countries' political independence with regard to labour control. Their administrations' labour policies sooner or later progressed from a dominant orientation toward the home country's labour needs to a primary emphasis on labour for internal development. In the case of Zimbabwe this was perhaps as early as 1899, when the British South Africa Company actually *became* the administration. To their dismay, the company's board of directors in London soon found an early state system growing within their African domain – when their subadministration in today's Zambia increasingly pursued its own interests in the control of labour export. Mozambique was divided into different administrative zones, with different policies of labour export corresponding to each one's development policy and level of internal labour demand. The Swaziland administration turned to the needs of its growing white-settler population and its investments, and restricted labour export quite effectively for a while in the 1950s. In Lesotho and Botswana, on the other hand, there was such a lack of internal development – steadily exacerbated by emigration to seek employment – that the administrations remained fixated on labour export right up until independence. In Lesotho, in fact, it is doubtful whether even today labour-export policy has become oriented to the needs of internal development.

Altogether there are two points here. Firstly, it is important to recognize how intertwined were the processes of state emergence and labour supply. There was no single aspect of colonial rule in Africa that was more responsible for the creation of an administrative capacity to govern than the quest for control of the movements of the African labour supply.

Secondly, the administrations established by the colonial state to further their interests first began to relate to each other as having different sometimes very antagonistic interests, mainly over the issue of labour flows. The squabbling was often too much for the distant government in London to handle, and a degree of autonomy on labour export was therefore one of the first powers – indeed, overall, *the* first power – awarded to many administrations in the realm of 'external affairs'. The Malawi administration was given the power to restrict, ban and negotiate foreign recruiting as early as 1909, at a time when it had no comparable 'foreign policy' responsibility and still relatively little authority over many internal affairs. The administration of Zambia developed a strong interest in protecting its internal labour supply, as did that of Swaziland to a lesser extent. The Botswanan and Lesotho administrations, though very weak, still developed distinct

interests in the control of their labour export. Many of these administrations spent years at the labour bargaining table before they were given the power to negotiate any other comparable 'international' agreements. Only the Portuguese retained direct control of labour export until the end of their rule, and even they consulted their Lourenço Marques administration more and more.

Controlling or 'containing' African labourers, then, was an important factor in the establishment of continuity and a capacity to govern within the emerging states, as well as in the development of discontinuity among them.

INTERTERRITORIAL COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND CONTROL

The last element of the state-formation definition given above is that rules must be established for the control of boundary crossing. Of course, this refers to both geographical and more abstract frontiers of authority.

Freund has noted that the partition of Africa was a peaceful process because it was in the mutual interest of colonial states to see an efficient power take control of neighbouring territories and exert authority over their populations.[4] This mutual interest in cooperation soon went a good deal further, for a group of territories in an economic region tend quickly to become more than a collection of parts. Flows of people, goods and capital become the lifeblood of what is actually a 'system' – in that it functions beyond the sum of its components. Among Southern Africa's emerging governments there was a great deal of prolonged bargaining and bickering over flows of African labour, with an enormous amount of energy expended on the matter by relatively small administrations. Rules were painstakingly established for boundary crossing – not only for the crossing of physical borders but also for definitions and interrelationships among the respective authorities that they delimited.

It was soon apparent that effective control of movements across an interterritorial border required cooperation between the administrations on either side. Clandestine migrants all too easily exploited differences among migrant administration systems, nimbly avoiding taxes, repatriation, or capture and prosecution. Frequently the majority of interterritorial migrants were 'illegal', and while their home administration may have been trying to impede or control their exit, once across the border they were out of reach.

The potential for greater control through mutual systems was the impetus for negotiations between both colonial states and the administrations of their individual possessions. Rather than struggling to control the crossing of the actual frontier, labour-sending administrations could harmonize their legal apparatuses to achieve common goals. Control was greatly improved, for instance, if recruiters were not known to be waiting just across the border to hire clandestine migrants. Still better was an agreement by a neighbouring administration to request to see a migrant's authorization from the sending administration – his 'pass' – before allowing him (or sometimes her) to participate in legal migration systems within the employing territory. Often it was in the interests of a sending administration to merely formalize the informal – adapting the legal framework around an existing flow so as to 'capture it' and be better able to channel the migrants thereafter. One of the best examples is Zambia's experience with the Tripartite Agreement of 1937.

Labour importing administrations, for their part, bargained for guaranteed or preferential access to 'reserves' of willing labourers. Importing employers were willing to pay sending administrations handsomely for the preferential right to recruit.

This cooperation was the essence of numerous labour treaties between different state governments, as well as long series of formal arrangements between different territories under the same colonial state. Bilateral, trilateral and even quadrilateral labour-supply agreements were struck, with sending governments extending their control in exchange for guaranteeing supply. Every government in the region signed bilateral labour export agreements, usually before the First World War or even before the turn of the century.

Multilateral systems were particularly effective. Several labour export agreements included three administrations. Southern Rhodesia, for instance, was a signatory to the original *Modus Vivendi* between Portugal and the Transvaal in 1901. There were several multilateral agreements between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and in 1936 a type of quadrilateral deal was made when the three administrations signed a 'Transvaal Agreement' with the South African Chamber of Mines. For a while, in the 1980s, there was even talk at the Southern African Labour Commission of an eight or nine-party agreement (see Appendix 1).

Physical control, though much more difficult, was also substantially improved through cooperation. In many cases border stations were actually established under bilateral labour-supply arrangements. The Ressano Garcia border crossing from Southern Mozambique to South

Africa is the most famous. In 1924 the South African government also opened a border post on its Swaziland border specifically for the entry of Mozambicans passing through Swaziland. In 1966 the South African government ratified an agreement with Mozambique on passport-control posts – again specifically to control the movements of labourers. Border-control improvements were a clause in the Rhodesia/South Africa 'arrangement' on migrant labour the same year, as South Africa began clamping down on illegal migrants. In another example, in 1957 the South-West Africa administration asked that migrants from Botswana be permitted to cross the border freely in order to solve South-West Africa's 'labour shortage'. However the Botswana resident commissioner insisted on controlled entry at agreed border posts and suggested that the South-West African administration instead set up a recruiting agency inside Botswana.

Labour departments were actually migrant labour departments. In Malawi in 1936, a colonial official recommended the creation of a new labour department specifically in order to have a greater capacity to negotiate with other territories on such issues as passes, pay deferral and taxes. The stated aim of the department was to derive more revenue from the outflows. In Zambia the administration also set up a labour department in 1939 in response to a request from the British Colonial Office, and this new department took a much more active role in labour-exchange management than had the previously responsible Department of Native Affairs. In fact all eight countries examined here sooner or later established large departments whose chief responsibility was migrant labour. In some cases, however, the new department resulted more from the growth in administrative work *other* than marshalling migration – as migrant labour control was a task that had previously dominated the entire administration. Even in 1989 district labour officers remained important figures in Malawi because of their control over dwindling recruiting for South Africa.

Diplomatic representation, too, was born of labour affairs. Most possessions in the region sent their first government representative to a neighbouring territory specifically as a 'labour representative'. The Portuguese installed a curator for labour in the Transvaal under the 1909 convention and maintained such curators in both Salisbury and Johannesburg for decades, during which time they were the Mozambican administration's only posted envoys. Malawi's first diplomatic representatives were also labour representatives, sent to those two cities in 1937 and 1939. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland later set up shared representation through the Rand Agency in Johannesburg.

This was also their first external representation. Stamping passes and collecting taxes, these men were the forerunners of modern diplomatic consuls, whose offices today stamp passports instead.

In the post-independence era diplomatic representation was a major labour-treaty bargaining goal of the white-minority government in South Africa. Rhodesia demanded full diplomatic recognition from South Africa in exchange for curtailing its illegal migrants in 1970, and Mozambique made the same demand of Swaziland before it would consider supplying Swazi plantations with labour in 1975. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland all posted their own 'labour representatives' in Johannesburg after independence, but refused to establish full diplomatic representation to the apartheid regime.

The arrival of unemployment was a monumental turning point in migration affairs. Demand and supply relations over international migrant labourers shifted dramatically with the coming of widespread labour surpluses, beginning in the mid-1950s. Greater supply shifted the balance of negotiating power in favour of the employing state. However this was substantially offset by the continuing improvement of sending-state control. For both sides, labour surpluses freed governments to design policy more in view of their own particular objectives.

New national governments came to power with markedly different ideological and developmental orientations from their colonial predecessors, emphasizing self-reliance and more rapid internal development that would create more employment at home. For the most part this disposed the new governments against outside employment. The newly independent governments of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe all banned recruiting for foreign employment right after their respective independences. In the case of Tanzania the post-independence ban appears to have been very largely ideological in purpose, but in Zambia and Zimbabwe there was also concern to keep real wages down for certain sectors. The leaders of governments that ended labour export in this way had to weather substantial political opposition to the policy from those who were hardest hit.

Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique pursued a more cautious approach as they were much more highly dependent on foreign jobs. While they would have liked to end labour migration to South Africa, they were still too economically dependent on it to do so. In Malawi, despite a great deal of antimigration rhetoric leading up to independence, labour migration abroad was quite intentionally expanded afterward. These remaining exporters of migrants, however,

were not completely economically dependent on cross-border employment. This was illustrated by the case of Botswana, where extraordinary economic growth following independence did little to change labour export policy. While a country as a whole may grow out of a once severe economic dependence on labour migration, it is much more difficult for that country's poor to do so.

Following the initial post-independence stoppages, then, other supplier countries' governments continued tacitly to encourage labour emigration, even if still participating in annual meetings of the Southern African Labour Conference, with its radical agenda for ending labour export (see Appendix 1). In these countries, historical labour-export systems, agreements and representatives continued much as before.

The combination of changes in governments' policy orientations, however, dramatically politicized international labour movements. Labour-supplying countries were unanimous that labour export should stop in the long term, and that the apartheid South African economy in particular should be prevented from continuing the practice. The pursuit of socialist transformation by several newly independent governments alarmed the remaining white-minority regimes, especially that in dominant South Africa, which saw itself as the bulwark of capitalism, and these regimes undertook violent campaigns of regional subordination. Mozambique became the victim of the withdrawal of foreign employment used as an unusual geopolitical weapon. The South African government has increasingly sought to use employment dependency to pressure other governments, at times even at the expense of its own key mining industry's labour supply.

This international politicization of labour-supply relations has tended to emphasize the *internal* politics of labour export as well. The government of Lesotho has been dependent for its limited domestic political support on its ability to secure continuation of labour supply to South Africa. Domestic politics, labour export and foreign relations are virtually synonymous there. There are, indeed, inherent advantages for *all* governments in separating the country of *de facto* residence and employment from the country of *de jure* political participation, and some sending governments are quite happy to inhibit the growth of the urban working class, which replaces labour migration.

Geopolitical conflict, then, was always an important determinant of labour flows among the possessions of colonizing states and became a dominant factor among new African states. In the most dramatic variant, states have snapped labour-exchange bans on each

other in a climate of open hostility. This was the case as early as the Portuguese High Commissioner's abrogation of the Transvaal Agreement in 1922. Then there were the Zambian and Tanzanian bans on labour migration to South Africa in the 1960s. Of course Malawi's sudden boycott of South African jobs in 1974 is the most famous, and there was also South Africa's subsequent 1986 ban on workers from Mozambique.

Where there is international conflict, there is also alliance. Many thousands of Mozambicans were employed in the GDR during the 1980s on what began as a programme of development assistance. Their wages became an important source of foreign exchange and revenue for Mozambique, with 18 000 workers there by mid-1989, but upon the reunification of Germany their contracts were abruptly terminated.

These modern forces promoting both conflict and cooperation among labour-trading governments are the direct descendants of the historical divergence and coalescence of interest among administrations driven to the bargaining table to seek mutual control. Today, however, that control has been much more firmly established. Granted, there are still considerable illegal flows of labour migrants across many borders, notably from Mozambique to the South African homelands, but the majority of international workers in Southern Africa has been brought more fully under the influence of the legal apparatuses of states. South Africa is the last major destination to remain open to labour migration. At the other extreme, in Lesotho, it remains difficult to imagine when its people will not depend on foreign jobs.

COMPARATIVE LABOUR EXPORT

The story of the growth of the modern state system in Southern Africa is the story of differential economic development. A large gap has developed between living standards for the majorities in different countries and labour flows among them have been a major aspect of that pattern of development. It can hardly be argued that such flows have had in any sense an 'equilibrating' effect on the distribution of income, for they began with – and were quite essential to – the processes that created the inequalities.

Based on data presented in Appendix 2, the labour performed by migrants working temporarily in another country totalled about 48 million worker years by 1990. Mozambique was the biggest sender of

labour, accounting for over 17 million worker years spent in other countries. Malawi was second, with over 11 million worker years, followed closely by tiny Lesotho, which alone contributed about nine million worker years. Zambians must have provided over three million, and Zimbabweans a little under three million. Tanzania's large population provided over two million such years in other countries, and the much smaller Botswana a little under two million. Tiny Swaziland's workers also managed to spend about one million worker years in South Africa.


However the real impact on economies is more appropriately measured relative to their populations and over time. This has been estimated in Appendix 2 and presented in the figures in each of the individual chapters. The data are the best estimates available of the number of migrants working outside than country – excluding normal emigrants – as a proportion of their *de jure* population.

By this measure, the highest level of labour export by far was that experienced by Lesotho. The percentage of the population working outside Lesotho soared particularly early, reaching 6 per cent as early as 1844 and remaining above that level until the present (discounting a brief plunge during the Boer War). At its historic peak in 1970, Lesotho migrants working away amounted to 20 per cent of the then roughly one million population (see Figure 11).

Mozambique, the region's greatest supplier of migrant labour, never experienced such high levels of migration from the country as a whole, as migrant-labour was disproportionately concentrated in three southern provinces. While in the south the level was at times nearly as high as Lesotho's, for the country as a whole the levels were closest to those experienced by Malawi (see Figure 10).

Botswana's levels of worker migration to South Africa were the second highest in the region, peaking at about 10 per cent of the population in 1961. Tanzania's were the lowest – never even 1 per cent of the population – and they started late and ended early. Zimbabwe's estimated level was also comparatively low, peaking at just 2.5 per cent of the population in 1937–38 (see Figure 9). Both Zambia and Malawi had a peak at about the same time – a historic high point of 5.4 per cent for Zambia and a higher 7.5 per cent for Malawi. Malawi's highest point was later, at an estimated 8.3 per cent in 1972.

One of the major questions in the examination of this data is: to what extent were the differences and changes due to economic forces and to what extent to state and administrative policies? A reference




Sum of Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana. Base data in Appendix 2. Population share held constant 1900–11; ind'l. pop. points estimated logarithmically 1911–88; pop. shares held constant 1988–90.

Figure 9 Southern Africa – seven countries: population working abroad, 1900–90

point for this discussion is the overall average of the proportion of population working away from these countries. The estimated average from 1900 to 1990 is presented in Figure 9. Tanzania has been excluded as its relatively large population and low labour export make it only arguably one of the major migrant-sending countries, thus the average presented is for seven countries.

Overall, among the seven main labour exporters of Southern Africa the proportion of migrants working outside their home country has been remarkably consistent in its rise and fall (see Figure 9). The level was already 2 per cent by 1900, the earliest point for which average migration can be reasonably estimated. This had climbed to 3 per cent by 1913, to 4 per cent by 1933 and to a historic peak of 5 per cent 1955. Were this level to be equalled in the world today, we would have more than a quarter of a billion migrant workers temporarily employed in other countries.

Average worker migration to in Southern Africa declined much more rapidly than it rose. It took 55 years to increase from an average of 2 per cent in 1990 to an average of 5 per cent in 1955, but had fallen to 2 per cent again by 1978, after only 23 years. This was accelerated by a sudden drop in the late 1970s due to the internalization policy of the South African Chamber of Mines, which was by then the dominant employer of foreign labour. Levels had fallen off



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 10 Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi: estimated population working abroad

to 1 per cent by 1986, and to only an estimated 0.4 per cent of population by 1990.

The trend line for the seven countries depicts a fundamental process. Up until the peak in 1955, increasing differentials among countries in terms of wages and the economic pressure exerted on Africans caused increasing labour emigration. The point when the rate of labour exchange began to fall was not occasioned by a decline in these pressures and differences, however, but rather by the advent of unemployment. Surplus labourers for hire made intercountry transfers less advantageous to employers and governments. This in itself is a demonstration of the impact of policy on migrant labour flows, as intercountry wage and income differentials did not decline sufficiently to account for the drop. Instead the policy instruments of importing and exporting governments proved quite effective in discouraging the flows.


Under labour 'surplus' of course, exclusion was more important than retention. Zimbabwe's progressive exclusion of foreign workers from the 1950s, and South Africa's from the 1960s and 1970s, were important milestones in the region's labour export history. However the policy of labour exporting governments has also been important. At the most general level, the policy of administrations was inseparable from the forces that provoked the initial flows. Though a few migrants set off before the pressure of colonial states was brought to bear, it was mainly the taxes and oppression of administrations that

pushed migrants away to work in larger numbers. This was true in all eight countries. Differences in the policies of states and their administrations were fundamental to differential rates of labour export. Very aggressive labour export by Botswana and Lesotho resulted in the highest proportions of population working outside, while the deliberate labour-retention of the Germans and then the British in Tanzania was an integral part of a development strategy which allowed the great majority of Tanzanians to stay inside the country to farm or work (see Figures 10–12).

The labour-retention policy implemented by the Swaziland administrators while encouraging economic growth there in the 1950s was a major factor in the permanent divergence of Swaziland's labour export levels from those of Botswana and Lesotho, which continued to grow much more rapidly. Swaziland was remarkable for its stable levels, maintaining a labour export level of between 4 and 6 per cent of the population for about 70 years. More notably, there was a considerable reduction in the proportion of the Malawi and Zambian populations migrating outside following the signing of the Tripartite Agreement with Southern Rhodesia in 1937.


The most dramatic example of a labour exporter's policy, of course, remains that of Malawi. President Banda's aggressive labour export after independence caused Malawi's labour export levels to soar beyond those of the 1930s, when they had still been closely in line with those of Zambia (see Figures 11 and 12). Then, in 1974, the Malawian president's boycott of South African employment achieved the sharpest fall in levels of foreign employment ever experienced in the region. The estimated number of migrants working outside Malawi plunged from over 8 per cent of the population in 1973 to under 2 per cent by 1980.

The impact of political independence on labour export levels is also a remarkable indication of the level of control that migrant-sending and foreign-migrant-employing governments achieved. Mozambique's independence was followed by a steep drop that can be blamed on both South African aggression and – to a lesser extent – Mozambican confusion. The Tanzanian and Zambian governments both put their already low levels of labour emigration to an end in 1961 and 1965 respectively, and the government of Tanzania went on to make it illegal for a Tanzanian to seek work in South Africa. Reliable data is unavailable for the period since independence, but the proportion of the population working abroad subsequently dropped to very low levels in both countries. Zimbabwe's independence in



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 11 Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe: estimated percent of population working abroad



Note: Estimates do not include emigrants. Based on *de jure* population estimates.

Figure 12 Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania: estimated population working abroad

1980 was also followed by a decision to end recruitment for South African mines.

I am not proposing here that government policy was the primary determinant of labour migration abroad. Labour export was a fundamentally economic process, as is especially apparent in Figure 9. Early major bumps in the levels – for instance the lull in the 1920s and then the climb in the 1930s – were primarily a function of labour supply and demand. However governments' policies were intrinsic to

the provocation, facilitation or inhibition of labour export. Administrations began by directly serving the interests of metropolitan accumulation. They then developed increasingly internal capital orientations that caused their interterritorial labour-exchange policies to diverge considerably from one another. There is an overall pattern of divergence in labour export levels that accompanies the divergence of development policies and rates of economic development. The very close parallels in labour export levels that we see between Swaziland and Zambia in the 1930s (see Figure 11) are not repeated until the steep declines that began in the mid-1970s. This period of roughly forty years was the period in which labour export policy was most important in influencing migration flows among countries.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION THEORY

Let me reiterate my second proposition in the Introduction: that the importance of the policies of labour exporting administrations cum governments in Southern African international labour flows has been seriously downplayed. The reason for this, as discussed, is that most research was understandably conducted in the context of discussions of apartheid. The work was necessarily 'South Africa-centric'. Important work was done on the political economy of migrant-sending administrations from the viewpoint of cause – exploring the state as agent in capitalist structural transformation. But migration not only had dramatic social and economic consequences at home, it had important *political* consequences as well.

The migrant-sending state has always been a part of the study of labour migration in Southern Africa. Writers examined the collusion of the migrant-sending British administrations, especially those in present-day Botswana and Lesotho, and the importance of the administrations there in provoking migration. The reasons for the participation of the Portuguese state were also explored in the case of Mozambique. Such sources have been tapped in the relevant chapters here. In addition, the South African state's collusion with employers in marshalling African labourers is particularly well documented. The entire country of South Africa was transformed into a labour labyrinth for the purpose of concentrated accumulation, and its people now face the enormous challenge of extricating themselves from the mess.

Despite the attention to the propulsion of migrants to jobs, however,

and to the struggle of employers – particularly the gold mines in South Africa – to obtain them, relatively little attention has been paid to the consequent struggle to *retain* labourers inside territories. Many scholars concluded that since sending-administrations were unable physically to stop informal migration flows across their borders, the issue of their policies regarding them must be relatively unimportant. But while it was true that the early administrators were largely unable physically to stop migrants from leaving their territories, that is only where the story began.

The first tactic employed by an administration wishing to contain African labourers was simply to forbid it. The Swaziland administration forbade labour migration to Natal and the Transvaal in the 1890s, and by 1903 the administrators of Malawi were also forbidding migrants to leave to work in today's Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the time this was not considered the right of an administration. The administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia, for instance, referred to such an action on the part of the British Central Africa administration as 'a highly improper pressure'. An embargo on labour migration from his territory to today's Zaire, under the Belgians, was imposed in 1906, but the administrator believed that migrants should be freely exchanged among British territories. The director of the British South Africa Company expressed 'great indignation' at the action from Malawi. However the company's own administration in Southern Rhodesia had passed a law in 1899 discouraging recruiting for outside Southern Rhodesia. This was not so much duplicity, I believe, as an amusing confusion over just exactly what were the rights of new-country-administrations regarding the control of labour. It was unclear yet whether the British state or the emerging local state was the 'rightful' locus of control.

For administrations not seeking to contain labourers, but rather to exploit their labour abroad, the initial reaction was to promote migration to increase their revenues. Botswana's hut taxes were applied with the full knowledge that the only way many men would be able to earn the cash to pay was by going to South Africa to work. The Resident Commissioner of Bechauanaland Protectorate leapt at the chance to renew Wenela recruiting for the South African mines in 1934, and instructed his district commissioners to help round up recruits and sell the protectorate to Wenela, and the story in Lesotho was not much different.

The most important mechanisms for maximizing control over migrants were taxes applied at the household level; attested contracts

for those going outside to work; recruiting licences; and an accompanying introductory migrant labour law. The introduction of a first law controlling labour migration to other territories was usually accomplished almost immediately upon the establishment of an administration. There was Swaziland's early decree disallowing recruiting for Natal and the Transvaal in the 1890s; Mozambique's first law on interterritorial migration dating to 1897; and Zimbabwe's in 1899. The German administration in Tanzania issued a decree in 1900 that included a ban on recruiting for outside work. Zambia's administrations had been instructed to embargo labour migration to Katanga by 1906, and did so quite successfully. In Malawi, an extensive native labour ordinance covered labour migration abroad by 1907.

Once in place, such legal frameworks allowed the collection of various fees and tithes and permitted labour-exporting administrations to 'tune' the system in whatever way their officials saw fit – changing contract length for instance or obliging the partial deferment of pay. Although migrants who chose to leave illegally were still quite difficult to stop, a host of measures were employed to at least channel or discourage them as needed.

It was also necessary at times to ensure that migrants returned. The most important tactic was to ban the emigration of women. Often it was chiefs who were able to manage this – as in Lesotho, where they ensured that only a woman with a letter from her father or husband could travel. In another example, the Portuguese curator in Johannesburg became absolutely incensed at Wenela's encouragement of Mozambican women to become *clandestinos*, apparently in pursuit of permanent labour emigration. The curator objected very loudly and the containment of women within Mozambique was made a major priority of the Portuguese administration, explicitly in order to keep migrants circulating back and forth.

The signing of contracts with foreign recruiting organizations or governments also began fairly early in the history of emerging governments. One of the administrations in today's Zambia signed a deal with Tanganyika Concessions as early as 1894, and Botswana had signed with the Transvaal by 1896. By 1901 the Portuguese in Mozambique had concluded a first major agreement to include a key section on migrant labour. The Malawi administration had struck a deal with the Rhodesian Native Labour Association by 1903, and Lesotho a deal with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines by 1907. Swaziland signed a similar contract in 1928, by which time Tanzania had at least agreed to a formal arrangement of 1936 on labour export

to Zanzibar. Only Southern Rhodesia held out until the quadrilateral arrangement of 1937 to supply its *neighbours'* labourers to South Africa. It did not sign a deal to send its own labourers to South Africa until the 1970s.

The story of the ban on recruiting north of 22° is a case in point on the subject of 'South Africa-centrism'. The complicated mesh of interests around the ban on recruiting north of 22° was far from a South African initiative as is often suggested. The Portuguese originally instituted an effective ban on recruiting at about 22° when the *Modus Vivendi* of 1901 extended recruiting rights to the Transvaal only in the areas of Mozambique under their direct administration. This was made formal by Portugal in 1909, and later changed to 26° in 1928. The South African government lifted the ban it had imposed in 1912, but the Portuguese ban on recruiting north of 26° remained in place until it was lifted by the independent government of Mozambique in 1985. The British government, for its part, first banned recruiting north of 22° in 1906, when those attempting to protect more-northern capital's labour supply from South African competition had seized on the issue of the high death rate of 'tropical' labourers. The Nyasaland administration was also moving permanently to impose such a ban in 1912. There is little evidence, on the other hand, that many officials in South Africa were genuinely concerned at the high death rates. The horror seems to have aroused genuine sympathy mainly in Britain, where those lobbying on behalf of non-South African investments were able to exploit the issue to protect their labour supply. South Africa's ban should therefore be viewed only as a preemptive reaction to early, restrictive labour export policy.

Another issue is the question of responsibility for maintenance of the interterritorial circulation of labour. Normally the separation of home and workplace is thought to be the objective of employers, who seek to keep labour migratory in order to keep costs down. We would therefore expect to find that it is they and their governments who were primarily responsible for returning migrants home. The employers are certainly able to pay a lower wage to labour migrants who leave their families behind, but most often it was *sending* administrations that introduced measures to keep the migrants circulating, particularly compulsory repatriation, limited contract duration and deferred pay.

As early as 1894, in Zambia a BSA administrator consented to send migrant labour to work as porters in today's Zaire only on the condition that they were returned to the company's territory after

their contracts had ended. In Mozambique the Portuguese insisted during their negotiations over the *Modus Vivendi* with the Transvaal at the turn of the century that labourers be intentionally circulated between home and workplace, and they demanded the same of Southern Rhodesia. In a further convention with the Transvaal government in 1909, the Portuguese insisted that compulsory repatriation be included in each worker's contract in order to make it more enforceable under Transvaal law. In another example in 1928, Swaziland's Resident Commissioner and government secretary asked the NRC, a major South African recruiting agency, for some built-in guarantee that workers would return to their homes rather than remain permanently in South Africa. Labourers were a scarce commodity until at least the 1950s, and officials were simply afraid to lose them and the revenue they brought.

It was also sending administrations that sought shorter contract periods for migrants, and employers who bargained for longer ones. In Lesotho in 1905 the Resident Commissioner insisted that workers in South Africa remain there for a maximum of only nine months. The Portuguese specified a maximum of a year in their original *Modus Vivendi.* In fact *all* labour export and recruiting agreements included maximum contract lengths specified by the labour-sending government.

Compulsory deferred pay was also uniquely the demand of *sending* administrations seeking to pull in the foreign exchange and purchasing power of migrants' earnings. Such deferred pay was disbursed only upon a migrant's return, thus it was also a powerful incentive to return home. Botswana's European farmers suggested compulsory deferred pay in the 1920s. but were refused by the British High Commissioner. Eventually, however, most labour-sending governments in the region won compulsory deferment at least for their miners in South Africa. Voluntary deferred pay systems were also implemented in most countries for other types of migrants and – thanks again to home governments – the technically 'voluntary' aspect of the schemes was often a well-kept secret.

The sending administrations, then, and not hiring administrations, were primarily responsible for the process of territorial labour containment that took place, at least until large labour surpluses began to set in. Administrations reacted to various pressure groups' lobbying on labour-supply issues by diverging in orientation regarding the labour movements among territories and strengthening the definition of borders among themselves. The conditions that varied with

administrative jurisdiction grew in importance, until they became the primary determinant of a migrant's fate. The process continues today with the further improvement and mutualization of migration controls among Southern African states and the continuation of bilateral negotiations on extraterritorial labour supply.

GLOBAL MIGRATION THEORY AND THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN EXAMPLE

In several respects, the more global or most abstract schools of migration theory have yet to take this Southern African experience fully into account. While the region's flows are easily eclipsed today by the much larger numbers heading to such destinations as the Gulf and the new Asian industrial economies, the lessons to be learned in Southern Africa are still important. Oceans on three sides of the subcontinent, along with a main concentration of labour demand at the most isolated end, make Southern Africa an unusually discrete system. Furthermore the decline in the importance of the region's labour migration now indicates that we have observed a relatively complete process.

The introductory chapter outlined the excessive polarization of the theorization of migration. Two tendencies have emphasized either the decisions of individuals or the imposition of structural forces in their paradigms of preference. In Southern Africa scholars are probably as close as possible to a consensus that the study of migration calls foremost for a historical analysis of the transformation wrought by capitalism. After all, a system in which a worker could be killed crossing an electrified border fence to get to a job is indisputably one that limits the value of examining the individual migrant's wishes.

However, an important area of the theorization of international labour migration that has been underexplored is the evolving role of states as a group. What has been inadequately treated – and yet is quite important – is (1) the importance of sending-territories' administrations in the determination of international migration; and (2), the importance of their activity with regard to labour migration in the crystallization of a regional state system.

This book has documented an extended effort over many decades to master most migrants' movements. The resultant conflict of interests sparked a process of containment that became a factor of considerable importance in the creation of Southern African states. The drive

for surplus value caused a demand for labourers that was satisfied through pressure applied on the African population by the new territorial administrations, and the resulting increase in the propensity of individuals to migrate outside their territorial unit forced their colonial administrators to exercise greater control of them.

This is evidence of the extent to which one of the major structures on our planet has been formed partly on the basis of the need to control migrant-labour movements. For international migration, the state is probably the 'most intervening' unit of analysis, one that can help us to see individuals and their structures in a more integrated fashion. Global migration theory is sometimes *too* structural, or insufficiently 'constructural' – failing adequately to distinguish forces, transformations, and results. Individual labour movements cannot be treated as only a consequence of the historical march of accumulation. They appear quite intrinsic to the evolution of the structures that facilitate changing accumulation patterns. Human desire to move and human socio-structural transformation are quite simply inextricable and their separation for analytical 'convenience' may have been far less convenient than supposed.

The relationship between state and migrant appears to have become particularly important in Southern Africa, perhaps because the migrant-sending territories were mapped out and their first administrators posted at much the same time as investments requiring more labour began to intensify. However the control of labour movements – indeed of population movements – has become quite fundamental to the maintenance of the state system worldwide. The particular characteristics of migration in Southern Africa that clarify this relationship between international labour migration and state-system formation may therefore deserve further consideration.

Notes and References

1. Lesotho's borders were established by 1869 by carving off large tracts of Basotho land with only minor changes later on (Kimble, 1978, p. 192). Botswana's present territory was established by the separation of Bechuanaland from its southern part in 1885 which was later ceded to the Transvaal (Sillery, 1974, p. 78). Swaziland's boundaries were recognized in a Convention in 1888. Nearly a century later, in 1982, the South African administration proposed to enlarge them slightly. Malawi's northern boundary was fixed at the Songwe River in 1890 in an Anglo-German agreement (Rafael, 1980, p. 45). The southern boundary

was defined in the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1891, and was slightly refined in 1962 (Great Britain, 1962). Considerable disputes with Tanganyika over Malawi's borders dragged on but fluctuations were minor. Mozambique's borders began to set in 1858 with a Portuguese/Transvaal agreement, followed by Portuguese/German treaties in 1886 and 1890 (Katzenellenbogen, 1982, p. 10). Tanzania's early border negotiations dragged on with the Belgians, British and Portuguese from 1890 until 1910, but were essentially created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 when Ruanda–Urundi was alienated from German East Africa for Belgium, and the Kionga triangle was added to Mozambique (Buell, 1928, pp. 427–9). The island of Zanzibar was added to Tanganyika to create Tanzania in 1964. Zimbabwe and Zambia were defined by 1891 in the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, although there was subsequent tinkering with the boundary of then Barotseland. The two territories were administered together from 1899 until 1923 during the BSA Company period, although Zambia began as North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, with separate administrators.

2. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1902, Colonial Office to the British South Africa Company, 3 Oct. 1901.
3. Foltz, 1973, pp. 360–1.
4. Freund, 1984, p. 90.

Appendix 1: The Southern African Labour Supply Commission (SALC)

The informed reader might wonder why this volume has paid so little attention to the ten meetings of the Southern African Labour Supply Commission during the 1980s. These were conferences of ministers and officials from the very eight countries studied here, who met to discuss the selfsame topic – labour-export policy. The answer is that despite lengthy discussions and at times high hopes, SALC failed ever to take any effective action – or to present a united front. Actual negotiations by governments were conducted with the South African government and Chamber of Mines quite independently of what was going on at the annual SALC meetings. Despite the considerable prospects for united action, the potential impact of disruptions in the migrant flow was too varied for governments to agree on a common course of action.

In the late 1970s there was considerable discussion within the ILO and among frontline states' officials of the possibility of a 'migrant-sending countries cartel'.[1] It was thought that such a move could give the five main supplier states – Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana – more bargaining power, jointly monopolising the supply of foreign migrant labour to South Africa in order to extract concessions. Given the experience of Malawi's boycott in 1974, there was reason to believe that the demand for foreign labour in South Africa would not fall so much as to undermine the value of any concessions won through collective bargaining by the supplier states.

The idea was not entirely new. In 1949 the Chief Secretary of Nyasaland had suggested that the administrations of the High Commission Territories join with those of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to bargain jointly with Wenela. An effective cartel would have been formed with five members – colonial Lesotho, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana. The British High Commissioner, however, hurriedly quashed the idea.[2]

Nearly thirty years later the idea was revived. In 1977 the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa drafted a working agenda for the proposed first meeting, including:

> [W]hether or not labour migration to South Africa should be terminated because South Africa wants labour from neighboring countries to avoid its social and moral responsibilities from [sic] its indigenous labour.[3]

The labour ministers of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Mozambique met in Maseru in 1977 to discuss the need for a common approach to migrant-labour export to South Africa, and the first meeting of the labour officials of

supplier countries organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa was held in 1978. The actual agenda was quite militant, including the need 'to radicalize the workers in the South African mines', 'for psychological re-orientation of migratory workers to see their progressive role in the liberation struggle'; and to organize 'the solidarity of migrant labour supplying countries as an economic (anti-apartheid) strike force'. This was enough to make Gaborone officials – striking a conciliatory posture with Pretoria at the time – consider not attending.[4]

SALC was formed in 1980 by the governments of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. In order to coordinate and harmonize their policies on migrant labour to South Africa, with the ultimate aim of abolishing entirely the labour-migrant system in Southern Africa. These terms were later widened to include mutual endeavour to reconstruct SALC economies so as to make them more responsive to the employment problem. By the second meeting, in 1981, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had joined and representatives of the ANC, SWAPO and SATEP were also present, adding to the radical mood. Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania also soon joined.

Despite the militant mood, however, the concept of a planned withdrawal of migrants from South Africa – a plan that had been elaborately drawn up by staff of the ILO – was rejected as early as 1978.[5] By 1983, when Tanzania joined SALC, there was no mention of supply-side action. The fear, instead, was that there would be a sudden *expulsion* of workers by Pretoria and it was resolved that each government should draw up a contingency plan to absorb repatriated workers in such an event.[6]

The concept of a coordinated pullout was not yet entirely abandoned at that point. In his speech in Maputo in 1984, the outgoing SALC chairman said that it was time that SALC members 'took the bull by its horns and agreed on a concrete, step-by-step programme of action to resolve the problem of migrant labour'. Ironically, the spirit of rebellion was also revived a little by South Africa's threats. The outgoing chairperson the following year, Mozambique's Labour Minister Mazula, noted that South Africa was threatening to expel one million migrant workers and then contradicting itself – an invitation to the delegates to respond. However, once again nothing concrete was done. The final report reaffirmed the SALC members' 'determination, *in the long term*, to stop exporting migrant labour so South Africa as long as apartheid prevails'.[7]

Given that there would be no dramatic pullout, SALC's emphasis shifted to employment creation. Mozambique created some programmes, especially after the ban imposed on Mozambicans by Pretoria. Lesotho, too, set up structures designed rapidly to expand public-works construction in the event of mass expulsions from South Africa. However the general consensus among SALC member governments on the creation of special employment programmes for returning migrants was that it would not be prudent to give them special treatment in a general climate of disgruntlement over unemployment. The problem of employment creation should be addressed as a whole. Another problem was that most members did not feel that they could realistically concentrate development projects in labour-sending parts of their territory unless such projects fell under their national development strategies. The fact that returning migrants do not possess skills of direct relevance

to employment creation at home underlies the fundamental redundancy of employment creation under such a mandate.[8]

With both the pullout and job-creation objectives of SALC abandoned, it seemed that the organization lacked a raison d'être. A case might have been made that SALC was at least acting as a bargaining forum, but the members were all too often guilty of duplicity. While putting up a good front at the conferences on a possible migrant pullout, or reduction, members were secretly bargaining with TEBA to obtain increases in the number of their citizens hired.

The one promising step taken by SALC was a resolution in 1986 to negotiate standard contracts with South Africa – implicit acceptance of the necessity of continuing migrant labour supply in the short to medium term.[9] Böhning of the ILO had drawn up a standard agreement between SALC states and the South African government, as well as recommendations on agreements between TEBA and the SALC states, and employer– employee contracts, which were adopted at SALC 9 in 1987.[10] The concept was a sensible and modest coordination of contracts that would put the SALC states in a position to negotiate, in complete unison, modifications to the contract. Pretoria, however, decided to meet requests for renegotiation of the contract with a demand for diplomatic representation from contracting states, albeit a substandard representation through trade missions such as those established by Malawi in the 1960s. The Botswana Ministry, however, reacted to the request for trade missions by declining to initiate negotiations for the new contract after all – despite the SALC resolution – noting that the existing contract was already virtually identical to the standard agreement.[11] The Lesotho government had at least tentatively agreed to include the missions in the standard agreement by 1989, and that progress was announced at SALC 10. But before the agreement was actually signed the Lesotho government began to balk at the idea of trade missions.[12] Swaziland reportedly nearly finalized renegotiation of the new contract in early 1989, although it was unclear whether the trade-mission request had been granted.[13] Mozambique was also negotiating for a new contract, but it seemed unlikely that the government there could make the diplomatic concession of missions, however suppliant it had been forced to become. Even the modest coordination of standard contracts, then, seemed to be falling through.

By late 1987 SALC had decided to face up to its own lack of purpose. The decision was taken to broaden its terms of reference from migrant labour to the harmonization of labour policy in the SALC states in general, including such issues as factory inspection, social-welfare schemes, labour conditions, employment creation and vocational and management skills programmes.[14] This decision constituted the transformation of SALC into a different organization. A proposal had been on the SALC agenda for several years to turn the commission into a tripartite body with equal representation from governments, trade unions and employers. One of the biggest hurdles was that many employers' federations in Lesotho, Swaziland and so on were dominated by white and international interests, to which governments would not be very comfortable according equal status. SALC meetings had long maintained a two-tiered process, with officials meeting in one forum and ministers in another. In 1989 the officials decided to reject tripartism because they anticipated

that the ministers would do so, especially because of the prospect of including trade unions. But when the proposed new constitution was discussed by ministers only – behind closed doors – the principle of tripartism was accepted. Governments retained some powers to select employer-delegates to the meetings.[15]

SALC also formally asked the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Council) to consider SALC's inclusion as the SADCC organ responsible for labour. The SADCC's policy on labour export has been historically different from SALC's, favouring the maximization of benefits from the migrant-labour system, while preparing contingency plans to reduce the costs of a sudden reduction or termination of opportunities for migrant-labour supply to South Africa.[16] Now that SALC has dropped the pullout objective, the policies of SALC and SADCC have become more or less the same.

It must be admitted that completely changing the purpose and structure of SALC is tantamount to a declaration of failure to achieve its original objectives. Perhaps SALC failed because its mandate for employment creation – of such fundamental importance – was directed towards departments of labour, the weakest of African government ministries.[17] Neither was SALC ever given its own structure and secretariat. It has lacked a head and head office throughout its history and has depended on a chairperson from a different government's ministry of labour every year. The prospects for withdrawing labour migrants from South Africa were also undermined by widespread drought in the region in the 1980s, reducing the alternatives to migrant jobs. SALC's own interpretation of its prolonged impotence is that some states, such as Malawi and Mozambique, were too dependant to pull out. This is not quite the case however, especially as Malawi pulled out in both 1974–76 and effectively again after 1987. Mozambique's population also suffered from Pretoria's dramatic reductions in its share of migrants, although this is admittedly not to say that it would have been prudent for the Mozambican government to have withdrawn the workers itself. Lesotho, of course, is still utterly dependent on South African jobs, but it was always expected that Lesotho's withdrawal would be the longest term by far.

The 1990s could be better for SALC, promoting a more attainable agenda of cooperation in training with more emphasis on skilled labour. The ministers might be able to adopt a common position on issues at the Organization of African Unity and the International Labour Organization. On the other hand, however, it might be asked if the best solution for an organization that had lost its purpose was to devise a new purpose – or to disband itself.

Notes and References

1. See Paine, 1974, p. 153; Stahl and Böhning, 1981, p. 147; Stahl, 1978, p. 7.
2. BNA S.464/1, High Commissioner to Barton, 14 July 1949.
3. MNA-RC, (DOL) 2/4/1, Draft memo, Sec. of Labour to the Minister of Labour, 17 Feb. 1977, attached to fi. 303.

4. UN/ECA/MULPOC, 1978; cited in Massey, 1980b, pp. 12–13. Malawi had been very difficult to please regarding the organizing of the first meeting, twice finding the dates inconvenient and asking for the meeting to be postponed for months (MNA-RC, (DOL) 2/4/1, various memos).
5. SALC/V/12, 1983, Annex III. Resolution on Migratory Labour in Southern Africa. This had been a sweeping plan for a coordinated pullout – imposing levies on South Africa for remaining migrants and spending up to US$3 billion on backup programmes (Stahl and Böhning, 1981).
6. SALC/V/12, 1983, Annex III, Resolution on Migratory Labour in Southern Africa.
7. SALC/VII/4/, 1985, Draft Version, Annex 3, p. 2, emphasis mine.
8. SATEP, 1985, p. 40. Indeed the migrants likely to be sent home first are the least skilled. There is nothing essentially different then, in creating jobs for returnees and creating jobs for the already massive swell of underemployed. Projects for returnees would more honestly emphasize temporary accommodation, services and so on rather than creating privileged jobs for them. The one exception to this is the small-scale mining sector, which might be stimulated to absorb an obviously trained labour force – gemstones in Botswana, diamonds in Lesotho, construction materials and coal in Malawi, and gold and tin in Swaziland (Moshi, 1985).
9. SALC/VIII/4/Rev. 1 Annex IV, 1986.
10. Böhning, 1986.
11. Interviews with Acting Labour Commissioner Lebang, Gaborone, 6 Sept. 1989; Mr Mookodi, TEBA's Botswana manager, at Kgale Siding, 4 Sept. 1989.
12. Interviews with TEBA's administrative manager for Lesotho, Mr Seth Sethloho, 9 Aug. 1989, Lesotho Labour Commisioner, Maseru, 9 Aug. 1989; B.C. Gondwe, economic affairs officer, UNECA, Lusaka, 17 Oct. 1989.
13. Interview with Labour Commissioner Bembe of Swaziland, Mbabane, 13 July 1989.
14. SALC/X/6/Rev. 1, p. 10.
15. SALC/X/6/Rev. 1, p. 11.
16. Zingel 1985: 5.
17. Interview with Mr George Aryee, expert on industrial development and labour migration, SATEP, Lusaka.

Appendix 2: Statistics on Migrant Labourers Working Abroad in Southern Africa

Table 1 Malawi

Year	*SA* (*thousands*)	*Zimb* (*thousands*)	*Other* (*thousands*)	*Total* (*thousands*)	*Estd* de jure *pop.* (*millions*)	*Total as share of population* (*%*)
1904	12[1]	9[2]	3[3]	24[4]	0.90[5]	2.5
1911	18[6]	13[7]	2	35[8]	0.97[9]	3.6
1913	18	20[10]	2[11]	40	1.03[12]	3.9
1921	–	50[13]	–	65[14]	1.20[15]	5.4
1926	–	–	–	70[16]	1.29[17]	5.4
1931	–	–	6[18]	75[19]	1.60[20]	4.7
1935[21]	20	75	22	120	1.60[22]	7.5
1937[23]	27[24]	75	13[25]	115	1.64	7.0
1941	30[26]	73[27]	12[28]	115[29]	1.72	6.7
1944	31[30]	88[31]	11[32]	130[33]	2.18[34]	6.0
1946[35]	33	80	9	121	2.32[36]	5.2
1948	–	–	–	130[37]	2.64	4.9
1949	–	–	–	138	2.81	4.9
1950	–	–	–	143	3.00[38]	4.8
1951	–	–	–	148	3.04	4.9
1952	–	–	–	160	3.08	5.2
1953	–	–	–	170	3.12	5.5
1954	–	–	–	180	3.16	5.7
1955[39]	–	–	–	190	3.20[40]	5.9
1956	–	–	–	190	3.28	5.8
1957	–	–	–	195	3.35	5.8
1958	–	–	–	200	3.43	5.8
1959	–	–	–	210	3.52	6.0
1960	–	–	–	220	3.60[41]	6.1
1961	–	–	–	230	3.67	6.3
1962	–	–	–	220	3.75	5.9
1963	–	–	–	240	3.82	6.3
1964	–	–	–	260	3.90	6.7
1965	–	–	–	280	3.98[42]	7.0

1966	–	–	–	266[43]	4.07	6.5
1972	–	–	–	400[44]	4.80	8.3
1973	–	–	–	400	4.94	8.1
1977	–	–	–	200[45]	5.55	3.6
1980	–	–	–	100[46]	6.09	1.6
1987	–	–	–	30[47]	7.91	.4
1988	–	–	–	22[48]	8.16	.3
1989	–	–	–	10[49]	8.51[50]	.1
1990	–	–	–	5	9.25	.1

Notes

1. Tapela, 1979, pp. 75–6.
2. Estimates cited in Krishnamurty (1972, p. 396) and in *The Lacey Report* (Hyasaland, 1936) are held constant. Other figures are very close.
3. Ibid. Workers in Zambia. Others went to Mozambique.
4. Independent migration was still much more important than recruiting. Only 9000 were recruited for the Transvaal over the next decade while over 10 000 went south independently in 1904–5 alone, and at least 10 000 more to Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa (Nyasaland, 1936; Burden, 1940, p. 5; Pollock, 1971, p. 412).
5. Malawi, Department of Census and Statistics, 1980, vol. 1, p. 18. The Population Census of 1977 gave an estimate of 0.97 for 1911. Boeder (1974, p. 93) comes close to 1.0m, citing Governor Smith.
6. Macpherson (1981, p. 167) cites an official estimate of 18 000 made for 1910. Altogether, estimates range from 6000 to 18 000 but a higher figure fits the pattern.
7. Kuczynski, 1949, pp. 532, 534, 544, 553.
8. Sanderson's estimate for 1910 was 30 000 (1960, p. 43).
9. Malawi, Department of Census and Statistics, 1980, vol. 1, p. 18.
10. Boeder, 1974, p. 95, citing figures that sometimes included dependents. His estimate is that half were working in mines and half in other work.
11. Boeder, 1974, p. 95.
12. Boeder, 1974, p. 93, gives a pop. estimate of 1.0m for 1912.
13. The official handbook of Southern Rhodesia (1924, p. 6) (cited in Coleman, 1972, p. 39), reported that there were 44 702 Malawians enumerated in an official census.
14. Kuczynski (1949, p. 554) concludes after evaluating various data that the number 'could not have been less than 60 000 and may have been much larger'. It was certainly a little larger but there is no evidence that it was a lot larger.
15. Boeder (1974, p. 93) citing the figures of Governor Smith. Considerable effort had been expended to clear up the numbers after the previous governor seriously underestimated able-bodied males as 110 000, or only 25 per cent of the adult population.
16. Extrapolating from Kuczynski's (1949, p. 554) estimate.
17. Kuczynski (1949) gives a population of 1.2m for 1921 and 1.6m for 1931, which is consistent with other data. However he gives the 1926 population as only 1.29m – as opposed to 1.388m if you assume even growth from 1921–31. This requires a growth rate of 6 per cent for 1926–31. The known influxes are not enough to account for this.

18. There were at least 3000 miners in Northern Rhodesia. By the following year there were 3000 or so in Tanzanian mines, out of a total of 12 000 there (Tanganyika Reports, 1932, p. 55).
19. Kuczynski, 1949, p. 557.
20. Kuczynski, 1949.
21. All the numbers of migrants for Nyasaland in 1935 are taken from the Lacey Report (Nyasaland, 1936, p. 36). The total includes 3000 other unaccounted for.
22. Kuczynski, 1949.
23. There are three estimates available for 1937. The Bell Report's (Great Britain, 1938) estimate, which Coleman (1972) decided was low, and a memo from the Nyasaland Government to the Standing Committee on Migrant Labour 3 December 1937 (cited in Coleman, 1972). They average out to about 100 000. However, Kuczynski's estimate is a higher (114 000 and I am inclined to accept the highest figure to fit the general pattern.
24. Malawi, Ministry of Labour, 1961–2, p. 17.
25. There were at least 6000 in Tanganyika and 4300 in Northern Rhodesia. MNA-PA, S1/943[11]/29, memo on Nyasaland Government to the Standing Cttee on Migrant Labour, 3 Dec., 1937, Colonial Office 525/61.
26. MNA-PA, LB 14/6/1, letter from LC to CS, 19 Mar. 1942.
27. MNA-PA, LB 14/6/1, comparative statement on Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian Labor Statistics, fp. 60.
28. A colonial official's estimate was 2000 in Tanganyika and 5000 in Northern Rhodesia. MNA-PA, LB 14/6/1, letter from LC to CS, 19 Mar. 1942. Ohadike (1969, p. 5) estimates that there were 9000 in Northern Rhodesia.
29. An estimate of 110 000 appears in MNA-PA, LB 14/6/1 comparative statement on Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian labor statistics, fp. 60. Given Ohadike's higher numbers in Zambia I conclude that the official's estimate was a little low.
30. MNA-PA, LB 14/5/1, letter from labour officer in Johannesburg to acting LC. Nyld., 6 Sept. 1944, fp. 5.
31. MNA-PA, LB 14/5/2, Nyasaland labour officer, Salisbury, to labour commissioner, Nyasaland, 14 June 1944, fp. 6; 'Flow of Labour to and from SR', fp. 3A.
32. Ohadike (1969, p. 5) maintains his estimate of 9000 in Northern Rhodesia. It would seem that 2000 or more continued in Tanzania, as in 1941.
33. Kuczynski, 1949, p. 575. There are 25 000 army labourers included.
34. Kuczynski, 1949, pp. 532–53. There is an unexplained jump in the data from 1.72m in 1941 to 2.12m in 1942. The war may have been responsible. If, however, a logarithmic increase is assumed from 1941 to 1950s 3m (the beginning of the ILO equations' data) the result is a similar population of 2.07m in 1942. The growth rate was 6.1 per cent per year due to large influxes.
35. Central African Council, 1947, p. 26.
36. Calculated logarithmically based on 1945 and 1950.
37. Totals from 1948 until 1965 are taken from Coleman 1972, p. 45. Much of this excellent article is devoted to untangling conflicting apd partial statistics.
38. ILO, 1977c.
39. This was a census year, giving lower figures. I have chosen to continue using Coleman's estimated totals as more likely estimates.
40. ILO, 1977c.
41. Estimates for 1960–65 are based on the ILO figure for 1960 (1977c) and the World Bank figure for 1965 (1990).

42. Population estimates from 1965–88 are taken from World Bank, 1990.
43. Census figures, which are better this time. Discussed in Coleman, 1972, p. 45.
44. Boeder, 1974. Actual labour migrants abroad.
45. Fair has estimated that 250 000 returned from 1974–79, and this is commonly accepted (1982, p. 257). My estimate would be that 200 000 were back by 1977.
46. Lienau, 1980, p. 4.
47. There were 21 000 with TEBA in South Africa (TEBA annual reports), and the non-TEBA temporary labour migrants were considerably less than that, estimated here at 9000.
48. There were 15 000 with TEBA in South Africa (TEBA annual reports), and the non-TEBA, temporary labour migrants were considerably less than that, estimated here at 7000.
49. As of May 1989 there were only 6000 Malawians working in South Africa with TEBA, and their contracts were about to expire. There was no rehiring from Malawi, thus the figure reached zero for 1990. There was remarkably little evidence of Malawians working *temporarily* abroad (with the intention of taking up residence in Malawi again), although there were of course many now permanently resident in South Africa or Zimbabwe.
50. Estimated population for 1989 and 1990 is a logarithmic projection of the growth rate implied in the World Bank (1990) data for 1980 to 1988, projected smoothly.

Table 2 Zambia

Year	*SA (thousands)*	*Zimb. (thousands)*	*Other (thousands)*	*Total (thousands)*	*Estd* de jure *pop. (millions)*	*Total as share of population (%)*
1906	–	6[1]	1[2]	7[3]	0.76[4]	0.9
1911	–	17[5]	2	19	0.81	2.2
1913	–	22[6]	3[7]	25	0.88	2.8
1914	–	–	4[8]	–	–	–
1917	–	–	3[9]	–	–	–
1919	–	–	11	–	–	–
1920	–	–	14	–	–	–
1921	–	–	11	40[10]	1.0[11]	4.0
1922	–	–	5[12]	–	–	–
1923	–	–	9[13]	–	–	–
1924	–	–	14[14]	–	–	–
1925	0.2[15]	20[16]	11[17]	32[18]	1.14[19]	2.8
1927	–	–	13[20]	43[21]	1.24[22]	3.5
1929	–	30[23]	11[24]	42[25]	1.30[26]	3.2
1930	–	–	9[27]	–	–	–
1931	–	–	8[28]	–	–	–
1932	–	–	7[29]	–	–	–
1933	–	–	20[30]	60[31]	1.37[32]	4.4
1935	–	–	–	75[33]	1.42[34]	5.3
1937	–	–	–	85[35]	1.58	5.4
1938	–	–	30[36]	–	–	–
1939	–	–	30[37]	–	–	–
1940	8[38]	–	–	–	–	–
1941	6[39]	48[40]	9[41]	65[42]	1.82	3.6
1942	7[43]	50[44]	15[45]	75	1.88	4.0
1946	6[46]	51[47]	22[48]	80	2.17	3.7
1948	9[49]	–	–	–	–	–
1951	11[50]	49[51]	14[52]	74[53]	2.58[54]	2.9
1956[55]	–	40[56]	–	–	–	–
1961[57]	10	26	20[58]	56	3.38	1.7
1965	8[59]	45[60]	–	–	–	–
1966	6	–	–	–	–	–
1967	4	–	–	–	–	–
1968	1	–	–	–	–	–
1969	–	–	–	40[61]	4.04[62]	1.0

Notes

1. Kuczynski (1949, pp. 415–74) estimates there were 5000 on the Southern Rhodesian mines. His work is very thorough. There must have been another 1000 or so on farms.
2. There must have been around a thousand working for the UMHK in the Congo, staying at roughly that amount during the embargo until 1911.

3. There is little evidence of Northern Rhodesian migrants working in other places besides Southern Rhodesia at this time.
4. Estimates of population for 1906 and 1910 are from logarithmical projection from 884 000 in 1916 and 821 000 in 1911 (base data from ILO, 1977c).
5. Kuczynski, 1949. For all of Southern Rhodesia.
6. Macpherson (1981, p. 167) points out that the number going to Southern Rhodesia not via the RNLB likely exceeded the 11 000 recruited by the RNLB. 22 000 is likely a conservative estimate of the number there at the war's outbreak.
7. The recruiting limit for the UMHK of 250 per month must have kept the levels down – especially given short contracts. I estimate 3000 here.
8. Rau (1974, p. 351) has 4000 at the UMHK mines.
9. Henderson, 1972, Table 4; citing official reports of the time. His estimates follow for 1919–21.
10. Kuczynski (1949) estimated 50 000. I have concluded that his estimate must have been high for this particular year.
11. Kuczynski, 1949.
12. Henderson, 1972, Table 4.
13. Henderson's data is now confirmed with Buell's (1928, p. 536).
14. Henderson, 1972, Table 4.
15. This is the estimate of Northern Rhodesian Africans working in South Africa given in AHM-DSNI, Caixa 50, no processo no., 'Movimento de Indigenas no Transvaal, 1922–1923'.
16. Macpherson, 1981, pp. 181.
17. Macpherson (1981, p. 18) estimates 10 000 in the Congo. Labour migration to South West Africa had begun that year, at 1000 or so (ZANA RC/256 (1)). Resident Magistrate Monyu NR, to SEc. for Native Affairs, 28 Oct. 1925. There were more than a thousand recruits that year but they only had short contracts.
18. This is a quick drop from the 50 000 figure for 1921, but Kuczynski – who gave us the 1921 figure – also thought it had dropped to 28 000 by 1924.
19. Kuczynski, 1949.
20. In addition to 10–11 000 in the Congo there were by this time 3000 or so in South-West Africa.
21. Kuczynski, 1949.
22. Kuczynski, 1949.
23. Parpart, 1980, p. 57.
24. Kuczynski 1949, on Congo flows. The refusal to allow recruiting for South-West Africa had largely choked off the stream to that colony.
25. Kuczynski, 1949. Parpart (1980, p. 57) has suggested 50 000. I have found no evidence of flows above the known flows and have stuck to the 42 000.
26. Kuczynski, 1949.
27. In the Congo. Kuczynski, 1949.
28. Kuczynski, 1949.
29. Kuczynski, 1949.
30. There were 15 000 in Tanganyikan mines alone by 1934 (Heisler and Marwick, 1974). This figure is supported by an archival document, TNA 25516, which gives the figure of 9000 Northern Rhodesians in the Tanganyikan mines for 1937 and notes that the figure had been much higher in 1934–36 when the Lupa goldfields had boomed. I estimate, therefore, 20 000 for Tanganyika in 1933,

including 10 000 or so in Tanganyikan mines, 5000 more in Tanganyika, and 5000 in the Congo (Kuczynski, 1949). By 1934 there were 20 000 in Tanganyika but only 1000 in the Congo.

31. Estimate based on Kuczynski, 1949.
32. Kuczynski, 1949.
33. Kuczynski's estimate.
34. The most likely population estimates for 1934–49 are derived from a logarithmic projection of Kuczynski's 1.37m in 1933 (1949) up until the beginning of the ILO equations in 1950, at 2.5m. This yields a plausible population growth rate of 3.54 per cent. The alternative is to take Heisler's figures (1974) of 1.6m in 1946 and 2.5m in 1951. The 1946 figure would require a growth rate of 8.93 per cent.
35. Kuczynski, 1949, p. 466. He was certain that the number exceeded 80 and the trend to increasing numbers and destinations supports this.
36. Tanganyika. Iliffe, 1979, p. 469.
37. Tanganyika. Iliffe, 1979, p. 469. The heavy flow then presumably dropped off during the war.
38. MNA-PA, LB 14/6/1. 'Migrant Labour Agreement: Northern Rhodesian Labour Statistics', fp. 10.
39. Ibid.
40. MNA-PA, LB 14/5/1, fp. 3A.
41. Only 2000 in the Congo and 5000 in Tanzania. Ibid. There were some in Nyasaland as well.
42. There had certainly been an overall drop. Given the war, it seems likely that the real number was not much above these official counts.
43. MNA-PA, LB 14/6/1, 'Migrant Labour Agreement: Northern Rhodesian Labour Statistics', fp. 10.
44. Kuczynski, 1949, p. 469.
45. There were 2000 in the Belgian Congo (Kuczynski, 1949) and 13 000 in Tanzania (TNA 25246/11, memo from D.M.P. 23/7/42, p. 25.).
46. Central African Council, 1947, p. 46.
47. I am assuming that the decline from 53 000 in 1944 (MNA-PA, LB 14/5/1, fp. 3A.) to 46 000 in 1951 (Great Britain, 1951, p. 74) was gradual, or 1000 less per year.
48. 'Elsewhere'. Ibid. The Council seriously underestimated those in Zimbabwe at only 28 000.
49. Northern Rhodesia, Department of Labour, 1949, pp. 16–17.
50. Scott, 1954, p. 433. Only 3000 of these were on the mines.
51. Ibid.
52. The estimate of 11 000 (ibid.) must be at least a little low. This included 7000 in the Congo and 4000 in Tanzania. I have decided on 14 000.
53. The maths is confirmed by Great Britain, 1951, p. 74, estimating a total of 74 000.
54. Population estimates for 1951 and 1961 are smooth logarithmic estimates filling in the five-year estimates of the ILO (1977a). They are 2.5m in 1950, 2.9m in 1955, 3.3m in 1960 and 3.7m in 1965.
55. Heisler's total for 1956 is 47 000. For 1962 it is 94 000. While all of Heisler's estimates up until 1962 are low, 94 000 is higher than any other indication of the time. It is quite rare that a figure appears to be too high, but this one probably was.

56. Southern Rhodesia (1960, p. 62) census data found 40 000. Of course, census returns of Northern Rhodesians would be at least a little low, but a Southern Rhodesian census of the time is likely to be fairly accurate.
57. All figures for 1961 are taken from Hellen, 1968, p. 99. Breytenbach (1977, p. 49) comes up with very similar figures.
58. Ten thousand were said to be in the Congo, still temporarily, while 4000 more were thought to be in Tanzania. The remainder is not accounted for.
59. WNLA recruiting was 6000: 5000 in 1966, 3000 in 1967 and zero in 1968 (Zambia, Ministry of Labour, 1966, p. 19).
60. *Rhodesia Herald*, 9 Dec. 1965. This figure may have been high for political reasons of the time.
61. Heister, 1974, pp. 55, 56, 60. At this point, with WNLA recruiting eliminated and labour migration to all destinations falling, Heisler's figure seems very plausible.
62. World Bank, 1990.

Table 3 Zimbabwe

Year	*SA (thousands)*	*Other (thousands)*	*Total (thousands)*	*Estd* de jure *pop. (millions)*	*Total as share of population (%)*
1911	–	–	3	0.80[1]	0.4
1918	4[2]	1[3]	5	0.87[4]	0.6
1923	7[5]	1	8	0.94[6]	0.8
1937	33[7]	2	35	1.38[8]	2.5
1938	34[9]	2	36	1.44[10]	2.5
1940	14[11]	–	–	–	–
1946	25[12]	2	27	2.08	1.3
1950	–	–	25[13]	2.50	1.0
1956	–	2[14]	–	–	–
1966	75[15]	2	77	4.55[16]	1.7
1970	100[17]	–	100	5.25	1.9
1975[18]	–	–	–	–	–
1976	111[19]	–	111	6.23	1.8
1979	50[20]	1	51	6.78	0.8
1986	20[21]	1	21	8.70	0.2

Notes

1. Southern Rhodesia: Government Statistical Bureau, 1935, p. 1.
2. ZINA N3/22/4 vol. 1, notes of a conference at Pietersburg on 10 Sept. 1918, fp. 142. This Southern Rhodesian estimate agreed to by South African officials.
3. I am assuming that few Southern Rhodesian Africans of the time would leave the company's choicest employment market for any other destination than South Africa. There must of course have been some 'fuzzy border' labour migration but I am not concerned with this.
4. A logarithmic estimate of the growth in population between the 1911 figure of 800 000 and the 1921 estimate of 900 000 given by Southern Rhodesia, Government Statistical Bureau 1935, p. 1.
5. My estimate; includes only 300 Southern Rhodesian Africans working in Chamber-member mines (de Vletter, 1986).
6. Logarithmic estimate based on Southern Rhodesia, Government Statistical Bureau 1935, p. 1, which gave populations of 0.9m for 1921 and 1.1m for 1931.
7. ZINA S 1561/1, Sec. for Native Affairs to sec. to the Prime Minister, 15 Nov. 1937. The Secretary for Native Affairs conservatively estimated clandestine emigration to South Africa at 34 000 per year. Some would stay longer than 12 months of course, and many stayed less than 12 months.
8. Logarithmic estimate based on Southern Rhodesia, Government Statistical Bureau 1935, p. 1, which gave populations of 1.2m for 1935 and 1.1m for 1931.
9. ZINA S1561/1, Sec. for Native Affairs to PMO, 20 July 1938.

10. Logarithmic estimate for years 1938 and 1946 are based on the Southern Rhodesian Central Statistical Bureau estimate for 1934 (1.2m) and the first ILO estimate – for 1950 – of 2.5m (1977c).
11. This estimate appears in ZINA S 1561/8 vol. 2, 'Migrant Labour Agreement: Labour Statistics, Southern Rhodesia, 31 Dec. 1940'. Even with the war, it seems low.
12. SAIRR, 1980, p. 209; 1981, p. 114.
13. Great Britain, 1951, p. 74.
14. There were 1900 Southern Rhodesian workers in Zambia according to the census data given in Southern Rhodesia, Department of Labour, 1962, p. 60.
15. Breytenbach (1979, pp. 32, 33) estimates 50–75 000. The official estimate of the time was 50–70 000. In view of the numbers to follow, and of general experience, the higher end of such estimates is usually closer to the correct figure.
16. All further population estimates are taken from World Bank, 1990.
17. Coetzer estimates that there were 70 000 illegal Rhodesian workers in Johannesburg alone (1980, p. 170). Certainly Rhodesian workers had specialized in the better-paying service jobs in the big city. The data is very thin. One hundred thousand is my rough estimate of the total in South Africa at that time. The official estimate of the time was 70 000.
18. Recruiting began for the South African mines with 8600 recruited that year.
19. There were 32 400 working legally in South African mines that year, to which can be added another 9000 legal workers (Breytenbach, 1979, pp. 32, 33). Another 70 000 illegal migrants from Rhodesia were probably there. This is both the average estimate of the Rhodesian government (40–100 000) and Coetzer's estimate (1980, p. 170).
20. This is the SAIRR estimate for June 30 (1979). It includes only 10 000 in the mines and 22 000 more. The war of independence in Rhodesia made illegal migration to South Africa more difficult and more dangerous in its final years. Many of the higher numbers in South Africa became permanent residents and the migrant figure would fall accordingly. Altogether there was a sudden drop in both miners and illegal migrants compared with 1976. However SAIRR estimates of the same type have proven low for earlier years, with only 31 000 non-miners in 1977 for instance. The figure of 50 000 given here is my rough estimate.
21. I am not satisfied with the estimates of 1984 migration for instance, with legal mineworkers at only 300 and other Rhodesian workers at 7500. If we make the assumption that the proportion of illegal foreign workers deported during 1986 represents the proportion of illegal foreign workers, we get the figure 26 000 for the number of Zimbabweans working illegally in South Africa. This is too high, however, as Zimbabweans were specifically targeted for deportation. The figure 20 000 is my estimate of the total, assuming Zimbabweans were about twice as likely as average to be deported.

Table 4 Mozambique

Year	*SA* (*thousands*)	*Zimb.* (*thousands*)	*Other* (*thousands*)	*Total* (*thousands*)	*Estd* de jure *pop.* (*millions*)	*Total as share of population* (*%*)
1899	80[1]	–	–	80	3.10[2]	2.6
1906	70[3]	–	–	70	3.29	2.2
1907	95[4]	–	–	95	3.31	2.9
1908	87[5]	–	–	87	3.34	2.6
1909	92[6]	–	–	92	3.37	2.7
1913	–	–	2	–	–	–
1915	–	–	7	–	–	–
1916	–	–	10[7]	–	–	–
1918	–	–	7	–	–	–
1920	105[8]	20[9]	3	128	3.69	3.5
1928	133[10]	–	–	–	–	–
1930[11]	100	40[12]	5[13]	145	4.00[14]	3.6
1935	83[15]	33[16]	12[17]	128	4.45[18]	2.8
1937	101	42	13	156	4.74	3.3
1939	112	57	15	184	4.98	3.7
1941	138	71	17	226	5.17	4.4
1943	134	82	18	234	5.30	4.4
1945	149	100	20	269	5.44	4.9
1947	162	103	22	287	5.68[19]	5.1
1949	183	133	24	340	5.93	5.7
1954	177[20]	162[21]	22[22]	361	6.20	5.8
1957	177	183	26	386	6.61	5.8
1960	176	209	24	409	7.54	5.4
1963	–	–	11[23]	–	–	–
1965	200[24]	107[25]	5[26]	312	8.40[27]	3.7
1975	200[28]	20[29]	–	220	10.60	2.1
1976	209[30]	5[31]	–	214	10.88	2.0
1977	130[32]	–	–	130	11.18	1.2
1979	110[33]	–	–	110	11.79	0.9
1984	110[34]	–	5[35]	115	13.43	0.9
1986	115[36]	–	8	123	14.16	0.9
1988	90[37]	–	17	107	14.97	0.7

Notes

1. Ferreira, 1963, p. 16. There were 50 000 in the South African Mines according to van der Horst, 1942, pp. 127–36.
2. Population before 1930 has been estimated by applying the combined average estimated population growth rate of Malawi, Zimbabwe and Tanzania (less Zanzibar) for the period 1900–30 (rate = +0.82), to the figure 4.0m in 1930 (Mozambique, *Censo de Popuação em 1940*).
3. In South Africa's proclaimed 'labour districts' was the very large majority (AHM-

DSNI Caixa 41, Processo 35, Curator in Johannesburg to Secretary for Emigration, Lourenço Marques, 27 Aug. 1906). There were 57 000 in Chamber mines by this time.

4. AHM-DSNI Caixa 47, Processo 66, Estatisticas. In proclaimed labour districts as of mid-year. There were 69 000 with the WNLA by this time (Katzenel lenbogen, 1982, p. 159, citing WNLA returns for mid-year).
5. Ibid. There were 82 000 with the WNLA and a drop in non-WNLA migrating to South Africa.
6. AHM-DSNI Caixa 49, processo No. 66, fp. 1. In labour districts. There were 84 000 with the WNLA as of mid-year (Katzenel lenbogen, 1982, p. 159).
7. There were now only 3000 in São Tomé and Principé, down from a high of 10 000 in 1916 and 1917. I have calculated the number of migrant workers there temporarily from Mozambique from recruiting data and contract length, likely very accurate due to boat transportation and long contracts averaging three years seven months, lengthening throughout. The data derived goes: 1913 – 2000; 1914 – 4000; 1915 – 7000; 1916 – 10 000; 1917 – 10 000; 1918 – 7000; 1919 – 5000; 1920 – 3000; 1921 – 1000. Base data from Sociedade de Emigração para São Thomé e Principé, 1916–18.
8. AHM-DSNI Caixa 47, Processo 66, Estatisticas. There were 98 000 registered with the Portuguese curator of Labour in Johannesburg, of whom 91 000 were with the WNLA as of mid-year. I have assumed at least as many non-WNLA workers were not registered as registered.
9. My estimate.
10. Saldanha, 1931, pp. 188–9. There were 120 000 in the South African mines, of whom 112 000 were recruited through the WNLA.
11. Estimates for 1930 are largely my own. We know there was a decline, and when the data re-emerges in 1935 we know what the lower levels were. Migration to both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa then began to grow again. A colonial official estimated that there were 20 000 clandestine migrants from Tête Province alone in 1930, going not just to Southern Rhodesia but also to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
12. My estimate.
13. My estimate.
14. Mozambique, *Censo de Popuação em 1940.*
15. Numbers taken from Mozambique, Reparticão Central dos Negócios Indígenas 1950. 'Grafico A.' has been used for 1935–44. Legal mine workers in all mines were the great majority in 1935 (79 000 out of a total of 83 000), but the non-miners and clandestine workers grew until miners were only 102 000 out of 183 000 in 1949. Clandestine migrants are estimated at about one third of non-mining but legal workers. By 1944 they had increased to about 10 per cent of all workers, despite regularization programmes. Quadro A. has been used for 1945–49. Clandestines for the Transvaal thereafter were given and 20 000 more have been added for elsewhere in South Africa.
16. Ibid. 'Quadro L' for 1935–49. Miners ranged from 7–12 000, a small proportion of the total.
17. Tanganyika Labour Department Reports, 1952–64, show the number of Mozambican migrant workers growing steadily from 16 000 in 1951 to 23 000 in 1959. I estimate they grew more or less evenly from around 7000 in 1935 to 14 000 in 1949. Most Mozambicans heading to Nyasaland were emigrants, but

a small minority of labour migrants were interwoven with the thicker emigrant stream. I estimate that they increased from about 5000 to 10 000 over the period 1935–49.

18. Population estimates from 1935 to 1945 are based on ILO (1977c) five-year estimates, with individual years filled in logarithmically.
19. Estimates of population for 1947, 1949, 1954, 1957 and 1960 are smooth logarithmic estimates using ILO (1977c) data for 1945 and the World Bank's (1990) figure for 1965.
20. AHM-DSNI Caixa 48, two *processos* marked A/23/1/2, 1960 and 1961A. Migrants registered with Portuguese curator in Johannesburg only.
21. AHM-DSNI Caixa 55, no *processo* no., official tables for migration to Rhodesia used for 1954–60.
22. Tanganyika Labour Department reports 1951 – 1963: 1954 – 14 000; 1957 – 21 000; 1960 – 21 000. A smaller and falling number of genuine labour migrants – as opposed to emigrants – were in Nyasaland. I estimate them here as 8000, 5000 and 3000 respectively.
23. There were only 10 000 in Tanzania by this time, having fallen sharply from 20 000 in 1961. Actual circular migrants to Malawi must have been down to no more than 1000.
24. My estimate.
25. *Rhodesia Herald*, 9 Dec. 1965, 'PM announces new measures to protect economy'.
26. My estimate.
27. Population figures for 1965–88 are taken from the World Bank (1990).
28. *Africa Confidential*'s estimate on 20 June 1975 was 200 000 and this was a widely accepted estimate of the time.
29. My estimate, mainly of those still slipping in to work illegally on farms in the East of Rhodesia. Numbers would drop to nearly zero soon because of the war and border closure.
30. My estimate, based on the increase in WNLA-recruited Mozambicans in South Africa from 101 000 in 1975 to 118 000 in 1976. We can assume the number of non-WNLA migrants fell by about half of the increase in WNLA hiring.
31. My estimate, as the border was closed in March.
32. This is the big blow, with WNLA recruiting cut to only 49 000 compared with 118 000 the year before. Other mine migration, and other legal and illegal migration were also tightened up, falling, I estimate, from 91 000 in 1976 to only 75 000 in 1977, and reducing gradually thereafter. Very long-term residents of South Africa can no longer be considered migrants, nor refugees.
33. WNLA-recruited workers were down to only 38 000 – the low point. Regulations and policing against clandestine workers continued to be tightened up.
34. My estimate. While WNLA recruiting was back up to 49 000, the 1977 level, total legal migrants numbered only 68 300 (de Vletter, 1986).
35. In the German Democratic Republic. These are my estimates from data given to me by the Mozambican Ministry of Labour. One quarter of migrants, on four-year contracts, returned to the GDR on another contract – usually after a month or two back home. The maximum stay was 10 years, and the average intercontract rest period only two months.
36. *O Seculo* (Lisbon) (16 Aug. 1986) quoted the South African director of labour relations in the human resources department as saying there were 30 000

Mozambicans working legally in the agriculture sector and another 40 000 illegals. I believe that he exaggerated slightly.

37. While Wenela-recruited workers in Mozambique remained at 47 000, others were continuing to give up under South African pressure, either going home or staying in South Africa permanently.

Table 5 Tanzania

Year	*SA (thousands)*	*Zimb. (thousands)*	*Other (thousands)*	*Total (thousands)*	*Estd* de jure *pop. (millions)*	*Total as share of population (%)*
1900	–	–				<0.1[1]
1925	–	–	10[2]	10	4.39[3]	0.2
1931	–	–	20[4]	20	5.00[5]	0.4
1936	–	–	39[6]	39	5.31[7]	0.7
1937	–	–	30[8]	30	5.37	0.6
1938	–	–	24[9]	24	5.43	0.4
1940	0.4[10]	–	24[11]	24	5.69[12]	0.4
1945	2[13]	2[14]	30[15]	34	6.76	0.5
1951	15[16]	3[17]	40[18]	58	8.37[19]	0.7
1954	16[20]	5[21]	40[22]	61	8.91	0.7
1956	23[23]	5[24]	35[25]	63	9.31	0.7
1958	24[26]	4	30[27]	58	9.74	0.6
1960	18[28]	3	20[29]	41	10.20	0.4
1969	–	–	–	50	12.94	0.4

Notes

1. My estimate.
2. My estimate, based on better indications appearing in 1931. There were at least 5000 in Zanzibar, temporarily, at peak season, and another 5000 in Uganda and other countries.
3. Estimated logarithmically from the figures for 1922 (4.1m) and 1928 (4.7m), given in Tanganyika Territory, 1932.
4. Buell estimated 10 000 away (1928, pp. 425, 496). There were at least 3000 in Uganda. Buell was not thinking of Zanzibar. There were 65 000 people in Zanzibar who identified themselves as belonging to mainland tribes in a census in 1931. This was the same number as in 1924, however. The state-run recruiting arm must have been circulating an average of 10 000 who were still permanent residents of the mainland.
5. Tanganyika Territory, 1932, p. 10. Census year.
6. There were 24 000 in Uganda – the peak of the era (based on estimates of ferry traffic in Kuczynski; see also Egerö, 1979, p. 25). To this must be added an estimated 10 000 in Zanzibar, although this was the last year of the Tanganyika-run recruiting agency for the island and numbers of labour migrants to Zanzibar fell thereafter; and another 5000 in other places.
7. Logarithmic calculation for years 1936–38 based on 1931 census and Kuczynski's higher estimate of 5.5m for 1939 (1949, p. 399).
8. The majority were still in Uganda, but down to 17 000. My estimate is that the numbers recruited for Zanzibar were down to 8000 and that other places drew 5000.
9. Uganda down to 14 000; Zanzibar down to 5000; 'Other' rising, especially to Northern Rhodesia, where there may have been 2000.
10. Buell, 1928, pp. 425, 496.

11. My estimate, including 4000 in Northern Rhodesian mines (Ohadike's five-year averages – 1969, p. 5).
12. Logarithmic calculations for the years 1940 and 1945 based on Kuczynski's 1939 estimate of 5.5m, and census results of 7.5m in 1948.
13. The official estimates, always somewhat low in Tanganyika in these years, begin with an estimate of 2000 away in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa combined. Of course, their Northern Rhodesia figure was very low, and this is an indication that flows to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were picking up.
14. My estimate.
15. Ohadike estimates 10 000 in Zambia (1969, p. 5), to which I add an estimated 20 000 more as emigration was growing.
16. Breytenbach, 1972, p. 47.
17. Gulliver, 1955b, p. A3.
18. There were 25 000 in Northern Rhodesia (Ohadike, 1969, p. 5); 10 000 in Uganda based on ferry traffic (TNA 41574 [1951] 'Tanganyika Labour Enumeration 1951, Summary for all Districts').
19. All subsequent population estimates based on ILO (1977c) data at five-year intervals: 1950 – 8.2m; 1955 – 9.1m; 1960 – 10.2m; 1965 – 11.6m; 1970 – 13.3m; 1975 – 15.4m; 1980 – 17.9m; 1985 – 21.0m; 1990 – 24.7m.
20. Lacking an overall figure, we know that the WNLA recruitment of 8000 in 1951 remained 8000 in 1954. Colonial estimates of the total in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa also did not change between the two years. *Tanganyika Reports* estimated 13 000 for both destinations (1954, p. 36) compared with 12 000 for 1951 – somewhat low both years. The overall total for South Africa of 15 000 in 1951, estimated by Breytenbach, therefore probably rose a little to about 16 000 in 1954.
21. Still going up a little.
22. Ohadike's five-year data still indicates there were 25 000 in Northern Rhodesia. There was likely to have been a fairly constant number in Uganda as well, around 10 000. Some were in other places.
23. WNLA recruits were up to 15 000 from 8000 in 1954. *Tanganyika Reports* for the year before had indicated a sharp rise from 1954 to 1955 in labour migration to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa combined (1955, p. 54). The increase was probably mostly to South Africa.
24. Ibid.
25. Migration to both Uganda and Northern Rhodesia was now beginning to fall. Ohadike's estimates came down from 25 000 to 22 000 for Northern Rhodesia at this time.
26. Only labour migration to South Africa was still increasing, with WNLA recruits there up to 16 000.
27. Labour migration to Northern Rhodesia did not appear to be changing, while labour migration to Uganda was falling (*Tanganyika Reports*, 1959, para. 330).
28. Migration to South Africa was definitely down. WNLA recruits fell from 16 000 to 10 000 the previous year (Hurst, 1959, p. 78; Tanganyika Reports 1959, para. 330). This is confirmed by Breytenbach's estimate for a total in South Africa of 18 000.
29. Labour migration to Northern Rhodesia now falling sharply, along with Uganda as a destination.

Table 6 Lesotho

Year	*SA (thousands)*	*Total (thousands)*	*Estd* de jure *pop. (millions)*	*Total as share of population (%)*
1844	3[1]	3	0.050[2]	6.0
1875	10[3]	10	0.119[4]	8.4
1901	10[5]	10	0.297	3.4
1905	25[6]	25	0.348[7]	7.2
1911	24[8]	24	0.442[9]	5.4
1921	47[10]	47	0.546[11]	8.6
1929	40[12]	40	0.552[13]	7.2
1934	45[14]	45	0.559	8.1
1940	68[15]	68	0.616	11.0
1950	100[16]	100	0.766[17]	13.1
1961	168[18]	168	0.898[19]	18.7
1970	209[20]	209	1.064[21]	19.6
1976	200[22]	200	1.223	16.4
1981	200[23]	200	1.391	14.4
1986	166[24]	166	1.586	10.5
1990	140[25]	140	1.761[26]	8.0

Notes

1. Kimble reports how 2–3000 passes were issued in Basotho territory in a two-month period for those going to work outside (1982). This was likely to have been the peak period and the average stay was short – probably just a few months.
2. The population was estimated at 25 000 in 1834 and 75 000 in 1850 (Kimble, 1982, p. 486). The fast increase was due to large influxes and border change. Estimated logarithmically, the population in 1844 would have been 49 700.
3. Kimble, 1982, p. 128. Half, or 5000, were working in mines.
4. This estimate is derived from the population of 75 000 estimated by Kimble (1982, p. 486) for 1850, and the census findings of 130 000 in 1880. In 1875 a population of 125 000 had been projected for 1880.
5. Numbers had actually been growing steadily since 1875, but there was then a sudden sharp drop during the Boer War. The rebound after the war soared much higher than whatever the levels had been before the war began.
6. Kuczynski, 1949, p. 16. These are labour migrants temporarily absent from Basutoland. There was a total of 83 000 Basotholand-born persons *living* in South Africa.
7. Kuczynski, 1949, p. 16.
8. Ashton, 1952, p. 162; cited in Breytenbach, 1979, p. 17. Once again there were twice as many Basotho permanently resident in South Africa as migrants.
9. Logarithmic estimate based on 429 000 in 1911 (Kuczynski, 1949, p. 16), and 546 000 enumerated in the Basutoland Census of 1921.
10. Basutoland Census, 1921; cited in Buell, 1928, p. 170.

11. Ibid.
12. LNA S3/5/18/7. RC Basutoland, to Gemmill NRC, 9 Jan. 1928. The RC estimated a pool of 60 000 migrants to South Africa, with 40 000 away working at any one time and 20 000 resting at home. This was short-contract migration. The figures are closely confirmed by the *known* numbers going to South Africa in 1929 – which add up to over 62 000 (LNA S3/5/18/3, table submitted to gov. sec. by AC Maseru, 20 Feb. 1930).
13. Logarithmic estimate on the basis of 1921 census and 562 000 estimated by Lorimer for 1936 (1961, pp. 190–1).
14. The number of miners in all mines was now up to 33 000 (BNA S344/3, RC Bechuanaland, to Gemmill, Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 29 Aug. 1933, fi. 7. The trend was towards growth in the number away.
15. BNA S464/1 (1943), draft of memo to be presented on behalf of High Commission Territories, Resident Commissioner's Office, Bechuanaland Protectorate, fi. 89.
16. My estimate. Growth in the number was greater in the 1950s than in the 1940s.
17. ILO, 1977c.
18. The Rand Agency on labour section of the British Consulate in South Africa state there were 280 000 Lesotho 'belongers' in South Africa in 1961, of which 60 per cent or 168 000 would be labour migrants (SNA DPMC 524 fi. 1., report of the working party on the operation of the Rand Agencies, July 1969, p. 2). The figure is supported by the issue of 94 000 passports for labour in South Africa in 1958, certainly less than the number of migrants there (Ferreira, 1963, p. 97). By this time there were nearly 60 000 working in the mines every year.
19. A logarithmic projection between ILO data for 1960 and 1965 (ILO, 1977c).
20. Breytenbach 1972, p. 41. In comparison, the Basutoland census found 117 000 absent in South Africa. They defined labour migrants rather conservatively, tending to err on the side of defining migrants as emigrants.
21. Population estimates for 1970–86 are taken from the World Bank's estimates (1990).
22. Lesotho, 1976, *Annual Statistical Bulletin*. There were 121 000 in Chamber mines that year. There was a fair amount of discussion as to what the most likely estimate would be. Van der Wiel (1977, p. 16) concurred with 200 000 – including 10 per cent women. Huisman (1983, p. 7) provides some discussion of various estimates.
23. Estimates range from the Lesotho Third Development Plan's figure of 171 000 (cited in Chikufwa 1986, p. 44) to the 250 000 estimated in Whiteside 1985b(II), p. 59. There were 124 000 in Chamber mines, almost the same number as in 1976.
24. Lesotho, Bureau of Statistics 1990. Of these 117 000 were in Chamber mines and another 21 000 or so were legally in South Africa.
25. With 105 000 in Chamber mines in 1989 and falling numbers of both other legal and illegal migrants.
26. Logarithmic projection of World Bank figures for 1981 and 1986 (1990).

Table 7 Swaziland

Year	*SA (thousands)*	*Total (thousands)*	*Estd* de jure *pop. (millions)*	*Total as share of population (%)*
1894	1.0[1]	1.0	0.069[2]	1.5
1901[3]	–	–	–	–
1904	2.0[4]	2.0	0.085[5]	2.4
1911	5.8[6]	5.8	0.106	5.5
1921	6.0[7]	6.0	0.113	5.3
1930	6.0[8]	6.0	0.136[9]	4.4
1936	9.6[10]	9.6	0.153[11]	6.3
1940	9.0[12]	9.0	0.178[13]	5.0
1946	8.7[14]	8.7	0.224	3.9
1956	12.0[15]	12.0	0.294[16]	4.1
1957	12.0[17]	12.0	0.301	4.0
1964	18.0[18]	18.0	0.353	5.1
1966	19.0[19]	19.0	0.370	4.9
1970	20.0[20]	20.0	0.420[21]	4.8
1974	25.0[22]	25.0	0.468	5.3
1976	29.0[23]	29.0	0.497	5.8
1977	25.0[24]	24.0	0.512	4.7
1981	20.0[25]	20.0	0.583	3.4
1986	17.0[26]	17.0	0.688	2.5
1988	21.0[27]	21.0	0.737	2.8

Notes

1. My estimate. By this time there was early emigration to the Barberton gold mines and to farms in the eastern Transvaal and northern Natal. See Booth 1981, p. 6.
2. Logarithmic estimate based on 63 000 in 1890 and 85 000 in 1904 (Kuczynski, 1949, pp. 25–6).
3. There was a brief plunge in numbers during the Boer War, for which accurate data is unavailable. The numbers seem to have returned to their prewar levels almost immediately after the war ended.
4. My estimate. By this time the queen was openly encouraging mine migration.
5. Kuczynski, 1949, pp. 25–6, for 1911, 1921.
6. Kuczynski, 1949, pp. 25–6.
7. Swaziland, 1966 (II), statistical tables.
8. My estimate. Schapera (1947, p. 32) notes that there was a dramatic increase of at least 60 per cent in labour migration over the period 1930–5.
9. Logarithmic estimate based on Kuczynski's 1921 estimate of 113 000 and the census data for 1936 totalling 153 000, cited in de Vletter 1981, p. 50.
10. Swaziland, 1966 (II), statistical tables.
11. The census data from Swaziland and South Africa cited in de Vletter, 1981, p. 50.

12. BNA S464/1, draft memo to be presented on behalf of the High Commission Territories from RC's office, Bechuanaland Protectorate, fi. 89, 1943.
13. Logarithmic estimates for 1940 and 1946 based on 1936 estimate of 153 000 in de Vletter, 1981, p. 50, and the ILO's estimate of 261 000 for 1950 (1977c).
14. Swaziland 1966 (II), statistical tables.
15. Swaziland 1966 (II), statistical tables. There were about 7000 in Chamber mines by this time.
16. Population estimates for 1956, 1957, 1964 and 1966 are filled in logarithmically from five-yearly estimates in ILO, 1977c.
17. Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1958, pp. 11–12.
18. de Vletter *et al.*, 1981, p. 53. It seems that about 10 per cent were women. The major difficulty in estimation at this point is the high number of Swazi emigrants to South Africa. The Rand Agency or labour section of the British Consulate found that there were 66 000 'Swazi' in South Africa. This is the South African definition of Swazi however. Only a minority were labour migrants. See SNA DPMC 524, Report of the Working Party on the operation of the Rand Agencies, reviewed July 1969, p. 2.
19. Swaziland 1966 (II), statistical tables.
20. Breytenbach (1972, p. 41), found there were 27 900 Swazi temporarily away in South Africa. Of these 18 200 were adult males. I have assumed them to be all labour migrants. De Vletter *et al.* (1981, p. 54) found that female labour migrants numbered 9.8 per cent of the total in 1964. I have assumed this proportion to be constant. This is confirmed by the roughly 9000 in the mines that year, compared with 7000 in 1966 (Breytenbach, 1972, p. 41).
21. Estimates 1970–88 from World Bank, 1990.
22. Milazi, 1975, p. 109.
23. de Vletter 1982, p. 116. The census is quoted at estimating the *de facto* migrant figure to be 32 000, of whom 95 per cent were of working age. Women were a record high 25 per cent of the total migrants. The proportion of all migrants working appears to have risen to about 90 per cent. This was the record year for Chamber mine employment of Swazi, at some 21 000. The figure dropped to 15 000 the following year and 12 000 in 1978.
24. Assuming that 2000 of the 6000 net drop in mine jobs that year represent people who returned to Swaziland.
25. Whiteside, 1985b (II), p. 26.
26. de Vletter, 1986. The number of mine jobs was up 2000 from 1981, to about 11 000, while the number of Swazi non-miners working in South Africa was in decline.
27. My estimate, based on a 6500 increase in mine jobs from 1984–88, but a continuing decline in non-mine employment for Swazi in South Africa.

Table 8 Botswana

Year	*SA (thousands)*	*Zimb. (thousands)*	*Other (thousands)*	*Total (thousands)*	*Estd* de jure *pop. (millions)*	*Total as share of population (%)*
1880	2.1[1]	–	–	–	0.110[2]	1.9
1890	2.6	–	–	–	0.115	2.3
1897	4.1[3]	–	–	4.1	0.120[4]	3.4
1902	1.0[5]	–	–	1.0	0.120	0.8
1904	0.5[6]	–	–	0.8	0.120[7]	0.7
1905	1.7[8]	–	–	2.0	0.120	1.7
1908	1.0[9]	–	–	1.3	0.120	1.1
1910	2.3[10]	–	–	2.3	0.120	1.9
1920	5.1[11]	–	–	5.1	0.147	3.5
1923	8.0[12]	–	1.6[13]	0.6	0.161[14]	6.0
1930[15]	10.0	–	1.4	11.4	0.207	5.3
1938	21.5[16]	2.9[17]	–	24.4	0.275	8.9
1943[18]	20.7[19]	0.2	10.1[20]	31	0.328	9.4
1945	20[21]	–	–	20	0.352	5.7
1950	30[22]	–	–	30	0.421	7.1
1961	51[23]	–	–	51	0.514[24]	9.9
1964	52[25]	–	–	52	0.544	9.6
1966	55[26]	–	–	55	0.561[27]	9.8
1970	57[28]	–	–	57	0.624	9.1
1971	60[29]	–	–	60	0.647	9.3
1974	60[30]	–	–	60	0.727	8.3
1976	70[31]	–	–	70	0.784	8.9
1981	42[32]	–	–	42	0.934	4.2
1983	36[33]	–	–	36	1.002	3.6
1986	32[34]	–	–	32	1.103	2.9
1990	25[35]	–	–	25	1.194[36]	1.9

Notes

1. Figures for 1880 and 1890 for Kimberly diamond mines alone (Schapera, 1947, p. 26). There were probably not many migrants elsewhere at that point.
2. Estimates for 1880 and 1890 are mine.
3. Massey, 1981, p. 65. The RNLA had recruited 2068 men in a 14-month period covering all of 1987. Massey estimates diamond mine employment to be comparable, which is compatible with Schapera's estimate.
4. I have no data for this year. However the population was 120 000 in 1904 and remained the same in 1911, according to Schapera (1947, p. 222).
5. In the gold mines.
6. Cuzen, 1985, p. 20. There were 1723 recruits for four Chamber-member gold mines that year, on contracts averaging four months. The number of non-miners was much smaller, and they were also generally staying for short periods.
7. Schapera's 1947 *de facto* estimates with the migrants added are used for 1904, 1911 and 1921, with intervening years estimated logarithmically (p. 222).

8. Chamber-member gold-mine recruiting went up to 2351 that year and contracts averaged a much longer 8.6 months.
9. There were only about a thousand that year in the gold mines and probably only a few hundred others.
10. Schapera, 1947.
11. BNA S92/10, letter to HC, Pretoria, Sept. 1923. There were 2600 in the gold mines alone. I estimate that there were another 2500 migrants.
12. My estimate. There were thought to be 4000 in the Transvaal alone, according to a document in Mozambique's archives (AHM-DSNI Caixa 50, no *processo* no., 'Movimento de Indigenas no Transvaal 1922–23). I am sure that this was low and have estimated the total for all South Africa at double that.
13. BNA S92/10, letter to HC, Pretoria, Sept. 1923.
14. Schapera's population estimates for the period 1921 to 1943 must have been low, as they require an unrealistically high growth rate after 1943 to reach the 1950 population estimated by the ILO data (1977c), whose own estimate was low if anything. I have estimated even growth logarithmically from the 1921 figure up until the ILO's 1950 figure of 421 000. Schapera's figures were: 1921 – 120 000; 1936 – 250 000 (based on official census data of 260 000 that year); and 1943 – 280 000 (Schapera, 1947, pp. 10, 12).
15. My estimates. There were generally thought to be about 4700 in the Transvaal and and another 1400 in South-West Africa at the time. I believe the number in South Africa altogether was higher than thought – or said.
16. Schapera, 1947. An alternative estimate is Sillery's 18 000 (1974, p. 138). Mafeking's estimated 30–35 000 was undoubtedly high (BNA S464/1, Resident Commissioner, Bechuanaland, to govt. sec., 5 Dec. 1942, fi. 5; draft memo of RC's Office, 14 Apr. 1943, fi. 43, fi. 81, 89).
17. Largely women. Schapera, 1947, pp. 46–7.
18. Army recruiting not included.
19. Schapera, 1947, pp. 46–7.
20. By this year there were 10 000 away in the British army.
21. Colclough and McCarthy, 1980.
22. My estimate. There were 17 500 in Chamber of Mines member-mines alone. Non-mining labour migration to South Africa from Botswana was on the increase.
23. The Rand Agency, the labour section of the British Consulate, estimated 'Botswana belongers' at 85 000 in 1951, and calculated that about 60 per cent were labour migrants. The rest had settled or did not earn a cash income.
24. Estimates for 1961 and 1964 are based on ILO data for years 1940 and 1965 and estimated logarithmically assuming a constant growth rate (1977c).
25. Colclough and McCarthy, 1980.
26. The official estimate was a low 45 000 (Botswana, 1968, p. 2). Colclough and McCarthy suggested 65–70 000, but that appears to be an overestimate (1980, pp. 149–55). Some 23 000 were found to have left the country to seek work during the year. The drop in the total compared with 1964 is partly explained by a decline in mine jobs that year, and partly due to the buoyant mood at independence.
27. Estimates of population for years 1966–86 are taken from the World Bank, 1990.
28. Breytenbach, 1972, p. 41. Mine jobs were up to some 36 000 compared with only 24 000 the year before.
29. The 1971 census reported some 47 000 working for wages in South Africa,

including an unusually high 9000 women. Sillery (1974) estimated that the real figure was 60–65 000. The next *National Development Plan*, for 1973–8, used Sillery's figure and not the census' (Botswana, 1973 (I), p. 12).

30. Colclough and McCarthy, 1980.
31. Ibid.
32. Whiteside, 1985b, p. 39. There is plenty of general evidence of the high rate of returnees. The Botswana *Labour Force Survey 1984–85* found that of 60 659 Botswanan citizens who had at one time or another worked in South Africa, 50 330 had returned over the last five years. Only 3421 had returned in the preceding 12 months (Botswana, CSO, 1985a).
33. Ibid.
34. Botswana 1987 (I). Sect. 2.4. This was a time of off-the-cuff estimates ranging up to 50 000, but I can find no basis for a higher estimate. Certainly there were *many* more Botswana who had effectively emigrated to South Africa, but 32 000 was probably very close to the total of actual labor migrants away only to work.
35. The number of mine jobs was falling – down to about 17 000 in 1990 from 21 000 in 1986. Non-mine employment was falling as well.
36. This is a logarithmic projection based on the World Bank's figures of 1 134 600 for 1986 and 1 164 000 for 1988 (1990).

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